



**SELECTED WORKS
OF
CHEN YUN**

**Volume I
(1926-1949)**

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!



陈强

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OF
CHEN YUN**

**Volume I
(1926-1949)**

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EDITOR'S NOTE ON THE SECOND EDITION

The *Selected Works of Chen Yun (1926-49)* was published in 1984. With the approval of the author, the second edition is issued and the book is renamed the *Selected Works of Chen Yun (Volume I)*.

Ten articles are added to the book, and it contains 55 articles.

In the second edition, a few changes have been made in wording and punctuation of some texts and footnotes, and a few notes have been revised and added to the book.

Editorial Committee for Party
Literature, Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China

February 1995

EDITOR'S NOTE

This volume contains 45 important pieces written by Comrade Chen Yun from July 1926 through January 1949, most of which are published here for the first time. They deal with the establishment of revolutionary base areas, with the Communist Party's work in White areas and especially with the building of the Party and of the contingent of cadres.

As can be seen from these writings, throughout the period of China's new-democratic revolution led by the Communist Party, Comrade Chen Yun, whatever field of work he was in charge of, constantly analysed his experience and proposed sound, effective guidelines and policies in accordance with the basic principle of seeking truth from facts. This was his contribution to the triumph of the Chinese revolution and to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, which is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party.

This volume was compiled by the Research Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and checked by the Party Literature Research Institute of the Central Committee. Drafts of speeches and notes taken by others have been edited. However, writings completed by the author, whether in manuscript or previously published, are reproduced with only a minimum of changes in language. The entire Chinese text was reviewed by the author himself.

A footnote on the first page of each article identifies the text; explanatory notes will be found at the back of the book.

Editorial Committee for Party
Literature, Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China

November 1983

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THE CHINESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT: ITS PAST AND FUTURE

July 1926

The national independence movement that has emerged in China, a country with a civilization thousands of years old now reduced to the status of a sub-colony, no longer concerns China alone; every development in the movement will have an impact on the general world situation. But how shall we bring this internationally significant movement through the long struggle ahead to a successful conclusion? This is a question worth examining. Of course, people from different quarters may look at the question differently. I hope that all my good colleagues at the Commercial Press¹ will discuss it, renouncing the traditional Chinese reluctance to talk about politics.

There have been major national movements before in China's history, such as the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom² and the Yi He Tuan³ movements. Although they failed for lack of scientific organization and leadership, they all earned a place in the annals of China's national movement.

The May 4th Movement of 1919⁴ dealt a staggering blow to imperialism and swelled the tide of the Chinese national movement, in which it holds an important place. Students, workers and tradesmen throughout the country participated. Their slogan was: "Resist foreign powers and eliminate domestic traitors." One lesson of the May 4th Movement is that our revolution cannot succeed unless the masses of the lower strata—the workers and peasants—are organized into powerful contingents.

The world-shaking May 30th Movement of 1925⁵ brought the national movement to a climax and shook the foundations of imperialist rule in China. People from all classes and all parts of the country took part in it.

This article first appeared under the pen name Huai Min in issue No. 10 of the *Worker*, a journal founded after the victory in the great strike of the Commercial Press in August 1925 and published by the trade union of the distribution department of the Commercial Press in Shanghai. Comrade Chen Yun, then a clerk in that department, was one of the leaders of the strike and chairman of the first executive committee of the trade union of the distribution department.

In particular, several hundred thousand workers courageously took the lead and have fought on unswervingly. A number of them are still struggling directly with the imperialists, as in the Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike.⁶ Through a variety of tactics the imperialists induced the bourgeoisie to compromise and the petty bourgeoisie to stall, and thus undermined the movement's united front in its incipient stage. But the people from the lower strata—the workers, the general run of small tradesmen and a number of students—have remained unyielding throughout. Today they are still determined to emulate the May 30th Movement's spirit of resistance. A case in point was the recent joint strike in Shanghai at six cotton mills owned by the Japanese Naigai Cotton Mill.⁷ Though the May 30th Movement suffered defeat, it ushered in a new day in the progress of the national revolution.⁸ Organized workers, several hundred thousand strong, have become the vanguard of the Chinese national movement. The May 30th Movement proved that the bourgeoisie is opportunistic and unreliable. And the workers have realized how weak they are in the absence of the peasantry, the powerful main force that is destined to play such an important part in the national movement.

China is an agricultural country, with peasants making up more than 80 percent of its population. They alone can provide the main force for the national movement. Without their participation the Chinese revolution has little hope of success. Today, although peasant associations have been set up in a few places, there are no signs of rapid progress.⁹ However, the peasants are not cowards; they have a rich revolutionary tradition. The history of the Chinese peasant movement demonstrates that when driven to the wall by the rulers, the peasants will rise in revolt. Witness the cases of Chen Sheng, who stopped ploughing and called on the peasants to revolt, of the Red Eyebrows, the Yellow Turbans, Huang Chao, Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong,¹⁰ and the more recent Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and Yi He Tuan movements, down to the present Red-Tasselled Spear Society.¹¹ It is true that these uprisings were somewhat primitive in nature, but it is an irrefutable fact that the Chinese peasant movement has persisted for 2,000 years. Members of the Red-Tasselled Spear Society are now found throughout the provinces of Shandong and Henan and in parts of Zhili,¹² Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. A new uprising is brewing.

From this brief review of the Chinese national movement, we can readily identify the causes of past defeats. The peasantry is the main force in the national movement, and the major problem that calls for immediate solution is how to organize these thousands upon thousands of peasants and to train and guide them so that they can join the workers, students, small tradesmen

and other revolutionary elements in the national movement under the anti-imperialist banner. The May 4th and May 30th movements are over, but imperialist rule in China has yet to be toppled. People throughout the country should be ready at all times for any similar movements that may arise in future. How can we make up for past defeats and what should our strategy be for the future? These are questions of vital importance that every Chinese, and particularly the enlightened youth, must confront. "Join with the people" should be the key slogan of the Chinese national movement.

THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN JIANGSU AND OUR FUTURE STRUGGLE

November 24, 1929

The peasant movement in Jiangsu is on the rise. There are objective reasons for this, the fundamental one being increased exploitation and oppression of the peasantry by the landlord class.

In rural Jiangsu more and more land is being concentrated in the hands of landlords. Not only do the landlords enforce inflexible rents;¹³ it is increasingly common for them to demand advance rent payments or deposits and to use falsely weighted scales and outsize measures when collecting rent in kind. There are more than 60 kinds of exorbitant taxes and levies. Exploitation by usury and merchant capital is relentless too. All this has driven large numbers of peasants into poverty and bankruptcy. In the face of peasant resistance, landlords have rapidly expanded their armed forces. The situation is aggravated by the natural calamities that have struck vast tracts of land this year and reduced the harvest to 30 to 50 percent of the normal yield. This, along with the fighting among warlords, has inflicted untold hardships on ordinary people in the Xuzhou-Haizhou area.¹⁴ Resistance to the collection of rents, taxes and debts is therefore sweeping the countryside. Some of these struggles are led by or associated with our Party. Many started spontaneously. In short, the struggle is expanding. If such day-to-day resistance continues, it will gradually disrupt feudal agrarian relations and undermine the rule of the Kuomintang warlords. In some places where the Party has greater influence, the situation is tending towards armed conflict. In Nantong, Rugao and Taixing, for example, the struggle has already assumed the dimensions of guerrilla warfare, and in some cases it has

Excerpt from a report to the Seventh Session of the Second Jiangsu Provincial Party Congress. After the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, Comrade Chen Yun was engaged in the peasant movement in Jiangsu, working successively as member of the Qingpu County Party Committee, head of the organization department of the Songpu Special Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, member of the Standing Committee of Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and secretary of its Peasant Movement Commission.

even led to the establishment of Red villages. These developments show that although there are still many shortcomings in the peasant movement in Jiangsu, the struggle is precisely what the masses of impoverished peasants need to secure their vital interests.

Today there are many problems in the struggle in the countryside, and our leadership is not all it should be. Party organizations have not given the peasant movement firm guidance, and they have not done enough to awaken people to the need for the Agrarian Revolution.¹⁵ Peasant organizations of a mass character have not been widely established, and those that exist have not been consolidated. They have not converged to form a network of peasant associations. Ruthless repression by Kuomintang warlords and murders by evil gentry and landlords have terrorized the peasants, especially in areas where their struggle has failed. And the reformist illusions spread by the Kuomintang still have considerable influence on them. As for our Party, though traces of putschism can still be found within our ranks, there is a deep-seated preference for peaceful progress. Some Party organizations are afraid to lead the peasants in their struggle and some Party members don't even dare to set foot in rural areas. In a few local Party organizations the leading organs have been infiltrated by rich peasants, so they are hardly able to initiate a struggle. If one is ever started, it often ends in compromise or is betrayed by turncoats. In short, resistance is developing very unevenly in different places and is subject to sudden ebbs and flows. Only by firmly tackling these problems will the Party be able to lead the peasants to victory in the Agrarian Revolution.

As for the Party's tasks and tactics in guiding the struggle in rural areas, the following points merit our attention.

1. For the current peasant movement, Party policy is still to recruit and organize the masses in preparation for armed uprisings. The central idea is that the Party must lead the peasants in carrying out a fundamental agrarian revolution and in waging guerrilla war. It should be noted that conditions for guerrilla warfare can't be created subjectively. But the fierce struggle between the peasantry and the landlord class is bound to lead to armed conflicts. The guerrillas are farm labourers and poor peasants, who are the most enlightened and courageous of the peasant masses. Given these two conditions, we should step up our effort to arm the peasants. Jiangsu offers good prospects for guerrilla warfare. Though the outcome of a guerrilla war depends on many objective as well as subjective factors, and though the struggle will be very hard and complicated, especially in Jiangsu where control by Kuomintang warlords is well entrenched, it is possible for small guerrilla units to survive by arming themselves with weapons seized from the

landlords. Moreover, even if guerrilla action does suffer a temporary setback, its impact will spread, the guerrillas will continue to grow in strength and the struggle in rural areas will expand.

2. We should collect all the facts about the devastating effects of the repression and exploitation of the masses by evil gentry, landlords and Kuomintang warlords and, in the light of the peasants' pressing demands, systematically define the objectives and tactics of resistance in the countryside. In that way we can mobilize the peasants against the collection of rents, taxes and debts, road-building corvees and the fighting between warlords. Tactically, we should co-ordinate various forms of day-to-day resistance so they support each other and merge into a general struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

3. The Party should develop an independent policy with regard to the peasant movement and not cherish any illusions about the Big Sword Society.¹⁶ Objectively, as a mass organization consisting mainly of impoverished peasants and unemployed farm labourers, the Big Sword Society wants revolution and is making it. But without vigorous Party leadership, it is likely to become a tool of the ruling class. We should therefore adopt the tactic of infiltrating the Big Sword Society and try to win over large numbers of its members.

4. So far as bandits are concerned, they are of two types, one consisting of impoverished peasants and unemployed farm labourers and the other of defeated enemy soldiers. While the former are promising, the latter are unlikely to be receptive to the revolution because they are used to living as soldiers and bandits. Therefore, in trying to recruit bandits we should focus on the peasants among them and try to win them to the revolutionary side by explaining the Party's policy of Agrarian Revolution. In incorporating bandits into a guerrilla force we should see to it that they are not all assigned to the same unit.

5. Efforts should be made to organize more people through the systematic establishment of peasant associations at all levels. To avoid creating divisions among peasants, these should not be called tenants' or poor peasants' associations. Nor do they all have to be called peasant associations; other designations may be used too. Rich peasants should be barred from peasant associations, and those who are already in the Party should be expelled. We should join the organizations and struggles led by rich peasants and gain control of them. As a means of winning over the masses, this tactic applies especially to the "yellow" peasant associations.¹⁷ We should do more work among women and young people in rural areas and mobilize them to join in the struggle by raising demands that reflect their needs. Propaganda

in rural areas should be presented in forms acceptable to the peasants, such as wall newspapers, pictures and songs.

6. The leading Party members' groups¹⁸ have a very important role to play in peasant associations. It is they who must explain the Party's line and tactics for the peasant movement and see to it that they are implemented. Local Party headquarters should do a better job of guiding these groups, so as to consolidate the political leadership of the proletariat over the peasants.

THE WORKERS' ECONOMIC STRUGGLE IN SOVIET AREAS¹⁹

April 25, 1933

Over the past year the Party and trade unions have raised the political awareness of the workers by improving their welfare and leading them in economic struggle. Ten thousand workers have heroically joined the Red Army. Large numbers of workers have returned the second issue of public bonds to the government²⁰ and many of them have participated, sometimes in leadership positions, in the campaign to check up on the distribution of land in rural areas.²¹ These facts show that increased political awareness on the part of workers is an important condition for consolidating and expanding Soviet political power.

However, within Party and trade union organizations in Soviet areas there is still a serious and widespread tendency to ignore the workers' economic struggle and the economic demands of those workers who have obtained land.²² Instead of leading the workers in the struggle to improve their welfare, some people criticize them for not being revolutionary or for lagging behind the peasants. In some places they even ask the workers to put up with all kinds of capitalist oppression for the duration of the war without resisting. They take this attitude because they do not understand that only when the workers' economic status is improved will it be possible to increase their political awareness and enthusiasm for the revolution. Since the land redistribution, agricultural workers²³ have been seriously hampered by the lack of oxen, farm implements and manure, yet in many cases we have not helped them to overcome these difficulties through mutual aid, co-operation or government assistance. Many of the rural workers have to get by without any wage increase.²⁴ Others have not been recommended by an employment

In January 1933, Comrade Chen Yun arrived at the Central Revolutionary Base Area from Shanghai. He was then member of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Leading Party Members' Group of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This article, which first appeared in issue No. 9 of the journal *Struggle*, an organ of the Soviet Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, has been abridged for publication in the present volume.

agency²⁵ and have consequently been deprived of their jobs by rich peasants and remaining landlords. Economic blockades by the enemy and slowdowns by the capitalists have made life very difficult for tens of thousands of unemployed workers. Many women and children doing the same jobs as men and adults are not paid the same, and we have failed to lead them in the fight for equal pay and other special demands they have. We have not paid enough attention to finding jobs for unemployed apprentices or helping apprentices improve their skills. In addition, there are many trade union organizations that are in possession of large sums of money for social insurance but have spent it randomly, instead of for the relief of workers. In short, our neglect of these most urgent problems now confronting the workers in Soviet areas is dampening their enthusiasm for the revolution. This represents a dangerous Right deviation in the labour movement at present.

There is another extremely dangerous deviation in our leadership of the workers' economic struggles, the "Left" deviation. It manifests itself in a one-sided emphasis on the particular interest of a single trade, at the expense of the people's fundamental interest in the economic development of Soviet areas and the consolidation of Soviet political power. For example, excessive economic demands were made, and the Labour Law,²⁶ which was meant to apply only to large cities, was mechanically implemented in stores and workshops in many small cities, which strained the ability of enterprises to comply and soon forced them to shut down. The regulation requiring an eight-hour day for adult workers and a six-hour day for adolescents was mechanically applied to enterprises regardless of their operating conditions. Enterprises were compelled to give jobs to unemployed workers, whether or not they could afford to do so. General strikes were called in many cities during year-end struggles, which hampered economic activities in Soviet areas. Instead of increasing the political awareness of the working class and their enthusiasm for struggle, this "Left" error only serves to cultivate among certain workers an unwholesome romanticism. Moreover, by forcing many enterprises and workshops out of operation, it gives the capitalists an opportunity to jack up prices, deceive workers and alienate them from the leadership of the Party and the trade unions. This "Left" deviationist type of leadership is therefore detrimental to the economic development of Soviet areas, to the worker-peasant alliance, to Soviet political power and to the complete emancipation of the working class.

This error originates mainly in political syndicalism,²⁷ but it is also the result of bureaucratism on our part in leading the workers' economic struggle: instead of going deep among the masses and sizing up the actual conditions

in different stores and workshops, our comrades have presented general demands and programmes unsuited to specific enterprises. Consequently, though collective contracts have been signed in various trades,²⁸ they fail to meet the pressing demands of workers in any given trade.

It is essential for the Party and trade unions to explain in great detail to the masses of workers that the working class, while striving for higher living standards, must regard economic development in Soviet areas and consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance and of Soviet political power as fundamental to its emancipation. It should be made clear to the workers that the working class cannot emancipate itself without overthrowing the rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The struggle for immediate interests must therefore be integrated as closely as possible with the struggle for complete victory in the revolution.

In economic struggles, Party and trade union organizations must overcome bureaucratism. They should review the specific provisions of the collective contracts for various trades and carefully investigate the economic capabilities of each store and workshop to ensure that the economic demands presented to each enterprise are appropriate to its actual conditions. They should not copy the Labour Law indiscriminately in disregard of the actual conditions and the specific demands of the workers in different enterprises. They should not be satisfied with having gone through the formality of convening a few mass meetings or with having obtained the consent of the masses by a show of hands. The collective contracts to be signed should not be imposed by trade union organizations from above; they should come from below, thus reflecting the most urgent demands of the workers. Only in this way can the contracts win the warm support of the masses and their willingness to fight to secure the demands embodied in them.

Party and trade union organizations should conduct careful investigations to determine whether a capitalist has engaged in sabotage and deal with each case on its own merits. They should lead the workers in a resolute struggle against those capitalists who have deliberately ceased operations in order to undermine the Soviet economy, and they should encourage the workers to exercise supervision over production and management in their stores and workshops. As for capitalists who are shutting down their stores or workshops because there is a genuine shortage of wares or because business is slow, the trade union should take the lead in urging them to continue operations and, at the same time, in voluntarily reducing wages enough to keep the enterprises going. In certain enterprises where the eight-hour day is impracticable, the union should seek the workers' agreement to work longer hours for overtime pay. Only when the Party and trade union organizations

understand actual conditions and give practical guidance to the workers in various trades will they be able to increase the workers' enthusiasm for struggle, gain their confidence and rally them to our side.

As for methods of struggle, we should abandon the bad practice of ordering people about instead of arousing them to action. In the past we made the mistake of acting independently of the masses and relying entirely on government power to arrest capitalists or parade them through the streets in dunce caps. This mistake was corrected, but at the end of last year general strikes were widely called. Again those strikes were staged on order of higher authorities and without careful discussion by the masses. In many cases we used wrong methods because we didn't understand that in every day-to-day struggle we must rely on the strength of the workers themselves and on their enthusiasm for that struggle. Under Soviet political power, general strikes as a method of economic struggle not only impede the flow of goods and the operations of the Red Army, but may also be used by the capitalists as a pretext to oppose the struggle and the Soviet government by stopping operations entirely. In these circumstances, therefore, staging a general strike is not only a wrong method of struggle but a grave political mistake.

Our tactics must serve to divide the capitalists. The workers in each store or workshop should therefore adapt their tactics to the particular economic conditions of the capitalists concerned. At the same time, the union should organize workers of one or more trades to express their sympathy and support for the struggle by holding meetings, paying visits to strikers, staging demonstrations or setting up picket lines. That will reinforce the sense of class solidarity and build the united strength of the working class.

In the labour movement, both the Right deviation that ignores the workers' economic struggles and the improvement of their living standards and the "Left" deviation that hinders economic development in Soviet areas are incompatible with the Party's correct line regarding the Soviet movement. Party organizations must be keenly aware that both "Left" and Right opportunism in the workers' economic struggles seriously jeopardize the consolidation and development of Soviet political power. Our central tasks at present are: to overcome these two deviations, to give correct guidance to the workers' economic struggles, to educate the workers and enhance their class consciousness in the course of each struggle and to mobilize them to take part in the building of Soviet political power and in the revolutionary war. In this way we shall cement the alliance of workers and peasants, consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in that alliance and strengthen and expand Soviet political power.

HOW TO NEGOTIATE LABOUR CONTRACTS²⁹

July 2, 1933

Although the trade unions in the Central Soviet Area³⁰ have represented the workers in many contract negotiations with their employers, the provisions in most of the contracts were copied verbatim from the Labour Law²⁶ or from the action programmes issued by the Jiangxi and Fujian provincial trade union councils. Consequently, the contracts are all the same, irrespective of the particular conditions of different places and enterprises at a given time. The reason the contracts are so lifeless and unrelated to actual conditions is that the trade union leadership didn't understand that each provision must represent an urgent demand of the workers. They therefore made no attempt to involve the workers in intensive discussions and paid no attention to their opinions when negotiating the contracts. Usually the trade union leaders would bring their own draft contract to a mass meeting for discussion, and the discussion, if ever held, was often no more than a show of hands by those in favour, after which the contract was considered adopted. Though we do not as yet have complete information on how labour contracts have been observed in practice, we find in Tingzhou³¹ that quite a number of them have remained on paper. This is owing partly to the capitalists' reluctance to abide by them and partly to the provisions themselves, which even the workers find impracticable. For example, an eight-hour day and a six-day week are mechanically stipulated for both shop assistants and boatmen. Provisions like that won't arouse the workers to fight for the implementation of every clause in their contracts. That is the trouble with most of the contracts that have been signed.

Last month I went to Tingzhou and did the following with regard to contract negotiations:

1. First of all, I tried to find out where each enterprise actually stood, whether the contract already negotiated was being observed and what the

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demands of the workers were.

Before negotiating a contract for the grocery trade in Tingzhou,³² I first called on two Party members and inquired in great detail about the situation of the business and the amount of profit it produced. I also asked them whether all the provisions in the contract negotiated for the first half of the year had been carried out, how the workers felt about the May 1st Congress³³ and what their opinions and demands were in relation to the contract to be negotiated now. I learned that because of the tightened economic blockade imposed by the Kuomintang against Soviet areas¹⁹ in the wake of the battle of Shuixidu between the Red and White armies,³⁴ many goods could no longer be shipped from Shanghang, and shops in Tingzhou had to buy from Ninghua and other distant places or from pedlars from Shanghang. With increased costs and reduced business turnover, some capitalists refused to replenish their stocks, using the blockade as a pretext. Many workers believed that the enterprises were unable to meet their demands regarding wages and other benefits and that under these circumstances, the owners would lose money even if the workers worked for nothing, receiving neither wages nor meals. I also learned that April to June is a slack season in the grocery trade and that the extraordinary situation created by the total cut-off of supplies from Shanghang had added to the difficulties of operation. This investigation gave me an overview of the position of the enterprises and the sentiments of the workers.

2. I relied on the Party branch as the centre to mobilize the masses, strengthening its leadership over the workers in labour contract negotiations and consolidating its organization through mass work.

At a meeting of the Party branch of the grocery trade, I explained at length the resolution of the May 1st Congress on correcting the “Left” deviation, and some major articles in the draft of the revised Labour Law.³⁵ I questioned all Party members closely to determine how well they had understood the resolution and the revised law and sincerely asked them to voice all their doubts, however slight, for discussion. After two and a half hours of discussion, all the comrades at the meeting declared that they no longer had any doubts.

At the next branch meeting, Party members reported on the situation in various stores regarding the implementation of each article of the contract negotiated for the first half of the year. Their reports revealed the following facts: (1) Many store owners were behind in the payment of wages, more than 400 silver dollars in arrears in the worst cases. Some gave government bond certificates to workers as partial payments. There were, of course, a number of workers who had been paid in full in cash. (2) The eight-hour

day provision was not enforced at all. The actual working time in a store was less than three hours a day, and the busy hours varied between individual stores and between groups of stores serving peasants and those serving city dwellers. For instance, stores close to villages on the outskirts of the city were relatively busy between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., a period when peasants flocked to markets in Tingzhou, while some stores in the city patronized mainly by local residents were busy before 8 a.m. and after 4 p.m. It was therefore inappropriate to arbitrarily stipulate an eight-hour day or fix the work period between certain hours. (3) No one had Sundays off, and no one was paid overtime for working on Sundays. That was because the workers felt that since they worked less than three hours a day, it didn't make much difference whether they were given a day off on Sunday. If overtime pay was demanded for working on Sundays, the owners might prefer minding the stores themselves to paying double wages. (4) In accordance with tradition, shop assistants³⁶ were granted two months' annual home leave. Those who waived the home leave would automatically get two months' extra pay. (5) There were about a dozen other articles in the contract, most of them copied from the old Labour Law.

Having considered these facts, members of the Party branch offered specific suggestions about wages, hours, Sundays and other holidays, social insurance, etc. They unanimously agreed to replace the present contract with a new one, which would be a provisional one applying only for the period during which the supply of goods from Shanghang was completely cut off. It was pointed out, however, that the workers must strictly supervise the store owners so that the latter would not refuse to replenish their stocks without good reason. The Party branch summarized the comrades' suggestions in six or seven main articles and, when these were agreed upon, assigned members to explain them to the workers in each store and seek their comments.

At the third meeting of the Party branch, the comrades reported one by one the results of their sessions with the shop assistants. The workers demanded double pay for work on Sundays plus a monthly allowance of six silver dollars for board. Thus, on the basis of the opinions of the Party branch and considering the workers' demands, we drew up the provisions for the new contract. Comrades were assigned to different stores to call the workers together and solicit their opinions about the draft. Then, at a full membership meeting convened by the grocery trade union local, the contract provisions were discussed and adopted, and a five-member committee was elected to represent the workers in contract negotiations with each store owner.

3. I saw to it that the negotiated contract was realistic and flexible and

in keeping with the actual conditions in the grocery trade in Tingzhou.

The following is a contract that may serve as an example:

Article 1. This provisional labour contract signed by the two sides shall remain effective indefinitely from July 1, 1933, but only as long as goods from adjacent White areas³⁷ are unavailable to the groceries in Tingzhou. The trade union has the right at any time to demand a partial or complete revision of the contract corresponding to a change in the situation. The employer shall not use the economic blockade as a pretext to stop laying in goods.

Article 2. The wage scale shall remain the same as in the second half of 1931. The worker Wang Qifu shall be paid 20 silver dollars a month (including six dollars for board), in addition to a monthly allowance of 90 cents for haircuts, laundry and sundry expenses. His wage shall be paid in two instalments, on the first and the fifteenth of each month.

While this contract is in effect, the shareholders drawing wages for certain duties in the store and the managerial personnel (no additions to the present number being permitted) shall be paid the same amount as in the year preceding the establishment of the Soviet government. The wages of those who were paid 10 dollars or less shall remain the same. But those who were paid more than 10 dollars shall now draw a maximum of 10 dollars. The children of shareholders and managerial personnel who are apprentices in the store shall not be paid if they do not work; those who do shall be paid half the wages they drew in June 1932.

Article 3. The standard workday shall be eight hours, but workers may arrange their schedules according to business requirements (working during busy hours and taking time off during slack hours), so long as they average neither more nor less than eight hours a day.

Article 4. The workers shall work six days a week. In order to keep the store open on Sundays, they may take different days off by rotation. If a meeting of the trade union membership decides that they are to work on Sunday and donate the day's pay to support certain political movements, the workers shall get full overtime pay for that day.

Article 5. The annual legal holidays shall be observed as stipulated in the Labour Law with no deductions from wages. The out-of-town workers shall have in addition two months' home leave each year with full pay; those who waive home leave shall be paid an extra month's wages. The regular holidays and home leaves may be scheduled for slack periods in the store; this does not apply to workers who have urgent matters to attend to.

Article 6. When a worker falls ill, for a period of three months the employer shall be responsible for his medical expenses and give him full pay (venereal diseases and prescriptions of tonics excepted).

Article 7. In addition to paying full wages to the workers, the employer shall pay the Social Security Bureau a monthly sum for unemployment insurance. This sum shall be equivalent to 6 percent of the payroll of all workers (whether or not they are members of the trade union, but excluding the proprietor and the supervisors). The trade union may at any time examine the SSB receipts. In addition, every month the employer shall pay the trade union a sum equivalent to 2 percent of the payroll for administrative expenses and a sum equivalent to 1 percent of the payroll for cultural and educational activities.

Article 8. The employer recognizes the production supervision committee organized by the workers, which has the right to examine the account books and sales receipts at any time.

Article 9. During the period when the contract is in effect, all disputes between labour and capital shall be dealt with in accordance with the existing Labour Law and decrees, or in accordance with the revised Labour Law once it is promulgated by the Central Government.³⁸

Instead of simply repeating the provisions in the Labour Law designed to protect workers, the articles of this contract embody the needs of employees in the grocery trade. So I think it is realistic.

Why did we advocate signing provisional, open-ended contracts? Because they correspond to the present conditions in the grocery trade in Tingzhou. The supply of goods from Shanghang having been cut off, business is very slow right now. That situation will not last indefinitely, but we don't know when it will end. So it is entirely appropriate to sign provisional labour contracts with no fixed term. When business picks up and is thriving again, the trade union can represent the workers in demanding a partial or complete revision of the contracts as it sees fit. The workers will understand the need for provisional contracts. If the capitalists refuse to get supplies from Shanghang when they in fact can, the workers' production supervision committee, which constantly keeps an eye on them, can organize the masses to protest.

The provisions in Article 2 of the sample labour contract would reduce the monthly wages for both adult workers and apprentices by 10 dollars each, as compared with the contract signed in February 1932, which increased their wages by that amount. Might not this across-the-board reduction put adolescent workers and apprentices too much at a disadvantage? I carefully raised that question at the Party and trade union branch meetings for joint discussion by workers and apprentices of all ages. They unanimously considered the reduction to be in order. In fact, the wages for most of the young workers are close to those for the older workers. The overwhelming majority

of the 51 shop assistants are paid from 25 to 32 dollars a month; only a couple of apprentices, a tiny minority, earn from 20 to 25 dollars a month.

The two articles on the eight-hour day and the six-day week are flexible. We should encourage the workers to insist on these limitations, because they are basic demands of the working class on which there should be no compromise. But the scheduling of the eight hours and the weekly holiday should not be rigid and mechanical. This contract takes into consideration the special conditions in the grocery business.

With regard to holidays, it is stipulated that “the out-of-town workers shall have in addition two months’ home leave each year with full pay; those who waive home leave shall be paid an extra month’s wages.” In discussions of contract provisions, this has always been a controversial issue between local workers and workers from out of town. The latter firmly demand that the provision be included, while the former are opposed to it or demand equal treatment. Through careful discussions, the local workers were persuaded to take a more sympathetic attitude towards the demand of the out-of-town workers and not to allow the capitalists to sow discord between them.

Finally, it was decided that when the negotiating committee, together with the trade union, was negotiating contracts with the owners on behalf of the workers, it could modify some of the provisions that had been endorsed at the meeting of trade union members, in the light of the particular conditions in each store and after discussion with the workers concerned.

AN INSPECTOR'S METHODS OF LEADERSHIP

July 5, 1933

In the Agricultural Workers' Union³⁹ there is a hardworking inspector who has the virtue of keeping in close touch with the trade union branches. He is an excellent comrade, but his methods of leadership are clumsy. He doesn't know how to give energetic, practical guidance. Now that the question has been discussed at a meeting of the Executive Bureau of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions,⁴⁰ however, I think he will be effective the next time he goes on a tour of inspection.

During a recent tour of a county, this comrade called a meeting of the directors⁴¹ of the AWU branches in a certain district. There are eight branches in the district, but only five of the directors showed up. The meeting began with a report by the "senior participant" (*i.e.*, the inspector), in which he enumerated seven tasks for the branches and asked the directors to state their views. The seven tasks he listed were: (1) to intensify the campaign to check up on the distribution of land;²¹ (2) to expand the Workers' Division of the army;⁴² (3) to mobilize the people to return public bonds²⁰ and grain coupons;⁴³ (4) to set up co-operatives for producing farm implements; (5) to organize ploughing-oxen stations;⁴⁴ (6) to expand the Agricultural Workers' Union and improve the work of its branches; and (7) to unify the management of trade union funds. Not many people spoke up during the discussion that followed this report. Later in the meeting the workers said, "We can't get grain and now we are starving." And also, "According to the regulations issued by the Central Government,³⁸ workers are exempt from the land tax, but our district government here still wants us to pay it. We hope higher authorities will do something about that." Our inspector didn't ask the meeting to take up these two questions raised by the workers. As a result, his report was discussed only in abstract terms. Finally, he asked the branches to provide recruits for the Red Army, and the meeting

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ended with each branch director committing himself to supply one or two.

Later, at a joint membership meeting of the branches of the grocers' and butchers' unions in the city, the inspector again made a report. This time he talked about: (1) avoiding errors that had been made in past economic struggles—either “Left” or Right; (2) stopping the practice of compelling employers to hire unemployed workers²⁵ assigned to them; and (3) ceasing to pay regular wages to workers who took on trade union or government work. After his report the urban workers, unlike their comrades in rural areas, unceremoniously opened fire on him. They said, “Unless they are forced, employers won't hire workers and we'll be without jobs. If regular wages are abolished, our families will starve.” They opposed the report outright and the meeting ended without having accomplished anything.

This type of leadership is not peculiar to the comrade in question, I think, but is characteristic of many others. Nevertheless, it is undesirable. It dampens the workers' enthusiasm and creates dissatisfaction with the trade union leadership, so that instead of promoting the work of the branches it makes it harder to consolidate them. What is wrong with this type of leadership?

1. *Lack of preparation before a meeting.*

The inspector enumerated seven tasks in his report to the joint meeting of branch directors of the district, but his audience didn't think any of them was as important as the fact that they were starving and had to pay the land tax after the harvest. So they were not at all interested in the report. This shows that before going to the meeting, the inspector should have talked with members of the district trade union's regular staff or with some of the branch directors to find out what the workers' concerns were. Then he should have thought those concerns over and consulted with the local comrades about ways to ease them. Thus prepared, he should have gone to the meeting and discussed the workers' concerns either at the very beginning or in the course of his report. If he had done that, the workers would have been very pleased and ready to discuss both their concerns and his report. A meeting like that would have helped the branches improve their work among the peasants.

Similarly, before the meeting of the branches of the grocers' and butchers' unions in the city, the inspector failed to familiarize himself with the workers' sentiments and demands and to find ways of helping them overcome their difficulties. Surprisingly, even the inspector himself did not know the real nature of the errors that had been made in struggle and how the “Left” deviation could be overcome. So he was astonished when the workers rejected his report and could only issue peremptory orders. Experience shows that this kind of leadership does not help our work.

2. *Listing too many tasks at a branch meeting.*

This is one of the situations we should try hardest to avoid. If we treat the comrades at a branch meeting just as we do the cadres of a higher organization and present seven or eight tasks at once with no sense of priorities, they won't know what to do or where to begin, and it will only be a headache to them. They will in effect reject the tasks by saying, "We can't do it." Or they may say, "You are outsiders and don't understand our real conditions and problems. All you can do is spout official jargon." When they are hard pressed by the senior participant, they feel uncomfortable about saying, "We don't want to do it," and say instead, "We'll try." Will the workers actually try to perform the tasks after saying this at the meeting? I doubt it. Instead of openly rejecting the tasks, they say they will try, as a gesture to save face for the higher authorities. Does this mean that the workers are reluctant to fulfil their duties and that they should therefore be accused of "Right opportunism"? The fault doesn't lie with the workers at all; it lies with poor leadership. If you ask the workers to undertake seven tasks, and after the meeting they do nothing, not only is it useless to blame them but it undermines the credibility of our leadership. The next time you invite them to a meeting, they will be reluctant to come and will decline with all sorts of excuses.

3. *Failure to start with the task the workers feel is most urgent.*

Before calling a meeting we should get to know the workers' current demands, and we should bring up at the meeting the problems they urgently need solved. If the workers are not interested in the report that has been delivered and raise two questions of their own, for example, lack of food and imposition of land tax, the senior comrade should adjust his sails to the wind and urge the participants to address those two questions first. The workers will have much to say during the discussion, since the food shortage is an immediate problem, and with autumn harvest fast approaching the question of land tax is crying out for settlement. Then we might suggest that, as a form of mutual aid, peasants with a surplus should lend grain to those who need it now and be repaid after the autumn crops are harvested. Or we might propose that the masses join the Soviet government¹⁹ in asking rich peasants to donate grain for the relief of needy workers and peasants. Doing this puts us in a better position to ask the workers to consider the tasks presented by the higher authorities. We should also explain to them that in the last analysis, the emancipation of workers and peasants will only be possible once Soviet political power is consolidated and developed. If the inspector had guided the joint meeting of branch directors in this way, I believe many of the tasks could have been accomplished.

It is essential to raise the issues the masses urgently want settled. It's like trying to enter a locked house: you have to find the key to open the door. Here the key lies in what the workers are ready to do, not in what we tell them to do, according to our own preconceptions. Only when we start with what the workers consider necessary and are willing to do will we be able to rouse them to action. So long as they pitch in and we give them energetic, timely guidance, many tasks can be carried out over a period of time. So in order to promote the work of the branches and our work in general we must be good at finding the key to the enthusiasm of the masses. The art of leadership lies in understanding what's on people's minds; even the order of items on the agenda of a meeting can make a world of difference.

4. *Failure to give the participants specific guidance and to be aware of their feelings.*

At a meeting discussing the expansion of the Red Army, it would be meaningless simply to commit branches to providing a certain number of recruits. Even it were going to be hard for them to do so, they would agree to the demand, if only to show respect for the "feelings" of the higher authorities. Under such circumstances, the comrade presiding over the meeting should explain to them how to go about the work. He should advise them to talk first to those workers and peasants who are usually enthusiastic about the Party's work or who are willing to join the Red Army. He should tell them how to approach these people and how to encourage those who are ready to join up to volunteer at mass meetings, so as to influence as many other people as possible. That is a focused, painstaking way of exercising leadership, instead of a general, slipshod one. And it is a way that helps the branches accomplish their tasks.

At the same time, we should tell the comrades in the branches not to be discouraged if they encounter difficulties in following our advice. When things are proceeding smoothly, we should urge them to be mindful of possible difficulties and prepare to overcome them. Also, we must be aware of their feelings at each stage of the work and, again, must give them concrete advice to keep them from becoming disheartened or careless. Only in that way can we unite these comrades under our leadership, gain their trust and advance our work. Thus we will train large numbers of new cadres who will work with great care and determination.

In conclusion I want to emphasize that the above-mentioned inspector is a very fine cadre with a working-class background. If my criticism is well founded, I believe he will accept it and apply it to his work the next time he goes on an inspection tour. I have written this and other articles in the hope that everyone will discuss leadership methods and write an account of

his experiences, whether successful or unsuccessful, so we can increase our effectiveness. In the work of a branch, good methods of leadership are the key to success. A correct decision by itself is not enough; flexible methods and skilful leadership are needed to ensure that the correct decision will be translated into action by the masses and become a guide to practical work.

HOW TO BEGIN WORK IN WHITE AREAS

June 7, 1934

1. How should we go about setting up Party and mass organizations in White areas?³⁷ Our guerrillas used to go there to attack armed bandits,⁴⁵ local tyrants and evil gentry and to call mass meetings, hand out leaflets and mobilize the masses for struggle. These are ways of starting work in White areas, but they are not systematic or well organized. Other channels should be explored too. We should avail ourselves of comrades in the Party and mass organizations in the border areas⁴⁶ who have access to White areas and of boatmen, coolies and pedlars who travel between Red and White areas. Also and in particular, we should look for residents of White areas who enthusiastically support the Red Army and want to take part in the Agrarian Revolution,¹⁵ invite them to Soviet areas¹⁹ and teach them how to work in White areas. Whichever category they belong to, we should listen attentively to these people's opinions, size up their potential, discuss with each one separately the places where they are going to work, assign them a few simple tasks and tell them how to accomplish these tasks—all in accordance with their individual backgrounds. At regular intervals we should invite them to report on their work and help them to review and analyse their experiences. Before sending them back to carry on the work, we should tell them patiently and concretely how to overcome the difficulties they have encountered. This is the first step in our work in White areas.

2. In setting up Party and mass organizations in White areas we must be sure to train local cadres. To find and train cadres for local organizations is one of the most important tasks of the comrades we assign to work in those areas. Cadres who are indigenous to White areas are better acquainted with the living conditions and demands of the masses there, are in close contact with them and can travel freely. Insofar as possible, therefore, the comrades

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we send there should encourage local cadres to play a leading role in the organizations and in all other work. Before each meeting they should talk with these cadres to gain their enthusiastic support for our ideas; later, the cadres themselves can run meetings and guide mass struggles. Only thus will the masses in the White areas recognize their own strength and their own leaders, and not feel that they are being ordered about by outsiders. The training and education of local cadres should be conducted in the course of day-to-day work; we can also bring them to Soviet areas and give them short-term training, so long as it doesn't interfere with their regular activities.

3. One task of our comrades and organizations in White areas is to mobilize the masses and lead them in their day-to-day struggles—for example, the fight against exorbitant taxes and levies and for tax reductions, the fight for the unrestricted purchase of rice and salt, the fight against press-ganging of road builders and for the payment of wages to them, etc. In urban areas they should seize on every complaint of the workers and the poor, however minor it may seem, to organize them and lead them in struggle. Leading them in struggle does not mean raising many demands or setting forth, in accordance with those demands, slogans that are beyond the comprehension of the masses or for which they are not yet ready to fight. Before raising demands the comrades must listen to the opinions of the masses in order to make sure the demands correspond to the needs, and they must take into consideration each struggle's chances for success. The quality of our leadership is to be judged not by how many or how high-sounding our slogans are, but by whether those slogans are acceptable to the masses at a given time and place and can arouse them to immediate action. In the course of struggle our comrades should miss no opportunity to raise the enthusiasm and political consciousness of the masses so they will fight for slogans representing higher demands. Comrades must seize every opportunity to expand Party and mass organizations and to establish struggle committees that involve the masses. Under the leadership of the Party these committees should recruit large numbers of activists to further swell the ranks of the Party and of mass organizations like trade unions and peasant associations. The expansion of organizations and the success of each struggle are the major criteria for rating the efficiency of leadership.

4. We must organize and lead the masses in the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist struggle. The predatory Japanese imperialists have occupied our three northeastern provinces and Rehe by force of arms and are advancing on north China.⁴⁷ The other imperialist powers are stepping up their efforts to partition our country, and the Kuomintang has adopted a shameless policy of capitulation and betrayal. All this has enraged the toiling masses of

workers and peasants and even the petty bourgeoisie and has touched off direct, fierce resistance to Japan, the other imperialist powers and the Kuomintang. It is the urgent task of our Party, and particularly of Party organizations in White areas, to organize this resistance. The Party should ruthlessly expose the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese and other imperialists and denounce the Kuomintang for the shameless betrayal it has committed by helping the Japanese to wipe out the Anti-Japanese Volunteers, by suppressing anti-Japanese organizations and by arresting or massacring anti-Japanese people and their leaders. We should help the masses to set up societies for resisting aggression and saving the nation and to organize inspection teams to ferret out and confiscate Japanese goods.⁴⁸ We should encourage them to join the anti-Japanese organizations set up by various political parties and groups. Also, we should creatively apply united front tactics among people of the lower strata and win them over to our side with our anti-Japanese programme.⁴⁹ We should publicize the following contrasts: our Soviet Government's declaration of war against Japan,⁵⁰ as opposed to the Kuomintang's policy of capitulation and betrayal; the complete elimination of imperialist influence in the Soviet areas, as opposed to the Kuomintang's eagerness to serve as a lackey of imperialism; the determination of our Soviet Government and Red Army to take the lead in the national revolutionary war and their readiness to fight the Japanese imperialists, as opposed to the Kuomintang's repression of the anti-Japanese movement and participation in the annihilation of the Anti-Japanese Volunteers, etc. We should conduct intensive publicity to rally an even greater number of people around the revolutionary Soviet banner and broaden the front against Japanese imperialism and the Kuomintang's capitulationist policy.

5. We must start a mass campaign in White areas to support the Soviets and the Red Army. In regular publicity and agitation work, in the course of every struggle and in all day-to-day activities, Party organizations should publicize the Soviet Government's successes in the Agrarian Revolution, its anti-imperialist political programme and its various laws and decrees for the protection of workers, peasants and other poor people. They should also mobilize the masses in White areas to organize Friends of the Red Army societies and to collect donations to help the Red Army. Party organizations and trade unions should organize the masses in White areas to visit Soviet areas, and we should give them a warm welcome when they arrive. Workers' clubs and people's recreation centres should be set up along the borders of Soviet areas by trade unions and Soviet governments to encourage workers, peasants and other poor people from White areas to stop there for rest and recreation when they pass by the border areas. In this way we may persuade

some of them to participate in our work in White areas. The Party organizations and Soviets in the border areas should always be aware of the difficulties and needs of the masses in White areas and use every opportunity to help them, demonstrating that the Soviet Government is the emancipator of toiling masses throughout the country. An example was provided when a visiting group of workers came to a Soviet area from the White area in northeastern Jiangxi. Because the price of rice there is lower than in the White area, the Party organization encouraged the peasants to sell rice to the visiting workers' representatives at a still lower price, and every one of them went home with a silver dollar's worth of rice. That didn't cost us much, but it had a tremendous impact on the workers in the White area. If it is economically feasible, we could ship out rice from Soviet areas and sell it at a lower price in those White areas where the people are poorest. All these things will help draw the masses around the Soviets and motivate them to fight for the establishment of Soviet governments.

6. Underground work is indispensable to the success of our work in White areas. We must make it clear to our cadres that the situation in White areas is entirely different from the one in Soviet areas and that work there must be conducted by entirely different methods. The most important requirement for underground work is that we mingle with the masses and gain their trust and protection. We should live and operate in the midst of the masses; our way of life and even our language and clothing must be identical with those of the local people so that we become one with them. Meetings held by Party and mass organizations should be camouflaged by the people in different ways. The various units of these organizations should be kept separate from one another in places where there is unbridled White terror. Underground work depends on the protection of the masses. The more extensive our contacts with them and the more developed the mass organizations, the more protected the Party and mass organizations will be and the less vulnerable to surprise attacks by the enemy.

7. Local Party headquarters must provide constant guidance for the work in White areas. The White area work committees under border area Party headquarters and the trade unions should pursue their work according to plan and urge all Party and trade union organizations in the border areas to make a success of their work in White areas. Meetings should be held regularly to discuss and review such work. They should summon leading members of White area organizations to Soviet areas or send inspectors to White areas to check up on the work there. These inspectors should listen attentively to the reports of the leading members and give them guidance that is specific and practical, rather than general and offhand. Moreover, they must take pains

to find out what the masses are thinking, get to know all the cadres individually and give them concrete help in overcoming the difficulties they have encountered in their work. In addition, they must review and analyse the experience of White area work for the benefit of the entire Party.

9. All work methods must be adapted to different conditions in different places. For general principles and methods we can refer to the various resolutions adopted by the Central Committee of the Party. At the same time, we should carefully adapt our slogans to the actual conditions of a particular time and place and apply flexible methods.

METHODS OF STRUGGLE AND ORGANIZATION IN GUERRILLA AREAS

September 14, 1934

In many of the enemy-occupied areas, no real guerrilla warfare has yet been conducted on a mass scale. Even though guerrilla units do infiltrate those areas, their ranks tend to dwindle and they often have to retreat to Soviet areas.¹⁹ Those that have stayed have failed to mobilize the local people for mass guerrilla warfare. Though there are quite a few Party members in occupied areas, some of them engaged in a tenacious if lonely fight against the enemy, there is no Party organization to organize them or give them guidance. Generally speaking, the activities of the guerrillas and Party organizations in occupied areas are not causing insuperable difficulties to the advancing enemy; they are not luring him in their direction or stopping his advance as they should.

What are the reasons for the failure to develop large-scale guerrilla war in these areas?

First, the importance of guerrilla warfare is not sufficiently understood within the Party. The development of such warfare on a mass scale is not generally considered the paramount task for the Party. There is still a tendency to abandon work in enemy-occupied areas. All of Daiying County⁵¹ except four townships has been occupied by the enemy, but the county and district Party committees, instead of waging guerrilla war in the occupied areas, have crowded all their workers, Party members, refugees, district headquarters staff and armed units into those four townships. In many war zones Party organizations have remained passive, merely strengthening defences and hiding provisions from the enemy, instead of promptly arming the masses for guerrilla warfare. In occupied areas they are not actively leading the guerrillas in the fight. Some of them have reduced themselves to

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“intelligence teams.” Others have led local people in resistance to the Kuomintang’s attempts to impress them into building roads and fortifications, but they have stopped short with the slogan “Give us food and wages.” They have not urged the masses to perform acts of sabotage and demolition to keep the enemy from building blockhouses and roads, much less to engage in armed struggle against him.

All Party organizations must understand the importance of developing guerrilla warfare. They should regard it as the paramount task of the Party at present and an indispensable condition for the victory of the Red Army’s main forces. By waging widespread guerrilla war we can stop the enemy’s advance and safeguard Soviet areas. By carrying the armed struggle deep behind enemy lines we can create new Soviet areas and new Red Army units. Only when the Party’s correct policy in this regard is completely understood by all Party organizations and members will it be possible to avoid such errors as belittling guerrilla warfare and abandoning the work in guerrilla areas.

In order to wage guerrilla war on a mass scale we should do the following: (1) step up political education and military training among existing guerrilla units and send the most politically reliable cadres to improve the Party branches and strengthen Party leadership in those units, so that they will firmly follow the Party line and develop guerrilla warfare with mass participation; (2) strengthen Party leadership over the detachments of Red Guards and Young Pioneers,⁵² starting with the model ones, by sending them cadres to set up new Party branches and improve the organization of existing ones, so that those detachments—first of all, the model ones—become local guerrilla units ready for action, penetrating occupied areas and operating there; and (3) where the Red Guard and Young Pioneer detachments are not yet fully organized but guerrilla teams have already come into being, encourage those teams to form platoons and squads within the detachments and to lead the detachments in guerrilla warfare.

Successful development of guerrilla warfare depends on the guerrillas’ efforts to mobilize the people and to lead them in armed combat and all other forms of struggle. Some guerrilla units in occupied areas have failed to develop guerrilla warfare of a mass character, to get a firm foothold or even to find food there, and have thus been defeated. The reason is that they did not mobilize the masses and win their support.

To overcome the Party organizations’ and guerrilla units’ alienation from the masses in occupied areas, we must combat any tendency to doubt the strength of the masses and our ability to lead them in resolute struggle against the Kuomintang and the landlord class. In arousing the masses to action we must stop mechanically applying to occupied areas the methods

used in the Central Soviet Area.³⁰ We should recognize the different conditions in different places and at different times and adapt our work methods to the circumstances. We should truly understand the urgent demands of the local people and put forward slogans that are acceptable to them and that they will be willing to fight for. Here is a concrete example that may serve to illustrate the point. In the face of enemy attacks, the people in the Central Soviet Area urgently wanted to defend the area. So we called on them to take up arms and also to conserve grain and lend it to the Red Army and to donate money to buy arms and supplies, "all for victory at the front." Because the Party's slogans struck the right chord in the people's hearts, 63,000 new armed recruits went to the front in May and June alone, and throughout the Soviet area the movement to conserve and lend grain and to contribute to the Red Army was enormously successful. In the occupied areas, however, the situation is different. There the people's most urgent demand is to oppose the killing, raping and looting by the Kuomintang White army and the intolerable oppression and exploitation by the landlords, who, for example, press the people for payment of rents and debts and confiscate the cattle and pigs of those who cannot pay. In these circumstances too we need to mobilize the masses to join the Red Army and guerrilla units and to donate grain for the ultimate purpose of overthrowing the Kuomintang rule and re-establishing the Soviet regime. However, if we do not raise slogans that represent the people's urgent demands, but mechanically start a "drive to expand the Red Army"⁵³ or a "grain-lending movement"⁵⁴ there as we did in the Central Soviet Area, we shall not achieve our purpose and we shall not be able to arouse the people, least of all those who are not yet politically aware. That is what happened in the Yongding guerrilla area. Although the county Party committee and the guerrillas continued fighting for a long time there and initiated an energetic "drive to expand the Red Army" as in the Central Soviet Area, they enrolled only eight recruits in three months. Their labour was fruitless precisely because they failed to adapt their methods of mobilizing the masses to local conditions.

The second reason why large-scale guerrilla warfare has not been developed in the occupied areas is that serious mistakes are being made in organizational work and leadership. In the first place, Party organizations in various localities have not assigned the most suitable and most capable cadres to leadership positions in occupied areas. In the second place, the underground Party branches set up by Party organizations in war zones⁵⁵ have not become one with the masses and have even alienated themselves from them. And lastly, a centralized headquarters has not been set up in each occupied area. All these mistakes have handicapped the Party's efforts to arouse the

masses there, with the result that the guerrilla forces have been isolated and sometimes defeated for lack of popular support.

To make sure that Party organizations and guerrilla units in occupied areas adhere to the Party line, we must see to it that they are led by the best cadres. The cadres assigned to work or to exercise leadership there must be able to solve problems on their own and follow the Party line unswervingly even when contact with higher Party organizations is temporarily cut off. Moreover, we must select for leadership positions local cadres who are familiar with local conditions and have enjoyed the confidence of the local Party members all along. And all these cadres must be familiar with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Unless we choose cadres carefully in accordance with these requirements, the same problems we encountered in the Guangdong-Jiangxi area and other occupied areas where the enemy was in pursuit will arise again—problems such as vacillation, retreat to Soviet areas, and even desertion and defection. One of the urgent tasks now confronting the Party organizations in the war zones is to make organizational preparations, which means basically to select and assign cadres. The Party must make a point of assigning fine cadres to the guerrilla areas and giving them posts commensurate with their abilities. Local cadres who are politically staunch should be given the necessary military training or admitted into detachments of Red Guards and Young Pioneers so they can acquire experience in guerrilla warfare.

A Party branch should provide the core of leadership for the struggle of the masses. We must correct the mistake of organizing secret Party branches. The committee of a secret branch was usually composed of three or four old and infirm women or of young people, to the exclusion of other fine branch members. These branches inevitably alienated themselves from the masses, and they were totally unable to direct guerrilla warfare. We must encourage Party members to work hard and persistently among the masses in guerrilla areas and to become the core of leadership for their struggle. If we merge with the masses and enjoy their support, we shall be able not only to gain their protection but to mobilize them for revolutionary struggle.

In each occupied area the Party organization must set up a centralized leadership to overcome the lack of co-ordination between the work team from the higher level, the county Party committee and the guerrilla units. Without such centralized leadership the guerrilla will be deprived of the co-operation of local Party organizations and the support of the masses, and consequently they will have to fight alone and risk defeat. Also, heavily staffed leading organs should stop accompanying the guerrilla units wherever they go, while subordinate districts and small guerrilla groups are short of leading cadres.

This practice only makes it easier for the enemy to locate the guerrilla units and robs them of their mobility and flexibility in battle. To exercise centralized leadership a military-political committee should be formed in each guerrilla area with the best cadres selected from the independent regiment, the work team and the guerrilla forces operating there. Where there is already a county Party committee but it has no contact with the guerrillas, the committee should be reorganized into a new one made up of the most capable leading cadres from the old committee and from the largest guerrilla unit in the county. The new secretary of the committee should also serve as political commissar of that guerrilla unit. All district military-political committees and county Party committees should work with the guerrilla units to give them better and more direct guidance and at the same time should exercise leadership over the local Party organizations.

In occupied areas the large staffs that have been assembled in the county or district leading organs should be dispersed. A number of persons should be assigned to lower Party organizations or small guerrilla groups to reinforce the leadership there, and the rest should either be armed and sent to join the guerrilla units as combatants or be sent to work among the masses in various districts and townships.

OUTLINE REPORT ON THE ZUNYI ENLARGED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU

February or March 1935

It was decided at the meeting of the Political Bureau held in Liping that an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau should be held in Zunyi⁵⁶ because of the various disputes which emerged in southern Hunan and Tongdao. The purposes of the meeting were 1) to examine the question of whether to establish a Soviet base area¹⁹ with northern Guizhou temporarily as the center as had been decided at the Liping Meeting and make a decision on this; and 2) to review our experience and what we learned concerning military command in countering the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign⁵⁷ and during the westward march.⁵⁸ This enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau was held immediately after the Red Army occupied Zunyi. Besides the members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, participants included commanders and political commissars of the First and Third Army Groups,⁵⁹ respectively Lin and Nie,⁶⁰ Peng and Yang⁶¹ as well as political commissar Li Zhuoran of the Fifth Army Group,⁶² chief of the General Political Department Li,⁶³ and chief of the general staff Liu.⁶⁴ The meeting lasted three days during which a number of resolutions were adopted.

1. The enlarged meeting unanimously agreed to alter the Liping Meeting resolution on establishing a Soviet base area centred in northern Guizhou, and it unanimously decided that the Red Army should cross the Yangtze River to establish Soviet base areas southwest or northwest of Chengdu. The reasons for the decision were that Sichuan is more advantageous than northern Guizhou politically, economically and militarily (there would be

This outline report was completed shortly after the Zunyi Meeting during the march from Weixin County, Yunnan Province, to Yaxi Town, Renhuai County, Guizhou Province. It was written between mid-February and early March 1935. During the Long March, Comrade Chen Yun served as representative of the Central Committee to the Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, political commissar of the Military Commission Column, political commissar of the Zunyi Garrison Command and political commissar of the Crossing-the-River (the Jinsha River) Command.

better cooperation with the Fourth Front Army⁶⁵ in Sichuan and Sichuan borders Xikang,⁶⁶ a region free of enemies).

(Assessing this decision today, we should criticize it for determining where to establish base areas on postulated conditions without firm knowledge or precise estimates of the enemy situation and possible eventualities, and without having specified the concrete steps to be taken to reach this goal. Moreover, some comrades underestimated the military strength of the enemy in Sichuan, which was the very reason we had to retreat from Weixin to northern Guizhou and could not cross the Yangtze River into Sichuan.)⁶⁷

2. We reviewed our mistakes in countering the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign and in marching west.

(A) The enlarged meeting held that the resolution adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee after the smashing of the first four “encirclement and suppression” campaigns⁶⁸—the resolution on smashing the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign launched by the imperialists and the Kuomintang⁶⁹—had been correct. Opinion was at variance with the report made by Comrade Bo Gu,⁷⁰ which tended to focus on objective factors such as imperialist aid for the Kuomintang, the failure of the anti-imperialist and revolutionary movements in the White areas³⁷ to coordinate with the activities of the Red Army, and our extreme weakness in guerrilla campaigns around the Soviet areas and in our work in the White areas. The report did not attach enough importance to errors in military command as one of the factors contributing to our failure in defending the Soviet areas and our inability to smash the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign. (Although Comrade Bo Gu did mention the command errors and did not specifically indicate that these command errors were not the major problem.) He attempted to cover up strategic errors, a manifestation of right opportunism which makes it impossible to learn from these mistakes.

The meeting agreed that, aside from the many objective and other important factors, it was the errors in military command both of strategy and tactics that were the primary reason for our failure to defend the Central Soviet Areas³⁰ and our inability to smash the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign.

The meeting expressed the belief that the general political line of the Party at that time was basically correct⁷¹ and that all the logistic work within the Soviet areas was exemplary and should be commended. However, in this civil war, military command constitutes a major aspect of the Party’s general political line. Because our Party was acting in error through its military command during this period and during the westward march, it failed to

fulfil its objectives. That is, it was unable to defend the Soviet areas and to smash the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and reach western Hunan, which had been set as the destination of the westward march.

The meeting was of the opinion that Chiang Kai-shek had not been completely successful in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign. Not only did the main forces of the Red Army break through a tight encirclement, they are still actively operating and expanding in Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Hunan. In terms of military strength, over a year and a half of bloody fighting during the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns has left Chiang Kai-shek weakened.

The meeting was of the opinion that the Soviet movement in China is not waning; on the contrary, it continues to expand. On the one hand, the Red Army has been victorious in several Soviet areas, the Central Red Army⁷² is operating actively and there is an upsurge in the anti-imperialist movement; while on the other hand there is a coincide with the collapse of the national economy under the rule of the Kuomintang. The Chinese Soviet movement has deep historical roots; the Soviet movement and the Red Army cannot be stopped.

(B) Why do we say that the military command has been basically in error? (analyse this by dividing this time into four periods from the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign through marching west and then to Zunyi).

The first period spans from the time of the smashing of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign to the Pengkou Battle,⁷³ prior to the conclusion of the military agreement with the 19th Route Army.⁷⁴

During this period, immediately after victory in the Dongpi and Huangpi battles (after smashing the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign),⁷⁵ the main forces of the Red Army were held at the northern front for a short time due to our underestimation of the possibility of victory. Later, we moved towards the Minjiang River to open up the eastern battlefield and won the Pengkou Battle. All this was correct. Generally speaking, the command was faultless during this period, but one big mistake was the failure to concentrate our main forces. Only the Third Army Group and the weaker forces already deployed on the eastern battlefield were engaged in fighting the 19th Route Army. If more forces had been concentrated there during this period, our victory on the eastern battlefield would have been much greater.

The second period was from the signing of the military agreement with the 19th Route Army to the defeat of the 19th Route Army and the occupation by the enemy of Lichuan, a key military position.

During this period, the Party Central Committee decided to sign a military agreement with the 19th Route Army, which was correct. But the military command failed politically in not moving out of Jianning, Lichuan and Taining⁷⁶ to launch lateral attacks on those of Chiang's troops which were advancing towards Yanping.⁷⁷ Instead, they sent our main forces towards the Ganjiang River. By the time Comrade Luo Fu⁷⁸ (member of the Military Commission) learned about and objected to this move and the Red Army began to move eastward to Yong'an and Shaxian counties, the favourable situation which had existed in the Fujian People's Government had changed. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek was able to gain control of the eastern battlefront, from which he launched large-scale attacks on Soviet areas. Meanwhile, Lichuan was lost due to bungling on the part of a commander.⁷⁹

At the meeting, the Political Bureau was of the opinion that if the military command had acted correctly during this period, it would have been entirely possible for us to have smashed the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and the situation within the country would then have been quite favourable to the development of the revolutionary movement and the Soviet movement.

The third period was from the Guangchang Battle,⁸⁰ following the defeat of the 19th Route Army, to the time when the main forces of the Red Army began their westward march.

This was the bloodiest period of fighting of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, during which the enemy employed his greatest military strength and confined us to the Soviet areas. It was during this period that we committed serious command errors. Instead of striving to create opportunities for mobile warfare and for attacking the enemy's flanks, the strategy and tactics of positional warfare and confrontation with enemy blockhouses were adopted. We invented the tactic of countering the enemy with "red blockhouses" and of fighting a war by engaging in "short range, swift thrusts."⁸¹ This tactic abandoned the strategy of eliminating the enemy in mobile warfare and relinquished efforts to attack the enemy's flanks. Consequently, large blockhouses were built everywhere along the borders of Soviet areas, on which we relied in resisting the enemy. (Some of these blockhouses in specific areas were actually necessary.) However, this tactic completely exposed our main forces and thoroughly revealed our weaknesses to the enemy, so that it was possible for their planes and artillery to follow targets in attacks coordinated with their infantry. As a result, we competed with the enemy only in attrition (which was not to our advantage) and many red blockhouses were destroyed by planes and artillery. Some of these were

taken over by the enemy and used in attacking Soviet areas.

The tactic of “short range, swift thrusts” deprived us of the victories we might have achieved in mobile warfare, (the battle of Longgang is an example),⁸² and caused us to suffer very heavy losses under fierce enemy fire. Under attack by enemy forces several times stronger than our own, we were forced, though very reluctantly, to retreat from the stretches of red blockhouses (Jianning, Taining and Guangchang). This resulted in substantial weakening of the Red Army in the Guangchang Battle, Sanxixu Battle,⁸³ Taiyangzhang Battle,⁸⁴ Shicheng Battle⁸⁵ and in many other battles fought while retreating from the Soviet areas. Each battle resulted in two to three thousand casualties; in a short period of time all the senior company commanders of the Third Army Group were either killed or wounded. Just two days before we began marching west, the Military Commission was still ordering the 13th Division to defend the town of Xingguo at any cost. Nearly 200,000 soldiers, enlisted by the Red Army from May 1933 to September 1934, were lost mainly due to this tactic.

The fourth period began with the westward march and ended at Liping. Generally speaking, during this period we made command and organization errors as already described, so I will not repeat them here.

Taking the four periods as a whole, we made mistakes in military command, in strategy and in tactics.

(C) The Right opportunist line of pure defence.

The Zunyi Meeting held that the strategy that had been adopted during those periods was a military line of pure defence. This strategy derived from a lack of confidence in our ability to counter the enemy’s blockhouse strategy.⁸⁶

This line contained the following aspects:

- 1) Reject mobile warfare and operations on the enemy flanks.
- 2) Attempt to defend the Soviet areas through a war of attrition from red blockhouses. (Rigidly applying the principle of not giving up an inch of land in the Soviet areas.)
- 3) Since the enemy was attacking us from six directions, it was thought that we should divide our forces to resist the enemy, which not only put us in a passive position, but also made it impossible for us to concentrate our main forces. Hence, we suffered everywhere from enemy attacks because of lack of strength on all battle fronts.

It would have been a mistake to ignore the features of the enemy’s strategy of blockhouse warfare adopted for the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, but there had been opportunities, and more than a few, to lure the enemy in deep. It was precisely because we adopted a strategy

of launching an attack every time the enemy moved—even one or two kilometres—that they became more and more cautious, building blockhouses at each halt. At the beginning of the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, enemy blockhouses were five to seven kilometres apart. The result of our “short range, swift thrusts” was that the enemy learned to build three to five blockhouses every half kilometre. As an example of this faulty strategy, in the Longgang Battle when the enemy had pushed forward only 2.5 kilometres, we attacked, thus exposing the position of our main forces and causing the enemy immediately to retreat into their blockhouses. As a result, what might have been a great victory was reduced to the capture of one battalion of enemy soldiers. There have been countless similar examples. Many battles were cited by army commanders at the enlarged meeting. They said, “During this battle, when we received orders from the Military Commission, we recognized the futility of following the orders, but we had no choice but to obey.” The battle at Wenfang⁸⁷ which occurred not long before our retreat from the Soviet areas, in which we attacked Li Yannian’s⁸⁸ column on the eastern battlefront, was a great victory (more than 1,000 armed soldiers were captured), but this was accomplished only because the commanders of the First Army Group disobeyed the Military Commission’s directive to defend Wenfang to the last. Instead, the army retreated 10 kilometres back into the Soviet area. The commanders experienced two sleepless days and nights in fear of reproach from the Military Commission for abandoning Wenfang. The enemy then felt free to advance and left their blockhouses, so we were able to launch an attack. But in the later period, our forces were divided in order to resist and there were absolutely no operations at the enemy’s flanks or in the rear except for the vanguard detachment of the Seventh Army Group which was marching north to resist the Japanese invaders.⁸⁹

As for resisting the enemy’s blockhouse warfare by utilizing red blockhouses, everyone knows that, given our position today, it was extremely disadvantageous to engage in such a war of attrition.

The tactic of dividing our forces for the purpose of defence put us in a totally passive position. The enemy would draw out the Red Army by feigning attacks on one front while actually engaging in a fierce attack on another. Not only did this tactic wear out Red Army forces, which suffered unnecessary losses, but for our part, we did not adhere to the principle that the Red Army should concentrate its main forces so as to be able to overpower the enemy’s weakest points and smash its converging attacks. Since our main forces could not be concentrated because they were being divided for the purpose of defence, we were defeated at many times when

we should have been victorious. Following the battle in Wenfang, when two divisions of enemy reinforcements were rapidly being brought in, we failed in our efforts because we had not concentrated our troops to engage the enemy.

This kind of military command error has been going on for a very long time. There have been disputes regarding military command within the Party and the Military Commission. Mao, Zhang and Wang⁹⁰ put forward many objections and Comrade Enlai⁹¹ has expressed disagreements regarding specific battles, but these viewpoints were not acted upon. The commanders of army groups, especially those of the First and Third army groups, have made countless suggestions and have sent countless telegrams and detailed reports of each battle, including their own ideas about the fighting, but unfortunately all of this was ignored.

The enlarged meeting pointed out that the mistakes in military leadership had been committed by three comrades "A," Bo and Zhou,⁹² and that Comrades "A" and Bo primarily should be held responsible.

It was pointed out at the Zunyi Meeting that the rectification of these errors in military leadership did not deepen inner-Party conflict, rather, it strengthened unity, placed our military leadership on the right track and raised the prestige of the Party and the Military Commission even higher. Wavering, pessimistic or despairing elements have nothing to do with progressive Bolsheviks.⁹³ At the meeting it was pointed out that in opposing the military line of pure defence adopted by the military leadership, we must also resolutely combat any right opportunist tendencies.

(D) The following decisions were adopted at the Zunyi Meeting:

1) Comrade Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Standing Committee.

2) Comrade Luo Fu will be asked to draft a resolution which will be given to the Standing Committee for examination before it is distributed to the Party branches for discussion.

3) An appropriate redistribution of duties is to be undertaken within the Standing Committee.

4) The three-person group⁹⁴ is to be abolished; the supreme military leaders Zhu and Zhou⁹⁵ are to retain military command; and Comrade [Zhou] Enlai is to be the person entrusted by the Party to make final decisions in military command.

At the meeting, Comrade [Zhou] Enlai and other comrades fully agreed to the outline and views put forward by Luo Fu, as well as those of Mao [Zedong] and Wang [Jixiang]; Comrade Bo Gu did not completely acknowledge his mistakes;⁹⁶ Comrade Kai Feng⁹⁷ disagreed with the opinions of Mao,

Zhang and Wang; and Comrade “A” completely and resolutely disagreed with the criticisms directed at him.

Immediately after the enlarged meeting, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee began the redistribution of duties. Comrade [Mao] Zedong was assigned as Comrade [Zhou] Enlai’s aid in military command and it was decided that Comrade Hua Fu’s name could be mentioned at Party branch discussions. (Hua Fu is “A’s” real name. He often used the name “A” in publishing his articles in the Military Commission’s journal *Revolution and War*, especially articles on “short range, swift thrusts”). Comrade Bo Gu’s name should be mentioned only at meetings of cadres at or above the regimental level.

After the resolution was issued, the comrades on the Standing Committee—Mao, Zhang and Chen⁹⁸ attended various army group cadre meetings to inform them of the resolution. At all these meetings enthusiastic support was expressed for the resolution of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau.

On the way from Zunyi to Weixin, in dividing Standing Committee member duties, it was decided that Comrade Luo Fu should take over all of Comrade Bo Gu’s responsibilities.

MY EXPERIENCES ON THE WESTWARD MARCH

Autumn, 1935

Communist forces in China have grown very rapidly over the past year. Red Army units under the command of Zhu (De), Mao [Zedong], Xu Xiangqian,⁹⁹ He Long,¹⁰⁰ Xiao Ke¹⁰¹ and others have become a formidable force in China. When the Red Army was founded, it was only a tiny spark, but it has already become a prairie fire. The Red Army, now under the command of Zhu and Mao, consists of remnants of Ye Ting and He Long's troops under the command of Zhu De and the peasant army led by Mao Zedong in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. These joined forces in 1927 when the Kuomintang broke with the Communist Party. Troops from Nanjing and various provinces have been suppressing the Red Army for eight or nine years, but the actual strength of Mao and Zhu's forces has been increasing. Over the past year the Generalissimo personally supervised this suppression. He had blockhouses built at every step as part of a plan to annihilate the Red Army at one stroke. To his surprise, Zhu and Mao had foreseen his plan. They broke out of the encirclement and marched westward in mid-October of last year. They crossed the Hunan-Guangdong border into Guizhou Province. After staying in Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces for a while, they finally ventured a crossing of the Jinsha and Dadu rivers, both of which are wide and turbulent at the upper reaches of the Yangtze, into Sichuan Province in order to join Xu Xiangqian in northern Sichuan. Now that these two major units of China's Red Army have joined forces, they have become majestic and powerful. Moreover, this shift of military focus from the southeast to the northwest has made it very difficult in terms of

This article was written in Moscow to publicize the Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In order to be able to circulate this article in Kuomintang-controlled areas, the author wrote under the name of Lian Chen, a fictitious Kuomintang military surgeon taken captive by the Red Army. The article was first serialized in March 1936 in *Monthly for the Whole Nation*, sponsored by the Communist Party of China in Paris. A separate edition of the article was published in Moscow in July of the same year. Thereafter, it was printed and distributed in China many times. The article has been left as it appeared then, except for a few changes in wording and punctuation.

both operations and transportation for the Kuomintang to implement their strategy of suppressing the Communists. It has become more and more difficult for them to contain the activities of the Red Army.

I worked for the Nanjing troops for four years as a surgeon. I was taken captive by the Red Army during the Dongpi-Huangpi⁷⁵ battles in Jiangxi Province the year before last when I was working with Nanjing's 59th Division. At first I thought that I would not survive my capture. But I was sent under escort to Ruijin in the Red Army's rear area and taken to the army's Public Health Department because I was a military surgeon. The chief of the department, He Cheng, had a talk with me. Because the Red Army had few surgeons at that time, they asked me to work at a Red Army hospital. They promised me the same monthly salary that I had received from the 59th Division, of which 60 silver dollars could be sent to my family. As a captive, I really had no alternative. The Red Army kept its promise. They paid me every month and my mother wrote back to tell me that she was receiving the family allowance every month. Later, I was sent to the Red Army's reserve hospital in Shicheng several times and sometimes transferred back to the Public Health Department in Ruijin. I also often made medical diagnoses for paramount personages in the Red Army such as Zhu, Mao, Lin⁶⁰ and Peng,⁶¹ for members of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and for other important people in the Red area. I had thought that these Communists who were well-known throughout the country would be extremely fierce and brutal, but what I discovered when I first met them was quite contrary to my expectations. Mao Zedong had the appearance of a scholar. He was often seen in his gray student suit. When he could spare the time, he would read Tang poetry. He was gifted with a silver tongue. When I would diagnose his ailments, I found him to be very modest. You would know that Zhu De was a military man at first sight. At the age of about 50, he wore a gray military uniform. He worked hard even though he was suffering from malaria; he gave the appearance of being very busy. When I made medical visits, he would be reviewing a military report, with pen in hand. He did not put the pen away until he saw me. He was very amiable and never put on airs when he talked. These two leading personages were completely different from what I had thought they would be like.

In mid-October of last year when Nanjing troops were occupying Xingguo, the Red Army there broke out of the encirclement and marched westward, taking me with them. That was the first march I had ever undergone. Except for the ten or more days when we rested in Zunyi Prefecture in northern Guizhou Province and the five days when we stopped

in Huili County after we had crossed the Jinsha River, we spent all of our time marching, regardless of the weather, from Jiangxi to Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan and then to Xikang⁶⁶ provinces, and then on to Lifan¹⁰² and Songpang in Sichuan Province. We travelled about 6,000 kilometres to almost every region south of the Yangtze River during a period which lasted over eight months, climbing countless tall mountains and crossing innumerable rivers before we met Xu Xiangqian. I was frail, but I survived the hardship, which made me happy. At the same time, I felt proud that I had travelled in this lifetime across all the provinces in the valleys of the Yangtze and the Pearl rivers, including some places that I had never dreamt of visiting.

Early this July, I was sent by the public health chief He Cheng to work for the Maogong¹⁰³-Baoxing Guerrilla Detachment operating in the mountainous areas of these two counties. One morning, the Sichuan Army attacked us, which separated me from the Detachment. The civil corps confiscated the 20 silver dollars I had with me. Later on, fortunately, I came across Mr. Jiang Zheng, a former classmate of mine who was a surgeon with the Fifth Brigade of the Sichuan Army. With his help, I travelled to Tianquan, Yazhou,¹⁰⁴ Chengdu and then on to Chongqing, from where I went home by boat. I had a joyful reunion with my whole family; it was as if I were dreaming.

The departure of the Red Army from the Fujian-Jiangxi area where they had been operating for many years for Sichuan Province was obviously a well-planned move. According to my observations, the Red Army prepared well for the withdrawal from Jiangxi Province last year. From May to September of last year, the Red Army recruited about 100,000 new soldiers. During that period, surgeons Lin, He and I were sent to work at one of the hospitals of the Military Industrial Administration, the department managing the Red Army's military supply factories. Dr. He had been working with Zhang Huizan's¹⁰⁵ troops at the time that he was taken captive by the Red Army. While at the hospital, I observed that there were thousands of people working and bustling about in the munitions factory, clothing factory and other factories day and night. Later in September, *Red China* (the organ of the Central Government of the Red area) published an article¹⁰⁶ by Zhang Wentian, Chairman of the People's Committee of the Central Government, hinting that the Red Army might leave the Red area in Jiangxi for areas where antagonistic military forces were weaker. Sure enough, in mid-October all the units began to march westward. Zhu and Mao led over 80,000 Red Army troops out of the province when they broke out of the encirclement. Only a small number of men were left behind in Jiangxi. Almost all the

important personages of the Communist Party went along with the army, as did many middle and lower rank communist cadres from various counties. Dozens of these cadres were women. The women cadres had handguns hanging from their waists and wore straw sandals. These women soldiers were strong and healthy. They walked as if they had wings and often nursed the sick and the wounded for the Public Health Department. Sometimes they even carried stretchers, as conscripted labourers did.

The Red Army crossed the Xinfeng River along two routes. One of these left Wangmudu in northern Xinfeng. The other defeated the Guangdong Army in Gupi and Xintian in southeastern Xinfeng. They then both crossed the Zhangshui River between Nankang and Dayu¹⁰⁷ counties as well as the Ganzhou-Nanxiong highway. The Guangdong Army had blockhouses along the Gupi-Xintian and the Ganzhou-Nanxiong highways with troops stationed there, but the troops deserted upon learning that they were outnumbered and so the first line of blockhouses which the National Army had used over the past year to encircle the Red Army in Jiangxi Province was completely broken through. All the blockhouses along this route were torn down by the Red Army and the local residents, who despised the defending Kuomintang troops because they had been extorting their possessions. Designed for attacking and blockading the Red Army, the blockhouses had been erected on both sides of highways, at major crossings and on mountain tops near roadsides. Built with stones and bricks, the blockhouses were square or hexagonal. There were both large and small blockhouses; some were built to house platoons, others were for companies, and still others were for battalions. The defending troops usually lived in the blockhouses and could fire rifles and machine guns from the embrasures. A blockhouse had only one small entrance. When attacked by the Red Army, the defending troops would close the gate and shoot from inside. As these blockhouses seriously hampered their military operations, the Red Army had to tear them down. The defending troops had not observed discipline in their contacts with local residents. So when the Red Army arrived, the residents rose to help dismantle the blockhouses. After breaking out of this blockade line, the Red Army, like a tiger with wings, rushed fiercely at Rucheng on the Hunan-Guangdong border and at Chengkou in northern Renhua in Guangdong Province. They soon captured Chengkou, seizing thousands of cases of kerosene for military use and much ammunition from the Guangdong Army. The Red Army broke through the Guangdong Army's line of blockhouses (that is, the second blockade line of the National Army) running from Chengkou to Rucheng and Guidong in Hunan Province, smashing all the blockhouses involved. At that time, nothing could have stopped the Red Army. As the Central Army

was far away on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, and as the Guangdong Army wanted only to protect itself, the Hunan Army was alone; they could not match the Red Army and had to flee. The Red Army captured the city of Yizhang without meeting any resistance and crossed the Guangdong-Wuchang highway, which constituted the third blockade line of the National Army. The Red Army again tore down the blockhouses and its vanguard units seized Linwu, Jiahe and Lanshan. At that time Li Yunjie's troops, which were a part of the Hunan Army, moved southward and planned to intercept and attack the Red Army along the Fujiang River in Tiantangxu. To Li's surprise, all his troops were encircled and routed by the Red Army in Tiantangxu and had to retreat northward. Again the Red Army captured many guns and much ammunition. Then, in a strong thrust, the Red Army began to advance on two routes. One route marched towards Daozhou¹⁰⁸ and the other towards Jianghua and Yongming.¹⁰⁹ The Red Army took all of these cities and then crossed the Xiaoshui River. That made it impossible for the Nanjing troops and the Hunan Army to pursue the Red Army, so they sent only a few troops to follow and keep track of its movements. The Hunan Army and most of the troops under the command of Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan¹¹⁰ gathered in Lingling, Hunan Province, and in Quanzhou, Guangxi Province, while the Guangxi Army was ordered to stand mainly in Guanyang and Xing'an. At that time Generalissimo Chiang's plan was to use heavy forces to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Xiangjiang River and to drive it southward into Guangxi Province so as to benefit from a clash between the Red Army and the Guangxi Army. But Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi of the Guangxi Army were all aware of Chiang's intention and feared losing their strength in such a confrontation. At the same time, they were also apprehensive that if the Red Army could not cross the Xiangjiang River, it would be inevitable that they would remain in Guangxi Province or operate in the vicinity of Guilin. Moreover, the two columns under Xue and Zhou were supposed to follow the Red Army deep into Guangxi Province, which would cause the powers of the province to fall into the hands of the Nanjing Government. Because of all this, Li and Bai ordered the Guangxi Army units in Xing'an to withdraw southward. Xue, Zhou and the Hunan Army by themselves could not stop the Red Army from crossing the Xiangjiang River. After crossing the river, the Red Army destroyed the blockhouses along the highways on both banks of the river. These constituted the fourth line of blockades erected by the National Army. Once the Red Army broke through this blockade line, they were like a tiger just released from a cage and could now advance eastward or westward. It was said that the Guangxi Army units withdrew from Xing'an because they had concluded

a treaty of mutual nonaggression with the Red Army. All of the efforts Generalissimo Chiang of the Nanjing Government made over the past few years to implement the blockhouse policy for the purpose of suppressing the Communists had been for naught.

The joy of the Red Army at the time was really beyond description. The army's Political Department composed and printed a song to the music of China's March of the Long-tubed Bugle. The soldiers were taught this song. The 200 or more nurses at the Public Health Department for which I worked, all of whom were 15 or 16 years old, sang the song with resounding voices every day. The song expressed the joy of the Red Army and their contempt for Generalissimo Chiang's blockhouse policies. The song read, "The leadership of the Communist Party is really correct and enjoys the support of the people. The Red Army fought really heroically and smashed the tortoiseshell of the Kuomintang (meaning the blockhouses of the National Army). How happy we are! How happy we are! How happy we are!"

The reason why the Red Army was able to break through the tight encirclement is that it not only had the necessary military capability but also enjoyed immense popular support. For example, Zhu and Mao had operated in Zixing, Chenzhou and Yizhang in southern Hunan Province over a long period of time, and the residents there had been deeply impressed by the policies of the Communists. So when they saw the Red Army returning, they would treat the army to drinks along the way. Whenever I passed a village or a town during the march, I saw a crowd of spectators of all ages and both sexes standing about like a wall by the roadside. Also, when Zhu and Mao were operating in the counties of southern Hunan Province a few years before, local residents had joined the Red Army. As the Red Army passed by this time, the relatives of those soldiers were at various crossings where they had been waiting for a long time and asked whether their sons or nephews were still in the army. At that time, the Management Chief of the General Public Health Department, the equivalent of a mess officer in the Nanjing Army, was from Wenmingsi in Yizhang. On the day when he reached Wenmingsi, his mother met him at the roadside. But his unit was to march on after a 15-minute break, so he requested of the chief staff officer of the Public Health Department (at the time the department was like a branch of the army) a two-hour leave to visit his home. He returned to his unit the same day, bringing with him 11 peasants who wanted to join the Red Army and two others who wished to serve as conscripted labourers. Later, one of these labourers helped me with my belongings. In addition, he brought us some homemade, sweet white spirits made from rice and much better than those brewed in Jiangxi Province.

The reason why the peasants in Hunan Province accepted the policies of the Communist Party is that the Party carried out activities among them; these people had always been bullied and oppressed by the local tyrants and evil gentry. After Zhu and Mao left southern Hunan a few years ago, the local tyrants returned home and blackmailed the peasants on the excuse of searching for Communists. So the peasants wished to repay injury with injury. A labourer whom the Management Chief conscripted for me told me the following concerning the local tyrant most hated by these peasants: "Because it was made known at our country fair a few days ago that the Red Army was coming, the 30 or so families from our village which had been harmed by District Head Li secretly planned to keep a watch on Li's activities. On the morning of the day before yesterday when the Defence Corps withdrew from Wenmingsi, over 100 men and women from these 30 families captured District Head Li in a village over ten kilometres from town. At noon of the same day, they turned Li over to the Headquarters of the Red Army. Also, they led a company of the army in securing some 20 rifles and handguns belonging to the Defence Corps. Currently, 51 people from these families are members of the Red Army." "Only when the Red Army is here," he continued, "can we poor people enjoy a means of subsistence. For example, a porter like myself can earn a silver dollar in two days and in addition we are paid ten day's wages in advance so that we can support our families. Over the past two days, 88 people from the two villages in my hometown became porters for the Red Army." Peasants with such a deep faith in the Communist Party can be found not only in one location but in all the cities, towns and villages we passed in southern Hunan when we crossed the Xiangjiang River in the vicinity of Quanzhou. All this made me feel all the more that it would be no easy job to suppress the Communists.

The Red Army won the support of the people not only because of popular policies and efforts to "expropriate local tyrants and distribute land" and to "confiscate grain from local tyrants and evil gentry and distribute it to the peasants," but also because the army observed discipline. Mao and Zhu's Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, which I cannot recall here in detail, were really observed by Red Army soldiers. For example, when the Red Army was in Yanshouxu, which is a large town in southern Hunan Province, and in the city of Yizhang, the Soviet Bank notes which the army used could be cashed daily. Therefore, except for the shops of a few big shopkeepers who had fled for fear of being suspected of being local tyrants or evil gentry, all other shops there remained open and did three times more business than usual. This is something I had never seen at times when the Nanjing troops, for whom I had served for

many years, marched through or were stationed in remote areas. Because of serious sectarianism in the provinces over the legitimacy of Central Bank notes, the bank did not have branches in many areas. Because of this, often the bank notes could not be cashed. When Kuomintang troops arrived in an area, the officer would issue an order that the Central Bank notes should be circulated in the market, but there were no agencies to honour these notes. This raised doubts concerning Central Bank notes among businessmen. And the troops' failure to observe discipline left a particularly bad impression on the residents.

I also felt profoundly that the Kuomintang and its troops lacked yet another characteristic. When the Red Army passed through Yizhang, over 400 workers were engaged in construction of the Guangzhou-Wuchang Railway. This railway is still not completed and is now open only to motor vehicles. Among those workers there were several members of the Communist Party who had been carrying out clandestine activities for a few years. Also, there was a student who had been sent by the Party to conduct activities among railway construction workers. When the Red Army reached this location, all of these workers joined the army. When I passed by this place, I saw the former construction workers drilling with rifles under the supervision of the Red Army officers. The communist student, who had been building the railway for some years, had become a political commissar. The Red Army has a political commissar with great powers in every unit at the battalion level or higher. He was delivering a speech to the former construction workers. This vividly reminded me how, when the National Revolutionary Army carried out the Northern Expedition, the people in various localities responded with full support. Consequently, the Northern Expeditionary Army smashed all resistance triumphantly. Since breaking with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang has had nothing like the popular support for the Northern Expedition. On the contrary, most people throughout the country are disappointed with the Kuomintang. The Communists are unpretentiously immersing themselves in hard work, whereas members of the Kuomintang are scrambling for fame and gain only. I have never seen anyone in the Kuomintang working very conscientiously under Japanese forces in the Three Northeastern Provinces. I keenly feel that as the Communist Party enjoys the full support of Chinese society, the attempt to suppress and wipe out the Communists will never succeed.

When the Red Army crossed the Xiangjiang River, this completely foiled any attempts of Xue and Zhou's troops and of the Guangxi Army to blockade the Red Army and made it extremely difficult for them to continue their pursuit because after the Red Army crossed the Xiangjiang River it

ascended the Xiyang Mountain Range.¹¹¹ This range consists of rolling hills, and so the pursuing troops were not able to encircle the Red Army. Red Army rear guards resisted the pursuers every step of the way while the vanguards marched westward towards the Hunan-Guizhou border.

The Red Army was able to cross the Xiyang Mountain Range without suffering any losses in this sparsely populated area of tall mountains because both its officers and men had developed industriousness and stamina, virtues which the National Army does not possess.

Laoshanjie in the Xiyang Mountain Range was the first tall mountain I climbed in over a decade. Qianjiasi was at the foot of Laoshanjie. I remember it was in the afternoon when the General Public Health Department reached Qianjiasi. Soon after taking a break and having a meal there, we began to climb the mountain. After we travelled ten kilometres, we reached a small village of seven or eight households. The sun was about to set, so the conscripted labourers and grooms were busying themselves preparing torches. It was not long before it became dark, but the troops marched on. Some of the troops did not have torches because they had not been able to secure enough torch material in such a small village. They had to grope their way very slowly in the dark. Marching at the front of the Sixth Company, I almost always had to pause briefly after each step. It was cold and there were strong winds on this tall mountain. Spring water was racing downward at the foot of the mountain like 10,000 galloping horses. We were tired, but we had to keep alert because the road was very narrow — it was only one foot¹¹² wide. One nurse travelled in the dark without a torch. As his eyes were blurred by tiredness, all of a sudden he slipped and tumbled down into a ditch. A messenger was immediately ordered to carry a torch slowly down to the ditch; he had to brace his descent using the roots of trees. The nurse was found covered with mud and unable to speak. This was a warning to the others to walk slowly and cautiously. Because the march was so slow, those who had prepared torches in the afternoon had now already burned up two or three of these. Later on, not a single torch could be seen in looking forward or backward; only a few scattered barn lanterns were seen moving. The troops began to walk more and more slowly. They would stop for five to ten minutes after taking a few steps. They were neither really walking nor really resting. It was already two o'clock in the morning when the oral directive of the commander was passed on to us from the front: "All companies may encamp where they are and their cooks should go to the front to prepare food." Immediately we passed this message on to those behind us, "Tell those behind you...." We were so exhausted that we fell to the ground at random, covered ourselves with sheets and fell asleep regardless of whether the ground

was wet or dry. Nowhere else and at no other time could we have had a better rest. In less than two minutes we were asleep and the sounding of snoring could be heard.

In the morning before daybreak reveille was sounded. We arose and ate breakfast. Everyone took a lunch for the day's journey. According to the local residents, Tangzhuang was still 30 kilometres away and we still had to pass through 20 kilometres of mountain.

It was truly a towering mountain, so the troops could not climb quickly. Your feet hurt and you had to pant for breath even if you were not carrying anything. It was really no easy job for the conscripted labourers carrying two baskets on a shoulder pole which could weigh up to 17.5 kilograms.

The General Political Department of the Red Army was marching ahead of the General Public Health Department. Two top officials of the Soviet Central Government, Lin Zuhan¹¹³ and Xu Teli, were among the ranks of the General Political Department. So I would see them from time to time. The other day when I was climbing Laoshanjie Mountain, I saw Lin and Xu, also ascending the mountain on foot. Lin Zuhan, Minister of Finance of the Soviet Central Government, had worked together with Sun Yat-sen to found the Chinese Revolutionary League and to lead the Revolution of 1911. Lin had been a Communist Party representative to the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition. He was the person who worked out all financial plans for the Red area. Lin was about 50 years old; he had white hair and a rosy complexion. He was still very healthy because he usually travelled by foot; he rode a horse only 18 days during the march over the past eight months or so. Xu Teli was Vice-Minister of Education; he was over 50 years old. At the time that the Red Army left Jiangxi Province, Xu had one horse. But halfway through the march, he offered it to injured soldiers under the care of the Public Health Department when he learned that they had no donkeys or horses to ride and thereafter he travelled on foot. Lin and Xu lived simply and were still at their age full of vigor and vitality. There were no important persons in the Nanjing Government comparable to these two men.

Laoshanjie Mountain was very tall. In arriving close to a peak, it would appear that this was the last climb lying ahead, but when we were at the top of that one, we would perceive another even taller summit towering ahead of us. We crossed these peaks one after another, gasping for breath and sweating profusely. Suddenly, we could hear the faint sound of singing from a gramophone. "God damn you Mao Yanshou. You are a traitor...." When the record finished playing, we heard a song: "Comrades, arise and take up weapons. We are the armed forces of the people. We are determined to

overthrow the imperialists and the Kuomintang....” This turned out to be the publicity team of the General Political Department who were singing in a shed in order to build the soldiers’ morale and help them forget their fatigue. Next to this shed on a rock were these words written in chalk: “Comrades, try hard! There are 25 *li* left to reach the top.” “Let’s have a contest and see who will get there first.” The recorded songs and the one song in the shed did inspire us. The young nurses in the ranks also began to sing, “God damn you, so and so,¹¹⁴ you traitor.... How can you surrender to the Japanese with no conscience?” Others responded, “Having crushed the tortoiseshell of the Kuomintang, we are so happy....” With that, we marched on. We ascended 12 peaks before reaching the summit. At the pinnacle of the mountain we were in high spirits and quite jubilant. It was four o’clock in the afternoon when we finally reached the summit of this 80-*li* tall mountain.

We were expecting it to be a distance of 12 *li* from the top of Laoshanjie to Tangzhuang, but it actually turned out to be 35 *li*. So we walked on for a distance in the dark and then took up quarters at Tangzhuang for the night.

The 80-*li* tall Laoshanjie Mountain is not so tall when compared with the mountains the Red Army would later cross. Still, it was no easy task for the Red Army to march over this tall mountain without resting for two days and two nights and not lose any personnel — all of the injured soldiers being cared for by the Public Health Department were there too. But this was accomplished because the soldiers were united and because the Political Department made every effort to help alleviate the soldiers’ fatigue and boost their morale by, among other things, using this shed for publicity.

The Red Army met with many difficulties in the area of the Xiyan Mountain Range. One of the most serious difficulties was that wherever the army went, the houses and grain of the villages and towns had been burned. Who on earth had done that? At first there were rumors among the people that the Red Army who started the fires. But I could not believe this because many of the towns were ablaze before the Red Army arrived. And would the Red Army cause themselves such difficulties? If houses and grain were destroyed, there would be no place to rest nor food, right? Afterwards, the whole thing came to light when the Red Army was quartered in the town of Guangnanzhai (located in northwestern Longsheng County, Guangxi Province). The General Public Health Department gathered outside the town one morning to set out. At that time, three houses were seen to be burning. It was obvious that someone had set these fires. General Public Health Department Commander He Cheng ordered the garrisoned soldiers to search the town. Seven or eight persons wearing Red Army uniforms were caught. They

spoke with a Guangxi accent. They confessed that they had been sent by the Longsheng County government to burn down houses for two silver dollars per day. The purpose was to deprive the Red Army of places to rest and food, and also to arouse resentment for the Red Army among the local people. Having been asked where they had obtained their uniforms, they answered that the county government had captured some Red Army soldiers who had fallen behind, taken their uniforms and killed them. These uniforms were then provided for those who were sent to set fires in order that they might impersonate Red Army soldiers. The men had already set fires in several villages and towns. They were pretending to be Red Army troops who had fallen behind the ranks, trailing behind the Red Army from day to day. Sometimes they pretended to be Red Army scouts and set fires before the Red Army arrived.

General Public Health Department Chief He Cheng was very resourceful. After hearing what these men said, he ordered his soldiers to extinguish the fires. When the fires were out, he called together the townspeople and ordered those who had impersonated Red Army soldiers to confess to the townspeople what they had been doing. The townspeople began striking these men. He Cheng stopped them and said, "The Guangxi warlords and bureaucrats are trying to frame the Red Army, and it is cruel of them to destroy your home. We Red Army soldiers are very sympathetic and have helped you with the fires. Moreover, we will provide relief funds which were confiscated from local tyrants to those whose houses have been destroyed. You can get the money over there. What are you going to do with these arsonists?" Following He Cheng's address hundreds of local people responded in solidarity that they should be put to death. The arsonists were dragged outside the town. All of the townspeople went along. They soon returned to secure their money, which was distributed at a table. Moments later, 50 or 60 young people approached He Cheng and said, "We want to join the Red Army." Over 100 persons signed up to join at that time.

From this occurrence I surmised that although the leader of the Guangxi Army, Bai Chongxi may have been known as "little Zhuge Liang," the master mind, he had acted unwisely and cruelly in his effort to discredit the Red Army by sending these arsonists. What happened in the town of Guangnanzhai could only cause the people to hate the local authorities all the more and this would assist the Red Army in gaining support.

The Red Army marched northwestward from Guangnanzhai to Lianghekou¹¹⁵ and then to Niupishan. The two columns under the command of Xue and Zhou and most of the Hunan Army gathered in Chengbu, Suining, Jingxian and Huitong counties to prevent the Red Army from

marching northward to join forces with He Long and Xiao Ke's troops. Units of the Guangxi Army were guarding border areas between Guangxi and Hunan to prevent the Red Army from marching southward. Other units were pursuing the Red Army. At that time, Red Army vanguard units were occupying Tongdao County and began marching directly towards Liping, Guizhou Province.

Two divisions of Hou Zhidan's troops were defending eastern and northern Guizhou Province. Hou Zhidan was one of the three leaders of Guizhou Province (the others were Wang Jialie and You Guocai). Although he had two divisions, his weapons had all been produced locally at the Chishui munitions factory; he had no modern weaponry. So his troops were at a disadvantage in confronting the Red Army under the command of Mao and Zhu. Because of this, the Red Army was able to occupy Jinping, Liuji,¹¹⁶ Jianhe and Taigong¹¹⁷ by moving along different routes. They reached Zhenyuan and took control of the highway leading to Guiyang. Hou Zhidan's troops lost battle after battle and finally retreated to the bank of the Wujiang River. The Red Army also defeated Wang Jialie's troops in Xinhuangping which then fled the town. By that time, the Red Army had occupied all of Zhenyuan, Shibing and Huangping.

While the Red Army was moving from Hunan to Guizhou, it seized considerable amounts of ammunition. One of Hou Zhidan's divisions surrendered their weapons. Hou lost three cities in secession, Liping, Huangping and Zhenyuan. The Red Army purchased all the clothing in stock whenever they occupied a city. They were winning battle after battle. Red Army soldiers were high spirited and were by then wearing new uniforms. The fatigue they had experienced in western Hunan Province had been swept away.

The people of Guizhou Province were extremely poor. For those of us who have been living in Jiangsu Province or Zhejiang Province, it is difficult to imagine what their lives were like. In winter, the peasants wore shabby unlined clothes. Peasants owned one plain garment only, which had been sown and mended many times, and in midwinter their children did not have a stitch on. As we marched by, we could see children standing on the roadside shivering. The only way for those people to keep out the cold was to warm themselves by a fire. As the saying goes, "Heaven never seals off all the exits." In this poor locality, coal was sold everywhere. A ton of anthracite, worth over 30 yuan in Shanghai, was sold here for only one string of coins, and one silver dollar could be converted into more than 20 strings of coins. Upon reaching a village in Jianhe County, we saw an old woman and a child dressed in rags lying by the roadside, but still alive. On inquiry, we

discovered that the woman was a local peasant. After the autumn harvest, she had to give all of the rice they had reaped to a country gentleman as land rent and so she had to beg for food all day long. Because it had become cold suddenly that day and she had not eaten since morning, she lay on the roadside. While we were inquiring about this, Mao Zedong, the leader of the Red Army, came over and was informed what the old woman had told us. Mao Zedong took off a woollen sweater and took a quilt from his luggage to give the old woman and then had a soldier give her one *dou* of rice. The old woman expressed her thanks and left contentedly.

There were many Miao people in each county of eastern Guizhou. I had seen the photos of Miao people and their villages which were carried in *Oriental Magazine* and in articles on travel, but this time I saw them with my own eyes and lived with them in their homes. The Miao people called themselves the Miao ethnic group; they called the Han people the Han ethnic group. The Han have always bullied the Miao, so there were often disputes between Miao and Han people. Miao people here wore the same kind of clothing as the Han. The dress of Miao women was similar to the long garments with broad brims and sleeves worn by the Han people at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China. The language spoken by Miao people was entirely different from the Chinese language, but most Miao people could also speak Chinese. Miao people enjoyed practicing martial arts and would carry sharp swords. The Miao people in eastern Guizhou had coexisted with the Han for a very long time. Their houses were constructed of plank covered with straw or pine bark and they were usually encircled with wooden fences. Miao people lived on maize and sometimes on rice. They did not store rice; they kept their unhusked rice in a bin built in trees and each day they husked the rice they would eat.

As soon as the Red Army entered Guizhou, it wholeheartedly conducted activities among the Han and Miao people. It won the support of the Miao people because it carried out publicity on the equality of all ethnic groups, the liberation of the Miao people and opposition to the oppression of Miao people by Guizhou warlords. The Red Army also incited the Miao and Han peoples to go to the homes of district office chiefs and the like who were oppressing them and confiscate their property and rice to distribute among themselves. The Red Army sometimes captured guns from the local armed corps and distributed them among Miao people. It was always cautious to keep on good terms with Miao people and to provide them with various benefits. For example, when the Red Army was in Liping, the Political Department instructed Red Army soldiers to maintain perfect discipline in areas inhabited by Miao people and each soldier was asked to prepare one

gift for a Miao person.

Red Army publicity had a great influence indeed on ordinary poor Han and Miao people in Guizhou Province. When Xiao Ke and his troops traversed Guizhou to western Hunan, they impressed the local Han and Miao people quite favourably. Because of this, when the Red Army under the command of Zhu and Mao arrived here, the Han and Miao people did not flee, rather, many of them joined the Red Army and some Miao inquired of Red Army soldiers when it might be possible for them to lead a peaceful life. Thanks to the support of the Han and Miao people, the Red Army did not go hungry in this impoverished region.

The poor Han and Miao people in Guizhou were open to the publicity of the Red Army because the Red Army soldiers conducted activities among these people whereas corrupt local officials, local tyrants and evil gentry there had only perpetrated misdeeds. People from Jiangsu and Zhejiang had no idea how cruelly the warlords had been oppressing the people of Guizhou. The Kuomintang army forced men into military service, imposed exorbitant taxes and levies, and forced peasants to grow “tobacco seedlings,”¹¹⁸ which in effect resulted in starvation among these people even though they farmed all year long. When the Red Army entered Guizhou, Hou Zhidan had twice forced the peasants to pay taxes to be used to suppress the Red Army. The Kuomintang army did not protect the local people; they only did them harm. Because of this, the Communist Party was able to elicit popular support.

When we entered Guizhou we immediately perceived three conditions besides the poverty of the local people of which those who lived along the Yangtze River basin had no idea. First, opium was grown everywhere. Second, it drizzled every day. Third, there were tall mountains everywhere; we could see neither level land like that of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces nor stretches of plain as in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Because of this, the following words had been inscribed on a map depicting the situation in Guizhou: “There are never three sunny days in a row, three *li* of level land, nor anyone to be found possessing three *fen* of silver.” This was all true. For two months we never experienced three sunny days in succession.

The Wujiang River Campaign was the first fierce battle that the Red Army fought after entering Guizhou. Hou Zhidan’s army was guarding the north bank of the Wujiang River. The Red Army first occupied Yuqing and Weng’an and then marched to Houchang on the bank of the Wujiang River. Houchang was one of the four thriving markets of northern Guizhou. When I arrived in Houchang, the Red Army had been there for three days. This was right at the solar calendar New Year and Red Army slogans and notices were posted everywhere. Each soldier had been given an allowance to

celebrate the New Year, so shops and peddlers were tripling their earnings. People here could give an account of how Xiao Ke's Red Army had proceeded through Houchang. At that time, because the Red Army had not yet succeeded in driving out Hou Zhidan's troops at the north bank of the Wujiang River, Red Army follow-up units rested in Houchang. On the second day, I saw an old man bringing a sick man into town. On inquiry, I discovered the sick man to be a native of Lianhua, Jiangxi Province. He was a Red Army soldier in Xiao Ke's unit who had been left behind at the home of a local resident because of illness. Now he was feeling well and wanted to rejoin the Red Army under the command of Zhu [De] and Mao [Zedong]. Thereafter, he was taken to Red Army Headquarters. Seeing this, I came to understand that Red Army soldiers had strong faith in the Communist Party.

On the third day, Red Army troops marched to Jiangjiehe on the bank of the Wujiang River and found that the Wujiang River would now present an obstacle to their continued movement. There were tall mountains and precipices on either bank of the river, and this river was much wider than the Xiangjiang River. The current was swift, moving at three *mite*¹¹⁹ per second. Without the use of a boat, the Red Army constructed a floating bridge of bamboo. The bridge could not support soldiers and their luggage at the same time, and a distance of one metre had to be maintained between any two soldiers while crossing. The Red Army later captured a boat and used it to transport radios, machinery and horses. As we traversed the floating bamboo bridge, we were fearful at the sight of the swiftly flowing water. After we reached the northern bank of the river, we began ascending tall mountains. From a strategic location in the mountains, a place that had been difficult to reach, we were able to view Hou Zhidan's fortifications.

The General Medical Department stretcher team transported seven wounded Red Army soldiers and two wounded Guizhou army soldiers. As I was treating their wounds, I asked a soldier who was not seriously wounded about the battle. He gave this account of what had taken place.

Hou Zhidan's troops were holding their fortifications on the north bank of the river. The Red Army approached the bank before dawn under cover of trees and bamboo forest. Then the Red Army fired on them from the opposite bank with machine guns and mortars, and was at once fired upon in return. The enemy's machine guns, both light and heavy, had all been produced at the Chishui munitions factory; those weapons had a short range and could not reach the south bank of the river, so, immediately after constructing several bamboo rafts, the Red Army rushed to the river. Some of the engineers and infantrymen attempted to cross the river in these bamboo rafts, but the water coursed too swiftly and the two rafts were washed

down river, but this did not deter them. Six or seven bamboo rafts then attempted a crossing together. On this attempt, six rafts were able to reach the northern bank. The Red Army immediately went ashore, drove out the enemy troops there and occupied their fortifications. Hou Zhidan's troops retreated into the mountains to guard their strongholds, firing downward. By that time, the Red Army held all the fortifications on the north bank and continued their crossing over using on bamboo rafts. About three hours later, the Red Army made the ingenious military move of shipping a regiment of its soldiers to the north bank from a location six kilometres further up the river. There troops then launched a flank attack on Hou Zhidan's troops at lower reaches of the river and also a surprise attack on his follow-up units. Thereupon, a number of Hou Zhidan's troops laid down their arms while others broke out of encirclement to retreat to Tuanxi¹²⁰ and Zunyi. The Red Army then constructed a bridge and pursued the enemy. Liu Bocheng was the Red Army officer in charge of the Wujiang River Campaign. He was well-known in Sichuan for having once defeated Wu Peifu,¹²¹ and he enjoyed much prestige in the Sichuan army. He became a member of the Communist Party in Sichuan and after the Kuomintang and the Communist Party split, he led the Sichuan army in an uprising in Luzhou.

After the Red Army crossed the Wujiang River, Hou Zhidan's remaining troops could no longer sustain any resistance. After successfully occupying Tuanxi, the Red Army kept pursuing, attacking and finally by three o'clock in the morning of the third day it had control of Zunyi. Meanwhile, Red Army troops taking the rightward route entered Meitan and Suiyang while those on the middle route captured Tongzi and Songkanchang on the Sichuan-Guizhou border. The Sichuan army brigade under the command of Liao Ze was defeated. It looked like the Red Army might enter Chongqing following this victory. Immediately, the rich people of Chongqing began to panic, and the *huishui*¹²² from Sichuan Province to Shanghai increased by 70 percent, a reflection of just how uneasy people were feeling. But after wiping out Hou Zhidan's troops, the Red Army did not march on. It rested in Zunyi, Tongzi, Meitan and in Suiyang.

The Red Army's entrance into northern Guizhou benefited it considerably.

First, in defeating Hou Zhidan's two divisions, the Red Army had been able to seize most of their guns and ammunition. This replenishment of arms and ammunition enabled the Red Army in entering Zunyi for the second time to defeat the two divisions under the command of Wang Jialie and Xue Yue's two divisions which had been dispatched by the Nanjing government to pursue and wipe out the Red Army. Many warlords were being destroyed

while trying to suppress the Red Army. Originally they were engaged in savagely oppressing the people but now, in encountering the Red Army, these troops were defeated or wiped out and their guns and ammunition were captured. On account of this, the Red Army called the Nanjing government and the Kuomintang officers of various provinces “chiefs of the transport corps,” and it called generalissimo Chiang [Kai-shek] “commander in chief of transport.” This was extremely caustic.

Second, the Red Army benefited by being able to rest in northern Guizhou for 12 days. The 12-day rest helped the Red Army recover from the stresses they had experienced in Hunan and to brace themselves for the future. In future battles the Red Army would demonstrate that it could still maneuver effectively and with great vigor.

The reason why the Red Army could rest for 12 days at that time was that the four armies under the command of Xue [Yue] and Zhou [Hunyuan] which had been dispatched by the Nanjing government to suppress the Red Army had hurriedly entered Guiyang and were unwilling to attack the Red Army for fear of weakening themselves. Local Warlords, however, like Hou Zhidan, Wang Jialie and others met their doom. Xue Yue used these warlord troops to engage the Red Army, in effect utilizing the Red Army to eliminate them.

A third benefit was that the Red Army received popular support. In eastern Guizhou the Red Army exhibited much more orderly behaviour than what Hou Zhidan’s troops had done. This was obvious to the people. Merchants would not flee at the approach of the Red Army. Moreover, students from technical training centres for orphans, those from other schools, merchants and poor people gathered in crowds and held banners to welcome the Red Army. These read: “Welcome Chairman Mao of the Soviet Government” and “Welcome Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army.” This mood was so contagious that Zhu and Mao entered Zunyi amid the sound of fire crackers and cries of welcome. After shaking hands with the welcoming party one by one on open ground in front of the city gate, Zhu and Mao made some remarks for these people, expressed their thanks for the welcome and related how the Red Army wanted to relieve the suffering of people of Guizhou.

On the third day, the Red Army held a meeting with the common people at the No. 3 Secondary School playground. Zhu and Mao were present at this meeting. About 10,000 workers, peasants, students and merchants holding flags attended the meeting. Zhu De spoke energetically on the Red Army’s Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention and said that the Red Army was willing to unite with people throughout the

country from all walks of life and with all Chinese troops in the effort to resist Japanese aggression. Mao Zedong exclaimed vigorously that the Soviet regime would not collect exorbitant taxes and levies and spoke about democratic elections and resistance to Japanese aggression.

Red Army's publicity had a great effect on the people of Guizhou Province. At this meeting the Red Army established a revolutionary committee, and dozens of students, workers, peasants, merchants and people from various educational circles were elected as members, some of whom addressed the public. Within a few days after the revolutionary committee was established, a group was founded consisting of several hundred people to support refusal to pay levies. They were to ferret out corrupt officials, confiscate their property and then summon the people with gongs and distribute the property to those gathered on the spot. Soon thereafter over one thousand poor people converged in the courtyard of the county office where the General Political Department had taken up headquarters to receive clothing confiscated from local tyrants.

The Red Army conducted publicity work and recruited soldiers. Indeed, four to five thousand men joined the Red Army over a period of 12 days. All of them were poor people or ex-servicemen from Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. They were quite familiar with local conditions and in this they were able to assist the Red Army considerably. Later with great assistance from these new recruits, the Red Army under Zhu and Mao was able to wage battles continuously in various areas in northern Guizhou.

The Red Army dealt with matters quickly, something which I had not observed in the Kuomintang army. The day after the Red Army entered Zunyi, its clothing factory, a weapon repair center and a grain processing plant were already in operation. Uniforms for new recruits were distributed promptly and the repair of old guns was quickly accomplished.

At that time, there were about three hundred sick and wounded soldiers under the care of the General Medical Department. During the period that the Red Army rested in northern Guizhou, eight-tenth of these soldiers recovered and were released from hospital. Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, visited the wards of the General Medical Department, expressed his sympathy for the sick and wounded soldiers and talked for half an hour with the Red Army soldiers who had been wounded in the Wujiang River Campaign. At that time, the General Medical Department was caring for two of Hou Zhidan's men who were captured during the Wujiang River Campaign. Zhu De had a brief talk with these soldiers also and told them to set aside their worries and to have a good rest.

At the time that the Red Army rested, I was free to stroll through the

whole of Zunyi. Zunyi was the communications hub of northern Guizhou. To the north the road led to Songkanchang on the boundary of Sichuan; by going southward from Zunyi and crossing the Wujiang River you could reach Guiyang directly. Zunyi was an important location which linked Guizhou Province to Chongqing in Sichuan Province. Because Zunyi was close to the Sichuan border, the customs, habits and commerce were similar to those in Sichuan. Zunyi had old and new sections. The new section was a commercial district; the old section was where the government offices and residential quarters were located. There was a stone bridge over a small river linking these two sections. At that time, Red Army soldiers took up residence in Zunyi's government offices and temples. The Red Army's General Headquarters where Zhu and Mao stayed in the old section had been the residence of Bai Huizhang, the Division Commander of the Guizhou army. There were five to six secondary schools in the whole of Zunyi, but Red Army soldiers did not take up residence in these schools in order not to interfere with young people's education, even though no students were attending school at that time. The Red Army was paying special attention to young students and had sent people ahead to organize an anti-Japanese association for national salvation, a Red Army support association and other organizations. Because this had been done, on the first day that the Red Army entered the town, dozens of boy and girl secondary school students were carrying flags on the street and making addresses in support of the Red Army. When I walked to the No. 3 Secondary School, I saw a school team and a Red Army team playing a basketball match on the playground. The Red Army soldiers played skillfully because of their excellent physical training. The Red Army tried every means to motivate young students. From all this it was evident that the Red Army gave great consideration to working with students.

I recall one episode in particular. At the time that Red Army established the revolutionary committee in Zunyi, a female student by the name of Li Xiaoxia who was about 20 years old expressed her sympathy with the Red Army and spoke at the meeting. Later she was elected as a member of the revolutionary committee. She was socially adept at relating to the local students. When the Red Army left Zunyi, Li Xiaoxia accompanied it. I heard that after the Guizhou army entered Zunyi, Li Xiaoxia's whole family, including her seventy-year-old grandmother, her parents and her younger brother were shot by Wang Jialie's troops. So when the Red Army returned to Zunyi, Li Xiaoxia was no longer able to be with them. Thereafter she involved herself actively in revolutionary activities. Later I heard that when the Red Army was pressing on towards Guiyang, Li Xiaoxia slipped into the city to plot against the Kuomintang. I have now lost track of this Red Army

woman soldier from northern Guizhou.

As I would stroll through the whole of Zunyi, I noticed three kinds of shops, all with many customers. First, there were shops with foreign goods. All the shoes and towels had been sold out. Second, there were three bookstores where magazines from Shanghai and Nanjing were sometimes sold. In these three bookstores all the new and secondhand books, pencils and notebooks were sold out. Third, there were restaurants whose earnings at that time were tripling. The restaurants in Zunyi offered mainly Sichuan cuisine. I went to a restaurant with three others and we had Sichuan-style dishes including twice-cooked pork with chili seasoning, chili chicken and all kinds of pickled vegetables, all of which were very inexpensive.

When the Red Army was in Zunyi the shops operated normally because all the Red Army's Soviet paper money could be cashed on the same day it was received. The Red Army confiscated a salt company worth several hundred thousand yuan which was owned by Wang Jialie, governor of Guizhou Province. It also intercepted a shipment of Baijinlong cigarettes worth fifty thousand yuan which Wang Jialie had ordered from the Shanghai Nanyang Tobacco Company to be used as gifts to reward Xue Yue's troops at the lunar calendar Spring Festival. The Red Army distributed some of the salt and cigarettes to the poor people of Zunyi and Tongzi and sold the remainder. People could use one Red Army silver dollar to buy 3.5 kg of salt and four tins of Baijinlong cigarettes, which was much cheaper than usual.

After the Red Army had rested in northern Guizhou for 12 days, it traversed Tongzi and Xishui, crossed the Chishui River at Tucheng and marched into southern Sichuan.

Tongzi County was a gateway from northern Guizhou into Sichuan. The county town was not large; it was only about 0.5 km from north to south, but it had one unforgettable characteristic. Tongzi had been the hometown of Guizhou's military and administrative elite for many years, so there were dozens of magnificent and quite beautiful Western-style buildings to be seen. In contrast, there were numerous shabby thatched cottages next to these buildings. Important military and government officials used to travel easily to Zunyi or to the border of Sichuan by car, but the poor would have to carry goods in baskets on their backs, toil throughout the year, yet still went hungry. Porters and peddlers in Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces did not use shoulder poles; they carried baskets right on their backs. The difference between the rich and the poor was very great.

A wide road led to Tucheng in Chishui County from Tongzi and Liangcun. There was a roadbed for motor vehicles in several stretches of the road. However, this was one of the poorest roads in China. When we went

by, it was snowing. The road was wet and slippery, making it difficult to march. When I was on my way to the tall mountains beyond Tongzi's western gate, I saw Mao Zedong, the leader of the Red Army, approaching the mountains carrying a bamboo stick. There was mud all the way up to his knees and he was stained all over with mud. I thought that he must have fallen.

The Red Army built floating bridges at Tucheng and Taipingdu to facilitate crossing the Chishui River from these towns and then advanced towards the area south of Gulin, from where we entered Sichuan Province. Later the Red Army marched westward along the upper reaches of the Chishui River on the border between Sichuan and Guizhou, travelling on smaller roads than it had traversed in Hunan and Guizhou provinces on its westward march. In particular, the small road at Lianghe'ai was most precipitous. It was a distance of 15 km from Lianghe'ai to Weixin County. There were ditches between precipices and people could pass through mountains only on small paths which had been made through the cliffs. If five feet of these paths had been destroyed, the army would not have been able to pass. Braving untold difficulties, the Red Army reached Weixin County, formerly called Zhaxi, on the border of Yunnan and Guizhou. The Red Army arrived at Weixin on the third day of the first month of the lunar year¹²³ and rested there for one day. It was bitterly cold and it snowed that night.

There was an ethnic problem in Yunnan, where the Han people were being oppressed by the Yi. Long Yun¹²⁴ was of the Yi nationality, and the high-ranking officers in the army and the government of Yunnan were all of this ethnic group. A Yunnan county magistrate who had graduated from Peking University approached the commander of the Red Army before it reached Weixin and expressed his willingness to lead the local civil corps and enlist the civil corps of other counties to assist the Red Army in attacking Yunnan so as to help free the Han people from oppression by the Yi. Upon arriving in this area, the Red Army originated a slogan about emancipating all ethnic groups. This was aimed at obtaining support from the Han, Hui and Miao people. Sometime later, the Red Army's Ninth Army Group under the command of Luo Binghui¹²⁵ was campaigning in Bijie, Xuanwei and in Dongchuan. Luo, a secret Party member, was a native of Yunnan who had for a long time served in the Yunnan Army under Zhu Depei's command. While serving as commander of the civil corps in Ji'an in Jiangxi, he led several hundred civil corpsmen in joining the Red Army. About five to six thousand Han, Hui and Miao people joined, which shocked the whole of Yunnan. A rumor began circulating among the people of Yunnan that a Red

Army commander named Luo of the Miao ethnic group was going to return to drive Long Yun out of Yunnan. Luo's name was by that time well-known among the people. The Red Army opposed any oppression of Han, Hui or Miao people by Long Yun and some Yi People and among the ordinary Yi people gave publicity to the idea of equality among ethnic groups and opposition to Han chauvinism.

The Red Army planned to march westward from Weixin and to enter Sichuan after crossing the Niulan River, but after resting one day in Weixin they decided to go eastward. They did not want to risk crossing the river at that time because of the situation. The Sichuan and Guizhou armies had not expected the Red Army to return suddenly to northern Guizhou. The Sichuan Army had been marching rapidly westward on the northern bank in pursuit of the Red Army to try to block it along the river. When the Sichuan Army discovered that the Red Army had suddenly moved from Weixin to a point east of the Chishui River, it also turned about, but by that time the Red Army had already crossed the Chishui River and had taken Tongzi and Loushanguan. The Red Army succeeded because it was flexible, a tactical approach characteristic of Zhu De and Mao Zedong. That was why Mao was called "Zhuge Liang" by the Red Army soldiers.

The Red Army won a great battle after returning to Tongzi and Zunyi in northern Guizhou, one of the notable victories the Red Army enjoyed after breaking out of encirclement in Jiangxi. This campaign appeared to have been very well planned by the Red Army. On the day the Red Army took Tongzi, a field hospital was immediately set up and I was sent there by He Cheng to take in wounded soldiers. That afternoon at Loushanguan, the Red Army clashed with two divisions under Wang Jialie's command which had come from Zunyi to attack it. Wang's troops launched several attacks on Loushanguan but were defeated by the troops defending the city. The Red Army used its main forces to outflank the enemy on both sides and occupied the town of Banqiao on the Zunyi-Tongzi Road behind Wang's troops, thus cutting off any possible retreat. Then, the Red Army's defending troops at Loushanguan fired down on Wang's troops, who were at this point unable to hold on any longer. Having been encircled by the Red Army, most of the troops of the two divisions laid down their arms and only a few escaped. In pursuing the enemy, the Red Army launched fierce attacks and took both the new and old sections of Zunyi by three o'clock in the morning. It was reported that Wang Jialie, the Division Commander Bai Huizhang and several attendants fled. Wang Jialie lost all of his troops; before long he was forced to relinquish power and left Guizhou.

The field hospital was moved into Zunyi along with the Red Army. On

the morning of the following day fierce fighting began once again. Two divisions of Xue Yue's army commanded by Wu Qiwei attacked the Red Army. In marching northward from Guiyang, they had planned to reinforce Wang's troops after crossing the Wujiang River. They could not have expected that Wang's troops would be defeated so quickly. As Wang Jialie and his attendants were retreating to Lanbandeng¹²⁶ (30 km away from Zunyi), they met Wu's troops and informed them of their defeat. Thereafter, Wu's troops immediately marched towards Zunyi and at Shilipu (10 km south of Zunyi) engaged the Red Army's Third Group Army under the leadership of Peng Dehuai, who personally commanded the fighting at the battlefield. One hour after the engagement began, Peng Dehuai predicted that most of Wu's two divisions would be captured that same afternoon. Before long, the First Group Army commanded by Lin Biao had outflanked the enemy from the rear by maneuvering a shortcut. At noon, Wu's two divisions had been encircled by the Red Army, who held strategic positions all around. Recognizing his unfavorable situation, Wu Qiwei attempted to retreat, but the Red Army pressed closer and closer while shouting to Wu's troops from all directions to lay down their weapons. With most of his troops now captured, Wu Qiwei and his two remaining regiments broke out of the encirclement at the south in a panic and retreated towards the Wujiang River along the highway. Fortunately for them, the floating bridge had not been dismantled and Wu and his troops began crossing the river. Some extraordinarily courageous Red Army soldiers pursued Wu's troops southward along the highway and others hurried to the bank of the Wujiang River along a mountainous route. This kind of rapid movement was characteristic of the Red Army, who could travel a distance of 50 km through mountainous terrain in eight hours. When the Red Army arrived at the bank of the Wujiang River, Wu Qiwei himself had already crossed the river, but about 1,800 of his troops were still in the process of crossing. Seeing the Red Army arrive, Wu at once ordered that the suspension cables at the south bank of the river for fear that the Red Army might take the bridge and press on to Guiyang. The bridge was immediately destroyed by the river's turbulence and the Red Army was unable to cross the river. Wu's 1,800 troops who had remained on the northern bank of the river were disarmed by the Red Army. It was said that all of Wu's military supplies were seized on the northern bank. After this battle, Zunyi was swarming with captives from the Guizhou and Nanjing Armies. The Red Army organized a special division composed of captives and gave each of them three yuan for having laid down their arms. Communist Party members engaged in publicity work with the prisoners. It was said later that 80 percent of them were persuaded to join

the Red Army. Those who did not want to join were given travel expenses and escorted beyond the cordon of the Red Army. Zhu De personally called together high- and middle-ranking officers who had been captured and talked with them. He consoled them and informed them that the purpose of the Red Army was to resist Japanese aggression and save China. He said he hoped that all Chinese soldiers might cooperate with each other. He related to them that any captured officers were welcome to join the Red Army, but that if they did not want to do so they would be given travel expenses and escorted out of Red Army areas. This was an innovative procedure for dealing with captives, and so the officers who were freed by the Red Army were indeed amazed at their good fortune.

This victory shocked the Nanjing Army and the warlords in Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Hunan. Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan now believed that their military forces had to be redispersed and that the Sichuan Army should not risk forging ahead. The Hunan Army dispatched several divisions which were besieging He Long and Xiao Ke's troops in an attempt to safeguard the eastern bank of the Wujiang River. According to a later Red Army victory report, He Long and Xiao Ke's troops thereafter captured a whole Hunan Army brigade which was under the command of Chen Quzhen. Following the Zunyi victory, Red Army soldiers and low-ranking officers all wanted to engage Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan's troops, saying that it was not good enough just to be able to capture the inadequate weapons of the Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou armies, and that if they could engage the Nanjing Army, they could capture modern weapons and large quantities of ammunition. From this we can see how boastful they were feeling.

The Red Army were able to defeat Wang Jialie and Wu Qiwei's troops because of two factors. One, the Red Army fought tenaciously and had been united. When You Guocai entered Tongzi for the second time, there was a 13-year-old Child Bureau secretary (an activist among the children) in the local working team who had been sent by the Political Department of the Red Army. On his way to Tongzi from Jiangxi, he had been blocked on the mountain near Loushanguan and had lost touch with the Red Army. But this 13-year-old boy was neither afraid nor discouraged. He continued on his difficult journey through the mountains for two days and three nights and at last met up with the Red Army. I heard that the child could not obtain any water during his journey and drank his own urine. This shows how strong the feeling of unity is among Red Army soldiers. The other factor is that there was a large number of new Red Army recruits from Guizhou Province. These soldiers were very angry at the Guizhou authorities for the exorbitant taxes and levies which had made their lives so difficult. This is why they

fought so bravely. Moreover, the new recruits were familiar with the roads in Guizhou. Several times they assisted the Red Army in outflanking Wang Jialie and Wu Qiwei from the rear through utilizing shortcuts. Because of this, Wang and Wu's troops were finally captured. This is how the Red Army could escape heavy losses of personnel while engaging in so many battles. Wherever they went, their fighting capacity could always be strengthened through mobilizing local people.

After the Zunyi victory, the Red Army stationed large forces in Yaxi (30 km southwest of Zunyi), making several attempts to lure Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan's troops and the Sichuan Army into decisive clashes. But Xue and Zhou's troops and the troops of the Sichuan Army under Guo Zunqi, Liao Ze and Pan Zuo were being extremely cautious and would only build blockhouses. Having failed to achieve their strategic goal in northern Guizhou, the Red Army marched quickly to the Wujiang River to attempt a secret crossing and planned to advance south towards Guiyang. The Guiyang authorities were very shocked. When I arrived in Shanghai later, I read in the newspaper that the Guiyang airport had been taken by the Red Army and over 20 airplanes had been destroyed.

At that time I had the idea that the Red Army was going to enter Sichuan after marching south to cross the Wujiang River. But instead they moved east with the intention of feigning an attack on Weng'an and Huangping. The Nanjing Army was heading east and the Yunnan Army was marching out of Yunnan towards Guiyang, so the Red Army advanced along a route between Guiyang and Longli. Feigning an attack on Guiyang, the main force of the Red Army seized Dingfan,¹²⁷ Changzhai,¹²⁸ Ziyun, Zhenfeng, Anlong, Xingyi and other county towns, and then crossed the Beipan River. This initiative fooled Generalissimo Chiang entirely. While the fourth brigade of the Yunnan Army was away in Guizhou, the Red Army took advantage of this easy opportunity to enter Yunnan. Leaving the Nanjing Army, the Sichuan Army, the Guizhou Army and the Yunnan Army behind, the Red Army continued to advance without meeting any resistance, disarming a few Yunnan Army troops, seizing many cities, and in Kunming, cutting off several motor routes to Guizhou. After accomplishing this, they were able to cross the Jinsha River unhurriedly.

Two interesting incidents of amusement to Red Army soldiers occurred after they entered Yunnan. One was that while the Red Army was marching towards Malong after encircling Qujing, they captured a car coming from Kunming in which sat one of Xue Yue adjutants. In the car were many military maps and a well-known *baiyao* useful in the treatment of bullet wounds, which is produced in Yunnan. According to the captured adjutant,

he had been sent by Xue Yue to visit Long Yun. Two days before, Xue Yue sent a telegram requesting Long Yun to send him some military maps. Long Yun planned to send them by plane, but the next day the pilot fell ill, so he used this car, being unaware that Qujing had been encircled and all motor routes were blocked. The car was also loaded with local *baiyao*, Xuanwei hams and famous Pu'er tea. When it was 10 kilometres from Qujing, the car ran into the Red Army. The adjutant and his guards were disarmed, and the military maps, which were not to reach Xue Yue, were used by the Red Army when they crossed the Jinsha River. All of the *baiyao*, hams and tea were consumed by the Red Army. When the Red Army soldiers talked about this incident, they would convulse in laughter.

The other incident occurred when the Red Army entered Songming City and Guandu.¹²⁹ It found itself being welcomed by county magistrates, local army personnel and police leaders, who had no relationship with the Red Army. Yunnan is in southwestern China, people there did know that the Red Army was operating in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Sichuan and in other provinces. But the Red Army soldiers were always been described in official notices as “Red Bandits” who, in the minds of local people, must be like all other bandits — ragged, destitute, poorly equipped individuals who went about looting people. By the time the Red Army arrived here, the local people found that it had not been robbing people along the way; instead, it was well disciplined, acted fairly in any cash dealings, was tidily dressed and had many modern weapons, which was not to be seen in the Yunnan Army. So the local officers and gentry were quite certain that this army must be the Nanjing Army, as it outdid the Yunnan Army in discipline and appearance. The road was lined with a welcoming party who handed out military grain and funds as had been ordered by the provincial government. They had also recruited several hundred porters and a large number of guides to serve the “Nanjing Army.” Pretending to be the “Nanjing Army,” the Red Army accepted all these military supplies and labourers and also attended a grand local banquet. At the banquet, the county magistrate introduced himself, a local director, a civil corps commander and some of the local gentry to a Red Army officer. Then, local leaders asked this “Nanjing Army” officer to give a talk. The officer stood up, shouting “Comrades!” Some of the Red Army soldiers who had been hiding immediately came out and aimed their weapons at the local leaders. The Red Army officer declared: “We are not the Kuomintang’s Nanjing Army, but the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area.” On hearing this, the local leaders looked at each other and turned pale. But the Red Army did nothing further to embarrass them; they just offered a few words to comfort them and then left.

The Red Army immediately called together the several hundred porters and guides who had been sent by the local government, announced that this was not the Nanjing Army but the Red Army, and asked whether these people were paid or forced to serve the Red Army. They all responded that they had been coerced to serve without pay and that their families would soon die of hunger without their help. A Red Army officer immediately responded: "The warlords and bureaucrats in Yunnan have been mistreating you; the Red Army will now let you return home. But if any of you are willing to stay and serve the Red Army, you will be paid a half silver dollar a day plus half a month's salary in advance for your families." More than nine tenths of the porters and guides expressed their willingness to be employed by the Red Army. Only ten or so wished to return home; each of these was given a silver dollar for their journey.

I had a favorable impression of Yunnan. The Red Army soldiers thought that a plateau in western China would have to be very mountainous and difficult to traverse, offering vile weather and inadequate resources. To our surprise, we saw large areas of plain in the northeast. Travelling from Guizhou to Yunnan, the terrain became higher, but it was different from that of Guizhou. On the march towards Yunnan, we saw many tall mountains. Each time we reached a mountain top, we stepped out on a tract of plain from which we would inevitably again face a tall mountain with another plain up higher. The terrain became higher and higher with plains stretching for tens or hundreds of *li* surrounding every county town and city. Local people called these Kunming Bazi, Dali Bazi and Qujing Bazi. The roads in Yunnan were so smooth and wide that they could accommodate mule-drawn carriages, which were most commonly used vehicles in northern China. Here it had been easy to develop transportation. For instance, it was much easier to build motor routes here than it was to tunnel through the mountains of Guizhou. So motor routes in Yunnan had been developed long ago.

Yunnan's climate is excellent, far superior to Guizhou where fine weather never lasts long. The weather around Kunming is as mild as that in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. When we passed through an area by Qujing, we had to take off our cotton-padded clothes. Then, the weather changed drastically on the same day. Around five o'clock in the afternoon there were cold wild winds and rain.

Thanks to its good climate, much rice and cotton are grown in Qujing, Malong and in northeastern Yunnan, and Yunnan opium which grew everywhere was known throughout China. Yunnan opium was more expensive than the opium grown in Guizhou, Sichuan and other provinces because

its fruit was as large as a man's fist. Yunnan opium was very inexpensive. In Malong and Songming, a silver dollar could purchase 250 grams of crude opium. I often bantered that if the addicts in Jiangsu and Zhejiang knew how cheap crude opium was here, they would start drooling.

In Yunnan, the Han people accounted for the largest part of the population, the rest were Miao, Yi and Hui people. At that time, the Yi people ruled the province, so they were relatively wealthy. In some rural areas they headed most of the villages or districts. In passing through Guandu, we encountered an area stretching for tens of *li* inhabited by Hui people who had adopted the same customs and habits of the Huis in Jiangsu and Zhejiang and went to mosque. As many Huis from Gansu were serving in the Fifth Army Group, the Red Army got along well with local Huis and showed much respect for their mosque. The Red Army Leader Zhu De visited the mosque in person and talked with the religious leader. The following day the Huis expressed their amity with the Red Army by lining up to see the latter off. At this time, dozens of Huis joined the Red Army and were later formed into an independent brigade so that they could maintain their own customs, habits and diet.

In Kunming I noticed that many male and female residents of thirty years of age or above had throat tumors. I soon learned that about eight tenths of the local residents had these tumors because of the lack of iodine in the spring water. In one of mountains, spring water could be so caustic that it burned the throat. For this reason, the Red Army soldiers avoided using this water when passing through.

Yunnan's climate, resources and terrain impressed me very favourably. Also, politically, Yunnan has had a glorious period, such as the time that insurrections against Yuan Shikai¹³⁰ in support of the Republic took place.

The Red Army's intention in entering Yunnan was to cross the Jinsha River. To this end they followed two routes. The main force occupied Zhanyi,¹³¹ Malong, Xundian and Songming and pressed on towards Kunming. The rest of the forces drew the Guizhou Army and Yunnan Army towards the border of Yunnan and Guizhou, defeated the fifth regiment under the command of You Guocai and captured many weapons. After this victory, they entered Yunnan and seized Xuanwei and Dongchuan and then pushed on towards Qiaojia County and finally crossed the Jinsha River. As the main force of the Red Army was approaching Kunming, the whole province panicked. But it was not the intention of the Red Army to occupy Kunming, but rather to lure the Yunnan Army back to the city to reinforce their troops and so be unable to move towards the Jinsha River. In the meantime, in order to confuse the pursuing troops, the Red Army, who had

planned to cross the river at the Jiaoxidu,¹³² pushed westward and occupied Luquan, Wuding and Yuanmou and then shifted north into Longjie and feigned a crossing. The pursuing troops again fell into the trap. All of the enemy troops, the army under Zhou Hunyuan, the Yunnan Army and the Hunan Army pressed on towards Yuanmou while the main force of the Red Army crossed the river safely at Jiaoxidu. The Red Army troops which feigned the crossing at Longjie also turned back, taking a shortcut. It took nine full days for the Red Army to cross the river. The pursuing troops did not know of this crossing until the Red Army approached Huili Prefecture¹³³ following the occupation of Tong'an Prefecture.¹³⁴ By the time that the pursuing troops turned back to Jiaoxidu, the entire Red Army had crossed the river and had destroyed the boats. It was not until the afternoon of the eleventh day that the pursuing troops under Zhou Hunyuan approached the river. Red Army troops were now defending the river from a cave on the north bank, making it impossible for them to cross. They had to give up in despair. The success of this stratagem exhilarated the Red Army soldiers. A new drama entitled "Ragged Straw Sandals" was carried in the Fifth Army Group political department newspaper. It described how Generalissimo Chiang had pursued the Red Army in Jiangxi and in other provinces for more than six months, but could only manage to trail behind and secured nothing other than the ragged straw sandals which Red Army soldiers had discarded. The drama showed how highly spirited the Red Army soldiers were at the time.

Crossing the Jinsha River was the Red Army's most dangerous yet most fulfilling experience since leaving Jiangxi Province. I noticed that newspapers published in Shanghai and in other areas gave no precise details of this crossing. As I had personally taken part in this, I too felt this experience to be one of the unforgettable blessings of my life.

The Jinsha River, which is at the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, originates in Qinghai. It is called the Jinsha River in Xikang and Yunnan provinces. Where it flows down to Yibin (Xufu) in Sichuan, it is called the Yangtze River. On both banks of the Jinsha River were tall mountains and steep cliffs, except for a few crossings. In marching from Yunnan to about 60 *li* from the river, we first descended about 40 *li* towards Jiaoxidu and then advanced another 20 *li* towards the river. On this march, formidable mountain peaks of fantastic shapes appeared and turned golden in the setting sun. From Jiaoxidu to the river, the slopes became steeper. As we descended, we had to use walking sticks so as not to tumble down into the gully. On the 20-*li* march towards the river, it was very hot — this was at the end of April. There were few trees and very little grass, and it became hotter as we

descended. Upon reaching the river bank where the weather was even hotter, the Red Army soldiers avidly consumed the cold water. Here lived about six families who worked as ferrymen. Because it was hot here in spring and summer and cold in autumn and winter, they lived in caves. According to a legend, it was here that Zhuge Liang crossed the Lushui River and entered into a barren land during the period of the Three Kingdoms. *The History of the Three Kingdoms* also describes the weather to be hot beside the river and that 1,500 out of 2,000 men under the command of Ma Dai who crossed the river died of water poisoning, which might be true.

On the north bank of the Jinsha River there lived about seven ferrymen and their families, and there was a checkpoint at which taxes on goods flowing between Sichuan and Yunnan were collected. I heard that Yunnan opium was twice as expensive after it had been ferried across the river. The local residents referred to the north bank "Sichuan" and the south bank "Yunnan." As I prepared to cross the river, I noticed that the people seated on the boat were not distributed evenly and that one person was standing in the middle, so that the front of the boat tipped downward. The ferryman shouted: "Back to Yunnan, sir!" This was his way of directing the man standing at the center to move to the back (southward towards Yunnan) in order to level the boat. At the south bank of the river boats were moored to a sandy beach. But on the north bank there were only cliffs and so boats had to be moored in a 100-metre-long man-made tunnel. People had to pass through the tunnel and then travelled east towards the checkpoint in the mountain. At the time that we crossed, the river had not yet risen and the water level was two zhang below the tunnel entrance, and we had to climb stone steps to enter the tunnel.

The Jinsha River is about half as wide as the Huangpu River. Standing at the river, you cannot hear cries from the opposite bank. The river flows swiftly from west to east at about 5 metres per second. At the upper reaches, the water pours down like a waterfall from high above. The waves of the river, usually about 2 *chi* high, can swell to about 4 *chi* during a raging storm. The winds are horrible. When I began to cross the river, a gust of sandy wind suddenly roared up and blew away the straw huts which the residents had built in the caves alongside the river. As I was standing there, a wild wind suddenly toppled me over. The force of this wind surprised us all. But 30 minutes later the storm was over and the sun came out. In asking the local residents about this, we were made to understand that a storm usually lasts less than half an hour, and then after which the sun reappears. This is how dramatically the climate can change in western China.

The Jinsha River was too swift to sail upon. Wooden boats were used

only from Yibin to Luzhou; steamers were used from Luzhou downward. But boats were adequate from Dongchuan and Qiaojia downward. From Qiaojia going upwards there could be only about ten boats waiting at each crossing. From Longjie travelling upwards, only boats made of animal furs were used, each ferrying only one person. The reason for using fur boats to sail up the river was that the river was very swift and there were many reefs, so wooden boats could be easily destroyed.

The Red Army was unable to build a floating bridge to facilitate a crossing. They had only six boats, collected from Jiaoxidu and other crossings nearby. The larger boats could carry 30 people and the smaller ones, 11 people. These boats were leaking and it was necessary to empty the boats of water before each crossing. The river was very swift, so only three or four crossings could be made in an hour. Since almost the entire Red Army was to cross the river here, wood fires were lit on both banks at night. The fires cast light across the surface of the river and enabled the Red Army to cross the river throughout the night.

It would have been hard to believe that the Red Army could manage to cross the Jinsha River using only six shabby boats unless one saw it for oneself. But this is actually how it was done. Of course, the reason why the Red Army could cross the river unhurriedly was that the Nanjing Army and the Yunnan Army had fallen into its trap, that is, making a feint to the east while actually attacking in the west. Because this strategy succeeded, the Red Army had plenty of time to ferry all the troops across the river. Another reason why this could be accomplished was that the Red Army had skillfully organized the crossing. If they had failed in that, the men and horses might have crowded chaotically onto the boats and caused the boats to capsize. And had the boats been even slightly damaged, the crossing would have been even further delayed. This demonstrated how much better the Red Army was organized than the Nanjing Army and other provincial armies. The headquarters of the Red Army and the Central Committee organized the crossing headquarters made up of senior communist cadres. All troops had to follow instructions. They were requested to cross the river in turn according to their time of arrival at the river. Notices on related discipline were posted along the approach to the river. When troops arrived by the river, they were requested to stop and not to approach the boats until they heard the bugle call. As vacant boats arrived, a certain number of men, appropriate to the size of the boat, were instructed to go down to the sandy beach and to take the boat designated beforehand by number. For each boat, a maximum capacity was defined. The troops were ordered to form a queue and go aboard one at a time. A commander would ride in the boats alone with the ferrymen

to direct the soldiers. In obeying orders, the Red Army did much better than the National Army. For example, even division or army group commanders had to wait in line and would not disregard orders from the crossing headquarters. The capability of the Red Army was manifested not only in maintaining order but also in successfully organizing the ferrymen. On the first day, there were only 18 ferrymen, but later the number had been increased to 27. This was because the crossing headquarters sent communist cadres to conduct publicity and offered good pay. I learned that each ferryman was paid five silver dollars for a full day's work. Since most ferrymen smoked opium, the Red Army kept a cauldron of Yunnan opium burning and allowed the ferrymen to use it freely. They were also given six meals a day for which pigs were slaughtered, while the communists who commanded the crossing ate only peas. There is a saying that "when a high reward is offered, brave fellows are bound to come forward." This proved to be quite true. I also learned that after the Red Army soldiers crossed the river, they destroyed the six boats. These boats had been owned by Jin, the local Yi chieftain. Realizing that the ferrymen would now, temporarily, be unable to earn a living, the Red Army gave them each 30 silver dollars and several *jin* of opium in addition to their salaries. Thus, most of the ferrymen were well disposed to the Red Army and followed them to Sichuan.

Red Army soldiers took their guns with them in crossing the Jinsha River on boats. But the horses were not allowed to ride the ferryboats. The grooms were ordered to leave the saddles behind, sit at the stern and firmly grasp the reins of the horses which had been brought to the riverside. As soon as the boats left the river bank, soldiers drove the horses with whips. The horses were thus forced to follow the stern and swim across the river. The Red Army was very proud that they had crossed the Jinsha River without losing a single person or horse. This was really an exciting episode.

After the Red Army crossed the Jinsha River they saw before them a road leading uphill, extending 30 *li* from the north bank of the river to Tong'an Prefecture in Sichuan Province. The mountains were very tall and were all barren. There were almost no trees. On the way, we met with only one family, and only once in a while did we see flocks of sheep on the mountain slopes. Another uphill road 30 *li* in length extended from Tong'an Prefecture to Huili Town. Thereafter, the road became a little smoother but with tall mountains on either side of the road. Tong'an, a prefecture of about 300 households with a primary school, was the primary location where people from Sichuan and Yunnan provinces engaged in trade. When I arrived in Tong'an, I saw several hundred villagers wearing strips of red cloth lined up and about to join the Red Army. I was told that the Communist Party had

organized a revolutionary committee and an army to fight against the levying of taxes in Tong'an Prefecture. On our approach to Huili from Tong'an Prefecture we had seen in the distance that the city was burning. When we arrived at our campsite we were informed that the division garrisoned at Huili was led by Liu Yuantang and was part of Liu Wenhui's Chuan-Kang Army. Fearing that the Red Army might climb the city wall, they had burned all the houses on the outskirts of the city. This incited widespread indignation among the people living there, and several thousand of them cooperated with the Red Army in attacking the city. I heard later that most of them had joined the Red Army.

Because Liu's division was determined to defend Huili to the last, the Red Army did not attack, but just kept a watch on the city. This allowed them time to rest and recruit before the pursuing Nanking Army could cross the river. The General Headquarters of the Red Army gave orders that the entire army could rest in Huili for five days and that each army unit should intensify its publicity work among the residents. The General Headquarters requested that 5,000 new soldiers be recruited. All army units and the General Health Department immediately acted upon this. Five thousand people were actually recruited within five days. The Red Army was able to obtain frequent recruitments because the Red Army was good at publicity among residents and because conditions for the residents of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan were extremely difficult. The residents of Huili were extremely indignant at Liu Yuantang's oppression. Many exorbitant taxes and levies had emerged one after another. Liu Yuantang coined his own copper "silver dollars" and arbitrarily ordered all residents to use these. If there were three able-bodied men in one family, one of them would be pressganged; if there were five able-bodied men in one family, two of them would be pressganged. Young women were raped and if they did not submit to this, their families would be harassed. Because the Red Army was leading the poor to "Fight Against the Lius" and to "Expropriate the Local Tyrants," tens of thousands of poor people joined the Red Army.

Five days passed. The Red Army then marched northward by way of Huili, Dechang, Xichang, Lugu and Yuexi,¹³⁵ marching 60 to 70 *li* a day. In 29 days they reached the Dadu River. The Red Army, eager to cross the Dadu River, had not taken any action against Xichang. Instead, it took a detour and continued advancing northward. Along the Aiming River there was a road leading from Huili to the Dadu River. The smooth section of the road could be as wide as 20 *li* or more. But some sections were extremely narrow. On both sides of the Anning River there were tall mountains where the Yi people resided. The Han people lived along the road beside the Arming River.

Because conflict between the Yi and the Han people was very serious and the Yi people often descended the mountains to attack Han villages, every Han family had built a watch tower to protect themselves against the Yi. When the Red Army arrived at Lugu, its forces were divided into two columns. The smaller one went to the south bank of Fulin and pretended a crossing of the Dadu River so that the enemy on the opposite bank would be distracted. The larger column marched northwestward via Lugu and occupied Mianning County to attempt a crossing of the Dadu River from Anshunchang. But in order to reach Anshunchang by way of Daqiao Town which was 50 *li* from northwest Mianning, the Red Army had to pass through the mountain inhabited by the Yi people. It would take them two and a half days to cover this distance. This presented a significant obstacle for the Red Army at that time.

The Yi people in Sichuan Province were feared throughout the province. Daliang Mountain, to east of the Anning River, was a Yi base area. The Daliang Mountain range was very large, extending south to Ningnan County, north to the Dadu River, west to the Anning River and east to the Leibo-Mabian-Pingshan Mountains along the Jinsha River. The region between northwest Mianning and south of Kangding belonged to the Yi people. The Yi had their own army. Yi people living in the mountains northwest of Mianning were armed with several thousand rifles and a small number of portable machine guns. These weapons had all been captured from Han armies. The land along both banks of the Anning River had once been the property of a leader of the Yi people. After Liu Wenhui's failure in Chengdu and entrance into Yazhou, this Yi leader had been forced from the land and Liu Wenhui seized it. Because of this, the Yi hated Liu's army. In actuality, Nanjing government officials had control only over the Han people who lived on the plain beside the Anning River. The Yi people had not submitted to the control of the government and refused to pay land taxes or other levies. Because of this, government armies would have to cross the Yi people's mountains in great numbers for self-protection. Otherwise, their weapons could be seized.

The Yi people in that region consisted of several tribes. In this, they were different from ethnic groups in Inner Mongolia and Tibet. They were of a suspicious and jealous temperament. Family feuds existed between tribes and the Yi often fought each other. The Yi people lived a semi-nomadic, semi-agrarian life. Their main crop was maize and they raised oxen, sheep and horses.

The Yi ethnic community had two classes. One was the Black Yi, the ruling class of the Yi people; the other was the White Yi, who were the Black

Yi's slaves. The White Yi, who engaged all their lives in farming for the Black Yi, could secure nothing for themselves other than food and clothing. A Black Yi had the right to kill a White Yi at any time. Generally speaking, most Black Yi owned several dozen to several hundred White Yi who worked for them. This freed the Black Yi from having to toil the year round. Black Yi and the White Yi were not allowed to intermarry. At that time, the Black Yi population was gradually decreasing, but they still maintained their ruling position. The leader of these Black Yi people was the "chieftain." The White Yi had been captured by the Black Yi; they were formerly Han people. The Black Yi at Daliang Mountain and in the mountains northwest of Mianning often exchanged Han prisoners so that they would not know a route of escape. The Black Yi arranged the marriages of White Yi men and women, who were called "Wazi." Every Black Yi family had to entrust one White Yi person to manage household affairs. This White Yi was usually in charge of the family's income, expenditures and various daily affairs. Because the Han people indiscriminately opposed all Yi people, the White Yi cooperated with the Black Yi in fighting the Han. Whenever the Black Yi battled with Han armies, the White Yi would participate in the fighting.

Trade between the Han and Yi peoples was done through interpreters. Although some Yi people could speak Chinese, they did not want to leave the mountains because they were afraid of being killed by the Han. So the Black Yi used the White Yi to contact the Han. The Yi people would often trade furs and musk for cloth and salt.

The Yi people were very different from the Han people in dress. With a piece of black cloth wrapped around their heads and one *chi* of the cloth hanging behind, they resembled the Indian policemen of Shanghai.¹³⁶ Some had their noses pierced with silver rings. Both men and women wore earrings made of bones. They had swarthy complexions. The woolen clothes they wore, which they wove themselves, were similar to the *kasaya* worn by Buddhist monks. (This kind of coat, light and soft in texture, was good protection against the wind. I think it would be very suitable for us in marching.) The weather in the mountains changed several times a day. It could be burning hot at noon and then there might be a strong wind in the afternoon, rain in the evening, and the sky could be clear by the morning of the following day. So whenever the Yi people went outside, they had to carry their coats with them. Every Yi person carried a sharp sword for protection and also for cutting meat. They wore leg wrappings but they never wore shoes or socks. A few wore straw sandals. Because they had been born here and grew up in this mountainous region, they were good mountain climbers. At the approach of the Red Army along the mountain road, the

Yi people ascended the large rocks beside the road so quickly that they looked like monkeys or apes.

The Yi people led a very difficult life, much more so than that of the Han. The Han people had level land to till; the Yi people had only mountainous land because the good farmland had been taken from them by the commanders of the Sichuan Army and local officials. As we glanced up at fields for crops on mountain slopes, we were astounded at the acute angles; these fields sloped as steeply as cliffs. But the Yi people had to plant on these all year round. Because they could plant only in mountain fields, their diet consisted mostly of maize. The houses of the Yi people were extremely simple; the walls were made of bamboo and the roofs were covered with pine bark. These houses were very damp and swarming with fleas.

There were over than ten tribes of Yi people living in the mountains through which the Red Army had to pass. After climbing 10 kilometres from the town of Daqiao, the vanguard regiment of the Red Army was suddenly encircled by Yi people from three of these tribes, in the front, at the back and on the left, an attempt to seize Red Army weapons. But the Red Army was good at publicity; they declared to the White Yi people that the Communist Party advocated equality of all ethnic groups, that is was opposed to the oppression of the Yi people by the Han warlords and that it was their intention to fight Liu Wenhui's troops, which were cruelly oppressing Yi people. This was what the Yi people had eagerly requested. Thereafter, the leader of the vanguard regiment and a head of the Guji tribe took an oath by smearing the blood of a cock into a bowl and drinking it, swearing that they would join forces to attack Liu's troops. After the oath, some members of that tribe were incorporated into the Red Army as a "Red Army guerrilla detachment." They served as guides and persuaded the rest of the tribes including the Ayue and Luohong tribes not to oppose the Red Army. Later, when the main troops of the Red Army were passing through the mountains here, they received a warm welcome from the Yi people who provided them with cattle and sheep. The Red Army offered them fur clothing, old guns, salt and cloth in return. This is how we were able to pass safely through the mountains which had been so foreboding to us.

After that, the Red Army continued to march towards Kailuochang,¹³⁷ a town of over 20 households. Here an interesting episode is worth mentioning. The grain needed by Liu Wenhui's troops stationed in Dajianlu¹³⁸ in Xikang had to be supplied by Xichang Prefecture, so it was stored in Kailuochang. When the vanguard of the Red Army arrived in Kailuochang, Liu's men mistook these soldiers for the Nanjing Army and hastened to entertain the officers with a banquet. They were given over 4,000 sacks of

rice, each containing 30 kilogrammes. The leader of the Red Army later distributed the rice among the troops and gave the large surplus to the local people. When I reached Kailuochang, I saw all the people, old and young, happily carrying the sacks to their homes. I asked them what they thought of the Red Army. They replied: "We haven't had rice for a long time. Only after the Red Army arrived and gave us Liu's rice was this possible. The Red Army is great!" Liu Wenhui's troops had unintentionally supported the Red Army with the grain they had extorted from the people, but the Red Army distributed it again among the people. This is why the local people bitterly oppose Liu's troops and welcome the Red Army.

It was a 30-kilometre march from Kailuochang to Anshunchang, which is located on the bank of the Dadu River. The Political Department of the Red Army regarded Anshunchang as a "historic place of revolutionary significance." During the period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851-1864), when the Northern King, Wei Changhui, killed the Eastern King, Yang Xiuqing, the Kingdom was split. The Yi King, Shi Dakai led his troops out of Nanjing towards Sichuan, but he was finally defeated and seized in Anshunchang. On the evening when we arrived at Anshunchang, I went to give Li Fuchun, the deputy director of the Political Department, medical treatment for his feet. When I came in, Li was entertaining an old man of over 90 years of age who was a teacher in a local primary school and who had witnessed the defeat of Shi Dakai's troops here. Li feasted the old man with meat and wine and asked him to relate to us what came to pass for Shi's troops. The old man recalled that, when they reached Anshunchang, Shi's troops numbered about 60,000 men and had a good many weapons and horses. But the upper reaches of the Yangtze River were flooding and torrents were rushing through the mountains, making it impossible for them to cross the river. The Dadu River was before them; the Qing troops on their right had destroyed the iron-chain bridge over the river; on their left stood steep cliffs; and the Yi people, whose numbers exceeded the present Yi population by a great deal, were blocking their retreat. Under these circumstances, Shi and his troops were besieged here for 47 days. Shi and his troops gave up any hope of success. Shi surrendered to the Qing troops. All his troops were taken as prisoners. The old man continued to relate that those long-haired men, who were not bandits, had declared they would "restore the Han people to power and drive out the non-Han peoples." He added that Shi Dakai's troops had been kind to the people and had observed discipline, but that "the Red Army did even better." What the old man said was true. Shi Dakai had not been able to cross the Dadu River and was defeated there. Later I read some newspapers in Shanghai and Sichuan from which I discovered that

Generalissimo Chiang cited the failure of Shi Dakai's troops as a sign that the Red Army too would be defeated at the river. But the Red Army crossed the Dadu River safely. No wonder the Red Army was so proud of their maneuver and regarded it as a historic military victory.

The Dadu River is at the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. It flows into the Minjiang River and then into the Yangtze. The Red Army reached the Dadu River at the end of May. The weather was warm and the snow on the mountains was thawing, causing the river to flow swiftly and to flood. The Dadu River was wider and swifter than the Jinsha River and its waves were grander. It took 50 minutes to cross to the opposite bank and return in a ferry; this required the assistance of at least eight ferrymen. To cross from the south bank, the ferry would be pulled about 60 metres up river and then had to manage a dash in the direction of the current to the north bank. In approaching the north bank, the ferrymen had to be very careful; because the ferry might strike a reef, which could destroy it. The local ferrymen who knew the route of the river were the only ones who were capable of piloting these boats. On returning to the south bank, similar maneuvers had to be utilized. That is why it took 50 minutes to ferry across the river and back.

The Red Army captured only two ferries upon reaching Anshunchang. A battalion of Liu Wenhui's soldiers had fortified themselves along the river on the north bank, opposite Anshunchang in an attempt to stop the Red Army from crossing the river. But how was it that these two ferries had been moored on the south bank instead of on the north bank? This was just a chance happening. Liu's battalion commander was stationed on the north bank, but his father-in-law lived in Anshunchang on the south bank. On the night that the Red Army reached Anshunchang, the commander was staying with his father-in-law and intended to ferry the family and all the local gentry and merchants to the north bank the next morning. Since he had been informed that the Red Army was still 30 kilometres away and would not arrive before the afternoon of the next day, the commander felt the situation to be safe and slept soundly with his lovely wife. To his astonishment, on that very night the Red Army had advanced with such incredible speed that it reached Anshunchang at midnight, and that is how the commander and the two ferries were captured.

Even, with the use of these two ferries, crossing the Dadu River was still problematic. Liu Wenhui's battalion was defending the river along the north bank, making it difficult for the ferries to approach the bank. Besides, there were no skilled ferrymen to ferry them across the river. Nevertheless, the Red Army eventually routed Liu's troops and crossed the Dadu River. The Red Army was very proud of this victory. As an onlooker, I felt that this victory

was attributable to the bravery of the Red Army soldiers, the members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League.

I was informed just how the river was crossed. Having captured the two ferries, the commanders of the Red Army chose 17 Party and League members including several former boatmen from Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. Carrying spears, rifles, Mauser pistols, hand grenades and machine guns, they drove the two ferries to the north bank in defiance of all the dangers involved. The Red Army on the south bank had set up machine guns and mortars, and organized crack shots to cover their crossing.

As soon as the two ferries left the south bank, Liu's troops began firing at them. But the Red warriors did not flinch and pressed forward. Finally they reached the north bank and jumped ashore. Although Liu's troops were firing at them, only four were wounded as they swooped down on Liu's fortifications. Unnerved by the courage of the Red Army soldiers and under fire from the south bank, Liu's men dared not raise their heads. The Red warriors then took Liu's fortifications and seized the weapons. As one of Liu's machine gunners was climbing to a higher position to mount his weapon, he was shot down after a few steps by a Red Army sharpshooter on the opposite bank. All of Liu's troops began retreating up the tall mountain. The Red warriors immediately seized the fortifications and arrested the descent of Liu's men from the mountain while others drove the two ferries back to the south bank to carry the remaining Red Army soldiers across the river. As soon as a battalion of the Red Army had been ferried across the river, they charged Liu's army which was at this point terrified and they were totally routed. The Red Army then took over the mountain and used this position to pursue Liu's troops and capture most of their weapons. After the battle, the 17 warriors who initially commandeered the crossing of the Dadu River were widely celebrated, rewarded and thereafter were esteemed as Red Army heroes. Although I myself was not a soldier, I had served in the army for several years. I had seen quite a few vanguards forcing their way across rivers. But I had never witnessed anything like this, that on such a wide and swift river and with only 17 men, a battalion of enemy troops could be driven from their fortifications. No wonder the Communist Party regards its Party and League members as models for the Red Army. These Communists have always been willing to be the first to charge forward and the last to withdraw. Neither the Kuomintang Army nor any other troops can be compared with them.

The Red Army began its crossing shortly after capturing the two ferries. However, it would have taken a long time using only two ferries to carry all the troops, and during such an endeavor the pursuing troops would have

caught up. So the Red Army spent two and a half days ferrying a light division across the river. What they hoped to be able to do was to capture the Luding Bridge in Luding County so that the entire Red Army could cross the river on that bridge. Most of the Red Army on the south bank therefore marched westward and traversed Xikang Province on its way towards the Luding Bridge. On the north bank, the division which had crossed the river also pressed westward, aiming at capturing the bridge.

Liu had fortifications along the north bank of the river, so the division of the Red Army which had crossed the river from Anshunchang moved 15 kilometres westward and engaged Liu's troops in skirmishes. Due to the dispersion of troops and lack of communication equipment, Liu's troops suffered successive defeats. Most of Liu's troops were newly pressed; they had not been trained and were unwilling to fight. As they had heard that the Red Army would not kill white army officers and soldiers, they voluntarily laid down their weapons along the way. With those weapons, the Red Army fought on. I later heard that the division on the north bank had secured a lot of weapons and ammunition. In Lengqi, 22.5 kilometres away from the Luding Bridge, the Red Army fought a fierce battle with Liu's men, who staunchly held their positions. Later, the Red Army on the south bank opened fire at Liu's troops, making it possible for the Red Army soldiers on the north bank to outflank them from the rear. The Red Army captured an entire regiment and Lengqi was occupied. At this time, Red Army vanguard units on the south bank reached the Luding Bridge.

The Luding Bridge was a passage from Sichuan to Xikang and Tibet. Luding County stood on the north bank of the Dadu River. Here the river became narrow but flowed more swiftly. The Luding Bridge consisted of 13 iron chains whose ends were fastened at both banks of the river. Four chains constituted the handrails and the other nine parallel chains supported wooden boards on which long planks had been laid. The bridge could support people and horses. When I first heard of this iron chain bridge, I thought that it would be difficult to cross. But it actually could accommodate both people and horses. It was about 30 metres long and 3.3 metres wide; it had been built by donations from 13 provinces.

Without the resistance of Liu's corps, the Red Army on the south bank arrived at the Luding Bridge first. In order to check the crossing of the Red Army, Liu's troops on the north bank had built defenses and had removed all the wooden planks from the bridge. Lin Biao, commander of the First Army Group of the Red Army, ordered the company with the highest combat effectiveness and the most Party and League members to charge the enemy and to collect the wooden planks which had been piled up in a

Catholic church on the south bank. Those moving in front had to crawl forward over the nine chains while those behind relayed the planks. They dashed bravely towards the defenses on the north bank and discovered that Liu's troops had lost their will to fight and were shouting their willingness to lay down their arms. The Red Army soldiers immediately captured their weapons and took over their defenses. As Liu's troops withdrew from Luding County, they set fire along the streets so as to make it difficult for the Red Army to secure food or to rest. But after the Red Army reached the north bank, they began to pursue and attack Liu's army and at the same time they extinguished the fires. Soon the Red Army on the north bank was moving from Lengqi towards Luding County. They besieged Liu's men who were attempting to withdraw and captured their weapons. By that time the fires had just been put out, but over half of the houses had been destroyed. The owners of the surviving houses expressed their gratitude to the Red Army for extinguishing the fires, and cursed Liu's army. Liu Wenhui's troops set fires on route through Huili, Xichang and Luding counties in an attempt to hold back the Red Army's advance. Their attempt not only failed, it also evoked great resentment among the people.

It was indeed a great accomplishment for the entire Red Army to cross the Luding Bridge. If they had failed to do so, the division that had crossed the river and had reached the north bank from Anshunchang would have had to fight in isolation and the main forces of the Red Army on the south bank would have had to march into Xikang, a nomadic area where they could hardly expect to find grain or to take up quarters, and although the Kuomintang Army in pursuing the Red Army might encounter difficulties, they could depend on Ya'an in the rear for support, in which case the Red Army would hardly survive. As the entire Red Army did cross the river, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai provinces thereafter became new areas in which it could operate.

In order to finally reach Yazhou after the capture of Luding County, the Red Army had to march southeast through Hanyuan and Yingjing. When they approached Nitou,¹³⁹ they discovered that the Sichuan Army in Hanyuan held a commanding position and were waiting for them. The Red Army immediately moved northeast to the bank of the Tianquan River and launched a furious attack on Yang Sen's six brigades which were securing the River. The Red Army shifted from highways to narrow mountainous trails. I remember that it stayed one night in Hualinping,¹⁴⁰ which was at the top of a mountain some 4,500 metres tall. That night, although it was in early June, it was still very cold. When setting out the next morning, we found the mountain to be covered with snow. The weather had quickly become

frigid. But the Red Army soldiers, who had left their cotton-padded overcoats in Yunnan, were cheerful and uttered no complaints.

At the time that most of the Red Army arrived in Shuizitian,¹⁴¹ the vanguard had already repulsed Yang Sen's six brigades at the bank of the Tianquan River and were occupying Tianquan and Lushan. When we departed from Shuizitian we came upon a mountain where there were no trails and no stone steps, and where thick bamboo groves shut out the sky. The mud came up to our thighs. It was only 15 kilometres' distance up and down the mountain; we had started climbing at dawn, but it was already midnight when the rear guard units finally reached the top. Since there were no households on the mountain, we could not obtain torches. Most of us stood in the mud until daybreak when we began to descend. Zhou Enlai was one of those who stood in the mud all that night at the top of the mountain. He was once the director of the political department of Whampoa Military Academy during the period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; he was now vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the Red Army. The next morning I saw him looking vigorous, although covered with mud. When we descended to the foot of the mountain, we discovered seven households. The villagers were astonished to see the Red Army, as if it had just fallen from the sky. They had lived here for generations and had always been told by their parents that passages through the mountains did exist somewhere. But nobody had dared to pass through this mountain as it was said to be haunted by a horde of wild beasts. The villagers gathered round the Red Army soldiers and questioned them about what they had seen on the mountain.

Despite the hardships experienced on the snow-covered mountain in Hualinping and on the muddy trails in Shuizitian, all the Red Army soldiers were in high spirits and no complaints were to be heard because it was believed that they would be joining forces with the Red Army's troops under the command of Xu Xiangqian in North Sichuan and that if their ranks could be replenished in Sichuan, a land of abundance, they would have boundless prospects. Besides, they could then march north and move out of Shaanxi and Gansu to fight the Japanese troops and recover lost Chinese territory. The Communist Party had proposed such a campaign for several years. When the Red Army arrived in Tianquan, they began singing a song. The lines of the song were as follows: "1. Our central task is to fight the Japanese invaders, to recapture North China and the three provinces in Northeast China and to safeguard the Chinese nation. 2. Sichuan is an excellent area with rich resources. If the enemy thinks that he can blockade us, this is ridiculous. 3. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is as hard as iron; it

has crossed the Jinsha River and its two main forces are now joined, throwing the enemy into a panic. 4. The Red Army is united as one; the more we fight, the stronger we grow. Our great task is bound to be accomplished.” These words expressed the sentiments of Red Army soldiers.

After the occupation of Tianquan and Lushan counties, the Red Army dispatched troops to Feixianguan, which was only a little over 10 kilometres from Yazhou. At that time the Red Army was anxious to join forces with Xu Xiangqian’s troops in Songpan, Maoxian,¹⁴² and Beichuan counties in North Sichuan. The Red Army therefore avoided the Sichuan Army’s blockade and marched west towards the Qionglai Mountain Range. They seized Baoxing and Maogong and intended to join forces with Xu’s troops in Lifan. The two Red Army’s forces soon came together. I was then appointed by He Cheng as director of health for the independent battalion of the West Sichuan Special Committee. But it was not long before this battalion was dispersed by the Sichuan Army. Luckily, I met an old classmate of mine, Mr. Jiang, and was able to return home safely. As soon as I arrived in Shanghai by the Minquan Steamboat, I caught sight of my family waiting at the dock. At the reunion they rejoiced that I was still alive.

From what I have seen within the Red Army during the past three years and from my experience on the march west into Sichuan, I feel that the Red Army and the Communist Party have become a powerful force in China. This is an indisputable fact. If the Red Army consisted of only contemptible rebels, then why did the Nanjing government and the provincial authorities concentrate one million troops in an effort to suppress them during the past few years, spending most of the national revenue each year for this purpose? And why did Generalissimo Chiang himself lead the suppression of the Red Army in Jiangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces? Obviously, the Red Army has become a major opponent of the Nanjing Army and is stronger than any other opposing domestic force. With regard to the number of Red Army troops, except for the Nanjing Army, the Red Army outnumbered any other major power in southern or northern China. As to the quality of the Red Army, although I do not know very precisely, I can judge this from another angle. All the powerful groups including those of Tang Shengzhi, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan have occupied more advantageous areas with better economic conditions as compared to those of the Red Army. Nevertheless, once they started fighting the Nanjing government’s army, they were all defeated by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops relatively quickly. In contrast, Generalissimo Chiang has been suppressing the Communist Party for several years and has repeatedly ordered his troops to wipe out the Red Army within a definite period of time. But

the Red Army under the command of Zhu De, Mao Zedong and Xu Xiangqian has been able to join forces and has launched more and more operations. Furthermore, the Nanjing Army has inadvertently supplied a large amount of ammunition and weapons for the Red Army during these years of suppression. From where else could the Red Army have secured its weapons? There were no ports accessible to it from which it could purchase weapons, nor did it have modern arsenals in which to produce them. The weapons used by the Red Army during these years of operations were all seized from the Kuomintang Army. At the very least, the Red Army has been able to confront and match the strength of the Nanjing government for several years. This is why I say that the Red Army has in fact become a very powerful force in China in terms of numbers.

As an observer, I attribute a dynamic and forceful Red Army to the following factors.

First, the Red Army is united. This is a fact. Just think of this: The Red Army has been fighting under very difficult conditions for several years; if its morale had been shaken, it would have been defeated. This unity can be attributed to the education of Red Army soldiers conducted by the Communist Party, which has made them feel more responsible for resistance to the Japanese aggression, for national salvation and for the liberation of the workers and the peasants. This training has considerably boosted the morale of the Red Army. Also, members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League, accounting for about 50 percent of Red Army soldiers, have received special training by the Communist Party. These people have played a vital role for the Red Army soldiers. As an example, most of the newly recruited soldiers were trained by Party and League members in each company. When there were difficulties during the march, such as lack of grain or places to rest, the Communists would let the non-Party soldiers eat and rest first. In battle, the Communists would be the first to charge and the last to withdraw. If Communists were wounded at the battlefield, they would not wail, but shout out to the others: "Comrades! Dash forward!" "Don't stop fighting to take care of me!" The efficient fighting capacity of the troops was also attributable to the leadership of the Communists. On the eve of an operation, the Communists in each company would hold a meeting at which they would select four or five nominees to succeed the commander or political instructor in case of death or incapacitation. So, even if junior cadres were wounded in fighting, there would be several successors. Because of this, the Red Army could not be easily destroyed.

No armies in China can compare with the Red Army with respect to unity and high morale.

The second reason why the Red Army has not been defeated and has been continuously growing is that it has the support of the people. Take the Jiangxi Red Area as an example. For many years the Red Army has fought in this area; the population has been decreasing and economic conditions have worsened. However, thanks to the vigorous support of the local people, the Red Army has been able to persist in fighting over a long period of time. And when the Red Army entered Sichuan, they experienced all sorts of hardships on the way. But they did not go hungry because they were assisted by the local people, from whom the Red Army enlisted tens of thousands of new soldiers.

Some people say that the Red Army has been forcing the local people to join them. This is not true, nor would it have been possible. Just think: When the Red Army arrived at a location, if local people had fled, where could the Red Army have found recruits? In fact, except for "local tyrants," the local people did not run away. They stayed and acted as guides and porters, and they joined the Red Army in groups.

As I see it, the Red Army has achieved the support of the people not through threats but through disciplined behaviour. They never disturb the people or take away their property. Moreover, they often confiscate the effects of warlords, bureaucrats and evil gentry and then distribute these among the local people. Having realized that they could benefit from the Red Army, local people support it enthusiastically.

Third, the Red Army has suffered untold difficulties, but they finally overcame these. The difficulties were far greater than those experienced by the Nanjing Army. How was it possible for the Red Army to overcome these hardships? I believe this was possible because the Red Army has wise and capable leaders. The Red Army, under the command of its founders Zhu De and Mao Zedong, have persisted in fighting for eight years during which they have experienced many difficulties and have been under continuous attacks by provincial troops and by the Nanjing Army. Nevertheless, this army has increased from a small number to hundreds of thousands. This was no easy feat. So I think Zhu and Mao are rare geniuses without whom such great undertakings cannot be realized. And Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao,¹⁴³ Lin Zhan and others had already become political celebrities during the period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Because Zhou had served as director of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy, many graduates from the Academy, who are serving in different armies throughout the country, know him quite well and admire his bravery and strong will.

Most of the senior officers of the Red Army, such as Peng Dehuai, Liu

Bocheng,⁶⁴ Lin Biao, Xu Xiangqian, Dong Zhentang,¹⁴⁴ Zhou Kun,¹⁴⁵ Luo Binghui and Chen Yi,¹⁴⁶ had been officers in the National Revolutionary Army and had participated in the Northern Expedition during the period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. They are capable of leadership in battle and have now commanded the Red Army for many years. With regard to state and political affairs, they have firm faith in the Communist Party. Liu Bocheng, Peng Dehuai, Luo Binghui as well as Zhao Bosheng¹⁴⁷ and Dong Zhentang from the 26th Army of the Kuomintang were all Communist Party members in the National Revolutionary Army during the period of the Northern Expedition. They rose in mutiny and joined the Red Army. They firmly believe in communism and have commanded the Red Army in fighting the National Army for about eight years.

When I was in the Red Army, I thought highly of the moral conduct of its leaders. This impressed me very much because of what I had seen in the Nanjing Army. Everyone knows that a regiment commander in any other army lives in luxury, not to mention a division commander or an army commander. By contrast, the officers of the Red Army shared in the weal and woe of the soldiers. Senior officers including the general commander were given the same food and clothing as the soldiers. Because of his age and dress, people would view Zhu De and call him the “chef.” You could not tell which one was an army commander and which one was a division commander. These leaders made friends with the soldiers and often played basketball and volleyball with them. The officers and soldiers were on intimate terms and shared the soldiers’ joys and sorrows. This is not something you will see in other armies. It was just because of this that Red Army soldiers have been willing to endure all sorts of hardships without complaining. The behaviour of Red Army’s leaders and the way they handle problems leave other military officers today too far behind to catch up. As an example, Red Army leaders including Zhu [De] and Mao [Zedong] have no concubines; none of them gamble or smoke opium; and I have never heard accusations of corruption or embezzlement of military supplies. The following incident demonstrates that neither officers of the National Army nor ordinary people can be compared to Red Army officers. Zhao Bosheng and Dong Zhentang, who had been senior officers in the Northwest Army under Sun Lianzhong, led about 17,000 troops of the 26th Army in joining the Red Army in Ningdu, Jiangxi Province. Both of them had secretly been Communist Party members. As soon as they arrived in the Red area, they each donated about 8,000 yuan to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which was all the money they had saved during the past decade or so.

This demonstrates the world of difference that distinguishes Red Army leaders who believe in the Communist Party and are willing to make personal sacrifices from officers in other armies who engage in corruption and use public office for private gain.

As I have said, the reason why the Red Army has survived many years of bitter struggle and has gradually grown stronger is that it has talented leaders and capable cadres. Such competent individuals as can be found both in the Red Army and in the Communist Party are hard to come by in this country.

First I was a member of the Nanjing Army, which has been suppressing the Communist Party and later I was in the Red Army and I took part in the fighting for about eight years. After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that continued fighting between these factions can only lead to domestic destruction, and that, if the Chinese continue in conflict amongst themselves, they will not be able to prevent the forceful Japanese annexation of the three provinces in the Northeast, and the whole of the North will fall into the hands of the Japanese invaders. If from now on the Nanjing Army, the Red Army and all the other troops throughout the country would aim their guns at the Japanese and not at each other, it would be very difficult for the Japanese to annex our country. The gentlemen of the Nanjing government have repeatedly preached "internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion." But at this critical moment, they should immediately change their policy. The national government and Generalissimo Chiang have spared no efforts to suppress the Communist Party over the past few years, still the Red Army has not been eliminated; rather, its troops under the command of Zhu [De], Mao [Zedong] and Xu [Xiangqian] have joined forces. As they now occupied large areas, it is difficult to surround them as was done in Jiangxi. Army personnel with any understanding of the present situation know that it is now impossible to eliminate the Red Army. If this internal struggle continues, then no matter which side wins, China will have been defeated by Japan. If we Chinese continue to kill one another, ignoring the annexation of China by that formidable enemy, the gentlemen of the Kuomintang will not be able to face the Chinese, for they will have doomed the Chinese nation to destruction.

In my opinion, in continuing to fight the civil war and at the same time trying to suppress the Communist Party, the government cannot save the country but will only precipitate disaster. The authorities should therefore change their policies and cooperate with the Red Army in resisting foreign aggressors. People of insight will readily admit that the Red Army throughout the country is a large force in terms of quantity and quality. For several years

how such a force has been able under extremely difficult conditions to counter one million Nanjing Army troops as well as the provincial armies. If its material supplies can be replenished, its combat effectiveness will be further enhanced. So why not utilize such a strong military force to resist the Japanese? If we unite all our domestic military forces to fight the Japanese, we can recover lost Chinese territory. Moreover, many of the leaders of the Red Army are highly capable. At the present time, when we need to gather capable people from all over the country to help us in resisting foreign aggressors, why not employ the military forces and skilled personnel of the Red Army for this purpose?

Some people may think that the Red Army is only willing to fight a civil war and is unconcerned about the foreign invasion, I'm afraid I can't agree with this. The Red Army leaders, such as Zhu [De], Mao [Zedong], Zhou Enlai, Lin Zuhan and Xu Teli, are political-minded statesmen. At the time of the Northern Expedition they were all high-ranking officers in the Central Committee of the Kuomintang or in the National Revolutionary Army, and they made great contributions to the Northern Expedition. Owing to different political positions, they withdrew from working with the Nanjing Army and rose in resistance. At this critical moment, when civil war means the end of China and resistance to foreign aggression means survival, so long as both sides really care about our country, they can surely cooperate in resisting the Japanese. The Red Army leaders have proposed uniting with all domestic military forces for the purpose of resisting the Japanese. I have also learned from my friends that the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government suggested that we organize all national military troops into an anti-Japanese united army under a national defence government. Our government needs to change its domestic and foreign policies at once. As ordinary people, we are not willing to let China be subjugated by Japan and let the Chinese become slaves. In my view, the Red Army are Chinese and fellow countrymen. It is a suicidal policy to allow foreign aggressors to bully us while fighting only amongst ourselves. China is a vast country with abundant resources and a huge population. If we stop this suicide and unite to fight our common enemy, then we have nothing to fear from Japan and the Chinese nation shall be rejuvenated in the future.

HOW GUERRILLAS ORGANIZE THE MASS MOVEMENT

June 5, 1935

The strategy the Party Central Committee has worked out for our field armies is to create new Soviet areas¹⁹ through large-scale guerrilla warfare. At the same time it stressed, in order to accomplish this task, that we should, apart from implementing correct strategies and tactics to empower the Red Army to be victorious, develop guerrilla warfare on a mass scale. We should understand that expanding guerrilla warfare in Sichuan is designed to create more Soviet areas.

The reason we emphasize that guerrilla warfare must involve mass participation is because this is the key to winning guerrilla warfare. One of the chief reasons why guerrilla warfare failed to unfold around the Central Soviet Area³⁰ and why some guerrillas suffered defeat was that guerrillas failed to keep close contacts with the masses. Guerrillas used to pay attention to military operations to the neglect of mobilization of the masses, so they could not win the support and participation of the people. As a result, guerrilla warfare failed to develop, and even met defeat.

Presently, how should we conduct large-scale guerrilla warfare in north-western Sichuan and throughout the whole province?

The present situation in Sichuan Province is that the masses are carrying on various struggles against exploitation and oppression by the ruling class. Also the victories won by the Fourth Front Army⁶⁵ in recent years and the impact exerted by the Central Red Army⁷² since it entered Sichuan have shaken the reactionary rule. This has encouraged the masses to expand their struggle against reactionary rule and to fight for land and for the establishment of their own armed forces and political power.

An article written in Tianquan County, Sichuan Province during the Long March before Chen Yun went to Shanghai to restore undercover Party activities. It was originally carried in issue No. 1 of *Advance*, which was jointly published by the CPC Central Committee and the General Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Under this favourable situation, the guerrillas' task is to further arouse and organize the masses in carrying on their struggle on a larger scale.

As for the strategy in leading mass struggle, local Party committees and guerrillas should first find out the most urgent needs of the people in each locality and then use these to arouse them to action. Other than the common demands with which we are so familiar, such as putting an end to exorbitant taxes and levies, the drafting of young men into puppet troops and pressing people into forced labour, we must find out what specific types of levies or oppression the majority of the people are opposed to the most. We can forward specific slogans, expressing these thoroughly in such a way that the people will be convinced that these represent their desires and are realizable. If we can accomplish this, the slogan we have put forth will be accepted by the masses and the masses can be mobilized into an all out struggle in the name of the slogan. Only if the people are aroused to fight under our leadership can we gradually organize them into a large scale movement.

As for the strategy we should employ in leading mass struggle, we should make it clear that whether we can arouse and organize the masses to struggle against reactionary rule, enlarge the scope of their struggle and maintain leadership in the mass movement depends on whether we can make right use of the broad united front and ensure Party leadership in this united front. The united front work is the most important work in Sichuan. People there are suffering a most deplorable exploitation by warlords. Workers and peasants are waging a large-scale struggle against the warlords and have established their own Soviet regime³⁸ and armed forces, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Given this situation, at the early stage of the mass movement in Sichuan, hooligans, rich peasants, even impoverished petty landlords and intellectuals with impure motives will worm their way into the revolutionary movement to pursue their own class interests and try to take advantage. These speculators might temporarily succeed in occupying leading positions in the revolutionary movement as in the movement against the payment of levies, in which over one hundred thousand people participated after the Fourth Front Army entered Sichuan. Now, through several years of thoroughgoing struggle in the Agrarian Revolution, class differentiation has sharpened, but the chance for speculators to occupy leading positions might still exist to some extent in certain areas and under certain conditions. We should broaden the scale of the struggle against reactionary rule, no matter who leads it, but attempt to keep it under our leadership. This conforms to our strategy for overthrowing reactionary rule in Sichuan and establishing new Soviet areas.

To use the united front correctly, we should neither be afraid of nor

refuse any speculators who wish to participate in the mass movement as long as they can arouse the masses or are willing to fight alongside them against warlords. Refusing their participation will retard the development of the mass movement, let alone the Party's ascension to a position of leadership in the movement. Our basic strategy in this situation is to unite the people and organize them into a large scale movement supportive of the Red Army's struggle against warlords in Sichuan. To obtain leadership, we must try to win the people's support through propagating our ideas and organize them for the ongoing struggle. In so doing, the masses will most likely turn away from speculators and accept our leadership.

In organizing the masses, we must oppose closed-doorism, which only alienates us from the people. We should be aware that political awareness varies among the people and we should not always try immediately to organize "Guerrilla of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army." We should be flexible. In light of our experiences in organizing the mass movement and in responding to the people's demands in Sichuan, we can greatly expand the army against the payment of levies. In organizing the army, we must avoid the closed-doorism which occurred in Mianning, where, at a meeting with over one thousand participants, 400 to 500 people expressed their willingness to join the army, but the leaders refused to enlist the old, the young and those who were occupied in production, and, as a result, only about 50 persons were enlisted. The army against payment of levies must be an armed force of the people and must be powerful and capable, so recruitment cannot be divorced from the masses. Only by developing our activities aimed at organizing an army against the payment of levies into a mass movement can we form an army of brave and politically aware persons. We should keep in mind that organizing the army against payment of levies is another means of mobilizing the masses.

Guerrilla leaders must possess various skills which can be acquired only through training and education. These skills will help them to accomplish the tasks of organizing and sovietizing the masses and setting up additional Soviet areas through employment of flexible strategies and the ability to work independently in various circumstances wherein guerrillas cannot receive timely instructions from higher levels. Before guerrillas set off, the leaders should have knowledge of at least the following: 1) the basic reason for the Soviet revolution in China and the current situation; 2) the strategy and methods for mobilizing and leading the masses; 3) how to organize, develop and lead the Party; and 4) military strategy necessary for guerrilla warfare. Only through understanding these can guerrillas have a correct political outlook and be competent in conducting the mass movement. In order to

fulfil the above-mentioned great task and to consolidate and strengthen the guerrilla forces, Party branches should be established and improved in guerrilla forces and leaders of guerrillas should be determined and brave; they should set examples through their own conduct and they should share the weal and woe of the soldiers. The tendency to look down on local recruits must be completely corrected. Efforts should be made to train them so that they can gradually assume low and middle level leadership positions. These people can help the guerrillas in their efforts to get closer to the masses and sovietize them.

DEVELOPING THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND PREVENTING SABOTAGE BY ENEMY AGENTS

October 1, 1936

The invasion of China by Japanese imperialists over the past five years has put the fate of the Chinese nation in the balance, and people across the land have risen in a vigorous movement to save the country. The Communist Party of China has always stood at the forefront of this movement against Japanese aggression and for national salvation. It was under the leadership of the Party that the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, frustrating the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns of the Kuomintang reactionaries and the attacks of their pursuing troops, marched 10,000 *li* [5,000 km.] north to resist Japanese aggression. It was also under the leadership of the Party that the Northeastern Volunteers attacked the Japanese invaders in ice-bound northeast China.¹⁴⁸ In the Kuomintang areas the Communists, defying all repression and difficulties, have courageously played a leading part in the national salvation movement and in all the struggles for the emancipation of the nation and the people. On August 1 last year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Government of the Soviet Republic advanced specific proposals for the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front to save the nation from destruction.¹⁴⁹ Both our efforts over the years and this call for a united front have won the sympathy of people throughout the country and tremendously increased the prestige of the Communist Party.

It is precisely for this reason that the Japanese imperialists are clamouring for the suppression of the Communist Party and that certain Kuomintang leaders, disconcerted by the people's movement for national salvation, are

This article, originally entitled "The Development of the Revolutionary Movement and the Activities of Enemy Agents," first appeared under the pen name Shi Ping in issue No. 67 of the Chinese-language journal *National Salvation Times*, founded in Paris by the Chinese Communist Party.

relentlessly attacking the Communists and all other revolutionaries and trying to undermine their organizations. At the same time, many politically awakened persons want to join the Party, and many people's organizations want Communists to join them and give them direction. The opponents of the national salvation movement are therefore trying new ways to wreck the Party and other revolutionary organizations.

They no longer limit themselves to opposing the revolution from outside the Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations and to hiring "big-bellied, black-gowned gumshoes"¹⁵⁰ to track down revolutionaries; they also smuggle secret agents into the Party and other organizations to sabotage the revolution. In some places enemy agents disguised as revolutionaries have set up phony communist parties, trade unions and youth leagues to camouflage themselves and deceive the people. They use the names "Communist Party" and "revolutionary organization" to undermine the Party's policies and to ensnare and kill revolutionaries.

Shanghai is an example. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party moved from there to the Soviet area¹⁹ long ago, and its Shanghai Sub-Bureau was dissolved in the winter of 1934. Since then, there has not been any organization or representative of the Central Committee in that city. However, quite a number of organizations have appeared in Shanghai with names like "Central Committee of the Communist Party," "Central Bureau," "Representative of the Central Committee," "Central Bureau of the Young Communists" and "Such-and-Such Trade Union." There is even a "Shanghai Committee of Probationary Members of the Chinese Communist Party." These organizations put out newspapers that sometimes reproduce articles published by leaders of our Party at home or abroad. Indeed, there are some genuine revolutionaries and Party members in these bogus organizations. That's not surprising, for these people do not yet know that they have been hoodwinked by enemy agents and believe that they have joined truly revolutionary organizations. On the other hand, enemy agents need these Communists and revolutionaries who have been unwittingly misled as a facade to deceive other revolutionaries.

Why do the opponents of the revolution resort to this new stratagem of having secret agents set up false revolutionary organizations?

First, they want to forge quantities of "Communist Party" documents. Kuomintang leaders who prefer to sit back and see the nation perish can use these documents as pretexts to reject the united front and to damage the prestige of the Party and other revolutionary organizations.

Second, seeing that the Communist Party's prestige is growing as the national salvation movement expands and the more and more people wish

to join the Party or to rally around it, they want to set up bogus communist parties and revolutionary organizations in an attempt to deceive these people, ensnare them and arrest and kill them.

Third, they know that although the Central Committee has left Shanghai, many Party members and sympathizers have stayed behind, independently carrying on a heroic and unyielding struggle in the workers' movement, the students' movement and all other movements for national salvation. It is for the purpose of arresting and murdering these people that the opponents of the revolution have set up phony communist parties and revolutionary organizations and, taking advantage of the difficulties of communication between Party members and their higher-level organizations under conditions of underground activity, have tried to make contact with revolutionaries by passing themselves off as Party members. Unaware of the tactics of enemy agents, many revolutionaries did make contact with them and so lost their lives.

Of course, in attempting to destroy revolutionary organizations, the enemy agents do not stop at putting up false fronts. They have many other despicable tricks up their sleeves, as we have already discovered.

Enemy agents do not necessarily try to destroy Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations as soon as they have infiltrated them, for they want to make bigger hauls and cause greater damage. Even when they have a chance to destroy an important organization and arrest its leaders, they don't always seize it. They may "exert themselves for the cause" and pretend to be busy working for the united front, so as to gain the confidence of the organization and improve their positions in it; thus they hope to be able to destroy a greater number of organizations and more important ones. Hence, it is wrong to believe—as some Communists and other revolutionaries still do—that only those who arrest revolutionaries on sight are enemy agents. It would be a terrible mistake to place one's trust in a dubious person just because that person had "exerted" himself in a particular job, or because some important task had been smoothly accomplished even though he had knowledge of it. Persons who make that mistake are the very ones enemy agents use to cover their operations. Enemy agents often leave such unsuspecting revolutionaries at liberty because they can find shelter in their credulity.

Another method used by enemy agents to infiltrate a higher Party organization is to sabotage it either from below or from above. When many Party members and revolutionary cadres have been killed, disguised enemy agents come forward to "restore the organization" and "re-establish contact," and thus eventually worm their way into the higher organization. Each

time a Party organization is destroyed, the secret agents try to divert the attention of revolutionaries from their own role by shouting that the destruction occurred because somebody was careless enough to have been shadowed and tracked down by detectives. Such devices work because many Communists are not so alert as they should be in difficult conditions and, with their traditional revolutionary enthusiasm and tenacity, are eager to re-establish contact whenever a Party organization has been destroyed—so eager that they don't even stop to consider whether they have found the right person. Because we have not carefully studied the problem of hidden enemy agents, these agents are often able to achieve their purposes. A destroyed organization may be re-established time and again, but if it fails to eliminate the enemy agents lurking within it, time and again revolutionaries will be delivered into the blood-stained hands of the enemy. Long years of experience in China and elsewhere have taught us that revolutionaries operating underground should not hurry to restore a destroyed organization. Their first task is to investigate the cause of the destruction until it becomes perfectly clear whether any enemy agents were involved. It is true that if we wait to re-establish an organization we may incur temporary losses, but those losses are far less disastrous than the death of valuable cadres that may result if we try to re-establish it prematurely. The loss of revolutionary cadres is the heaviest loss. Victory in the revolution cannot come about without the persistent struggle of revolutionary cadres.

A third method used by enemy agents to infiltrate revolutionary organizations is to pass themselves off as revolutionaries who have escaped or been released from imperialist or Kuomintang jails. They appear with blood dripping from their heads and claim to have been tortured. This trick often works, because revolutionaries generally are kind and warm-hearted. In fact, however, it is not right to accept a person just out of prison into an organization without prior investigation. Instead of establishing contact with such a person immediately, the organization should subject him to a rigorous examination, even if he is a genuine revolutionary. Aside from the danger of enemy infiltration, there is the possibility that he was photographed while in jail, and detectives are bound to shadow him in pursuit of other revolutionaries. A genuine revolutionary will not complain about this sort of examination, because he knows that its purpose is to ensure the security of the organization and prevent damage to the revolutionary cause.

Now, how can we identify enemy agents? They do have certain characteristics in common.

First, however much they may pretend, they are, after all, not really exerting themselves for the revolution. No matter how smooth-tongued they

are, claiming to be busy from dawn to dusk working for the revolution, they are reluctant to carry out the fundamental policies and the tactics of the Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations. For example, now that the Central Committee has decided to pursue a policy of an anti-Japanese united front for national salvation and shift the focus of work in the workers' and students' movements accordingly, enemy agents will try to stall for time, to deliberately misinterpret the policy or to undermine it.

Second, the basic objective of enemy agents is the arrest and murder of revolutionaries and destruction of their organizations. As soon as they think they have gained the revolutionaries' trust, therefore, they begin arranging the arrest and murder of people in organizations with which they themselves have no direct contact or no contact that would draw suspicion upon them. They often manage to have a "narrow escape" whenever revolutionaries are caught. Soon after they are assigned to work with a revolutionary organization in place A, that organization is destroyed, and the same thing happens when they are transferred to place B and then to place C. Obviously, this marks them as enemy agents.

Third, enemy agents are very interested in registering the membership of revolutionary organizations and in obtaining whatever other information they don't yet have. They often prepare a lot of questionnaires and statistical forms in the name of a higher organization as a means of getting detailed personnel data. After that, they sometimes have the revolutionaries arrested immediately, but in most cases they have policemen search the place where the records are kept, seize them and then make arrests. Such tactics can be effective, because some revolutionaries never bother to look into what these agents are doing in violation of the principles governing underground work. Some persons in higher-level organizations write down and even publish in journals much important information that should be kept absolutely secret. These people are either fools or enemy agents.

Fourth, another device of enemy agents is to sow dissension and create factions within the revolutionary ranks by deliberately provoking dissatisfaction with a certain person or organization. They know that discord in revolutionary organizations leads to endless disputes and thus makes it impossible for the movement to proceed. They can exploit such discord for their own ends. An example is Ma Yufu,¹⁵¹ who in 1929 tried to incite the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee against the Central Committee and later became a leading Trotskyite. He is now a police detective working openly in Nanjing.

Fifth, when an enemy agent knows that a new one has come to take over his job in a revolutionary organization, or when the progress of the mass

movement has made it impossible for him to carry on, he “gives himself up” as a Party member by publishing a “confession” in the newspapers to undercut the prestige of the organization. The so-called Communist confessions that sometimes appear in the press are in fact fabricated by enemy agents.

It goes without saying that enemy agents are too wily to limit themselves to the above-mentioned tricks. Constant vigilance on the part of the revolutionaries is required to detect them.

No doubt one reason why enemy agents have sometimes been successful is that they have become increasingly cunning over the past few years. But the main reason is that the revolutionaries have not been vigilant enough and, in some cases, have been totally blind to their counter-revolutionary attacks. For example, on three occasions in 1932-33 the Communist Party organization in Shanghai recruited members by open admission without examining the applicants’ backgrounds, offering a superb opportunity for enemy agents to infiltrate the Party. And each time a revolutionary organization was destroyed the cadres concerned, instead of trying to find out if enemy agents were involved, were always taken in by the explanation that someone had been shadowed by detectives. Some persons were known to have organized factional groups. Wherever they went, revolutionary organizations were destroyed. And when they were arrested, the detectives politely set them free. But instead of investigating these unusual occurrences to see if there were enemy agents in their ranks, the organizations concerned continued to regard the dubious elements as good people. Later these organizations suffered great losses, as might have been expected. Some people in revolutionary organizations were so foolish that they regarded as their “comrades” certain persons who had openly surrendered to the police and had later served as enemy agents arresting and killing revolutionaries. They hoped that these agents would return to the revolutionary path. That degree of folly is really beyond explanation.

A number of revolutionaries working with lower-level organizations and some inexperienced comrades are so gullible that they readily fall into the clutches of enemy agents. This is due partly to the failure of higher-level organizations to train them in revolutionary vigilance and partly to the many structural weaknesses in the organizations, which enemy agents can exploit. For example, some organizations have kept their structure unchanged for a dozen years, ignoring the perils of underground work. Regardless of the amount of work to be done or the number of people they actually need, they are always reluctant to change either the vertical structure (the organizational hierarchy) or the horizontal structure (the branches). So they recruit people

indiscriminately, just to keep the number of personnel constant. The truth is that under present conditions, the simpler the structure and the more independent the organizations the better. Because of these structural weaknesses and through force of habit, a revolutionary organization is liable to accept without investigation anyone who is introduced to it by another organization or an individual, even though the letter of introduction may have been forged by enemy agents. There are also persons and organizations that are careless enough to introduce people randomly and irresponsibly. Enemy agents have no difficulty getting letters of introduction from them. It is therefore essential to find out all the facts about a person introduced in this way, no matter where he is from, before accepting him into an organization. That is the only way for us to avoid falling into the traps of enemy agents. Violations of the principles of underground work can be found in revolutionary organizations everywhere; some people even write in ordinary letters everything that should be kept strictly secret. Haven't we had enough bloody lessons over the years to know better?

In the grim conditions created by ruthless enemy repression, revolutionary organizations in many places are constantly threatened with destruction, and every revolutionary faces the possibility of losing contact with his organization. When that happens, of course, it means considerable losses for the movement, but it does not mean that revolutionaries can't continue their work on their own. Experience throughout the world has shown that it is not unusual for revolutionaries to lose contact with their organizations. In many places abroad such organizations are outlawed and can rely only on a newspaper published by a few leaders, which frequently carries articles on strategy and tactics to guide the revolution. People who have lost contact with their organizations have not stopped working because of that. They have followed the guidance given by the newspaper from afar and carried on the struggle independently. In this way many outstanding revolutionaries have emerged who are capable of working on their own. Furthermore, when they had no contact it was impossible for enemy agents to track them down and entrap them. I think this is an example Chinese revolutionaries should follow. In Shanghai and elsewhere enemy agents have already set up "Communist headquarters" and "revolutionary organizations." Genuine revolutionaries who have been deceived and joined these bogus organizations should try at once to shake off pursuit and continue to work quietly and independently among the masses. Isn't that what the Russian revolutionaries did for a long time before the February Revolution?¹⁵² Though they worked independently at that time, they were provided with strategic guidelines by a distant newspaper. That explains why people working separately in different

places were able to co-ordinate their efforts when the great February Revolution broke out. Of course this method can be adopted today not only in Shanghai but in all other Kuomintang areas. Even though certain contacts have been maintained between higher-and lower-level organizations in some places, revolutionaries should not overlook the possibility of their being cut off at any moment. They should be prepared to work independently.

However brutally the enemy represses revolutionaries, the reactionaries, who are bucking the tide of history, can never stamp out the revolution. They cannot escape their doom by intensifying repression. As far as the people and the revolutionaries are concerned, greater cruelty on the part of the enemy can only deepen their hatred and sharpen their determination to carry on the struggle.

LATE ONE NIGHT

October 26, 1936

Late one night in 1932 in the eleventh month of the lunar calendar at about 11 o'clock, I was riding in a rickshaw,¹⁵³ my bowler hat¹⁵⁴ lowered over my eyes, my face fully obscured by the upturned collar of the worn Western-style overcoat I had bought in a shop in Wusong Road. Passing down twisting lanes, I stopped at the No. 1 trolleybus terminal at the end of North Sichuan Road. The fare paid, I looked around and, seeing no "tail," I ducked into a three-storey house on the street. The building was rented by the room, with the stairs just inside the door. As I recall, it was a door on the right on the third floor which bore the mark a comrade had instructed me to look for. I gave two light knocks, and a woman came out.

"Is Mr. Zhou in?" I asked. "Mr. 'X' asked me to come to meet Mr. 'Y'." The hostess politely showed me in.

Comrade Qu Qiubai¹⁵⁵ had everything ready. Several of his manuscripts and books had been placed in Comrade Yang Zhihua's¹⁵⁶ cloth bundle. He too carried a small cloth bundle with a change of clothes for himself and Zhihua.

"Anything else?" I asked him.

"Nothing else," he answered.

"Isn't there a suitcase?" I enquired curiously.

"That's all I own," he said, and then asked me, "Is it far?"

"Very far. I'll go and get three rickshaws," I said and turned to go downstairs when the host, a serious-looking man in his fifties who was very considerate towards us, said: "You needn't go. I'll send someone." He asked

This memorial article was written by Comrade Chen Yun one week after Lu Xun's death. It recounts their meeting when Chen Yun went to Lu Xun's home to move Comrades Qu Qiubai and Yang Zhihua to a new location. Chen Yun was at that time a member of the Provisional Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and secretary of leading Party members' group of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This article was originally carried in the Issue No. 64 of the Chinese Communist Party's *National Salvation Times*, which was published in Paris, France. The author's name appeared as "Shi Ping."

the hostess to call the rickshaws.

Pointing to the host, Comrade Qiubai asked me: "Have you two met before?"

"No," the host and I responded simultaneously.

"This is Mr. Zhou, or rather, Mr. Lu Xun," Comrade Qiubai made the introduction, and indicating me, he continued, "This is Comrade 'Z'."

"How I've been wanting to meet you!" I said with sincere respect.

This was actually the first time I had ever seen Lu Xun. He wore an old grey padded cotton robe. His serious, worried look revealed a deep concern that Qiubai, Zhihua and I might be caught by detectives or police on the road.

"Is it safe outside so late at night?" he asked me.

"Luckily, it's raining, so we can raise the rickshaw canopies and then there will be nothing to worry about," I reassured him.

I had no idea where Lu Xun was from although there was something of a Shaoxing accent to his speech. (Not until I had taken Qiubai and Zhihua to their new place and asked Comrade Qiubai about this did I learn that Lu Xun was indeed a native of Shaoxing).

The hostess soon returned. "The rickshaws are at the door," she said.

"Let's go," I said, helping Zhihua with her bundle, and we went to the door. Comrade Qiubai told Lu Xun, "Please give the two books that I want to you-know-who to pass on to me," then pointing at me, "or ask Comrade 'Z' to come for them."

I seized the opportunity to respond to this request: "I'll come for them in a few days." We were at the door, but Zhihua was still saying her parting words to the hostess, so we waited a moment for her.

"When you get there safely tonight," Lu Xun told Comrade Qiubai, "ask you-know-who to tell me, so that I won't worry." Comrade Qiubai agreed and a moment later the three of us were on our way downstairs. At the door Lu Xun and the hostess repeated, "Take care. We won't see you out." When we were halfway downstairs, I looked around. They were still at the door watching us, Lu Xun's serious, worried expression showing his concern for our safety.

Then, Comrade Qiubai also glanced back. "Please go back in," he said. They nodded silently. Only after we had reached the second floor landing did we hear the door shut on the third floor.

Ever since Comrade "Y" was arrested in 1932, the detectives had been chasing Comrade Qiubai. He had been seriously ill and stayed at Lu Xun's home for a long time. Although he was being hunted by the police, Lu Xun had managed to protect Comrade Qiubai for several months. As time passed,

rumours began to circulate, so we moved Comrade Qiubai to another location. We had intended to return to Lu Xun's home to pick up the books for Comrade Qiubai, and I was eager to visit Lu Xun again, but for various reasons I did not return and had to leave Shanghai quickly instead. Thus my first meeting with Lu Xun was also my last.

That Lu Xun should have died! When I learned from the newspaper of Lu Xun's illness and death, it seemed that my head would burst. For a few minutes I sat dumbstruck. I could see Lu Xun's image. He was wearing his grey padded cotton robe and had a solemn worried look as if he were still saying, "Is it safe outside so late at night?"

Lu Xun died, but his thoughts are deeply impressed in the minds of millions of Chinese youths. Lu Xun's spirit of "resolute and uncompromising defiance" will always remain in the thoughts of our youths, leading them onto the bright road of liberation for the Chinese nation and the working people. Lu Xun died, but his spirit will never perish.

Lu Xun's death is a great loss to the Chinese nation. His death means the loss of the Chinese Communist Party's best friend, a man who cared for our Party and our revolutionary fighters. Comrades! Friends! We should not give ourselves up to grief. We must march forward! The cause for which Lu Xun fought all his life calls us to carry on bravely and resolutely so it can be realized.

ON OUR POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CADRES

September 1938

Our policy with respect to cadres, to put it simply, is to make best use of personnel. Why am I discussing this question today? Because you will soon be working in areas behind enemy lines, not just as guerrilla fighters but as cadres and leaders. The proper use of personnel is a matter of great importance to those in leadership positions. You all know the saying, “Cadres decide everything.”¹⁵⁷ That is true throughout the world, not only in China but also in foreign countries, not only in the Communist Party but in other political parties as well.

It is unfortunate that in the last decade of struggle our Party has lost more than 100,000 cadres. Indeed, were it not for our northern Shaanxi base area,¹⁵⁸ that figure would be even higher. If each of our country’s 1,800 counties had saved just three Party members, we would certainly be much stronger.

In my talk on the cadre policy today I would like to emphasize four points: first, try to know people; second, be broad-minded; third, make good use of people; and fourth, look after their welfare.

Now the first point: try to know people.

It is not easy—in fact, it’s very difficult—to know people and know them well. Take our Communist Party, for example. Does every Party member know the people around him? Yes, but not well enough, I’m afraid. We have recently discovered two problems in this connection. One is that some comrades tend to look at others with one eye closed, so that they can see only one side of them. The other is that some comrades tend to see only what a person is doing today, ignoring what he has done in the past; they judge him only by his ability, ignoring his character.

Which of the following two ways of thinking is more common among our comrades: seeing only a person’s weaknesses and not his strengths, or the

Speech delivered to the students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yan’an. At the time, Comrade Chen Yun was director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

other way around? Generally speaking, I think our comrades are more likely to see a person's weaknesses than to recognize his strengths. Is there anything to support this statement? Well, when we are assigning cadres, we often hear quite a lot of unfavourable comments: one man is conceited, another is timid and incapable, a third has too doubtful a background, and so on.

Of course it is not good to be conceited. But when we decide a person is conceited, our judgement is often one-sided. If we probe deeper into the matter, we may find that a bad thing does contain something good. The cause of a person's conceit could well be his confidence and ability. In dealing with this kind of person we should try to make the best of his strong points and help him overcome his arrogance. If you set specific requirements for him, tell him the correct direction to follow and let him work to the best of his ability, I am sure he will accomplish something. If you assign him a job that is not very important and give him a free hand so that he can make full use of his strengths, he will gradually overcome his weaknesses as his experience increases in the course of work. The accumulation of experience is indispensable to the overcoming of one's weaknesses.

Of course it is not good to be timid either. But there is something good about that too. A timid person is careful and cautious in everything he does, because he is not particularly capable. Although such a person cannot do anything that requires courage and resolution, he may be excellent at work that calls for meticulousness—confidential work perhaps, or conducting investigations and compiling statistical data. I am not encouraging people to be timid; I just want to point out that a person of this type also has his own strength—his carefulness—and that that too can be useful.

Now a few words about a person with a doubtful background. When we recruit new Party members we hesitate to accept those applicants who are highly articulate, or who have a beard or moustache, or who know a lot about different political parties, because we regard those traits as manifestations of a doubtful background. However, such people often have broad social experience and understand many things. Why shouldn't we admit them into the Party, if they truly believe in communism and are willing to join the proletariat in the revolution and advance along with us? I, for one, have a very complex background. At first, I believed in Wu Peifu,¹²¹ then I switched to Etatism,¹⁵⁹ and then to the Three People's Principles.¹⁶⁰ Finally I turned to communism because, through comparison, I realized that it was the best doctrine. We may say that people like me have a doubtful background, but they have come to understand communism through their personal experience and are people of true conviction. Young people may have true conviction, but they are not the only ones; old people can have it too.

From what I have said we can see that a person's weaknesses also contain certain strengths and his strengths contain certain weaknesses. By "making good use" of a person we mean giving scope to his strengths while helping him overcome his weaknesses. No one is without virtues and no one is free from shortcomings. That's why we maintain that in the revolutionary ranks there is not a single person who cannot be useful.

The second problem in knowing people is that one tends either to see only how a person behaves today and turn a blind eye to his past or vice versa; either to see a person's merits and overlook his faults or vice versa; either to see a person's current strengths and ignore his past failings or the other way around. Thus one often fails to make an accurate assessment of the basic qualities of a cadre. How does this problem manifest itself? In promoting and demoting people in an irresponsible way. It often happens in our Party that when a cadre does his work well he is promoted to a high position, but if his performance is not quite up to par the next day, he is immediately demoted to the grass roots. This reminds me of the way people use pile-drivers to lay the foundations for a house—the drivers are first lifted high and then dropped. We should not use a cadre the way we use a pile-driver, promoting him to a high position when he has done good work today, bringing him down when he fails tomorrow, sometimes repeating the process again and again. That is very wrong. In driving piles for a house the more times you repeat the up-and-down process the better. But when it comes to using cadres, just repeat it twice and the future of the cadre in question is ruined: by then he has lost all self-confidence and no longer dares to do anything. When I worked in the Jiangxi Soviet Area,³⁰ we had a comrade named Mao Zetan, who was one of Chairman Mao's younger brothers.¹⁶¹ Just because people thought he had made some mistakes and was no good, he was considered unfit for any job. Later, when more people were needed to expand the Red Army, he was sent to work in a district, where he overfulfilled the recruitment quota. He did an excellent job. So when he returned, many people thought highly of him, and he was transferred to a guerrilla area on the Fujian-Jiangxi border. A few months later he happened to make a few remarks that seemed to border on Right opportunism, and about the same time he was sent to recruit men for the Red Army but was not successful. Again he was considered no good and was rejected wherever he was sent. To think that a comrade like him should have become so unwanted that he even found it difficult to earn a living! Finally, when the Red Army moved out of Jiangxi, he died a heroic death in action, shedding his last drop of blood for the revolution. That shows that we must not judge a person one-sidedly by his behaviour in a particular period only. Failure to make a sound

assessment of a person's qualities can lead to gross mistakes.

So much for the question of trying to know people.

Now let me turn to the second point: be broad-minded.

We should be broad-minded in using people. The reason I want to talk about this question here is that times have changed. What, then, is the difference between the situation in 1938 and that in 1928? What is the difference in the situation before the Lugouqiao Incident and afterwards?¹⁶² I think the difference is that the hearts of many more people have now turned to the Communist Party and that large numbers of outstanding people have come to Yan'an from all over the country. I remember in 1932 in Shanghai we ran a class to train cadres from among the workers. It was only a six-day course, and we had only six students. Today there are several thousand students in the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College alone.¹⁶³ If we count those in the Northern Shaanxi College,¹⁶⁴ the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature¹⁶⁵ and the Party School,¹⁶⁶ there are more than 10,000 students in Yan'an alone. What a difference between 6 and 10,000! That's why I say that over the last 10 years there has been a great change in the way people think. Many of them, men and women, old and young, have come to Yan'an despite the hardships of a long journey. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political College announced in a Wuhan newspaper that no more students would be enrolled, but that didn't stop people from coming to Yan'an. Those who couldn't take buses simply travelled on foot. Men and women alike traversed thousands of kilometres to come to Yan'an. Most of them were revolutionary young people, but there were also some university professors and engineers, including an elderly man of 75. The Northwest Hotel in Yan'an is now receiving all sorts of people—persons with party affiliations, journalists, visiting groups of young people, and so forth. I don't think these people have come to Yan'an just because they can't earn a living elsewhere, or because they want to live on millet.

Things do look complicated. Well, which do you prefer, a complicated situation or a simple one? It was really simple when there were only six students in our training class in Shanghai. And it's pretty complicated to have people with such diverse backgrounds as we have today. But as I see it, there is no way to avoid complicated situations if we want to achieve something great. And things will be much more complicated when the time comes for us to lead the entire nation. It would be really simple if we remained just a small group without expanding our ranks, but then there would definitely be no hope of victory in the revolution. As a vanguard, the Communist Party should lead a vast reserve force and identify itself with the masses. This means that it will invariably find itself in complicated situa-

tions. We could never win our fight against the enemy if we relied solely on comrades from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College and the Northern Shaanxi College. We must unite with many more comrades and broader sections of the masses. If we are afraid of complicated situations in making revolution, things will only become more complicated; if we are not afraid of them, things will be easier. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was indeed a great man. Within a few days the Wuchang Uprising, known as the Revolution of 1911,¹⁶⁷ won favourable response from a dozen provinces across China. What enabled Dr. Sun to achieve such success? For one thing, he was broad-minded. He accomplished so much because he was ready to accept all kinds of people for the cause of revolution, people of different party affiliations, whether they were members of the Red-Tasselled Spear Society¹¹ or the Society of Brothers¹⁶⁸ or people of the “three religions and nine schools of thought”¹⁶⁹ We too should be good at using all kinds of people, anyone who has specialized knowledge. That is the only way we can accomplish great things. Can we say that only Communist Party members have extraordinary qualities? I don’t think so. There are plenty of capable people in society and many of them are not Party members. We should therefore be broad-minded and find ways to use them. We cannot succeed in the revolution by going it alone.

After graduation you will go to work in the enemy-occupied areas and behind enemy lines. There will be all the more need for you to be broad-minded in seeking help in those places. There are many capable people there who have left the big cities to seek refuge in the villages and mountains. You will be organizing guerrilla units in the interests of the nation and the labouring people, and if you do your work well, I am sure the people in hiding will come out to join you. The scholars, artists, scientists, statesmen and economists—truly useful people disguised as peasants—will then reveal their identities and turn to you. For example, when a few Party members went with an Eighth Route Army officer to a place in Shandong Province to urge the local people to fight against Japan, very soon several thousand people responded to the call. Now they have an armed force of 10,000.

Now the third point: make good use of people.

How are you going to do that? I see no other way than to enable everyone under your leadership to work happily and energetically. If you can do that, you are successful. This applies to all sorts of work. Whatever work you are going to do, whether in civilian units, the army or the Party, you will certainly be successful if you can make everybody under you work actively and contentedly and with a keen sense of responsibility. You should try to avoid certain problems that may come up among your subordinates,

such as their becoming discontented with their work and requesting transfers. No comrade will ever ask to be transferred if he is assigned the right job that gives full scope to his ability. He asks to be transferred because he feels uncomfortable about his work. When such problems occur frequently, it is because of poor leadership.

How, then, can you provide good leadership so that your cadres will feel satisfied and devote themselves to their work? There is only one answer, and that is that leaders must trust their subordinates, who in turn must trust their leaders. A leader must work in such a way that those under him dare to speak out and to act. There are many lower-level cadres who never tell others what's on their minds and who always look submissive. When you ask them at a meeting, "Do you agree or not?" they answer, "Yes, I agree." When you say, "Would those who agree please raise their hands," they do as requested. But problems are not solved that way. So you should see to it that all your subordinates dare to speak up and are able to work with a free hand, and you should make it clear to them that even if they do something wrong, that is not too important. A subordinate will work with zest when he feels free to speak and act.

What harm is it if people don't dare to speak their minds? For one thing, if a person has a different opinion but doesn't dare express it, no resolution can be implemented efficiently even if it has been adopted by vote. So we should encourage debate rather than seek superficial unanimity.

How can we encourage others to speak their minds? Here are a few points that deserve attention.

First, leaders should be approachable. How can work be done well in a department where people become tongue-tied the moment they see their leaders? A leader whom everybody likes to be with and enjoys talking to must be one who is good at uniting people. If a leader acts superior and goes about looking as grim as the devil, nobody will dare approach him. Even when a subordinate is obliged to speak to him, he may forget eight out of ten sentences he intended to say. After all, what's the sense of a leader's putting on a severe, frightening appearance? You comrades might ask why one should judge a leader by his facial expression instead of by his politics. But a lot of people do just that. Even some of our Party members. So all leaders should pay attention to this point.

Also, meetings should not be conducted according to a rigid pattern. When presiding over a meeting, you should use every means to encourage the participants to argue with one another freely and animatedly. If you ask them to express their views formally one by one, most likely some will keep their mouths shut. For there are always people who are not used to speaking

in a formal atmosphere.

In short, your subordinates should feel that they can speak freely whenever they like. That means that you are a successful leader, because your subordinates are confident that it doesn't matter if they happen to say something wrong.

Second, don't pin exaggerated labels on other people. For example, when a person has said something wrong, you should not give him a good talking to, or criticize him for engaging in "Left" empty talk, or suspect him of being a Right opportunist. If you put three or four preposterous labels on a person, that will be the end of him; he won't be able to carry on his work.

Some people tend to approach every problem from the high plane of principle. Let a comrade make some minor mistake and they attribute it to political vacillation. But how can they do such a thing? It's wrong to regard everything as related to principle. In fact, such a mechanical way of thinking is very dangerous, because it may lead to absurd conclusions. Here are a few examples. There was a woman comrade who had tucked a pair of scissors under her pillow. Some people who discovered this reasoned: she probably doesn't want to let anybody else use her scissors. They concluded that she was "selfish" and criticized her for that. How could Communists tolerate such selfishness? Then there was the comrade who often helped himself a bit too much to the dishes that everyone was sharing. He was criticized for being "self-centred." If he had been a Party member, that label would have sufficed to put his membership in jeopardy. A third example: a student at the Northern Shaanxi College lost a foreign-made pocket knife. He felt very bad because it was a souvenir. When a comrade asked why he was so downcast, he told him about the knife. Thereupon, he was criticized for "lacking the spirit of self-sacrifice." A revolutionary, he was told, should be ready to sacrifice his life at any time, yet here he was, grieving over the loss of so small a thing as a knife. The reasoning may sound logical, but to criticize a comrade for a mere trifle is too much. Surely there is nothing wrong with cherishing a souvenir! How can you conclude from such evidence that this comrade "lacked the spirit of self-sacrifice"? That is a terrible thing to say about a person. But people do pin labels on others because they tend to elevate minor mistakes to the level of principle, which is absurd. We should not make sweeping judgements about people; we must be clear whether a mistake has really been made, and if it has, we must be able to tell whether it is serious or not. On no account should we pin labels on people.

Third, when criticizing someone for a mistake, you should point out its cause and the way to correct it. You don't criticize people in order to vent your spleen; you do it in order to help them correct their mistakes. Generally

speaking, there are two different ways of criticizing a person. One is to censure him in an overbearing manner. The other is to try kindly to explain the cause of the mistake and the way to correct it. Only the second approach will convince the comrade concerned and thus really help to solve the problem.

A leader's criticism of his subordinates must be well measured and justified. He should never use labels, because his words will have an impact different from those of the rank and file. People at the lower level treat one another as equals, and they won't mind too much if criticisms from that source are a little too severe or not well founded. But it is different when one is criticized by one's leader, because subordinates usually take their leaders' words very seriously. That is why a leader should guard against thoughtless criticism. If the criticism he makes is unjustified or too severe, it will cost him painstaking effort to dispel the misunderstanding on the part of the person criticized and to prevent others from looking down upon that person. Of course, a subordinate should understand that his leader means well, and not take criticism too seriously just because his attitude or manner of speaking may be too harsh.

When making criticisms, we should bear the following considerations in mind: Is the person being criticized a veteran or a new Party member? Is he an old cadre or a new one? We have to consider all this, because while your attitude and method don't matter so much when you criticize a veteran Party member, it's quite another thing when you criticize a person who has just joined the Party and who thinks differently from the veterans. In criticizing these new comrades, you have to use mild and persuasive language. In short, we should encourage people to speak their minds. To achieve this, we should refrain from pinning labels on others and from magnifying a minor mistake into a major mistake involving principles. Criticism should be well meant, sincere and made with careful consideration of people's feelings, and it should include an analysis of the cause of the mistake in question and the way to correct it.

To use people well, it is also necessary to delegate responsibility. If you feel happy and comfortable and like a true leader only when your subordinates consult you and ask your advice before handling any matter, no matter how trivial, your attitude will be a great hindrance to the work. How much time and energy can you afford? Even if you are the most capable and energetic person in the world, even if you are the "number one authority under heaven," you can't achieve anything without the help and support of "number two" and "number three." Indeed, without them you wouldn't be number one at all. This shortcoming in a leader inevitably robs other

cadres of their sense of responsibility, cripples their self-confidence and dampens their enthusiasm. When one of them does something right, he will say, "That's what my superior told me to do." When he does something wrong, he will say the same thing. In other words, he himself doesn't feel responsible for the outcome of his work; that's not his business. Without a sense of responsibility, the rank-and-file cadres cannot do their work well, their initiative and creativity will suffer, and it will be hard for them to improve their skills.

Some comrades may say that giving full responsibility to subordinates is a poor method of leadership because it engenders many mistakes. As I see it, although mistakes can scarcely be avoided, they are not so terrible. In a sense, one can't make progress without making mistakes. In fact, one learns from one's mistakes. Only by drawing on more and more lessons can one keep improving oneself. Correctness often comes from mistakes. Is there any scientist whose invention is not the result of learning from trial and error? The streamlined cars of today look attractive and are easy to handle. But take a look at their earliest models now on display in the museums and you'll find how awkward and clumsy they were in appearance. There's no telling how many experiments and failures prepared the way for such progress! In the same way, it doesn't matter if a comrade makes a few minor mistakes. If he can honestly draw the necessary lessons from them, his experience will be increased and so will his competence. So don't be afraid that cadres under you may make mistakes; they should be encouraged to give full play to their abilities.

To sum up, it's very important to make sure our cadres dare to speak out and to take initiative. That is the only way to keep them content with the jobs assigned to them and to maintain high morale. If all you want is a yesman who repeats whatever you say, the cadre will never be able to develop his own ability. If the cadres in a unit aren't asking for transfers and are all working creatively and taking initiative, then without a doubt, that unit is functioning under good leadership. If the situation is the reverse, something must be wrong with the leadership. In any leading bodies you comrades enter, I'm sure you will achieve a great deal if you can encourage your subordinates to dare to speak their minds and take initiative.

Now I'd like to take up my last point: look after people's welfare.

To do that you have to remember the following:

First, as I've said earlier, you should not treat a cadre as if he were a piledriver, alternately pulling him up and bringing him down. If you want to promote a cadre, you should first make an overall assessment of his political integrity and professional competence and decide, after careful

consideration, whether he is up to the job in all respect. Once he is promoted, you should keep an eye on his work. If he can't meet the requirements no matter how hard he tries, you should give him advice and help right away. It's no good to wait until he has made a mess of things and then blame him for it and dismiss him.

Second, you should help the people working under your leadership to solve the problems that bother them. As you know, my office is over there on the hill. Sometimes when I have just started reading a document I am interrupted by someone who comes in to discuss his problems. That's really annoying, and I hesitate whether I should receive him or not. But when I put myself in my visitor's place, I realize that he must have something important to consult me about, or he wouldn't have taken the trouble to come to see me. So I decide I should take some time out to talk to him. Sometimes I'm writing something when a comrade drops in without notice. It certainly wouldn't be right for me just to ignore him and go on with my work. What I should do is put down my pen, listen attentively to what he has to say and answer his questions patiently and earnestly. That's the only way to satisfy him. It's worth the effort if you spend a couple of hours helping a cadre solve some problems. You should spare no pains in handling affairs—big or small—concerning cadres. You may refuse a request, but once you've agreed to help with a problem, you must do everything you can to solve it. That will take some time, but it will be worth it.

Third, when handling a matter that may have a vital bearing on a cadre's political career, you should go about it seriously and carefully. A comrade who has joined the revolution may attach more importance to his political life than to his physical existence. He would rather sacrifice everything than be expelled from the Party. If that happens, he'll think he is finished. So we should make a point of not expelling a Party member unless it's absolutely necessary.

Many comrades, having been expelled from the Party, have appealed to the Organization Department of the Central Committee, either in person or by letter. Here I would like to cite an example. There was a young man who had been stripped of Party membership because another person had written a confession in which he accused him of being a Trotskyite.¹⁷⁰ Although the young man's Party membership was afterwards restored, the previous seven years of his revolutionary career were written off, and he was treated like a newly recruited Party member. He requested that his case be re-examined. There were four people who could provide information on his background, one in Xi'an, another in Yan'an, still another with the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and a fourth who was living abroad. We wrote to all

these people making inquiries. Recently—that is, after a considerable period of time—we received the replies, which disproved the earlier conclusion in the young man’s case. So we confirmed his honourable past. While previously this comrade had felt utterly despondent, hoping only to die on the battlefield and be done with it, he is now a changed man. Was it worthwhile to spend two months investigating his case? Yes, I think it was. For when all is said and done, you can’t train a cadre in a couple of months, and there’s nothing more worthwhile than a two-month effort that ends in a cadre’s reinstatement.

Another example involves a man and a woman. Certain people had accused the man of being a member of a special Trotskyite committee and the woman of being a Trotskyite as well. They came to Yan’an wanting to study and asked me to arrange for them to enrol in the Party School or a training course. Since we had received information on their political background, I told them all about it. They were so shocked at what I said that they wept. I promised to look into their case myself. They had been full of good cheer when they came, but they left in tears. An investigation that took only two weeks established that they were not Trotskyites at all. Wasn’t that a worthwhile effort?

Some comrades, afraid of being implicated themselves, don’t have the courage to provide true information on the political background of others. That’s why when dealing with such problems a leader has to be exceedingly careful. Otherwise some comrades’ problems can never be solved, and they will be unjustly kept under suspicion all their lives, to the detriment of the cause. All leaders, whether in Party organizations or army units, should pay special attention to this question.

Comrades, parents are deeply concerned about the welfare of their children, and the Communist Party looks after its members with no less solicitude. We should help all comrades who have made mistakes to correct them. But what if someone has made an extremely grave mistake, or even committed a crime? Then, we have to consider whether he has done good service in the past. If so, his mistake should be weighed against his merits before any disciplinary measures are taken against him. As for people who have made mistakes in the past and are making new ones now, they should be allowed to compensate by performing good deeds, provided that with the help of criticism they quickly come to realize their mistakes and make up their minds to turn over a new leaf. The Communist Party is fair-minded. It encourages everyone in the revolutionary ranks who has made mistakes to continue making revolution, so long as he admits his mistakes and really corrects them. Present mistakes may be offset by past meritorious service,

and both present and past mistakes may be made up for by contributions in the future. We Communists should do our best to bring back to the right path all those who have made mistakes, because that is in the interest of the revolution.

Fourth, don't flatter a cadre or lavish praise on him. If you only praise a lower-level cadre and gloss over his weaknesses, he's likely to become conceited and work just for appearances and not for real results. So you are only doing him a disservice.

Some cadres like to hear complimentary remarks about themselves. They feel comfortable when people praise them and unhappy when they don't. As a matter of fact, however, people who are always saying flattering things about others are only apple-polishing, which is never a good thing. Only those who criticize unreservedly are good people and deserve to be called revolutionary comrades. Yet not all cadres appreciate this. As the saying goes, good advice offends the ear just as good medicine tastes bitter. Our comrades should bear that in mind.

In short, it's very important to look after people. Before promoting a cadre, we should make an overall assessment of his political integrity and professional competence. Once he is promoted, we should try to give him every kind of support. Any problem that distracts a cadre from his work should be solved completely with painstaking effort. If the problem is related to the cadre's political career, it should be handled with great care and discretion. Don't flatter cadres, but call a spade a spade. That is the way to show we really care about people.

Well, that's all I want to say today. Before finishing my speech, however, allow me to clarify two points. First, I hope that none of you comrades will think that revolutionary discipline can now be dispensed with that idea is wrong. There must be iron discipline in the revolutionary ranks to ensure the fulfilment of revolutionary tasks. Without such discipline neither the Chinese Communist Party nor the Eighth Route Army could have survived and become what it is today. Revolutionary discipline must be observed, and I hope none of you will violate it. My speech can't be of any help to those who violate discipline. Second, I hope that those of you who have been wronged or punished in one way or another will not use this speech of mine as a pretext for launching a retaliatory attack. That's no good. Let bygones be bygones. For who can avoid making mistakes? If the mistakes are corrected, that's fine. Our comrades should learn to be magnanimous.

Thank you!

WHY WAS LIU LIGONG EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY?

May 23, 1939

Liu Ligong joined the Communist Party last year, and after graduation from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College¹⁶³ he took a training course in Party building. When he completed the course the Party organization assessed his performance and concluded that he was “very conceited and many of his views do not befit a member of the Communist Party.” Because of this, and because Liu Ligong was a new and inexperienced Party member, the Party organization assigned him to work at the grass-roots level so that he could temper himself. However, Liu insisted that he be either admitted into the Institute of Marxism-Leninism¹⁷¹ or sent back to work in his native place (far from Yan’an), saying that he would quit the Party unless his demand was met. The Party organization talked with him on seven occasions in an effort to educate this new member. During their first talk Liu admitted that he was wrong to have threatened to quit the Party, yet he still refused to go and work at the grass-roots level. The Party organization rejected his demand on the ground that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, as a higher Party school, could not admit an ideologically mistaken person like Liu Ligong, and that assigning him to his native place would only gratify his feeling of family attachment and would be detrimental, not helpful, to work in the area. During their last discussion Liu Ligong was told that Party discipline required the individual to be subordinate to the organization and that his assignment to work at the grass roots in north China was a Party decision that must be obeyed. But Liu continued to ask the Party to grant his request, which was in effect a request to subordinate the organization to the individual. At the end of this talk the Party organization gave him some time to reconsider. A few days later he said he would be willing

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to work in north China, but on condition that he be assigned to the Eighth Route Army's General Headquarters. When that demand was turned down, he simply refused to carry out the Party's decision.

The Central Commission for Party Affairs¹⁷² concluded that the Party organization had done its utmost to persuade and educate Liu Ligong. "The individual is subordinate to the organization; the minority is subordinate to the majority; the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee"—these are rules of Party discipline, which no one may violate. Since Liu Ligong had violated discipline and refused to correct his mistake in spite of the Party's attempts to reason with him, it was decided that he should be expelled and that this decision should be made known throughout the Party.

Thus Liu Ligong was expelled from the Party. It may be asked: Are there other members whose views are more or less similar to his? Yes, there are. That's because the Party has accepted many new members, and the great majority of them are undisciplined petty bourgeoisie. They joined the Communist Party in pursuit of truth and are willing to fight for communism. We welcome them. But many of them have been imbued with nonproletarian ideas and habits, a fact that must not be overlooked: we need to work harder at educating them ideologically. At the same time, the new members themselves should make conscientious efforts to temper themselves through revolutionary work and to correct their wrong ideas and bad habits.

We often find Party members who haggle over the Party's decisions regarding their work assignments or use our policy with respect to cadres as a pretext to resist those decisions. These Party members may talk glibly about our cadre policy, but they don't quite understand it. They have overlooked the fact that although the Party does indeed take the particular abilities of each individual into consideration when assigning work to members, the decisions are based mainly on the needs of the work. For instance, you may be a pilot and yet, because we don't have any aircraft, we cannot make practical use of your special skill. So what can we do but assign you to another job? In talking about cadre policy, therefore, we must not speak only of the principle of assigning jobs according to people's abilities and forget about the other principle, the main principle, of assigning jobs according to the needs of the Party's work. The view that only the interests of the individual should be considered without regard to the interests of the Party is erroneous and one-sided; in fact it stems from ignorance of our cadre policy.

What then are the rights and duties of a Communist Party member as far as work assignments are concerned? He has only the right to state

his views and the duty to carry out unconditionally the Party's decision, once that decision has been made. No other rights can be claimed and no conditions can be attached without violating Party discipline. May he say "I will not obey unless the Party agrees to my conditions"? No, absolutely not. Because in effect that would mean the subordination of the Party organization to the individual, and not the other way around. Therefore, the only possible attitude of a Party member towards an assignment made by the Party is: "I personally would like to take such and such a job. But if the Party decides otherwise, I will obey heart and soul." As a new Party member, Liu Ligong ought to have asked for permission to work at the grass-roots level in order to temper himself. Instead, he wanted to work at the General Headquarters. Some other new members also wrote letters stating that they wished to "work at higher levels." On this point, they differed completely from many veteran Party members. Many experienced, long-tested Party members have said to me, "Oh, we need fresh experience. We want to work at the grass-roots level to temper ourselves." On the other hand, some new Party members who have graduated from certain schools think they have learned quite enough and are competent to take on the responsibilities of leadership. They don't understand that although the theories they have learned in school are important, it is even more important to apply those theories and gain experience through practice. Cadres mature in the course of practical work. Squad leaders should be promoted from among the seasoned rank-and-file soldiers, and the secretaries of district Party committees from among those of Party branch committees. Generally speaking, skipping one or more grades in promoting cadres is a disservice to our work, for cadres promoted this way are often found to be inexperienced and unsuited for their new jobs. Leadership is an ability acquired through practical work at lower levels.

Liu Ligong attended a course of lectures on Party building and raised his hand to show his support for Party discipline. But when he was asked to translate his show of support into deeds and carry out the Party's decision, he reversed himself and flouted Party discipline. This shows all the comrades that discipline is a thing of deeds, not words. It's easy to pay lip-service to discipline but hard to abide by it. So the Party must examine a member's actions to see whether he really does abide by it. The necessity of observing discipline should be impressed on members not only through classroom lectures but through concrete examples whenever discipline is breached. I once knew a Party member who used to criticize others forcefully and cogently for lack of discipline, declaring that he would wage a relentless ideological

struggle against them. But when he himself was asked to carry out a Party decision, he completely reversed his position, arguing against the decision and showing contempt for discipline. It seemed to him that Party discipline was laid down for everyone except himself. That is impermissible. Article 44 of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China states, "It is the supreme duty of all Party members and Party headquarters at all levels to strictly abide by Party discipline."¹⁷³ This applies to "all Party members." That is to say, whether you are a member of the Central Committee or an ordinary Party member, whether you are a veteran or a new recruit, you must observe discipline. By "Party headquarters at all levels," the Constitution means all leading bodies from the Central Committee down to the branch committee; they must all observe discipline. In short, there are no privileged persons or organizations within the Party that are above discipline. First of all, you should make sure that you yourself abide by discipline. You should combat any tendency to breach discipline and, above all, any such tendency in yourself.

So what does it mean to abide by discipline? In essence, it means to carry out the Party's decisions promptly and faithfully. Why should that be regarded as abiding by discipline? Because the Party has formulated the principles that "the individual is subordinate to the organization; the minority is subordinate to the majority; the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee." These principles are designed to ensure that decisions are made on the basis of democratic centralism and on that same basis to guarantee unity of will and action in the Party. Party decisions and Party discipline must be supported not only in word but in deed. You are truly observing Party discipline only when you carry out the decisions of both the Central Committee and your next higher-level organization. Why do we say it is necessary to do so "promptly and faithfully"? Because that is the test of whether you are truly complying or just going through the motions, dragging your feet and perhaps even deliberately misinterpreting decisions. The Party does not allow any of its members to agree with a decision in public and oppose it in secret.

Why does the Communist Party attach such importance to discipline? The reason is simple. It is because the Party is leading the proletariat and other working people in a struggle for complete emancipation, which is no easy task. One of the fundamental conditions for victory in the revolution is that the party of the proletariat be an organized, unified force. We have no other weapons but organization and unity; therein lies our strength. Strict discipline is needed to guarantee that organization and unity. After the

victory in the October Revolution Lenin said: "Absolute centralization and the strictest discipline of the proletariat constitute one of the fundamental conditions for victory over the bourgeoisie."¹⁷⁴

The Chinese revolution is a long and difficult undertaking. It will not succeed without unity of will and action, indomitable fortitude and iron discipline on the part of all members of the Communist Party. China is a country where petty-bourgeois elements predominate. Without strict discipline the Communist Party will not be able to prevent the inroads of petty-bourgeois ideologies. Without strict discipline it will not be able to unite the great majority of the people. To undermine Party discipline, therefore, is in essence to undermine the revolution, and we must combat any tendency in that direction.

Today it is of particular importance to intensify education in discipline inside the Party. In his report to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee¹⁷⁵ Comrade Mao Zedong dwelt on Party discipline and on the four basic principles that the individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire membership to the Central Committee. He said, "Experience proves that some people violate Party discipline through not knowing what it is, while others, like Zhang Guotao, violate it knowingly and take advantage of many Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline so that the rank and file will not only observe discipline themselves, but will exercise supervision over the leaders so that they too observe it, thus preventing the recurrence of cases like Zhang Guotao's."¹⁷⁶ Today our Party has many new members. They have not been educated in Party discipline and have not developed a habit of observing it. We are now engaged in a war of resistance against Japanese aggression, and the observance of Party discipline is an indispensable condition for victory. The performance of the Communist Party members who are working in government and mass organizations has an immediate impact on the people's impression of the Party. It is therefore very important to step up education within the Party, and particularly among new members, so that they will understand why they must observe discipline, how to do it, what constitutes a breach of discipline, and so on. Although discipline is compulsory by nature, its observance must be voluntary. Our discipline will be ironclad, unshakable and effective only when all Party members observe it voluntarily. The Communist Party has been able to become the organized force of the proletariat precisely because its members are the advanced elements of the proletariat, people who have a high degree of political awareness, are infinitely loyal to the revolution and are imbued

with a sense of responsibility for it. All experience shows that we would not have become an organized force if we were not the vanguard of the proletariat. That is why an organized force of the proletariat cannot allow anyone who knowingly violates discipline, or who cannot observe it voluntarily, to stay within its ranks.

HOW TO BECOME A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER

May 30, 1939

I. QUALIFICATIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. In order to remain so, it must maintain the purity of its membership, and for this reason it has always been preoccupied with the question of qualifications. Since it is the duty and constant task of every Party member to win new members for the Party, the qualifications for membership must be thoroughly understood by all.

1. Who may join the Communist Party?

Regarding the qualifications for Party membership, Article 2 of the Party Constitution states:¹⁷³

Anyone who accepts the Programme and Constitution of the Comintern and of the Chinese Communist Party, joins and works actively in one of the Party organizations, adheres to all the resolutions of the Comintern and the Party, and pays membership dues regularly may become a member of the Party.

The nature of the Party and the desired class origin of its members determine the qualifications for membership. These qualifications and the intended role of Party members are of paramount importance in Party building. It was precisely this question which first aroused vehement debate and occasioned a serious difference of opinion at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, held in 1903.¹⁷⁷ This was to become the basic point of dispute between Lenin and the Mensheviks.

Lenin maintained that only those persons were members of the Party who accepted its programme, supported it financially and belonged to one of its organizations.

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But the Menshevik Martov's position was that anyone was a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party who accepted its programme, supported it financially, and regularly assisted it under the leadership of a Party organization.¹⁷⁸

In Lenin's view, only those who actually joined the organization, obeyed it unreservedly and were willing to give their all to the cause of the Party—to communism—were members of it. Lenin fought to establish the basic principles of Party organization, resolutely opposing Martov's proposition that people should be regarded as Party members so long as they sympathized with the Party and supported it, without necessarily joining or even intending to join it. This totally opportunistic viewpoint not only obliterated the distinction between Party and class, but also blurred the essential quality of the Party, relegating it to the status of a trade union or students' federation, submerging it in an ocean of sympathizers and "opening the door to all elements of confusion, vacillation, and opportunism."¹⁷⁹ Thus, joining a specific Party organization and working actively for the Party are minimum requirements for Party membership.

Upholding Lenin's principle, the Bolsheviks established their own militant Party, a Party that was absolutely Marxist and united in ideology and organization. This fact is of great international significance, providing the fundamental principle of party building for Communist Parties throughout the world. Over the past 18 years of struggle, the Chinese Communist Party has become a powerful, heroic party, because from the time it was founded, at its very first National Congress, it fought against the Menshevik legalism of Li Hanjun¹⁸⁰ and laid the foundation for building the Party in accordance with Lenin's principle.

Now that we are expanding our Party on a large scale, Lenin's principle concerning Party membership is of even greater significance. The tendency of certain individuals to leave their party organizations or posts without permission must be corrected.

2. Every applicant for membership must accept the Party programme; however, he need not necessarily have a profound understanding of it.

Although the Chinese Communist Party does not yet have a complete written programme of its own,¹⁸¹ it shares the general programme of Communist Parties of the world (the Programme of the Comintern)¹⁸² and has its own minimum programme (the platforms of its various congresses and the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation).¹⁸³ Acceptance of the Party programme is a prerequisite for admission to the Party. This does not mean, however, that every applicant for membership must have an expert knowledge of the programme, for that is possible only

for those who are well versed in theory. If we require applicants, especially workers and peasants, to have an expert knowledge of the Party programme and Constitution before they can be admitted to the Party, we shall be excluding many fine revolutionaries and denying the Party's responsibility to educate its members.

3. Communist Party members must not only participate actively in the fight against Japan but must also work hard for communism.

Not everyone who takes an active part in the anti-Japanese war can become a member of the Communist Party. Those who apply for membership must accept the Party programme and be willing to dedicate themselves to the communist cause of emancipating the proletariat and all mankind. To admit new members into our Party, therefore, we must conduct regular and systematic education among the masses in communism and the Party programme and select the more progressive individuals from among them by observing them closely in the course of the national and class struggle.

II. COMPOSITION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP

The Chinese Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, is composed of its awakened and advanced elements. But in order to remain the vanguard of the proletariat, the Party must regularly and systematically adjust the composition of its membership.

1. We must increase the proportion of working-class elements.

The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Stalin pointed out that the Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class.¹⁸⁴ It is therefore important for our Party organization to systematically strengthen its proletarian core.

The expansion of working-class elements in our Party is of particular importance at the present stage. Up until now the Party has not done very effective work in the urban labour movement. Never before have the Chinese workers suffered so much. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, many major industrial cities have fallen into enemy hands, so that the workers have been directly affected by the ravages of war. Vast numbers of them are out of work and widely scattered in the countryside. Under these circumstances, the Party must redouble its efforts to recruit them. Party organizations in cities should concentrate on workers who are still there, and organizations in rural areas should concentrate on those who have drifted to the countryside, as well as on hired farm hands

and handicraftsmen. Our goal is to broaden the proletarian base of the Party, allowing the workers to play their central role in the war of resistance and strengthening their leadership over the peasant masses and the urban petty bourgeoisie.

It should be pointed out, however, that the Communist Party is not a “labour party” but an organized vanguard of the proletariat, the highest form of its class organization. Therefore, not all workers can join the Party, but only those who are most politically conscious, active, and dedicated to the cause of the working class.

2. The Party must pay attention to poor peasants and intellectuals.

China is not a developed capitalist country but a backward, semi-colonial and semi-feudal one. In such a country, there are vast masses of poverty-stricken, revolutionary peasants. The fact that they suffer from oppression and exploitation of all kinds means that they are ready to support the Communist Party and, under its leadership, to wage a determined struggle against imperialism and feudalism. As has been amply demonstrated, the peasants have played a mighty role in the history of the revolution so far. There is no question that the poor peasants will continue to be the most powerful ally of the proletariat. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to take large numbers of peasant activists into the Party, so as to make rural proletarians and poor peasants our social base in the countryside.

Similarly, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in this semi-colonial and semi-feudal China may also play an important role in the revolutionary movement. During the revolutionary movements of the past, and particularly in the course of the current anti-Japanese war, it has been proved that many intellectuals can fight heroically for a just cause. With their education and political consciousness, they have served as a necessary bridge linking the Party and the masses. Our party should admit as many revolutionary intellectuals as possible who are willing to dedicate themselves to communism and the cause of the proletariat. At the same time, experience teaches us that we must especially recruit those intellectuals who are poor and revolutionary, because they are different from intellectuals in general. Since their poor living conditions motivate them to approach the Party and since they are near the lowest level of society, their thinking and way of life bring them closer to the toiling masses. Thus they constitute the Party’s ideal recruits among the intelligentsia.

3. The Party should pay particular attention to women workers and to the poor, revolutionary women of the petty bourgeoisie, that is, to peasant women and women intellectuals.

Women constitute one half of the population of China. Without their

participation the revolution cannot succeed. There are too few women in the Party, primarily because we have not made a sufficient effort to recruit them. Some Party members neglect their duty to recommend women, on the ground that traditionally Chinese men and women are not supposed to have much social contact with each other. We must denounce that excuse. All Communist Party members, particularly women, should regard recruiting women as one of their most important tasks. The Party should emphasize the need to bring into its ranks large numbers of revolutionary women, that is, workers, poor peasants and intellectuals. It should include the recruitment of women in its day-to-day activities and see to it that their political consciousness and educational level are raised through training and work.

4. All Party members must fight for communism, the cause of the proletariat.

Since workers are the foundation of the Party, the Party must pay particular attention to increasing their numbers in its organization. It should not reject persons of other class origins who have been tempered in the day-to-day struggle and the revolutionary movement. But before such persons can be admitted into Party organizations, they must give up their former non-proletarian, non-communist stand and accept the programme and constitution of the Party. The Party is utterly opposed to any view that denies the need to preserve the purity of its composition, to strengthen its proletarian core and to make communism its fundamental goal—to any view, in short, that relegates the Party to the status of a “national revolutionary alliance” of all classes. All Party members must be resolved to wage a life-long struggle for the proletarian cause of communism.

III. PROCEDURE FOR ADMISSION TO PARTY MEMBERSHIP, REINSTATEMENT AND READMISSION OF PARTY MEMBERS

1. Procedure for admission to Party membership.

An applicant for Party membership must be recommended by a Party member or members in accordance with provisions of the Party Constitution and current rules. Workers and hired farm labourers must be recommended by one Party member, persons of petty-bourgeois origin by two members, and persons who leave other political parties to join ours by three members. The applicant must be accepted by a Party group and branch and approved by the next higher Party committee. Persons who have at one time belonged to other political groups must be approved by the district Party committee,

the sub-bureau or the Central Committee itself.

2. Rules on reinstatement and readmission of Party members.

Reinstatement and readmission of Party members are to be dealt with according to the decision of the Central Committee on the subject and to the merits of each case. There are four principles:

(1) Those who have lost contact with the Party for a long period but have nevertheless continued to work for it and can produce Party members to verify the fact may be reinstated in seniority with credit given for the period of separation.

(2) Those who have lost contact with the Party for a long period and claim to have continued to work for it but are unable to find Party members to confirm the fact may be readmitted if they are now qualified for membership. If testimony is later produced on their behalf, they may then be reinstated in seniority with credit given for the period of separation.

(3) Those who worked for the Party for a long period but who have ceased to do so for some time (up to one or two years)—without, however, committing any acts harmful to the interest of the revolution—and who have been reinstated shall not have the years of their absence included in their Party standing.

(4) Those who have left the Party for a long period without committing any acts harmful to the interest of the revolution and are now qualified for Party membership may be readmitted after a considerable period of observation.

Former members who have disavowed the Party shall not be readmitted.

IV. CANDIDATE MEMBERS¹⁸⁵

1. Regulation on the period of candidature.

The length of candidature is determined by the class status of the new Party member. The periods of candidature tentatively decided upon by the Central Committee are as follows: for workers and hired farm labourers, none; for poor peasants and handicraftsmen, one month; for revolutionary students, intellectuals, office workers, middle peasants and revolutionary soldiers, three months; and for other classes, six months, or longer under special circumstances.

2. Purpose of the candidature, duties of sponsors and procedure and criteria for transference to full membership.

When those who are not of proletarian origin join the Party, they must

complete a certain period of candidature, which is to be used for education and observation. Through instruction in Marxist-Leninist theory as applied to local conditions and through specific work assignments, the Party should educate the candidate members, so as to raise their political understanding to the level expected of regular Party members. At the same time, it should examine the candidate members' personal qualities and determine, from a historical and all-round perspective, whether they are qualified for membership in terms of political ideology, attitude towards Party work and devotion to the Party. This is a preparatory step for transference to full Party membership.

New Party members must have sponsors who are politically responsible for them. Sponsors bear a heavy responsibility to the Party for the persons they recommend, one which they must not lightly dismiss. Not only should they pay close attention to the words and deeds of their candidates, but they should also regularly and patiently educate them in political matters and help them enthusiastically in their work. At the same time, the Party can test the sponsors' sense of responsibility and their devotion to the Party's cause.

Having educated and observed the candidate member during the period of candidature, the Party should carefully consider whether he is qualified for transference to full Party membership. The assessment should include his understanding of the Party, his faith in the cause of communism, his day-to-day performance and his dedication to the Party as manifested in all his words and deeds. If he is considered qualified, his request for transference to full Party membership shall be granted by the Party group and branch and must then be approved by the next higher Party committee. Where circumstances permit, a ceremony of admission may be held by the Party committee.

Transference to full membership does not depend on the completion of the period of candidature but on the candidate's understanding of the Party. If, on completion of the set period, the candidate is not considered qualified for transference, the period shall be extended for a length of time equal to the first. Where necessary, his status as a candidate member may be annulled. However, the extension of the period of candidature should not be regarded as a trifling matter. The period should not, for example, be extended only ten or twenty days merely as a disciplinary measure.

As a general rule, persons under the age of sixteen are not eligible for Party membership. Those who are sixteen or older may be recommended as candidate members and may become full Party members when they reach the age of eighteen. However, persons under the age of eighteen who have already become Party members may retain their membership and are not to

be dismissed or suspended.

3. Rights and duties of candidate members.

Candidate members should carry out the work assigned by the Party, pay Party dues and learn by studying Party documents, for example, or by undergoing political and military training. They have the right to speak at Party meetings but not to vote. The candidate member may propose other candidates for Party membership, but the Party branch will send people to interview and observe them before formal recommendation is made. In intra-Party work, candidate members are not eligible to serve on the staff of a branch or as group leaders. However, under special circumstances exceptions may be made for new Party branches and branches where the majority of the membership are candidate members.

Candidate members are not eligible to attend certain Party meetings or to read confidential Party documents.

V. REQUIREMENTS FOR A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER

1. He must dedicate his life to the struggle for communism.

The Communist Party is a political party that fights for the complete liberation of mankind, for communism and for the cause of the proletariat. Therefore, a Party member, being willing to dedicate himself to communism, must not only strive to fulfil the Party's specific tasks for different stages, but also form a revolutionary world outlook, which means that he must be determined to fight to the end for the realization of communism. But how is one to develop such an outlook and remain true to it? First of all, one must understand the laws governing the historic development of human society and have a firm faith in the ultimate realization of a communist society. That is to say, a Communist Party member should raise his class consciousness, temper himself in the revolution and become well versed in Marxism. In that way he will come to have a profound understanding of the historic position and role of the proletariat in society, of the interests of the proletariat and its great mission of emancipating all mankind, and of the immediate tasks and ultimate goal of the Party and its members. That is the only way he can develop a firm world outlook, remain true to it throughout his life and fight to the end for his convictions. At the same time, every Party member should recognize that the Chinese revolution is a long process of hard struggle, and that in following its twisting, hazardous path a revolutionary must be prepared for years of hardship and setbacks. At critical

moments in the constant struggle against the enemy, he must also be prepared to sacrifice his very life. Every Party member, therefore, should not only have an unwavering faith in the realization of communism but also be resolved to fight to the end, undaunted by either sacrifices or hardships, for the liberation of the working class, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.

2. He must place the interests of the revolution above everything else.

Our Party is dedicated to the complete liberation of the Chinese proletariat, the entire Chinese people and the Chinese nation, and the establishment of a communist society. Thus, the interests of the nation and the people and those of the Party are identical. Communist Party members are fighters for the cause of communism under the leadership of the Party. Thus, the interests of a Party member are identical with those of the nation, the people and the Party. Every Party member should be devoted without reservation to the nation, the revolution, the proletariat and the Party, subordinating his own personal interests to theirs.

In working for the revolution and the Party, however, a Party member may sometimes find that his personal interests conflict with those of the Party. In that case, he should draw on his devotion to the revolution and the Party and unhesitatingly sacrifice his own interests to theirs. He must put the interests of the revolution and the Party first, dealing with all his personal problems in accordance with the principle that those interests are paramount.

“The interests of the revolution and the Party above all” is not just an empty slogan. The Party not only requires that members understand the meaning of this phrase but also urges them to apply it unhesitatingly to every problem that arises in daily life. Only when its members are ready to sacrifice everything for the interests of the revolution and the Party can the Party be sure of victory in the revolution.

3. He must observe Party discipline and keep Party secrets.

The Party's 18 years of experience have demonstrated that discipline is the guarantee for the execution of the Party line. In the past, by conducting inner-Party struggle efficiently and enforcing Party discipline, we succeeded in overcoming the erroneous lines represented by Chen Duxiu¹⁸⁶ and others and in blocking Zhang Guotao's plot to undermine the revolution.¹⁴³ Thus we were able to ensure the fulfilment of our revolutionary tasks at various stages, the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the prosecution of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression today. The Party should continue to preserve discipline in order to unite the entire membership, surmount new difficulties and win fresh victories. It is therefore the duty of every Party member to observe Party discipline conscientiously.

He should resist all tendencies to undermine it and, above all, criticize himself for any violations of it in word or deed, so that he becomes a model of discipline. Don't think that observing Party discipline consists merely of stating your support for the Party line and voting for it at meetings or in the presence of the masses. Far from it.

The good Party member is one who voluntarily maintains iron discipline in everything he does and on every specific issue of daily life, thus serving as a model of discipline.

Alarmed by the growth of our revolutionary strength and of the prestige of the Communist Party, enemy agents, Chinese collabourators, and anti-Communist elements are desperately trying to destroy the Party. Therefore, the Party cannot slacken its underground work. On the contrary, it should intensify it, tighten discipline and combat any lapse in vigilance or anything else that might disrupt it. It must be pointed out that there has been a very dangerous tendency in Party headquarters in certain areas to think that we don't have to be so careful about underground work under present circumstances. No Party member should forget the costly lessons we have learned over the years from negligence in underground work. Every Party member must sharpen his political alertness, strictly observe Party discipline for underground activities and combat any tendency to be negligent or to endanger the work. In that way we will be able to preserve our strength for the war of resistance and assure the success of our revolution and of the Party's cause. No Party member should intentionally make known to the public anything that should be kept secret or unnecessarily reveal any confidential matter to other Party members. Any act harmful to the Party's underground work must be punished in accordance with Party discipline, even, if necessary, by expulsion from the Party.

4. He must be steadfast in carrying out Party resolutions.

A Communist Party member should not be content to support the Party's resolutions in words only; he should take it as his duty to carry out those resolutions with determination in the course of his work. In doing so, he is bound to encounter difficulties and setbacks, but he must try to overcome them with indomitable perseverance. To perform Party work indifferently like a hired hand is absolutely impermissible. The Chinese revolution is a cause that demands long years of arduous struggle. One of the characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party is that it defies all hardships and sacrifices. Every Party member must possess this fighting spirit if he is to carry on the fine traditions of the Party.

A Party member should be determined to carry out Party resolutions not only in his everyday work but also at trying and critical moments. He should

remain faithful to those resolutions and to the revolution both under Party supervision and in its absence, both in victory and in defeat. Only a person who has such steadfast devotion is worthy to be called a good Party member.

5. He must be an example to the masses.

The greater the political influence of the Party and the higher its prestige, the more the working class and the masses will expect from its members. Because they are members of the Communist Party, of the vanguard trusted by the masses, a great deal more is expected of them than of others. The masses often judge our Party by the conduct of its members. At all times and places Party members must act in such a way as to create a favourable impression, so that the masses will have more profound faith in the Party and higher respect for it.

The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party¹⁷⁵ called on all Party members to play an exemplary, vanguard role in the war of national liberation:

“Communists in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should set an example by fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with friendly parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand for unity in resistance to Japan, uphold the programme of the united front and set an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance. They should be true in word, resolute in deed and modest and sincere when they consult and co-operate with friendly parties and armies, and thus become models within the united front. Every Communist working in government should set an example of absolute integrity, impartiality in making appointments and willingness to work hard for little remuneration. Every Communist working in the mass movements should be a friend of the masses and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic politician. At no time and under no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, laziness, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one’s energy, wholehearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command respect.”¹⁸⁷

Every Communist should respond enthusiastically to this call, through concrete deeds and in his day-to-day work.

Communists should also set an example by their devotion to the interests of the revolution. They should staunchly maintain their dedication to the cause of the nation and the people, allowing neither threats nor bribes to shake them. Anyone who abandons his revolutionary and Party stand forfeits

his Party membership.

In the history of our Party there have been countless model members who fought for communism tenaciously in the face of every kind of adversity and who demonstrated their utter devotion to the Party and the revolution despite threats and temptations. Thousands upon thousands of fine Party members, both rank and file and leaders, have heroically laid down their lives at the front, on the execution ground and in prison. They have demonstrated to the toiling masses of China and of the world the lofty integrity of the fine sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, and their magnificent contributions will never be forgotten. They are models for all revolutionaries. Party members should not only revere them but learn from them as well.

6. He must study.

Revolution anywhere is a tremendous undertaking, and the conditions of the revolution and the revolutionary movement in China in particular are exceedingly complex and in constant flux. Nevertheless, the Communist Party has been able to control the great revolutionary movement and lead it to victory at each stage because its members are guided by revolutionary theory. Only when they are well versed in revolutionary theory can Communists find a way out of highly complex situations, chart a course in the ever-changing circumstances and fulfil their revolutionary assignments. Otherwise, they will lose their way. They will be unable to work independently or to faithfully carry out the assignments and decisions of the Party. It is therefore essential for every Communist, whenever and wherever possible, to study theory and acquire general knowledge through work in order to raise his political and educational level, enlarge his understanding of the revolution and cultivate his political vision.

What should we study in the circumstances prevailing today?

(1) Since our Party is a militant Marxist-Leninist party, we should above all study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin in order to become truly able Party members with a strong Party spirit. The purpose of our study is not to be able to recite Marxism-Leninism as dogma but to grasp its essence and learn to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method in examining problems.

(2) We should study the history and current political situation of China; otherwise we shall be unable to formulate the revolutionary tasks and methods for the present.

(3) We should study military strategy and techniques, particularly guerrilla warfare. "Militarization of Party members" has become a fighting slogan for the entire Party today.

(4) Those Party members whose educational level is low should first of

all spend a long time learning to read and write and then reading books and newspapers. That is the only way for them to make rapid progress in their political understanding.

(5) It is even more important, however, for every Party member to learn through practical work and from the masses whenever and wherever possible. The experience acquired in practical work and mass struggle provides the best lessons for us.

Self-criticism is a very valuable learning tool for Party members, and an open-minded acceptance of Party criticism is essential to their progress. A good Party member should understand criticism from the Party and accept it sincerely and with appreciation in order to correct his errors.

The two enemies of learning are conceit and reluctance. We are opposed on the one hand to over-confidence and complacency about the need to learn and on the other hand to lack of self-confidence about studying or unwillingness to spare the time for it. Since Party members seldom have the opportunity for extended study in classrooms, they have to squeeze out time from their busy schedules to study on their own. To do that one has to be persevering.

Our slogan for Party members is learn, learn, and learn again.¹⁸⁸ The entire membership should respond enthusiastically to the call issued by the Central Committee at its Sixth Plenary Session for all of us to be “insatiable in learning” and “tireless in teaching.”¹⁸⁹

Only one who meets these six requirements can be called a good member of the Communist Party without bringing a stain upon that great and glorious name.

THE PARTY BRANCH

June 10, 1939

The Party branch is the Party's basic unit, its grass-roots organization. It is through the branches that the Party's slogans, views and policies are disseminated among the people. It is the branches that, through day-to-day publicity and organizational work, use those slogans, views and policies to unite the masses in revolutionary movements.

Since the Party branch is the focal point around which the masses rally, the Party depends on it to recruit new members. In revolutionary struggles the branch leads and educates Party members and trains Party cadres. Hence it is the basic organization of the Party and the chief source of its growing strength.

I. ORGANIZATION OF PARTY BRANCHES

1. Basis of organization.

Where should Party branches be established? Like Communist Parties in other countries, the Chinese Communist Party follows Lenin's principle of organizing branches in production and other units, that is, in factories, mines, railways, villages, barracks, shops, schools, government offices and on ships and farms. Lenin was opposed to the social-democratic parties' practice of treating the party branch as a tool for winning votes in election campaigns, rather than as an organization providing leadership for the masses.¹⁹⁰ In certain cities we have had to organize some neighbourhood Party branches for the benefit of self-employed members, who for the time being have no suitable branches to be part of. These, however, are only temporary.

As the vanguard of the proletariat, our Party should first establish branches among its own ranks, building bastions in factories. In 1902,

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discussing the organizational tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,¹⁷⁷ Lenin explained the crucial role to be played in the revolution by Party branches in factories and mills: “These [factory circles],” he wrote, “are particularly important to us: the main strength of the movement lies in the organization of the workers at the *large* factories, for the large factories (and mills) contain the predominant part of the working class, not only as regards numbers, but even more as regards influence, development and fighting capacity. Every factory must be our fortress.”¹⁹¹

When there are no large farms in the countryside, Party branches should be organized in townships or villages according to the number of Party members and local circumstances. In areas with governments led by the Party (such as the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region), branches should be formed at the lowest administrative levels to make it easier to lead township or village organs of state power.

The Chinese revolution has taken the form of a struggle between national armed forces and imperialist armed forces, between armed revolution and armed counter-revolution. Therefore, it is vitally important for our Party to work among anti-Japanese troops (such as the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the guerrillas) and among enemy and puppet troops. The Party must take measures to build and strengthen its bastions in the armed forces.

How should a Party branch be organized? The Party Constitution¹⁷³ stipulates that a branch can be set up in any production unit where there are three or more Party members. In a large branch, sub-branches or groups can be organized in small production units, such as workshops in a factory or small villages.

In situations where Party work must be carried out in great secrecy—in factories in major cities occupied by the enemy, for example—Party branches should establish extensive contacts with the masses. The membership of a branch, however, should not be large; it should be kept small but effective. There can even be two or more Party organizations in one factory, operating independently of each other.

2. Leadership.

Sound leadership of a Party branch is vital for the fulfilment of Party assignments. Members of a branch must therefore take care in choosing comrades for the leading committee. They must see to it that the secretary and his assistants (or committee members) are politically solid, faithful about executing Party policies, capable and trustworthy. The Party should guard against the danger of careerists’ infiltrating the leadership of branches, especially now when so many new branches and members are politically

immature.

The size of a Party branch committee (or the number of secretaries and their assistants) depends on the number of Party members and the scope and requirements of the work. In areas under governments led by our Party, such as the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, there are secretaries and other committee members in charge of organization, publicity, military affairs (self-defence), government affairs, trade unions, peasant associations, youth work and work among women. To facilitate day-to-day work, a Party branch can elect a few members to a standing committee. A branch with fewer than five members should have a secretary and perhaps a deputy secretary.

The branches should regularly transfer good cadres to higher-level Party committee, so long as their own work does not suffer as a consequence.

II. BASIC TASKS OF PARTY BRANCHES

The branch is a core and a bastion not only in terms of organization but in terms of function. To fulfil that function a branch must define its basic jobs and assign them to its members. In light of the Party Constitution and the current situation in the revolution, the branch should perform the following four tasks or functions.

1. Uniting the masses.

The quality of a branch's work in general can be judged by its work with the surrounding masses. It is essential for a branch to have every member perform active and frequent mass work; that, in turn, will enhance the members' own enthusiasm and improve the activities of the branch. A branch with a majority of new Party members should make a point of assigning them to mass work. The branch committee and the committee at the higher level should provide constant help to the new, inexperienced members in this work.

The branch does mass work to persuade the people to accept the Party's leadership. To do this, the branch and all its members should maintain close ties with the masses, know what is on their minds, listen to what they have to say and, depending on their level of political consciousness, systematically explain Party policies and slogans to them, distribute Party newspapers and spread communist ideas among them. They will thus win the masses over to the side of the Party.

Especially for Party branches in war zones, a central aim of mass work is to organize the people to take part in the war of resistance. The branches

should mobilize people to join the regular army, form guerrilla detachments or self-defence corps or contribute to the war effort in other ways. At the same time they should take the lead in launching production campaigns, developing the economy, improving people's living standards and ensuring preferential treatment for families of anti-Japanese soldiers. In areas where we don't yet have our own governments Party branches should mobilize the people to abolish unfair and unreasonable burdens and to remove corrupt or tyrannical officials, village heads and *bao* and *jia* leaders.¹⁹² They should help people solve the problems that have arisen from their participation in the war effort, working through the mass organizations and using consultation, mediation or any other methods that will further that effort. This will motivate people to become more active in the resistance. The Party branches should make it clear to the masses that it is the supreme interest of every Chinese today to help drive the Japanese imperialists out of China by taking an active part in the war.

Party branches should choose those forms of mass organization that suit local conditions and correspond to local people's demands. In the war zones they should generally start by organizing groups that will make a direct contribution to the war effort—self-defence corps, morale-raising teams, Young Pioneers and so on—and then proceed to broader mass organizations, such as national salvation associations of peasants, workers, women and young people. In the Great Rear Area and in enemy-occupied areas, Party branches should first organize the activists, who will then help to organize the masses. They should send capable Communists to take an active part in the work of existing mass organizations, including traditional societies, to offer them guidance and to learn from them. When working in these organizations the Communists should follow democratic practices, rather than trying to take everything into their own hands and to replace the existing leadership with Party branch leadership. They should make constant efforts to unite with the present leaders, respecting them and learning from them, so that these leaders will gradually accept the Party's leadership.

The duty of the Party branch is to gather the masses gradually around the Party. Therefore, during the various struggles it should try to raise people's political consciousness and help them understand that the Party's policies and slogans represent their own demands, so they will work hard for them.

To ensure absolutely sound leadership in mass organizations the Party's work in those organizations should be frequently discussed at branch meetings. The branch should determine whether its decisions are correct and whether they are being properly implemented by the members. It should

analyse the opinions and demands of the masses and follow developments closely so as to adjust Party activities as necessary.

2. Recruiting new Party members.

As an organ for recruitment, the branch should regularly explain to Party members the importance of enlisting new Communists. The expansion of Party organizations provides a sure guarantee for the progress of the revolutionary movement. This is true both for strengthening the anti-Japanese national united front and for advancing the revolution. Recruiting new Party members is always an important task for every Communist. Branch committees should regularly check up on the work of members to see that it is being done in accordance with the Party Constitution.

Since the political prestige of the Party is growing daily, many revolutionaries willing to strive for the communist cause want to join the Party. This provides a good opportunity for Party branches to recruit new Communists. They should take advantage of the Party's increasing appeal to admit large numbers of new members. At the same time they should be aware that precisely because the prestige of the Party is rising, enemy spies, Chinese collabourators and anti-Communist elements are trying every way to infiltrate the Party for purposes of conspiracy and sabotage. Some careerists are also trying to slip in to further their personal ends and to corrupt the Party. In enlisting new recruits, therefore, Party branches must always be on guard against these kinds of saboteurs. Every Communist must remain on the alert to ferret them out and purge them.

The Party branch should help its members understand that the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and that members should be fighters ready to sacrifice everything for the communist cause. To ensure the Party's political and organizational purity, the branch should base its recruitment of new members on day-to-day mass work. It should encourage all its members to identify those activists in the mass movement who are willing and able to work for communism, to get in touch with them, educate them and explain communist ideals to them so they can be admitted to the Party. The branch should also explain to its members that the party is not a group of relatives and friends and that haphazard recruitment of unqualified persons would entail great danger both to the Party and to each individual Communist.

The Party branch must strictly observe the principle of admitting members on an individual basis. It should never admit members simply by entering their names without prior examination, and it should never admit a group of people without individual examination. Even when admitting a group of activists who have qualified for Party membership in the course of mass struggle, the branch should examine them before accepting their

applications on an individual basis and having them approved by the next higher Party committee. It should explain to its members the procedures and methods of recruitment laid down in the Party Constitution, so that they will become closely acquainted with the person to be admitted—his social status, his character and the way he acquits himself in mass movements, especially at critical moments—before deciding whether he meets the requirements for membership. In short, the branch should try to recruit large numbers of new members and at the same time prevent bad individuals from infiltrating the Party.

The branch should require its members to pay regular dues as provided by the Party Constitution. This is absolutely indispensable. It is the duty of Communists to pay membership dues by the month or at other regular intervals. It is one of the basic requirements for every Communist, together with adherence to the Party's programme and Constitution, observance of Party discipline and working for the Party in one of its organizations.

3. Educating Party members.

The Party branch should function as a school where its members receive basic political education and training. To offer a systematic education, it should obtain help from higher-level Party committees. The first priority in this education should be to give the members a basic knowledge of communism so as to strengthen their revolutionary world outlook. In its day-to-day work the branch should see to it that its members observe Party discipline, engage in criticism and self-criticism, overcome and deviations from Party theory, policies, rules and regulations and check other undesirable tendencies. It should teach illiterate members to read and write and encourage them to study on their own in order to raise their educational and political level. It should show its members how to conduct mass work, citing practical examples, experience and lessons learned.

The branch committee and veteran members should be responsible for educating new members. It is most important that they set an example by their thinking, work methods and observation of Party discipline.

4. Providing leadership in base areas.

Branches in areas whose governments are under the leadership of the Party should lead village governments, local armed forces (such as the self-defence corps) and mass organizations. They should take care of Party, government, military, mass organizations, cultural and educational work, all of which serves to build and consolidate model anti-Japanese base areas.

An important task of the branch is to lead the people in the exercise of political power, encouraging them to participate in elections to select trustworthy leaders for village governments, to help those governments and to

supervise them. The people should make sure that village governments obey the instructions of higher-level governments, including decrees designed to improve the people's welfare, and that they abide by the people's decisions. At the same time, the branches should help arm the people to fight violators of anti-Japanese laws and to eliminate enemy spies and Chinese collabourators. In short, the branches should see to it that village governments are anti-Japanese revolutionary governments and that they are administered by the masses themselves.

To make sure that the masses remain in control of government administration, Party branches must first build up the people's armed forces, such as the self-defence corps and the Young Pioneers, and organize all the people in the village into national salvation associations of peasants, women, the youth, workers and so on. These will form the bulwark of the village governments.

In places where the government is in the hands of undesirable persons who undermine the national revolutionary war effort and oppose the people, the Party branches should first of all mobilize the masses to reform the government by proper methods, removing the bad elements and creating a true government of the people. Where the local government enjoys popular support but there are no mass organizations or armed forces, the Party branches should help the government to mobilize, organize and arm the people and thus strengthen the administration. The purpose of all this is to create a democratic government managed by the people themselves.

In villages administered by a democratic government, the day-to-day work of Party branches should all be designed to aid in the defence of the homeland. The branches should urge the people to join anti-Japanese armies, guerrilla units or able-bodied brigades.¹⁹³ They should organize transport teams, mobilize all the people, men and women, old and young, to stand guard duty and to help the government collect grain taxes. In addition they should gather donations in cash and in kind for the troops, see to it that preferential treatment is given to the families of anti-Japanese soldiers and make other contributions to the war effort. At the same time, the Party branches should help the government undertake all possible projects to improve the people's standard of living and should encourage the people to participate in them. These could include practical economic projects that will increase the peasants' incomes, such as expansion of agricultural production, improvement of farm tools, seeds and fertilizer, reclamation of wasteland, conservation of water, organization of spring planting and autumn harvesting drives, establishment of mutual-aid working groups¹⁹⁴ and draught-oxen stations,⁴⁴ regulation of the labour force, development of handicrafts and

formation of co-operatives. In addition, they could include cultural projects that will raise the people's educational level, such as organization of literacy classes, evening schools and schools run during slack seasons in farming, with primary school pupils serving as teachers. In guiding these activities the branches should pay special attention to women, who represent half of the population. Without the participation of women no campaigns launched in support of the war, the government or economic development will be successful. The branches should make a constant effort to eradicate the rural practice of looking down on women and subjecting them to special restrictions and unequal treatment. They should train women leaders and raise the political and economic status of women in the countryside.

Before mobilizing the people for any project the Party branch should first discuss in detail how to go about it. Then Party members should explain the project to people working in the government and mass organizations, who in turn should call meetings for democratic discussion of the project among the people. In this way the masses will come to understand that the proposed project represents their own interests and will be eager to carry it out. Communists should set the example and skilfully unite all activists in mass organizations, men and women, old and young, in a drive to carry out the project.

II. LEADERSHIP OF PARTY BRANCHES BY LOCAL PARTY COMMITTEES

When a Party branch's regular activities and mass work are deficient, the local (district or county) Party committee should provide it with proper leadership and practical help. This is vitally important. Proper leadership can help a weak branch become a strong one, while without such leadership even a good branch may deteriorate and the enthusiasm of its members flag.

1. Method of providing leadership.

If the members of a local Party committee—or those of them who are responsible for a Party branch—want to offer the branch proper leadership, they must first acquaint themselves with the internal and external conditions of the branch. They must learn all about its history, about the background of each of its members and about the environment in which it works: the local conditions, the mood of the masses, the relations between classes and so on. They cannot find out about all this by holding a couple of meetings or talks; the investigation will take them quite a while. To give them time

to familiarize themselves with the circumstances and accumulate experience, we should not transfer them to other places too frequently, although neither should we let them remain responsible for the same branch indefinitely. Without a thorough knowledge of the internal and external conditions of a branch it is impossible to give it sound guidance.

Members of a local Party committee who are responsible for guiding Party branches should help them to work out specific ways of implementing the directives of higher-level committees in accordance with the circumstances of the branches and after discussion by them. The committee members should not mechanically follow the same pattern for all branches. Only flexible and practical leadership can ensure full implementation of the decisions of higher-level Party committees and invigorate the branches. Especially with a branch whose members are inexperienced and not as enthusiastic as they should be, the leaders from the local Party committee should identify the central task that will push forward the work as a whole. As the members of the branch carry out this task, their enthusiasm and confidence will grow. Thus the branch will be transformed into a vigorous and dynamic one capable of carrying out all the decisions of the higher bodies.

2. Training cadres.

For local Party committees the key to successful leadership of the branches lies in training cadres for them. Without activists branch work cannot be successful and vigorous. Local Party committees have to make constant efforts to select and train secretaries and other committee members (or assistants) for the branches, giving them instruction in politics and work methods and helping them to master work skills and heighten their sense of responsibility. Where possible, they should try to run short-term classes for branch cadres, or else talk to them regularly on an individual basis. Training cadres in this way will enable the branches to work independently. But in the process, members of the higher-level committees should be sure not to take all branch work into their own hands; that would contradict the whole purpose of the training.

CONSOLIDATING THE PARTY ORGANIZATION AND IMPROVING MASS WORK

September 18, 1939

Consolidating the Party organization means, first and foremost, strengthening its ranks by educating the members and purging it of bad elements. Only a sound, strong Party can lead the masses in their historical mission.

At the same time, while consolidating the Party's primary organizations—the Party branches—we should also help them to improve their work among the masses. Urging Party members to temper themselves in mass work and cement their ties with the masses helps to consolidate the Party organization. The quality of mass work is a measure of the extent to which a Party organization has been consolidated. During the Soviet period,¹⁹ Xingguo County in Jiangxi Province was a model in mass work and it also had the soundest Party organizations. In the past, those Party branches in large cities that were not consolidated and experienced ups and downs in their work were the same ones that were divorced from the masses and reluctant to do mass work. In the Conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, the CPSU, analysing the fundamental lessons of the past, states: “We may take it as the rule that as long as the Bolsheviks maintain connection with the broad masses of the people they will be invincible.” And again, “A party perishes if it shuts itself up in its narrow party shell, if it severs itself from the masses, if it allows itself to be covered with bureaucratic rust.”

Can we say that our Party is not leading the masses and that it is divorced from them? No. It is leading the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army as well as the population at large in all sorts of activities to oppose Japanese imperialism, and it enjoys unprecedented political prestige among the people. But this does not mean that every one of our Party

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branches has become a focal point of the masses. In war zones and in areas that are under the leadership of the Communist Party—the border areas, for example¹⁹⁵—not many Party branches can administer every sort of work in a village, including Party, government, military, mass organization, cultural and educational work. If we can combine Party consolidation¹⁹⁶ with intensified mass work, we shall not only strengthen the Party branches but also greatly improve their work among the masses. The co-ordination of the two will advance our work in all fields.

How should Party organizations in the war zones,⁵⁵ and especially in areas that have governments led by the Party, combine Party consolidation with mass work?

Generally speaking, the Party organizations there have already embarked on mass work from the top down and should now proceed to the second stage. That is, they should consolidate themselves from the bottom up—something which has been started in only a few areas.

How should we go about this second stage? All our work depends on the townships and villages. No matter how many resolutions they adopt and how many orders they give, higher-level organizations depend on those at the township level to implement them. It is therefore essential to strengthen and reform organizations at that level.

What should we do after we have focused our attention on township organizations?

1. We should take organizational measures to help Party and mass organizations establish closer contact with the people. Both past and present experience shows that if we want to succeed, we must reduce the size of the area under the jurisdiction of district Party committees and mass organizations and divide densely populated townships so as to reduce their size as well. That was what we did in the Soviet areas in Jiangxi Province³⁰ and later in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. With a smaller area to deal with, the district Party committees and mass organizations will be able to maintain closer ties with the Party branches and the people. Today some district Party committees have so many branches under them that they have to establish intermediate Party branches. Then the district committee directly supervises only those intermediate branches, which have come to form a separate level. Indeed, the Party organization at every level takes on so large an area that it has to set up an intermediate level: even the county Party committee runs an intermediate Party committee and the district Party committee runs a kind of sub-district committee. Such a multi-layered hierarchy weakens the ties between higher and lower levels, slows down work and reduces efficiency.

When each Party unit is made responsible for a smaller area, there will of course be more than one Party committee for each administrative district and more than one Party branch for each administrative township. Naturally, that will cause difficulties in our work. And indeed if we want to keep our government in close touch with the masses, we should reduce the size of the administrative units as well. But even if we don't do that, we can still have more and smaller Party organizations in a given area, and they can consult with each other on matters of common concern.

Establishing more district Party committees means that we are going to need more cadres. How can we get them? By promoting cadres from lower levels. Don't be overly worried about their competence. Cadres on the intermediate Party branch committees are not necessarily better at managing township and village branches than cadres who are newly promoted to district Party committees will be. Besides, the newly promoted cadres will become more capable as they gain more experience.

2. Party branches should always be ready to help the masses solve pressing problems. It is their duty not only to carry out, in accordance with local circumstances, the tasks assigned by higher Party organizations, but also to keep abreast of the mood and wishes of the masses and help them overcome their difficulties. The more successful Party branches and their members are in solving people's problems, the more support they will win and the easier it will be for them to mobilize the masses.

Nowadays, higher-level Party organizations in many places scarcely bother themselves about the Party branches and the rank and file. They seldom urge Party branches to listen to the people's complaints and often fail to remind them that their central task is to help the masses solve their daily problems. They generally assign work to the lower levels and ask them for one thing or another, paying little attention to the daily demands of their subordinates and of the people. If they changed this work style, they would be far more successful in enlivening mass work, strengthening the branches and training Party cadres in mass movements.

Our goal should be to have the township or village Party branch in total control of Party, government, military, mass organization, cultural and educational work. That is the only way the Party branch can serve as the central force of the masses and their bastion. Party organizations in certain areas are working towards this goal.

To meet the people's needs, don't we have to step up economic struggle? Our reply to this question is: We Communists do stand for improving the people's welfare, but we also believe that the primary purpose of the mass movement during the period of the anti-Japanese war is to fight Japanese

imperialism and to strengthen anti-Japanese forces. Improving the people's welfare doesn't necessarily mean making life during the war much better than it was before. That's something we can't do. We should explain to the people that the only way to alleviate their hardships is to drive out the Japanese invaders. Of course, we should not miss the smallest opportunity to improve the political, economic or cultural status of the people. The more attention we pay to improving various aspects of the people's lives, the more enthusiasm they will have for resisting Japanese aggression. Moreover, improving the economic welfare of the people doesn't consist merely of freeing them from exploitation and unreasonable burdens; we should also find ways to raise their incomes and reduce unnecessary losses.

3. Active mass work doesn't necessarily mean large numbers of organizations and meetings. In some places there are people who register their names in seven or eight organizations, each of which holds a small meeting every five to seven days and a general meeting every 10 to 15 days. If, out of a strong sense of duty, a responsible peasant made a point of trying to attend every meeting, he simply wouldn't have time for them all, even if he abandoned his work in the fields. Obviously, ordinary people are unable to comply with the organizations' regulations in that respect.

Leaders of mass organizations should not call meetings that nobody will come to. Instead, they should spend more time at evening schools or other places of public gathering where they can get in touch with the masses, chat freely with them and talk about national affairs, household affairs, the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*¹⁹⁷ or anything else under the sun. Anyone who takes the trouble to do that will draw a larger and larger audience, even without issuing invitations. Then, when the peasants' national salvation association or the young people's national salvation association tries to mobilize people for resistance, it will gain ready support. And the other organizations will join in the same campaign. Experience has shown that this method is exceedingly effective.

Mingling with the people like this doesn't mean there should be no activities that are directed from top to bottom. Both ways of organizing, from top to bottom and from bottom to top, should be used in coordination.

4. If we want to get more than 90 percent of the people to join mass organizations, we should pay special attention to women. Most men are already organized, although not all, and some in name only. Children like to sing songs and perform drills, so most of them have been organized too. With few exceptions, elderly people are in peasant associations. Then why is it that total membership in organizations never amounts to 50 percent of an area's population? Obviously, because the women, who represent half the

population, have not been organized. In some places women's organizations exist only nominally: in fact the women are not organized at all. Women constitute a tremendous force in the mass movement. Wherever they are aroused, the mass movement develops in depth. This was true in the Central Soviet Area of the past,³⁰ and it is true in some war zones today.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party has ordered all Party organizations to intensify work among women.¹⁹⁸ Why does this work lag behind? I discussed this question with four secretaries of township or village Party branches. They all agreed in theory that work among women is very important and seemed to mean what they said. "Has your wife joined the Party or the women's national salvation association?" I asked each of them. I talked with them individually in different places, but their replies were practically the same:¹⁹⁹ "What does she know? How can she be of any help!" So there we were again, back to the old question: Can women do anything useful? If a Communist does not discard his own notion that women are of no use, if he looks down on his own wife and fails to enlighten her, how can he lead and organize the masses?

If we redouble our efforts to do a good job of mass work, we can reform some of the existing organizations so that they are no longer run by the government but are really organizations of the masses with many of their own leaders. This will not only produce better results in mass work but also help us to strengthen the Party and to tell good Communists from bad elements who have infiltrated it. At the same time, inexperienced Communists and junior cadres will gain experience and receive an education in class consciousness.

Intensive mass work will help consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, reinforce the anti-Japanese troops and make it easier for the anti-Japanese governments to mobilize the people. We badly need to do all those things if we are to persevere in a prolonged war of resistance in the enemy's rear. It is precisely for the purpose of supporting that war, smashing the enemy's "mop-up" campaigns and winning final victory that we propose to consolidate the Party organization and improve mass work.

MASS WORK IS THE CENTRAL TASK AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

November 3, 1939

After talking with comrades engaged in Party work in six different parts of north China, I think the weakest link there is mass work. This problem exists not only in north China but in central and south China, and in other war zones and enemy-occupied areas as well. In a word, it exists everywhere. Progress in the war of resistance and in our Party's work depends essentially on mass work. It is the central task at the local level now.

I am going to discuss a few aspects of the current war situation in light of some things we have learned from our experience in north China.

FULL MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES IS THE KEY TO ALL OUR WORK

In many anti-Japanese base areas in north China our work both inside and outside the Party has been successful. Nevertheless, when we examine it from different perspectives, we find that it has weaknesses.

Let's consider the Party organizations in the base areas. They are all new organizations, proliferating very quickly. As a result, Party members are not receiving nearly enough education in class consciousness. Another consequence is that a few bad elements have slipped into the Party. Since the Party branches were set up only recently, they are relatively inexperienced, and few of them have become a guiding force for the local people. The great majority of cadres on Party committees at the county and district levels are also new and inexperienced. Meanwhile, untrustworthy persons and alien class elements have made their way into certain leading organs.

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Now let's look at political power in the base areas in north China. Few of the township and village governments there are in the hands of persons who truly represent the interests of the people; most of them remain under the control of local tyrants, evil gentry and other wicked men who serve as township or village heads. Governments at higher levels have tried to reform these local governments but without success, because they have only given instructions from above and have failed to mobilize the people at the grass roots. As a result, progressive decrees and measures of the higher-level governments have not been fully carried out. Some are even distorted or enforced perversely. For example, the landlords in one county, who control the township governments, impose taxes and other burdens on family members of soldiers who are fighting the Japanese and on poor workers and peasants, telling them to "set good examples."

Now let's take military affairs. To carry on the gruelling war of resistance, north China needs massive amounts of manpower, money and matériel, which can only be obtained from the people. If we want the people to give the army their wholehearted assistance, and to keep on giving it, we have to do our best to mobilize them. Party organizations in the anti-Japanese base areas in north China must make every effort to organize the masses—that is the only way to secure their help today. And that's exactly what we did in the days of the Jiangxi Soviet area.³⁰ In the Red month of May 1933, we recruited 63,000 people for the Red Army. By comparison, the mass work in most base areas in north China today lags far behind. Of course, things were different then. In Jiangxi we were carrying out the Agrarian Revolution,¹⁵ while there is no possibility of doing that in north China today. However, if we adhere strictly to the current policy of reducing rents, interest rates and taxes²⁰⁰ and do our organizational work well, it will be entirely possible for us to mobilize considerable manpower and financial and material resources in support of the anti-Japanese war. In guerrilla areas where our governments have not yet been established, the quality of mass work is also a decisive factor in maintaining stubborn resistance and turning the guerrilla areas into base areas.

Lastly, let's consider popular organizations. We have to recognize that popular organizations have achieved real success in only a few places. In most areas the only mass organizations are those the government has helped set up from above. Since they have made little or no effort to awaken the masses, they are not what the people really need and are regarded as serving only the army and government. Most of the township and village organizations are not performing any real function and are only interested in accumulating names on a membership list. That is why so few people have stood out as

leaders who truly enjoy the support of the masses. Only in a few places have mass organizations become the mainstay of the anti-Japanese governments.

The above facts show that our work among the masses is the weakest part of our endeavour. It is true that Party, government, military, mass organization, cultural and educational work are conducted separately, but it is basically mass work that connects them all and provides the impetus for progress in each field. Unless we concentrate our efforts on mass work and overcome our weaknesses in this respect, we shall not be able to hold on to the anti-Japanese base areas or to carry on a protracted guerrilla war.

In mass work there are a thousand and one things to be done. Where should we begin? How can we expand the limited work we are doing now so as to involve the masses on a truly broad scale? The only way is to arouse the people and help them establish their own grass-roots organizations, under the Party's leadership, to safeguard their own interests. That will sharpen the conflict between the interests of the masses and those of the local despots who control the township and village governments. Encouragement from the Communist Party and from higher-level governments will make it easier for the people to help reform the township and village governments, placing them in the hands of leaders who will truly represent the people's interests. In other words, the key to transforming township and village administrations is mass work. In the course of the mass movement in which the people fight for their interests, they will learn through their own experience that their strength lies in unity and organization. Meanwhile, the mass organizations will function better and truly become people's organizations. Only then will leaders emerge from the masses. Only then will the people come to see that their own interests are inseparable from the defeat of Japanese imperialism and, consequently, take a keen interest in the resistance. And only then will they increase their support for the army, which—thus assured of a reliable source of manpower and matériel—will be able to continue the war for a long time to come.

Experience has proved that no Party organization that is divorced from the masses is really solid. The weakest Party committees are the ones that have lost touch with the masses. The Party branches that are strong and serve as bastions among the people are those that maintain close ties with them and truly give them guidance. All the weaknesses of the Party, whether in its organization or its work, can be traced to isolation from the masses. Once the mass movement of people fighting for their own interests gains momentum, it will be easy to tell true Communists working for the people from bad persons who have joined the Party out of ulterior motives. Then we will be able to rid the Party of undesirable members. The mass movement provides

new Party members and newly appointed cadres with a practical education in class consciousness that no book could offer. These new members and cadres have generally had no experience in doing mass work or in leading the mass movement. The only solution is for them to train themselves in the mass movement. Then they will quickly gain experience. The longer they engage in mass work, the richer their experience. Of course they will make some mistakes, but they will learn and make progress.

WE CAN AWAKEN THE MASSES ONLY BY IMPROVING THEIR WELFARE

We all understand that we cannot win the war of resistance unless we arouse the masses. Many comrades, however, do not understand that to arouse them we must first raise their political, economic and educational level. Our comrades in the anti-Japanese base areas in north China have done a great deal to improve the people's welfare. But many comrades elsewhere have not really grasped the importance of doing that. In some places they are not clear about the fundamental question of whether we should depend mainly on the workers and peasants in the anti-Japanese war or on people of all social strata equally. In others they have failed to help implement the progressive decrees issued by the local governments.

Experience has shown that wherever the people's welfare has been improved, the masses are more active in the resistance and better organized. Wherever no effort has been made to improve their welfare and the decrees designed to do so have not been enforced, the masses remain indifferent. Wherever the people are active, the Chinese collabourators have to pull in their horns and are easier to deal with, so to cope with them too we must rely on the masses.

When we have formulated a policy for improving the people's welfare, we must also rely on the masses themselves to enforce it. One of the chief reasons why in many places decrees issued by higher authorities for the purpose of reducing rents and interest rates were not fully carried out was that little or no effort was made to mobilize the masses to enforce them. To do so, members of various organizations at the township or village level, primarily Party branches, should mingle with the people, talk things over with them and help them come to decisions. If they do that, the people themselves will try to enforce the decrees concerning rents and interest rates and to ensure that their own urgent demands—demands that can and must

be met immediately—are satisfied. If local Party committees do not concern themselves with the people’s welfare and work hard for their vital interests, they will never be able to launch a vigorous mass movement and persuade people to join in the struggle alongside the Party, the government and the army.

LOCAL PARTY ORGANS MUST ALWAYS KEEP
PEOPLE’S VITAL INTERESTS
ON THE AGENDA OF EVERY MEETING

People’s vital interests include not only such things as the reduction of rents and interest rates and the abolition of exorbitant taxes and levies, but many matters of daily life as well. At meetings, therefore, a district Party committee, Party branch or group should always include on its agenda an item addressing the vital interests of the people in its area. Local Party organs, especially district Party committees and Party branches, should pay close attention to the people’s mood and find solutions for their difficulties and demands. It is important for us to encourage local Party organs to discuss people’s vital interests and to work for the local people.

In talking with comrades from nine Party branches in different areas in north China, I learned that very few Party branches do that. Most of them limit themselves to enlisting a few recruits for the Party and the army and collecting a given amount of grain and army shoes as instructed by the district Party committees. And they do this merely by assigning quotas, instead of by starting a vigorous mass movement. All they know how to do is to ask the people for things. They don’t care what the people need, let alone offer to discuss it. We must admit that many Party branch meetings have no clear-cut purpose. The comrades don’t know why they are meeting. Consequently, the gathering becomes a sort of publicity session. Once an inspection team from the Organization Department of the Central Committee attended a meeting of a Party group under a township Party branch in north China. Comrades from the district Party committee and the Party branch secretary were present. Without presenting any issues for discussion, they asked the Party members to speak up. Not knowing what to say, the comrades nudged each other to take the floor. Finally they elected one who was never at a loss for words. “I’m not good at speaking,” he said, “and I don’t know if I’m going to say the right thing. We are Party members. Everybody should pay membership dues as a way of keeping the Party in his

heart. We pay three coppers a month. Anyone who can't pay in cash can pay in kind, like eggs or millet. That's all I want to say." At least he had broken the silence. Another comrade stood up and said, "We must pay membership dues..." All together, three comrades spoke, all about paying dues. The meeting ended without the branch secretary or the comrades from the district committee having spoken a word. After a few meetings like that, I doubt that anyone would want to show up again. District Party committees, Party branches and groups that are completely divorced from the people's political and economic struggles are bound to lose the support of the masses, and that is very dangerous.

Nevertheless, there are good examples among the primary Party organizations. In a village in the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei border area there is an excellent Party branch that has mobilized 51 persons, or 13 percent of the population, either to join the Eighth Route Army or to leave the village for national salvation work. The comparable figure in other places is less than one or two percent. In this particular village the representatives who attend village meetings are really elected by the people. It has fulfilled its quotas for national salvation bonds and public grain. It has done a good job of giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting the Japanese. It runs a co-operative and an office that provides low-interest loans. It has lowered rents and interest rates. All the popular organizations are well organized. The women are involved, and they have formed a women's self-defence corps. The villagers have done all this of their own accord.

How is it that this particular Party branch has been able to do such good work? Basically, it's because it maintains close ties with the masses and loses no time in solving problems of immediate concern to them. Such problems were discussed at six out of ten meetings it held. I think this Party branch has set a good example for all the others.

But if a Party branch spends most of its time attending to the people's problems, won't that prevent it from fulfilling the quotas assigned by the higher Party committee? No. On the contrary, it will make the task that much easier. It will be like rowing with the current. Local Party organs, especially district committees and Party branches, must try both to fulfil the quotas and to solve the people's problems. Only by solving the people's problems can they win their support and trigger an enthusiastic mass movement to fulfil the quotas.

There are not, and cannot be, any fixed methods for solving the people's problems; it all depends on the circumstances of a given time and place. But one thing is certain and applicable everywhere, and that is that any solution must be worked out by the people themselves. Because only the people know

their own problems, and the best solutions can be devised only through their own discussions. Our local Party organs, district Party committees and Party branches must gather opinions from the masses before they can make sound decisions. That is why Comrade Mao Zedong often says that Communists should at all times “learn from the masses as well as teach them.”²⁰¹ To lead the masses, Communists must first learn from them. There is an old saying: “Three cobblers with their wits combined match Zhuge Liang, the master mind.” There are no master minds in the world who stand aloof from the masses.

MASS WORK IN THE SHAANXI-GANSU-NINGXIA BORDER REGION

December 10, 1939

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a model anti-Japanese base area where successes have been scored in all fields of work—Party, government, army, mass organization, culture and education. In order to improve this work, the current Second Party Congress of the Border Region has reviewed the successes of the past two years and analysed the problems.²⁰² It has taken the right approach, affirming achievements and criticizing shortcomings.

Now I would like to discuss mass work.

According to our experience in north China, the establishment of a base area passes through three stages. First, setting up armed forces. Without armed forces it is impossible to build a base area. The first thing we did in north China was to send troops to wage guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. In eastern Hebei Province and Shandong Province, the Kuomintang collapsed before the advancing Japanese invaders. As the Eighth Route Army was not there, our local Party committees began by organizing guerrillas to engage the enemy, which they did with notable success. This shows that once we have our own armed forces, we are able to set up a government, expand local Party organizations and initiate mass organizations. Hence our conclusion: When we have an army, we have everything. In the wake of the failure of the Great Revolution,²⁰³ almost all our local Party organizations were destroyed. That was not true, however, in places defended by our armed forces. In northern Shaanxi Province, for example, Liu Zhidan and other comrades had early on organized guerrillas for armed struggle and founded a base area.²⁰⁴ If it hadn't been for the garrison corps and our security troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, we could never have stayed here but

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Second Communist Party Congress of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

would have been driven out long ago.²⁰⁵

The second stage consists of developing Party organizations on a large scale and rapidly recruiting large numbers of Party members. The expansion of the armed forces and the mobilization and organization of civilians all depend on Party organizations. Particularly in the countryside, where the population is scattered, Party members are needed to provide leadership. In areas where the Party has just begun to work it is essential to have a large number of Communists, and new members must be recruited as fast as possible. If we don't act quickly, the Japanese imperialists will build their networks there, and the reactionary diehards²⁰⁶ will make trouble. He who strikes first gains the upper hand.

Once founded, the Party organizations should launch extensive and intensive mass movements. During the third stage, we should conduct publicity among the masses to arouse and organize them. Of course, we don't mean that the three stages—building armed forces, Party organizations and mass organizations—are separate and independent. Large-scale mass movements cannot be developed unless the armed forces and the Party organizations work hard among the masses. Similarly, the Party organizations and the armed forces cannot survive unless their mass work is successful. Without the support of the people the armed forces would have no possibility of expanding and the Party would be isolated and unable to carry on. Therefore, the masses must be mobilized if we are to make the accomplishments of the first and second stages secure. The completion of the third stage marks the consolidation of the base area. Does this mean that no mass work is needed in the first two stages? Not at all. Immediately after we have founded an armed unit, we should proceed to set up mass organizations. However, in the first two stages the masses are necessarily organized by people at the top. Such hastily formed mass groups have serious weaknesses: they are not consolidated and they are not organizations in which the masses can work with a full political awareness. That is why in the third stage the masses must be aroused.

How about things in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region? All of us acknowledge that the people here have a revolutionary tradition. They wholeheartedly support the Central Committee, are very aware politically and are determined to resist the Japanese. Nevertheless, as you comrades have pointed out, not enough work has been done to mobilize them. Don't think that the masses have been awakened just because there are various mass organizations around. Nominal organizations are of no use. They have to be strengthened at the grass-roots level. Our present task is to focus our attention on the township level, which is the basic link in mass work. That is

indispensable if we are going to consolidate the base areas.

Now I'd like to offer for discussion my views about future mass work in the Border Region.

1. We should continue to improve the people's living standards.

We should attend to people's most pressing problems and help them overcome difficulties. That is the key to arousing the masses. Have the people's most urgent problems been solved in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region? In some places the Agrarian Revolution¹⁵ has put an end to ruthless exploitation by the landlord class. The people have taken possession of farmland, a democratic system has been instituted and living standards have improved, so that people now have enough food and clothing. We can therefore say that their major problems have been solved. Other problems, however, have not been tackled. Our Party, government and army should continue to help the masses solve them. For instance, in the Border Region there is still hideous exploitation by commercial capital. To free the people from the exploitation, we have to run co-operatives. In some places the land problem has not yet been addressed. There is a general shortage of farm tools. Many families of anti-Japanese soldiers are short-handed. Poor sanitary conditions contribute to high infant mortality. And so on. We should help the people deal with all these problems. We must form teams to help families of anti-Japanese soldiers plough their land. This is a matter directly related to the strengthening of the army and we must not neglect it. If we do, it will be hard to consolidate the army, let alone expand it. In short, the people are confronted with many problems. If we deal with them effectively, the people will have greater faith in our Party and more respect for it. Why did Comrade Peng Pai have the support and admiration of the peasants of Haifeng and Lufeng during the Great Revolution?²⁰⁷ Because he showed great concern for the people's suffering and helped them solve their problems whenever and wherever he could. Some comrades regard the peasants' problems as trifles, but to the peasants they are vitally important. We should help the masses tackle both minor and major problems. Let me cite another example. When a certain peasant died, somebody seized his three *mu* of farmland [1 *mu* equals about 0.7 hectares—Tr.], depriving his son of his livelihood. Later, one of our comrades helped the family to recover its land. As a result, the peasant family, and indeed the whole village, trusted that comrade, and he was quickly successful in establishing a Party organization. Such examples are legion. When we help the masses, they in turn give enthusiastic help to the Party and government.

Now that a people's revolutionary government has been established in the Border Region, our Party holds political power. We have to ask the

people for things—if we didn't we would starve. Once in power, a Party is liable to demand things from the masses and to forget to give them anything in return. If we did that, the masses would see us as authorities who forcibly requisition things. So we should not just ask the masses for things. Even more important, we should always work for the people's welfare. All Party, government, army and mass organizations should bear this in mind.

2. We should turn mobilization for the war effort into a vigorous mass movement.

This has not yet been done. We should talk with the people to raise their political consciousness. We should explain to them the need to sacrifice their immediate interests for their long-term interests and to give up minor interests for major interests. Mobilization work must be appealing, so that the masses will voluntarily take an active part in the war of resistance.

First of all, we should explain clearly to our Party cadres and rank and file that only by overcoming our current difficulties can we ensure future victory. Some comrades have failed the test of hardship and forfeited their Party spirit just for a little personal interest. It is for the emancipation of the 450 million Chinese—and, in a broader sense, for the emancipation of the two billion people throughout the world—that we endure hardships today. Why can't we give up a little personal interest for such a great cause?

Mobilization for the war effort involves two tasks: one is to explain the situation to the workers and peasants and the other is to oppose bad persons. If we combat those who sabotage mobilization, that will help arouse the enthusiasm of the toiling masses. The two tasks cannot be separated. Party members and working people enthusiastically donated save-the-nation grain, giving two *dou* of grain when asked to give only one [1 *dou* equals 20 kg. —*Tr.*]. There are some people, however, who gave only one *dou* when they should have given five. As for landlords, who will not offer money and grain of their own accord, we have to set quotas for them, requiring them to pay their share and no less. If they refuse to do so, we should criticize and denounce them. Of course, summary and indiscriminate denunciation is wrong. Persuasion is essential. We are not against all wealthy people; we shall denounce only the wrong-doers.

The government should enact laws regarding mobilization. For instance, the law should stipulate the proportion of able-bodied persons in a family who should join the army. On the one hand, we should thoroughly explain to the masses why this is necessary and, on the other, we should see that the government's quotas are fulfilled. The current congress has decided to recruit 3,000 new soldiers, and we should enlist them in this manner. Both the cadres and the people are required to obey government decrees, with the

cadres taking the lead and setting an example.

3. We should do a good job in administrative villages.²⁰⁸

Administrative villages are the key to the development of the mass movement and the basic unit for all work in a county. When we speak of carrying our work to the grass-roots level, we mean carrying it to the townships and administrative villages. We rely on the cadres there to execute the policies and orders of higher government bodies. Suppose the Central Committee issues a directive to special committees, county committees and district committees to recruit large numbers of Party members. It is the township Party branches that will actually carry out the directive. So long as the Party branches work actively and earnestly according to Central Committee instructions, anything can be accomplished. But if they and their cadres are not enthusiastic about the work, nothing can be done.

The key to good work in the administrative village is the Party branch. It is essential to build sound, capable Party branches. Under the leadership of such branches, Party members can go among the masses, becoming acquainted with them and helping them solve their problems. Mass organizations can carry out various tasks in an orderly way and steadily develop the mass movement. Struggle can be waged against bad elements and undesirable tendencies. The people will be able to fulfil all Party and government assignments. The Party branch must be the guiding force for all other organizations in the township or village and the leader in any task.

We must go to the grass-roots level and check up on the cadres' work, instead of just reading the reports they submit. Those reports always say tasks have been completed. But an investigation will reveal that they have been fulfilled to varying degrees and not always by the best methods. Here I would like to compare two counties I have visited. When one of them received an order to recruit five soldiers, the cadres there took grain from local tyrants and evil gentry and then called a mass meeting at which they announced that anybody signing up for the army would receive a certain amount of grain for his family. Although they had accomplished the task, their methods were undesirable and their work had a shaky foundation. The Party branches in the other county fulfilled the task well by explaining things to the people painstakingly and thoroughly, so that not one man who enlisted has since deserted. Both counties carried out the order, but their approaches were quite different. It is more useful to check up on the work of the Party branches than to examine the work of county and district Party committees.

We should make sure that mass meetings in administrative villages are a success. An administrative village covers a relatively large area with a big population. A mass meeting should be held for the villagers to discuss any

matter concerning the community at large. In that way we will be working among the masses and developing democratic procedures. But we must plan the meeting carefully, considering what its purpose should be, how it should be run, what issues will attract people's interest and what location will be most convenient for all. In short, the meeting should focus on issues of vital interest to the masses, it should be lively and it should not last too long.

4. We should improve the work of mass organizations.

All mass organizations should fulfil both general tasks and their own specific tasks. For instance, they should perform such general assignments as recruiting soldiers and urging people to contribute save-the-nation grain. In addition, a trade union has its special mission of taking care of workers, a women's national salvation association has the job of organizing women, a young people's national salvation association is responsible for awakening the youth, and so on. It is wrong for a mass organization to neglect its own specific work; but it is also wrong for it to be preoccupied with its own work to the neglect of general duties. It should try to do a good job of both. When a matter concerning all mass organizations is at issue, they can meet to discuss how to deal with it together. Thus they can work both independently and in co-ordination with each other.

The mass organizations should hold democratic elections so that the people can choose their own leaders. This is necessary because when the masses agree that a particular person is a good leader, their judgement is generally correct. The Party should support that person. If the Party supports someone whom the majority of the people do not favour, they will be unhappy about it. Since we hold democratic elections within our Party, we should encourage them in the mass organizations as well. It is not a good idea to prepare a list of candidates. We should make democracy a general practice.

THE TRAINING OF CADRES

December 10, 1939

The training of cadres is an important aspect of Party building. Now I'd like to discuss this.

First, about the need to raise the political and educational level of veteran cadres.

There are many veteran cadres in the Border Region. With their invaluable experience they are the backbone of our Party. They have worked a long time for the revolution. But they should ask themselves: are we veterans really competent to lead the revolution? Do we have the necessary qualifications in political, educational and other areas? No. So we should work hard day after day to increase our ability. Comrades who were born into worker or peasant families have suffered at the hands of landlords and capitalists. Having had little schooling, they can neither read nor write. There are two alternatives for such comrades. One is to despair, feeling that they are no longer wanted because of their low educational level. The other is to decide to raise their educational level, study hard year after year, and gradually catch up with the others. We should be determined to master tomorrow what we do not know today. Reading and writing are musts. Without them the army, for example, would have no clerks and could not do its work. If our cadres are illiterate or ignorant, the revolution will not succeed.

Education and politics are closely related; our political level cannot be raised without a higher educational level. We can learn a lot of things from the voluminous theoretical works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but if we cannot read and are not up to the required educational level, it will be impossible for us to grasp Marxism. Many of our good comrades who are illiterate don't have enough insight into problems. Unable to read newspapers, they don't know what is going on elsewhere, and there are many

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Second Congress of the Party Organizations of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

things they don't understand. If they are unable to read and write, they will find it hard to attain a high level of political consciousness and see beyond the immediate. They only see what's under their noses here in northern Shaanxi Province. That's not enough. They must see all of China and the rest of the world. Many comrades think they are too old to learn. In fact they can learn perfectly well. Nobody is born an intellectual. Others think that they have to go to the Party School¹⁶⁶ or the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁷¹ Of course, these schools are ideal places for study, but not everyone can go there. The schools can only house a limited number of people, and if everyone was attending school, there wouldn't be enough cadres to do the regular work. What's the solution? It's what Chairman Mao calls the "permanent university," that is, continuous individual study. You are only a little over 20 now, and you will have at least 40 years to live and study. By the age of 60, you will be a full-fledged "professor." With perseverance, one can grind an iron pestle down to a needle.

Our senior comrades on the special Party committees and district Party committees should read books regularly and study hard and perseveringly, as our cadres on the Central Committee do. This is very important for senior cadres. It's not easy to improve your work if you don't increase your knowledge and raise your political and educational level. When should we begin? On January 1, 1940? No. Let's begin right now; we should act as soon as we have made up our minds. If leaders take the lead, others will follow.

Second, about promoting new cadres and uniting new and veteran cadres.

Let's discuss the importance of promoting new cadres. Do we have enough cadres at present? Far from it. The Border Region Party Committee often complains about the shortage of cadres. We have a vast territory to cover, and we have made great strides in our work: new base areas are mushrooming and the army keeps growing. Our Party needs large numbers of cadres to work all over the country. Without many new ones, our revolutionary movement will come to a standstill and we will never defeat Japanese imperialism.

Some people say that new cadres are not so seasoned and experienced as veterans and are not qualified for their jobs. If those people were right, it would never be possible to promote any new cadres. But they are obviously wrong. All veterans were trained as new cadres; all experienced cadres were inexperienced at first. By tempering themselves in work, raw cadres will become seasoned. As for qualifications, cadres with a short record of service will not necessarily be failures. Of course, veteran cadres are the backbone of our Party. It is good to have veterans in charge of county or district

committees. However, in areas where none of the cadres has been in the Party very long, we have no choice but to assign some of them to leadership positions. Take north China for instance. If we insisted that county and district Party committee members had to have been Party members for at least eight years, very few comrades would qualify for those posts. The overwhelming majority of the cadres in north China are former students who joined the revolution only in 1936 or 1937. The base areas there were built only after the arrival of the Eighth Route Army following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. It was those new cadres who started the work there, and they were quite successful. Were it not for them, we could never have established our base areas in north China. Although there are plenty of veteran cadres in the Border Region, we need to promote a great many new ones, not only for the sake of work here today, but for the sake of work in other parts of the country in future.

Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war our Party has admitted many intellectuals, who have been engaged in army and government work as well as in cultural and mass movements. That is a tremendous accomplishment. Nevertheless, our work in this respect is still inadequate, and mistakes have been made in some places. Recently the Central Committee has decided that large numbers of intellectuals should be recruited.²⁰⁹ Why? Because intellectuals form an important revolutionary force. We want to enlist that force in the war effort and in our revolutionary cause and bring it into full play. Since the work we do to promote the resistance and to build base areas is mainly carried out in rural areas, we need many revolutionary intellectual cadres to do publicity and organizational work in the villages and army units. Without intellectuals the revolution will never triumph.

In certain places some of our comrades, including a few veteran cadres, have been reluctant to make full use of the talents of intellectuals and have even pushed them aside. Those comrades fail to appreciate the importance of intellectuals and to recognize the profound difference between the intelligentsia in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and the intelligentsia in a capitalist country. The great majority of intellectuals in China are willing to serve the working class and the peasantry because they have warm enthusiasm for the revolution. The May 4th Movement⁴ was initiated and led by intellectuals who were advanced in their thinking. Later many progressive students took part in both the May 30th Movement⁵ and the December 9th Movement,²¹⁰ and many more joined the resistance. All these movements contributed considerably to the building of our Party, to the progress of the Chinese revolution and to the expansion of the movement to fight Japan and save the nation. Many of the leaders who worked for the revolution in the

countryside were intellectuals. Comrade Peng Pai,²⁰⁷ who led the peasant movement embracing 42 counties in Guangdong Province, was an intellectual. Comrade Liu Zhidan,²⁰⁴ who guided the revolution in northern Shaanxi Province, was an intellectual too. Earlier, the Revolution of 1911¹⁶⁷ was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was a college graduate. All this shows that the great majority of intellectuals in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country want revolution and that many revolutionary movements have depended on intellectuals for leadership.

Misled by false notions, some comrades sweepingly assert that all intellectuals work for the capitalist class. We believe that some intellectuals work for the capitalist class and others for the working class. In China, most of them can serve the working class. At present the different sides are trying to recruit intellectuals: the Kuomintang is doing it and so must we. If we delay, there will be no more available. The Japanese imperialists are trying to buy up Chinese intellectuals. If we make an effort to win them over to our side and allow them to make good use of their abilities, at least a third of them will join us, perhaps more.

When we have recruited large numbers of intellectuals and sent them to work in different areas, conflicts may arise between the new cadres and the veterans. This has happened in the past in the army and in Party and government departments, and it is still happening in some areas. By veteran cadres we mean those who took part in the Agrarian Revolution. There are some among them who look down on new cadres. "How many days have you worked for the revolution?" they say. "What are you so conceited about? Where were you when I joined the revolution?" On the other hand, some new cadres look down on the veterans. They regard them as country bumpkins. "Come on," they say, "let's discuss Marxism-Leninism. Do you happen to know anything on the subject?" Thus there is friction between them, they resent each other and avoid each other, and our work suffers as a consequence.

All our cadres—new ones and veterans, workers, peasants and intellectuals—should unite, compensate for their deficiencies by learning from each other and advance together. The revolution demands that of them. Many of our veteran cadres have a wealth of practical experience, but they can neither explain it nor write it down. The new intellectual cadres, for their part, are well read, they are good at explaining and writing, but they lack practical experience, so what they write is often superficial. Some can write easily but lack experience; some have experience but can't write it down. What is to be done? They need to help each other, learn from each other and make progress together.

Here I must make it clear that new intellectual cadres have quite a few shortcomings. It is the duty of veteran cadres to help them overcome their weaknesses and lead them onto the correct path. Veterans should not be jealous of the new cadres' knowledge and ability, and they should not put on airs because of their seniority. Rather, they should learn from their new comrades. New and veteran cadres must work together. If they quarrel, it is primarily the veterans who are to blame. Veterans ought to know better. You yourselves were once new cadres too! Now, it's up to you to help the others. There are now many new cadres in our Party—intellectuals, workers and peasants. They all have shortcomings, which they should try to overcome gradually through revolutionary practice so as to become good Communists. Veterans should not worry that new intellectual cadres may be more sought after than they themselves. That won't happen. Veteran cadres are the backbone of our Party. But veterans alone are not enough. We need many new cadres too. Veterans are valuable; so are new cadres.

Third, about ideological struggles among cadres.

Our cadres should not be afraid of ideological conflict among themselves. We don't support indiscriminate criticism of other people, but we do believe in necessary argument over matters of principle. Since different cadres have different ideologies, some bearing the influence of the exploiting classes, we must oppose all bad tendencies. The purpose of ideological struggle is to educate the entire Party membership, to help some comrades overcome their shortcomings and to keep them from making more serious mistakes and perhaps even going over to the counter-revolutionary camp. The Party wants no peace in its ranks at the expense of principle, and it will not tolerate the shielding of wrong-doers. It is wrong not to criticize errors as necessary.

Internal Party struggles primarily take the form of criticism and self-criticism. We often say Communists can make constant progress only by using the tools of criticism and self-criticism. This is very important. You could check the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, which in Conclusion lists six reasons for the success of the Soviet revolution. The fifth one is criticism and self-criticism. It reads like this: "A Party is invincible if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its cadres by drawing the lessons from the mistakes in Party work, and if it knows how to correct its mistakes in time."

I want to emphasize that self-criticism is especially important for a party that leads a government and an army. Because when the party in power makes mistakes, it inflicts especially direct and serious harm on the interests of the people. When its members violate discipline, they are especially

resented by the masses. Since they are armed and in power, the masses dare not speak out. Therefore, we must be very strict with our Party members and cadres and often listen to the opinions of the people. We should severely criticize those who harm the public interest and even take disciplinary action against them. As for those members and cadres who break the law—corrupt officials, for example—we should urge the masses to denounce them, and we should have them punished according to law.

To develop criticism and self-criticism we must begin with the leaders, who should examine themselves for their own shortcomings and mistakes. They should do that first and not keep blaming their subordinates. When something goes wrong they should step forward and account for it, instead of shifting the blame onto their superiors or subordinates. Generally, it is easier to see others' shortcomings than one's own. If a leader shares the responsibility for something but only criticizes others and not himself, his criticism will cut no ice because it will not be accepted. Leaders should be very careful when they criticize their subordinates: an imprudent remark may have a bad effect on them. It is all right for leaders to speak freely about certain things at meetings of senior comrades but not in other situations, where they might produce unfortunate results and arouse resentment among their subordinates. In criticism and self-criticism we must safeguard the interests of the Party, adhere to principles and seek truth from facts.

We should also be objective. We must study all aspects of a problem and get at its essence, not just look at one aspect or at superficial appearances. At the current congress many comrades from Party, government, army and mass organizations have criticized their own work. That is very good. Generally speaking, the army and government have good relations with each other. Is the Eighth Route Army of any help to the Border Region Government? Without question. For instance, it has successfully defended the Border Region. That is an enormous contribution. Are the governments at all levels in the Border Region good to the Eighth Route Army? Are they of any help to it? Indeed they are. First of all, they have provided the army with food and clothing. Those are the most important aspects of the relations between them. Only by proceeding from the most important aspect of a matter can we obtain a comprehensive and long-range view of it. The local authorities should earnestly assist the army. If minor problems arise, they should explain them to the people. At the same time, education should be conducted in the army, so that officers and men will appreciate the difficulties of the civilians. That is a duty of the leaders. If both the army and the government do these things, I am sure we will make great progress in our work after this congress. The Eighth Route Army is on very good

terms with the civilians, on much better terms than other armies. Nevertheless, there are some shortcomings that could change this situation unless they are overcome. If problems arise between the army and civilians, the army should blame itself first and should always try to improve its relations with the civilians. It should offer them greater help, and they, in turn, will respond with still more aid. Local comrades, for their part, should also see the weaknesses in their own work and take more blame on themselves. If each side praises the other's strengths and refrains from mentioning the other's weaknesses, they will maintain good relations.

Fourth and last, about screening cadres.

The overwhelming majority of Party members and cadres in the Border Region are good. But of course there are some bad ones too. They are of two kinds: enemy agents who have infiltrated the Border Region and comrades whose standards have deteriorated in the environment of peace of the region. We have ferreted out a few of each sort, and we are examining our ranks for more.

Some of our comrades are too naive. They recognize those bad people who oppose us openly but not those who pretend to be revolutionary when in fact they are not. There are people who used to be opposed to the Communist Party but who, once we arrived, came and joined us in hopes of preserving their wealth and property, while claiming that they wanted to make the revolution and fight Japan. Saboteurs have slipped into the Party and government in the same way. In some places our leading organs have let down their guard and promoted these people to positions as cadres, thus giving them the opportunity to carry out all sorts of disruptive activities. Bad people generally deceive us by concealing their true motives. Nevertheless, it is easy to see through them if we increase our revolutionary vigilance. They may be well disguised, but since they are rotten at the core, they can't help doing bad things, so that sooner or later their conduct will reveal their true nature. They can fool others for a while, but not for long. There is an old saying, "As distance tests a horse's strength, so time reveals a person's heart." They can take us in with one story, but not a hundred. I hope our comrades will keep a good lookout. There are also former comrades whose standards of conduct have degenerated in the peaceful environment of the base areas and who have fallen into evil ways. Some people have the false impression that there are no bad people in the Communist Party. In the revolutionary movement, especially in a period of vigorous expansion, it is unavoidable that bad people will infiltrate the revolutionary ranks and that a few persons who were once revolutionary will become corrupt. So we must constantly screen the ranks of cadres and the entire Party membership to detect bad

elements.

If we are strong and internally consolidated, we can repulse any enemy invader. The worst situation is to have bad people in our midst. If we are not consolidated within, there is no outside attack we can withstand. Hence the need to nip evil in the bud. We shouldn't close our eyes to the problem, but we shouldn't panic either. Indifference creates openings for bad persons, while panic leads to chaos. If we take firm and appropriate measures, we can successfully screen the cadres and strengthen Party organizations. We have both political power and guns in our hands, and the great majority of the people are on our side. As for persons who have done bad things and damaged the Party's cause, we should educate them ideologically and place them under investigation. If they are bent on doing evil and refuse to mend their ways, there is no alternative but to expel them from the Party or even to have them punished according to law.

Comrades! Let's not look upon these problems as trifles. If we can solve them, that will help us greatly to consolidate our Party, win the anti-Japanese war and advance the revolutionary cause as a whole. And if we are successful in the Border Region, that will help the Central Committee greatly in its work. We need foresight and courage to do our work well in the region.

IT IS THE DUTY OF EVERY COMMUNIST TO STUDY

December 1939

At its Sixth Plenary Session¹⁷⁵ the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao proposed study as a task for Party cadres, especially senior cadres. All comrades accepted the assignment and for the past year we have all been studying, though with varying rates of progress. An exchange of experiences would be helpful to our future study.

I think the key to making up our minds to study is to appreciate how important it is. That's something we did not fully understand in the past. For instance, we were all familiar with Lenin's teaching, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement"²¹¹ and thought we understood the importance of mastering theory. Nevertheless, after reading the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, particularly its Conclusion, we read fresh significance into Lenin's dictum and understand it better.

In fact, we didn't use to regard the study of theory as a duty for Party members. Even now that everybody knows study has been assigned as a task to Party members, not many comrades truly understand its importance. They think that so long as they work hard day in and day out they are discharging all duties imposed by the Party. This understanding is far from complete. If one works day and night without reading, without relating work to study, one cannot perceive the full meaning of one's work or keep improving one's performance, because study is an indispensable condition for doing a good job.

Since theoretical study is the duty of every Communist, senior Party cadres should take the lead and serve as models. As they are responsible for an entire department or area, they have a special need and obligation to raise their theoretical level. They should consider which of the following two approaches is more beneficial to the Party: (1) to be engrossed in one's work all day long without taking time out to read books; or (2) to spend two hours

An unpublished article in Yan'an.

a day reading. I think that without question the second is more beneficial. Senior cadres, who have more practical experience than newer comrades, will find it easier to assimilate the theories in books, and that will greatly enhance the quality of their leadership. And since the Party relies primarily on them to teach other cadres to integrate theory with practice, they should prepare for that task. If they fully understand the importance of study, they will try to find time to read.

The present time offers veteran cadres the best opportunity for study. During the ten-year civil war, when we were operating in the White areas³⁷ we had teachers and teaching materials available, but the White terror gave us no chance to read. In the days of the Soviet areas,¹⁹ although there again we had teachers and books and there was no White terror, we had little time to study because of the frequent battles. Today, Yan'an and some base areas offer much better conditions for study than we have had before. We veterans should take advantage of this opportunity to read and increase our knowledge; if we let it slip, we may regret it when it's too late. However busy we are, we must deepen our knowledge of revolutionary theory and of history in order to guide the great and ever-changing Chinese revolutionary movement.

Since people have different levels of education and work in different circumstances, they should adopt different study methods. Those of us who have a poor foundation and have gaps in our knowledge should become earnest pupils. We should read the basic texts one at a time, neither too slowly nor too hurriedly. We might read 30 to 40 pages a week, trying to understand every sentence. When we don't understand, we should ask others for help.

This way of studying is very important. In the past, few cadres made any attempt to get the meaning of each sentence, each paragraph, as they went along. That was no good. Finding it hard to keep at it, they quit half-way through. We should reject this practice. We should not stop reading anything until we have grasped its full meaning. There is no other way to achieve complete mastery of a subject. Beginners should try not to read too many supplementary materials at the same time, otherwise it will take them too long to finish a book. They will benefit a lot more if they read one book several times and add supplementary materials as needed to deepen their understanding.

Theoretical study must be linked with practice. Veterans should carefully analyse their experience and raise it to a theoretical plane so it can be a guide for future work. But you shouldn't be in a rush to link theory with practice before you have grasped the meaning of a book: that way, you will only

make a mess of things. Better to understand what you have read first, to digest it thoroughly. When you have mastered Marxist-Leninist principles and ways of thinking, you will naturally integrate them with your practical experience by generalizing the experience in theoretical terms and then guiding practical work with this generalization.

It's a good idea to take notes. For two reasons: it helps you review the reading, and it forces you to focus your attention and think about the text, so you reach a thorough understanding of it and not just a superficial one as in casual reading.

The best way is to have a study group, where several people can discuss what they have read, thus enlightening each other. In addition, beginners can get help from the advanced learners.

It's important to combat your own laziness. You have to draw up a workable plan of study and stick to it.

With the heavy revolutionary responsibilities we bear, Communists, especially senior cadres, cannot rest content with such a smattering of knowledge as we have now. It is high time we redoubled our efforts to learn.

ON SMALL GUERRILLA GROUPS: AN IMPORTANT FORM OF ORGANIZATION FOR STRUGGLE IN GUERRILLA ZONES

January 22, 1940

Our experience in the anti-Japanese war in north China over the past two and a half years shows that it is going to be a long, hard struggle for us to keep up resistance behind enemy lines. If we want to hold out till victory in such circumstances, local Party organizations must concentrate on developing mass movements. It is the mobilization of the masses that provides the foundation for all Party, government and army work.

There are three kinds of areas in north China. The first is the resistance base areas, such as the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei, southeastern Shanxi and north-western Shanxi base areas, which are large, contiguous and relatively consolidated, and which the enemy would hesitate to attack. The second is the enemy-occupied areas, or strongholds taken by enemy troops, and the adjacent areas. The third is the guerrilla zones, which both we and the enemy have access to; these zones are the largest geographically.

None of these areas is fixed; they are constantly changing. When we recapture strongholds occupied by the Japanese or puppet troops in cities or towns and carry out work in the surrounding territory, the guerrilla zones there turn into base areas, thus expanding our base areas. When part of a base area is occupied by Japanese or puppet troops, that base area becomes smaller while the enemy-occupied area or guerrilla zone expands. This has been the pattern, and it will continue so for some time. It is possible that the base areas may shrink temporarily while the guerrilla zones and enemy-occupied areas expand. Our policy is to strike the enemy in the guerrilla zones in order to destroy his strongholds, reduce the territory under his control and convert those zones into base areas. The base areas can thus be expanded and join with the rest of the nation to finally drive the Japanese invaders out of China.

An unpublished article written in Yan'an and edited by Comrade Mao Zedong.

I am not going to discuss in detail the building of base areas or the work in enemy-occupied areas. Right now the important thing is to study the methods of mass struggle against the enemy in guerrilla zones. What methods have the masses adopted in the guerrilla zones in north China? The activists there have been organized into small guerrilla groups under the leadership of Party branches, township governments and mass organizations. These groups may differ in size, equipment and the extent of their activities, but they all serve to defend the Party, governments and mass organizations in the townships and villages and they all harry the Japanese invaders. They are popular armed units, a form that was initiated by the people in the Jiangxi Soviet area³⁰ during the resistance to the Kuomintang's five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns.²¹² Under the Party's active leadership, these units rapidly spread. Today they operate throughout north China. Experience has proved that small guerrilla groups are well suited to operations in guerrilla zones and are an important form of organization for struggle there. Having studied the activities of such groups in seven different areas in north China, I believe that they can be organized in other areas too. Of course, these small groups must depend on larger guerrilla units and regular army units for support; otherwise they cannot hold out.

Small guerrilla groups are important for the following reasons:

First, they are the most useful form for enlisting civilians in the war of resistance. Since the Japanese and puppet troops frequently come and ravage the guerrilla zones, the inhabitants are compelled to organize for armed resistance in defence of their own interests. Thus their interests are linked with the national interests, and their defence of their native villages is linked with the entire people's defence of the anti-Japanese base areas. That is why civilians in guerrilla zones readily recognize that their interests are inseparable from the anti-Japanese war and why they are always ready to organize guerrilla groups to fight the enemy.

Second, participation in small guerrilla groups can temper Party members and train cadres, thus strengthening Party, government and mass organizations. Experience has shown that the Communist Party cannot survive—as a major party, that is, not just a small underground one—and grow without armed forces, a truth that is particularly evident in the current war zones. Without armed forces the Party cannot exist. The survival of the Party depends on armed struggle, which in turn helps steel and expand the Party. Similarly, without armed struggle it is absolutely impossible to establish, let alone expand, political power in the base areas. Without the small guerrilla groups, guerrilla zones will become enemy-occupied areas where the Party and government organizations will shrink and even collapse. New Party

members will be tempered best by joining small guerrilla groups to lead the people against the enemy and puppet troops. Bad persons who have found their way into the Party will reveal their true nature in the merciless struggle. Wavering persons will be unable to stand the test and will be sifted out. And military cadres from the local Party organizations will be trained in this sharp, complex and widespread struggle.

Third, small guerrilla groups provide effective support for the larger guerrilla units and regular armed forces. The regular armed forces operate chiefly in the base areas, but they occasionally penetrate the guerrilla zones to fight the enemy. The larger guerrilla units regularly launch operations in the guerrilla zones, from positions on the borders between those zones and the base areas. Assisting the two in their operations, the small guerrilla groups manoeuvre along the borders and throughout the guerrilla zones. They can serve as the nuclei of self-defence corps, but they can also function where there are no such corps. Operating everywhere in the guerrilla zones, they make things much easier for the regular armed forces and the larger guerrilla units. They serve not only as an auxiliary force but also as a reliable source of reinforcements.

It follows that we should intensify our work with regard to small guerrilla groups.

How are we to go about this?

First, we should explain to our cadres the importance of such groups, so that instead of doing a perfunctory job of organizing them, they will regard the task as a fundamental way of involving the masses in armed struggle against the Japanese invaders and put all their effort into it. Party branches should serve as the nuclei of small guerrilla groups. In the beginning activists can form one or two small groups and then gradually recruit more people to form more groups, rallying them around the core group led by Party cadres.

Second, no small guerrilla groups should be incorporated into larger guerrilla units or regular armed forces until conditions are ripe. That can be done only when the small groups have proliferated, and new groups should be organized afterwards. If small guerrilla groups are incorporated into other armed units as soon as they are formed, the masses, deprived of their protection, will be exposed to the ravages of the enemy. The solution is to help the small guerrilla groups to expand and multiply before any of them are merged with other units.

Finally, Party organizations at all levels in the anti-Japanese base areas and the guerrilla zones should analyse their work in relation to small guerrilla groups. They should consider how to co-ordinate the development

of such groups with that of larger guerrilla units and of the self-defence corps and how to establish correct relations among the three. We hope that studies of that sort will help make the work in the guerrilla zones more successful.

ON PARTY DISCIPLINE

March 19, 1940

I. Why must the Chinese Communist Party place special emphasis on discipline?

China is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, where the imperialists and domestic reactionaries have joined in an exceptionally powerful onslaught on the revolution. This means that the revolution against imperialism and feudalism that is being fought under the leadership of the proletariat will be a relentless, long-term and highly complex struggle. The proletarian party must have iron discipline if it is to consolidate its ranks, unite with the masses and persevere until the powerful enemy is defeated.

China is a country in which the petty bourgeois are numerically predominant. Peasants represent over 80 percent of the country's population, and there are large numbers of intellectuals, small merchants, handicraftsmen and professionals. The Chinese proletariat has a strong sense of organization and discipline, but it is small and quite young. It has natural ties with the peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. This is at once an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, the proletariat can form a close revolutionary alliance with them; on the other hand, it may retain or develop an aversion to discipline or fall under the influence of non-proletarian ideas. Without a party that maintains iron discipline the proletariat cannot unite with the petty bourgeoisie and lead it.

The Chinese revolution takes the form of armed struggle: "the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution."²¹³ In the harsh environment of war only a party of iron discipline can build an army of iron discipline with which to defeat the powerful enemy and establish a political power supported by the masses.

In the Chinese revolution it is essential for the proletariat to handle correctly the question of uniting with the bourgeoisie and at the same time

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the graduation ceremony for the fifth class of students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yan'an.

struggling against it—that is, the question of the united front. Especially during the period of alliance, when the bourgeoisie will attack the proletariat ideologically, politically and culturally, every Party organization and every Party member must strictly observe Party discipline and avoid being corrupted by the bourgeoisie.

Large numbers of people have been admitted into the Party during the current war of resistance. The majority of these new Party members are petty bourgeois in origin, and they are not accustomed to observing strict discipline.

The maintenance of strict discipline by all Party members is an important condition for achieving victory in the revolution.

II. Discipline helps to ensure unity of will and action in the Party.

Party discipline means that the individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level and the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure unity of will and action within the Party—in other words, to ensure unity of the entire Party organization.

Discipline is our major weapon. To maintain unity the Party depends not on armed force but on discipline. At the same time it depends on ideological and political work, a correct line and correct principles and policies.

Society at large is complicated and people have differing views, so it is only natural that controversies should arise within the Party. But we must be sure that Party organizations and members act in accordance with discipline.

III. Party discipline is unified and must be observed unconditionally.

Strict observance of Party discipline is the supreme duty of all members and of organizations at all levels. There are no privileged members or organizations.

The leading cadres and organizations must set an example by acting in strict accordance with Party discipline. It is of particular importance to guard against violations of discipline by high-ranking leaders, as in the case of Zhang Guotao.¹⁴³

Party members who are unwilling to observe discipline and new members who are afraid of iron discipline should quit the Party.

Subordination of the individual to the organization, of the minority to the majority, of the lower level to the higher level and of the entire membership to the Central Committee is unconditional. Of course, this is no problem when the decisions of the organization, the majority, the higher level and the Central Committee are correct. The difficulty arises when their

decisions are incorrect or partially incorrect. In that case, the subordinates should comply with the decisions while at the same time presenting their suggestions or reserving their opinions in accordance with the rights guaranteed in the Party Constitution.

At moments of crisis, when the outcome of the revolution is at stake, it is essential to struggle against mistaken leaders; nonetheless, the struggle should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Party Constitution and by legitimate means, as at the Zunyi Meeting.⁵⁶ In critical situations, when conspirators are undermining the Party, extraordinary measures may be taken. But the principles guiding inner-Party struggle must still be adhered to, as in the case of the struggle against Zhang Guotao during the Long March.²¹⁴ Naturally, this does not apply to struggles against renegades or those who have defected to the enemy.

For individual Party members (or lower Party organizations), neither correct views, exceptional competence, high position nor long seniority can be used as an excuse for refusing to observe discipline.

IV. Discipline should be voluntary, but it is also compulsory.

Having understood the importance of discipline, one must unfailingly observe it. Everyone who joins the Party should be aware of this. A staunch revolutionary regards discipline as freedom.

Discipline is compulsory. Party members who fail to observe it voluntarily will be compelled to do so. Members who knowingly violate it will be subjected to disciplinary measures, and those whose actions have grave consequences and who refuse to mend their ways will be expelled from the Party.

To maintain the Party's iron discipline, every member and organization should willingly accept supervision by other members and by organizations at the higher and lower levels. At the same time, they should accept supervision by non-Party people sincerely and with open minds.

V. Emphasis on discipline does not keep Party members and organizations from exercising their rights.

Party members are free to express their views within the Party.

Before a resolution is adopted they are free to debate the matter in question. Even after a resolution is adopted, they are free to hold a dissenting opinion (but they must comply with the resolution in practice).

Every Party member and organization has the right to appeal to higher Party organizations, up to and including the Central Committee.

Discipline and freedom form a unity of opposites. A proletarian party should be both the most disciplined and the most democratic and should ensure the highest degree of freedom

Having gone through nearly two decades of struggle, the Chinese Communist Party is now mature. The great majority of its members are faithful to the Party organization and have a high level of political consciousness. In such a party iron discipline can be enforced.

COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE HONEST WITH THE PARTY

1940

A few days ago two new Party members who are of intellectual background paid separate calls on me. They have both graduated from a Party school and are soon to leave for work. The first comrade said to me, "There are three things I never reported to the Party. I must let you know before I leave." Then he told me about the three things, which were not serious political matters but which he had failed to note on the application form for Party membership. The second comrade also reported something he had never before mentioned within the Party. In order to make a living, he had joined the Kuomintang in a certain place at a certain time, but he had never received a Kuomintang membership card or attended Kuomintang meetings. I asked him why he hadn't said so either before he joined our Party or afterwards. He replied that first he had been afraid that the Party would not admit him and then that he would not be allowed to study in the Party School. After revealing what he had hidden in the past, each of these comrades said he was greatly relieved now that he had made a clean breast of everything and no longer had a guilty conscience.

Listening to them, I felt they had made great progress because they had finally spoken the truth. I excused them for their misjudgement, but I had to tell them that it was very wrong to have concealed something that should have been reported to the Party. The Party does not tolerate such behaviour on the part of its members. To help the two comrades appreciate their mistake, I asked each of them to write a statement to the Party.

Are there other Party members, especially new ones, who have hidden such information from the Party? Yes, quite a few.

The commonest case is that an applicant has a big-landlord or capitalist family background, or that he has a father or a brother serving in the old army or government. But instead of writing down the truth on his Party

An unpublished manuscript written in Yan'an.

form,²¹⁵ he writes that he is from a petty-bourgeois family. Some persons have worked in various occupations but are very vague about them when filling out the form. Some even write “proletariat” for their class status when they have never been workers. Why do they hid the truth? Because they are afraid that otherwise they may not be admitted to the Party or that if they are, they may be discriminated against afterwards. Those who note down “proletariat” want to be well received in the Party.

All concealments are wrong. In essence, they are manifestations of non-proletarian ideology. Strictly speaking, persons who conceal things are not qualified to be Communists, who should be frank and forthright. They thought they could hide the truth and join the Party easily without being examined. They did not know that the Party requires a minute examination of the class status and family background of each Party member. Even if you succeed in concealing the truth when you join the Party, you will be subjected to an even more detailed and severe examination later when the truth is revealed. You will have no one but yourself to blame for the consequences. All Party members should understand that the Party judges its members primarily by observing their political stand and the way they perform their tasks for the Party’s cause. The Party understands that there are also revolutionary sons and daughters in reactionary families and social environments. All members should therefore have faith in the Party, hide nothing from it and be glad to undergo any examination.

On the other hand, we should acknowledge that some comrades in charge of Party work have shortcomings. In recruiting new members they only want “pure” persons. By “pure” they mean young and unsophisticated. They dare not recommend people who have unusual family and social connections or who have had varied experiences in society. As a result, plenty of young and inexperienced persons in schools and offices join the Party, while those with beards look on. There was a bizarre case in which the son was admitted to Party membership and the father was not, although it was under the father’s influence that the son had applied. Those comrades do not understand that by purity we mean devotion to the struggle for communism in complex and changing circumstances, not youth, lack of social connections and simple-minded enthusiasm.

Ours is a political party that matches its deeds to its words. Only a communist party can do that. Our Party does not allow its members to say one thing and do another, and it forbids them to tell it a single lie. We must never imitate the parties of the exploiting classes, which allow their members to spout lies to fool the people. If our members acquired that bad habit, there would be no mutual trust within the Party, no unified will and no iron

discipline. The Party would cease to be an organized contingent of the proletariat, and the people would lose faith in it and reject its leadership.

Therefore, all Party members must face this issue: if you want to be a good member, you must constantly struggle with yourself, using correct ideas to overcome your wrong ones. Success in this struggle will mean ideological progress. If you do not combat your erroneous ideas but try to cover them up instead, they will grow more and more serious until you eventually drop out of the revolutionary ranks. Communists must match their words with deeds; that is what the Party requires. If they violate this requirement, they undermine discipline. Some people lie to the Party once or twice and are admonished for it, but instead of mending their ways they go on to tell more and bigger lies. Such people should be expelled from the Party without hesitation, no matter how revolutionary their words or how great their accomplishments.

It is true that many people who have concealed information from the Party and told lies are either new members or politically immature. Some, however, have done so with ulterior political motives—malefactors, turn-coats, traitors or hostile elements who have sneaked into the Party. These people have concealed their records and told lies in order to subvert the Party. They are essentially different from the immature Communists. There are also some careerists who use the same method to win the Party's confidence and climb to leadership positions. We must increase our vigilance against all these persons and allow them no opportunity to sabotage our cause.

STRENGTHENING SECRET PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GREAT REAR AREA AND IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED AREAS

October 1, 1940

In the thirteen months that have passed since August 25, 1939, when the Central Committee issued its decision on strengthening the Party,¹⁹⁶ we have made some progress towards consolidating our organizations in the Great Rear Area and in enemy-occupied areas. In various places we have promptly withdrawn cadres who were already exposed, Party members have begun mingling with the people, we have carried out a preliminary reorganization of Party branches, sifting out undesirable elements, and we have improved Party education. Can we say, then, that the Party organizations in the rear and in enemy-occupied territory have been consolidated? By no means. After checking up on the work of a few provincial Party committees, the Central Committee thinks that on the whole these secret organizations are still far from consolidated. Many of them have not understood the key tasks that have to be accomplished in order to strengthen the Party. What are those key tasks? What must we do to strengthen the Party?

GUARDING AGAINST HIDDEN TRAITORS AND ELIMINATING THEM

The most important thing is to get rid of hidden traitors in our ranks and to make sure that no more of them enter the Party. The chief method used against the Party by Japanese imperialists, Chinese collabourators and

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anti-Communist Kuomintang diehards is to send agents or win over traitors, who hide in the Party, waiting for a chance to wreak havoc and wipe out our organizations. That's one of their standard tactics. I am sure plenty of hidden traitors are lying low today in local Party organizations. Many of our comrades are not on the alert. They don't realize how crucial it is to guard against hidden traitors and eliminate them in order to consolidate underground Party organizations. Under these circumstances consolidation becomes impossible. However good your underground work, however safe your cover, however fine a job you have done of united front and mass work, however much Marxism-Leninism you have mastered, you will forfeit all your achievements and your organization will collapse once the hidden traitors sitting in your office make their move. That is precisely what happened to the underground Party organizations in Shanghai and various provinces during the civil war. And it was a very painful experience. Now and in future, therefore, if we want to strengthen our underground organizations, we should give top priority to guarding against hidden traitors and eliminating them.

ENSURING THE SECURITY OF LEADING ORGANS

Another important thing that has to be done to consolidate secret Party organizations is to guarantee the security of leading organs. The reason is the following.

Our underground organizations are manned by two groups of people. One is composed of rank-and-file Party members, who mingle with the people and work among them. The other is made up of cadres specialized in Party work, who staff the leading organs at all levies. Both groups are indispensable. Nevertheless, it is of decisive importance to ensure the successful work of the cadres and leading organs and to guarantee their security. On many occasions when a leading organ has been destroyed, the rank and file who survived have either operated less effectively or been obliged to cease functioning altogether, so that the Party organization collapsed completely. Such cases are legion. Witness what happened to the Party organizations in the Shanghai enterprises and in many provinces in the White areas³⁷ towards the end of the ten-year civil war. Conversely, under favourable circumstances, local leading organs or a few leading cadres have easily built and expanded Party organizations with the help of a few Party

members or even without it, when their methods of leadership were sound. There have been such cases too. For example, there were only 20 to 30 Party members in the Beiping-Tianjin area before the movement of December 9, 1935, and Party members in the rural areas had lost contact with their organizations. But the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, the leading Party organ in north China, which had remained intact, succeeded in launching the December 9th Movement as soon as the situation improved. The Party grew rapidly in the province, until the Hebei organization became the largest in the Kuomintang areas before the outbreak of the war of resistance. So in order to ensure the safety of the Party we must first of all ensure the safety of leading organs.

In their plot to destroy the Party, our class enemies first and foremost try to murder Communist cadres and undermine leading Party organs. They send their agents or use hidden traitors to spy on Party leaders and infiltrate leading organs, so that once the order is given they can wipe out our local organizations from top to bottom at one fell swoop. First of all, therefore, leading Party organs must heighten their vigilance against surprise attacks. How can we ensure the safety of leading organs?

First, it is absolutely essential to make investigations so as to get rid of hidden traitors and prevent new ones from entering the Party. Everyone in a leading organ, from the leaders to the cooks, must undergo thorough examination so we can make sure there is not a single person who is unreliable or of dubious background. Everyone should understand the importance of such an examination and be ready to accept it.

Second, we have to do good underground work and at the same time secure a safe cover in society. We must strictly observe the rules for underground work that have been laid down by the Central Committee and the provincial committees and make sure that we don't try to impress people by letting them know that we are Communists or behave in any way that will betray our identity. As for cover in society, we must get regular jobs and try to keep them as long as possible. We must be aware that unless cadres in underground Party organizations have really dependable cover, there is no guarantee for their long-term survival. In this sense, getting and holding a regular job is as important as doing a piece of revolutionary work.

By emphasizing the safety of leading organs we do not mean to ignore the security of subordinate organizations. The destruction of lower organizations would also affect the safety of leading organs.

EMPHASIZING QUALITY OF PARTY MEMBERS OVER QUANTITY

Why does this issue warrant serious consideration?

First, because in enemy-occupied areas and in the Great Rear Area, Party organizations must remain secret. On the one hand, operating in places under the direct rule of the Japanese imperialists or the landlord and capitalist classes, they are constantly exposed to the dangers of armed suppression, political temptation, sabotage by enemy agents and surprise attacks. On the other hand, in their struggle against enemy forces, they have no armed troops to rely on, as do comrades working in areas defended by the Eighth Route or New Fourth Armies. They have nothing to depend on but the firm revolutionary will of the Party members, close-knit organization and their connections with the people. In such circumstances, if the Party members are of poor political quality and if spies infiltrate the Party, these organizations will be unable to carry on the unrelenting struggle against the enemy. We have called on the whole Party to place more emphasis on the quality of members than on their quantity, and it is particularly indispensable to follow that policy in enemy-occupied areas and the Great Rear Area.

Second, we emphasize quality because we already have a considerable number of Party members in the Great Rear Area. There, our goal is not so much to recruit more members as to strengthen existing organizations.

Third, we emphasize it because, in general, Party organizations in the Great Rear Area are far from consolidated, and in many places the quality of Party members is not up to standard. Although there are many members in enemy-occupied areas who are staunch and heroic in the struggle against Japan and in the fight for communism, there are also quite a few who are not. Most members in the Great Rear Area joined the Party in the early days of the anti-Japanese war. Some of them are likely to waver if the political situation takes a turn for the worse, or if they are presented with certain temptations. This is inevitable in the revolutionary movement, because at the beginning of the war some of our comrades had no political experience, no experience in recruiting Party members. However, we must admit that another important reason is that our leading organs failed to pay due attention to the matter.

When we stress raising the quality of Party members, we do not mean to stop expanding the Party organizations in the Great Rear Area. Some organizations there have too many members and others too few. In certain places there are scores of Party members—perhaps as many as a hundred—in

one *bao*²¹⁶ or one village, many of whom do no Party work and attend no meetings. Such overgrown organizations are hard to conceal as well as inefficient. They should trim their membership. Those who are unwilling to work or attend meetings should not be asked to withdraw from the Party or be expelled, but they should henceforth be regarded only as Party sympathizers. Those who remain members will be of better quality and will do a better job of underground work, and the leading cadres will be able to concentrate on more important matters. This conforms to the policy of maintaining small but efficient organizations that can easily seek shelter in society. In other places, where there are very few Party members or none at all, so that more need to be recruited, we should stress quality and avoid the mistakes of the past. It is not necessary for a Party branch to be set up in every *bao* in the villages of the Great Rear Area. Each "joint *bao*," however, should have one or two Party branches. There should not be too many people in one branch; five to ten are enough. A local Party organization should recruit more members only when the work calls for it. If it already has a large membership, it can take its time even though there are qualified peasants. These can serve as Party sympathizers. When there is a change in the situation and the Party needs more members, the sympathizers can be admitted at any time.

Improving quality involves not only ridding the Party of backward elements but also intensifying education. All Party cadres and rank-and-file members should read Party books and newspapers and other progressive publications to continue educating themselves. In this way they can keep raising their political level. Illiterate Communists should learn to read and write as a duty to the revolution. If every Party member in the Great Rear Area and the enemy-occupied areas studies this way with a long-term plan, in a few years we will have thousands upon thousands of politically capable cadres. Although that won't increase the membership, improvement in quality is far more important than growth in numbers. If thousands upon thousands of such cadres can be trained and preserved, they will form an invincible force at crucial moments in the revolution.

LINKING PARTY CONSOLIDATION WITH MASS WORK

Tightening Party organizations is only one aspect of strengthening them. It is also indispensable to carry on mass work outside the Party. A Party organization with no ties to the masses and isolated from the community is certainly not a strong unit. Without mass work in both upper and lower

strata of society it is impossible to ensure the security of underground organizations. During the ten-year civil war Party organizations in the White areas learned this lesson the hard way. They didn't correctly understand the connection and the difference between covert and overt work and therefore failed to carry out as much mass work as possible and to make best use of the mass connections they had established, so that in many places mass work was a complete failure. As an inevitable consequence, the underground organizations were exposed and subjected to enemy attacks. Present-day underground organizations should learn from that painful experience. That is why the Central Committee has stated time and again that consolidating Party organizations and broadening ties with the masses are two inseparable aspects of strengthening the Party. Underground Party organizations should quietly immerse themselves in hard work, not waste time idling.

By improving mass work in society at large, we do not mean seeking "struggle" in factories, schools and villages day after day, as Party organizations in the White areas did during the civil war. That kind of struggle, which was not needed by the masses and had little chance of success, should not have been conducted then and should not be conducted now. Experience has shown that such methods cannot help us establish genuine ties with the masses. When Party organizations are working underground, the bond between them and the masses does not depend on the number of struggles waged or the number of mass organizations set up or the number of members recruited for them. (Almost all large mass organizations have now been dissolved.) It depends on the amount of work done by Party members for the public welfare. We can work for the economic, cultural and political welfare of the people anywhere and enjoy their support. Communists are the best men and women among the people, and they will be recognized as such if they work for the benefit of the community. By constantly working for the people's interests, they will win not only the support of the working people but also the sympathy of upright persons in the middle and upper social strata, making it difficult for anti-Communist elements to oppose them. If they work hard for several years to maintain those ties with the people, they cannot fail to make a good impression on them and to secure a firm foothold among them.

If the people in a certain place rise up against corruption and extortion, then, should we just stand by and look on? Of course not. Communists should always defend the people against reactionary forces. But they should also analyse any popular struggle carefully. They should help the masses weigh the balance of strength between the two opposing sides, estimate the extent of public sympathy and predict the outcome of the struggle. They

should not create a struggle or try to launch one if they have failed to enlist the support of the great majority of the people and will have to fight alone without hope of success. We have to acknowledge that our understanding of "struggle" has been much too limited, and it is time we freed ourselves from that narrow conception. We should realize that to work for the public welfare and win the support of the masses, including the middle-of-the-roaders, is in fact a kind of struggle: a struggle to isolate the reactionaries.

Finally, to do a good job of mass work we should understand one principle: mass work and united front work are mutually indispensable. For example, in a certain village Party members worked with local upright gentry to overcome obstacles and open a school. This undertaking was a combination of united front work (working with the upright gentry), mass work (founding a school beneficial to the masses and thus winning their trust) and a struggle (isolating the obstructionists in the course of surmounting obstacles). If the Party members had not sought the co-operation of the gentry, it would have been hard to set up the school. And if there had been no school project, they would have had no focal point for their united front work. Although united front work and mass work are different, they are related. In short, in our activities outside the Party we should try to work effectively with both upper and lower social strata, not one alone. Anytime and anywhere, an impetus from the upper stratum will be beneficial to work in the lower.

If we have small, tightly knit, efficient and well concealed underground Party organizations with better-qualified members who can work independently, our leading cadres will no longer need to spend their energies guarding against internal subversion. And they won't have to go here and there every day attending Party meetings. Instead, they will have ample time to direct activities outside the Party. If a Party organization is strong within, if every member has a regular job, and if each is generally regarded as a good person, then that organization can be considered consolidated. Only such an organization can fulfil the task assigned by the Central Committee: to work underground for a long time and accumulate strength for use when the time comes.

SOME QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CADRES

November 29, 1940

IMPORTANCE OF CADRES

Comrade J. V. Stalin pointed out in 1935 that “of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized that under our present conditions ‘cadres decide everything’.”¹⁵⁷ Similarly, in 1938 Comrade Mao Zedong said in his report to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party’s Sixth Central Committee,¹⁷⁵ “Cadres are a decisive factor, once the political line is determined.”²¹⁷ Without a doubt these statements are correct, because all the Party’s resolutions and policies must be implemented by cadres. Party cadres, unlike ordinary members, constitute the backbone of the Party. They play an essential role in Party organizations. We believe that that role is of great importance, because without a strong contingent of cadres the Party cannot advance its cause and win victory in the revolution. Since cadres bear such heavy responsibility, they should set good examples for the ordinary Party members and the masses.

CURRENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO CADRES

Our cadres are many and their functions varied: we now have cadres working in the Party, the army, the government, in mass organizations and in cultural and technical fields. This is a remarkable achievement. However, we still don’t have enough of them, particularly in the new base areas. That is because the revolutionary cause has made rapid progress, the range of our activities has expanded and our work has become more complex than ever

A speech reconstructed on the basis of drafts prepared by Comrade Chen Yun in Yan’an.

before. Although the number of Party members has greatly increased, the number of cadres has not risen proportionately.

Veteran cadres are the mainstay of our Party, government and army. Take Party organizations and government departments for example. Cadres at and above the level of secretary in prefectural Party committees and of prefectural commissioner are all veterans, whereas 85 percent of the middle- and lower-level cadres are new, 85 percent of those at the middle level being intellectuals. In the army, which already has a long history, most of the middle-level cadres are veterans who joined the revolution during the Agrarian Revolution (1927-37). The exceptions are those in the newly formed army units in Shandong, central China and central Hebei. This is the overall situation with regard to Party cadres at present.

In addition, there are large numbers of non-Party cadres in the base areas.

STANDARDS FOR SELECTING CADRES

1. Loyalty to the cause of the proletariat and to the Party.

In specific terms, to be loyal means to put the interests of the revolution above everything else and be resolved to sacrifice one's all for the Party. When a cadre is loyal, "neither riches nor honours can corrupt him, neither poverty nor lowly condition can make him swerve from principle, neither threats nor force can bend him."²¹⁸ A person who places personal interest above everything else, who seeks the limelight and covets advancement, or who is boastful, insincere and always currying favour with superiors is not worthy of the name of Party cadre. To be able to put revolutionary interests above all, one must go through a process of education and tempering.

2. Close ties with the masses.

The Communist Party relies on the masses in all its endeavours. We must get to know them and help them before we can expect them to help us.

We should not look down on the local cadres who are natives of a place where we come to work. They have close ties with the masses and should be respected.

3. Ability to make independent decisions and assume responsibility.

Given the war situation and China's vast territory, the cadre must be able to work independently. He must exercise initiative when he loses contact with his superiors, without, however, disobeying their instructions.

A cadre cannot work independently unless he studies assiduously and

integrates theory with practice. He cannot simply rely on his experience without the guidance of theory. He should be modest and eager to learn.

He should be professionally competent and faithful in the discharge of his duties.

4. Observance of discipline.

Discipline is a tool for ensuring political and organizational unity.

We all tend to be more strict with others than with ourselves. In this respect, we should learn from good examples, not bad ones.

In short, there are basically two standards for selecting cadres: political integrity and professional competence. Both are indispensable, but the former is primary.

The standards by which cadres are selected are also the ones by which they should measure themselves. Every cadre should examine himself regularly so as to correct his mistakes and make up his deficiencies.

EVALUATION AND EXAMINATION OF CADRES

Policies with respect to cadres must be based on a correct evaluation of each individual. In examining cadres we must try to identify their strengths and weaknesses so as to distinguish the good cadres from the bad. Under the present circumstances, with schools and colleges in Yan'an open for enrolment and people flocking here from all parts of the country, it is crucial to make that distinction. When we examine cadres, we must be realistic, objective and careful. The conclusions arrived at should be irrefutable. Under no circumstances should they be based on speculation. We should not judge a cadre merely by his words and attitudes but focus on his deeds and qualities. And we should not judge him by a single act or a short period of his life but by the record of his work as a whole. It is his performance, not his family background, that counts. It's all right if he has connections with people from different strata of society, but he mustn't conceal those connections.

The persons in charge of examining cadres should have a high sense of responsibility to them and to the Party. No carelessness or wronging of innocent persons can be tolerated. Anyone who commits such errors will be held responsible for the consequences; wronging an innocent person is no trifling matter.

The examiners must use honourable methods and never try to trick the cadres they are investigating. Spying on them is absolutely prohibited.

The examiners must prepare a written report on every cadre, a report based on facts, not on hearsay, which is unreliable. They may not postpone making a judgement about the cadre; the report must present clear-cut conclusions.

PROMOTION OF CADRES

1. Principles.

In evaluating a cadre for promotion we should take into account both his ability and his political integrity, though more weight should be given to the latter. Neither aspect of the candidate should be considered to the exclusion of the other: the two should be integrated, and neither one is abstract. Our judgement of a cadre's ability and political integrity should be based chiefly on the way he does his work.

We should always try to choose the right person for the right job.

Cadres should be ready to work at both higher and lower levels, as required. The person who is willing to accept only promotion and not demotion betrays a "me first" mentality and a lack of Party spirit.

2. Shortcomings.

Some shortcomings in our promotion practices are as follows:

—Fearing or refusing to promote new cadres with intellectual background to more responsible posts; that is, distrusting and opposing intellectuals.

—Neglecting the need to train local mass leaders.

—Promoting cadres while neglecting their education.

These shortcomings should be overcome.

3. Methods.

Promotion is a systematic, regular task. We should promote no cadres without prior preparations and careful deliberations, and we should avoid promoting the wrong persons and then having to demote them. Cadres should only be assigned to posts for which they are qualified in terms of both ability and work record; that is, they should be promoted on the basis of competence. If a cadre's assignment proves to be beyond his competence, he should be demoted. If it is beneath his competence, he should be promoted. Promotion by more than one grade at a time should be avoided, however, because that practice has generally proved detrimental to our work.

We must get to know cadres in their day-to-day work before passing judgement on their ability to take on more responsible assignments. It is particularly essential to test them in the course of struggle to see if they are active, capable, upright and politically resolute. Many such persons can be found in the mass movements: we should seek them out and promote them. We need not worry about a shortage of able people.

Outstanding personnel should be brought into the leading organs.

USE OF CADRES

1. Principles.

Consideration should be given both to the competence of the cadres available and to the needs of the work. In principle, although exceptions may be made for urgent needs, assignment should be based on a cadre's ability. That means giving him the opportunity to show his strengths, not his weaknesses. Bringing his strengths into full play is the best way to help him overcome his weaknesses.

Cadres should not be distributed evenly but placed where they are most needed.

2. Shortcomings.

There are two deficiencies in our present practice. First, very often we do not use cadres according to their ability. This is due partly to objective difficulties that have prevented us from learning enough about them, and partly to selfish departmentalism, that is, to the practice of placing the interests of one's own department ahead of the general interest. What can we do about this? We can get to know our cadres well before determining their assignments. And we can set up a centralized organ to take charge of assigning cadres in all fields, so that departmentalism will have to yield to the general interest.

The second deficiency in our use of cadres is the tendency to look down on administrative work. Good cadres are not assigned to government departments, and the cadres themselves are reluctant to go there. That's because some people don't appreciate the importance of government work. Others, on the contrary, overestimate its importance and are afraid to undertake the responsibility it entails.

3. Methods.

The right way to use cadres is to allow them a free rein, check on their work regularly and give them help when they need it.

We should assign them to proper positions and keep them there for a relatively long time. If we want to train competent personnel and allow them to accumulate experience, we must not transfer them too often.

There should be local cadres working in leading organs.

Model cadres should be regularly assigned to different areas, especially to backward ones.

We have to make rational, efficient use of cadres. The organizational structure should be determined by the work and not the other way around.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF CADRES

Veteran cadres need education and new cadres need it even more.

Education in basic revolutionary theory must be integrated with training in practical work. A cadre cannot develop perspective if he stops short at practice. Conversely, he cannot solve practical problems if he only indulges in abstract theorizing. Neither theory nor practice can be dispensed with. It is wrong to overlook either the difference between the two or the need to integrate them.

Those who should receive theoretical education are cadres who have been engaged in practical work for a long time and also intellectuals who may be highly educated and politically conscious but are nevertheless weak in theory. People who are rich in practical experience should analyse that experience from a theoretical point of view, while those who lack experience should combine theory with practice. Teachers should help analyse practical experience by applying basic theories. It is wrong to look down on practice as inferior to theoretical study. It is equally wrong to neglect study in favour of practical work.

Practical work is an important educational tool; it is a process in which cadres are trained. We should assign them to appropriate posts and give them responsibility so that they will learn on the job. When they make a mistake, we should try as soon as possible to persuade them to correct it and to help them learn from it and understand it on a theoretical level. At the same time, we should encourage them to draw on other people's experience. We should give full play to their strengths and help them to overcome their weaknesses, praising them for the former and criticizing them for the latter, as appropriate.

WRONG METHODS OF DEALING WITH CADRES

We oppose both paternalism towards cadres and a *laissez-faire* attitude towards their mistakes. Rewards and punishments should be meted out strictly and fairly. Criticism and praise should be given at the appropriate time and to the right extent. We should see to it that all cadres are united on the basis of the Party's principles.

We disapprove of the conduct of some cadres who gather favourites about them to form a private clique. Mutual flattery and currying of favour are contemptible practices harmful to both the Party and the individuals concerned.

We think it wrong to say complimentary things to someone's face but speak ill of him behind his back, let alone attack him or retaliate against him. We believe in being open, above-board and frank with comrades.

We shouldn't take a cadre's political career lightly or treat him arbitrarily. On the contrary, we should foster his political career and help him to progress in his thinking. We should encourage him to overcome any weaknesses such as flaunting his seniority, for example, or giving up trying to improve himself. At the same time, we should constantly concern ourselves with his personal problems and help to solve them.

We are opposed to the abuse of disciplinary measures. The basic method of dealing with cadres who make mistakes is to educate them. Disciplinary measures are necessary sometimes, but only when there is no alternative, and they should always be appropriate to the case at hand.

STRENGTHENING UNITY AMONG PARTY CADRES

In general, the Party cadres are united in that they basically agree on the Party's line, but they are disunited in certain other respects. The disunity is evident between new cadres and veterans, between military cadres and civilians and between local cadres and those who come from other places. It also exists between cadres working in the same field (that is, between army cadres in different units, between local cadres in different areas and between government cadres in different departments). The most common and persistent problem is discord between new cadres and veterans. In essence, it is the friction between cadres from peasant backgrounds, who joined the revolution during the Agrarian Revolution, and those from intellectual backgrounds, who joined only recently.

Objectively, conflict between cadres stems from differences in the nature of their work, in the demands placed on them, in their individual experience, their ability, and so on. Subjectively, it stems from individualism, departmentalism and sectarianism, from a lack of appreciation of each other's strengths, from the temptation to claim credit for oneself and blame mistakes on others and from a failure to recognize the primacy of the Party's interests.

Veteran cadres bear the chief responsibility for any friction between themselves and new cadres.

Cadres should be encouraged to understand, respect and learn from each other. When conflicts arise among people working in two different units, it is important for the leaders of each to make self-criticisms. In such cases Party organizations should be strictly fair: they must not show partiality for their own people. They should criticize those who are in the wrong and support those who are in the right. That is the way to strengthen unity among cadres.

We must help all cadres to understand on basic point: it is our Party that is leading the revolution. All cadres, new or veteran, military or civilian, local or sent from elsewhere, should unite to safeguard the interests of the Party.

STRENGTHENING UNITY WITH NON-PARTY CADRES

The people will never be united throughout the nation and the revolution will never succeed unless we unite with non-Party cadres. This is, and will continue to be, a test for our Party. Whether the people turn to the Communist Party depends on how broad-minded we are. Sectarianism is our fatal weakness. Some Party cadres refuse to recognize the status of non-Party cadres or to co-operate with them. Instead, they look down on non-Party people, are prejudiced against them, make excessive demands of them and expect them to adapt to the Party people, rather than the other way around. Some Party cadres don't have a spirit of self-criticism and a democratic way of working with people.

Party cadres are the most to blame for any discord between themselves and non-Party cadres.

We must unite with non-Party cadres by all possible means. Our basic attitude should be above-board, frank and straightforward. Without such an attitude no principles can be applied.

ESTABLISHING AND IMPROVING DEPARTMENTS IN CHARGE OF CADRES

Managing cadres is the principal job of organization departments. Those departments must have a large number of qualified staff members, persons who are loyal, fair-minded and capable, who have had varied experience of society in addition to working for the revolution, who are patient and careful in their work and trusted by both their superiors and their subordinates and who can help expand the Party organization.

It is the regular task of departments in charge of cadres to know, evaluate and select cadres and then to make recommendations to Party committees. Important decisions concerning appointments and dismissals, rewards and punishments should be discussed and approved by Party committees in accordance with organizational principles. They should be based on the results of investigations and should take account of the suggestions of the cadre departments. They should not be made by just one or two persons.

ON METHODS OF LEADERSHIP

December 23, 1940

1. The Party's organizational work should meet the demands of the political line and ensure its execution. There are two requirements for cadres doing organizational work: they must have a correct understanding of the political line and they must be thoroughly familiar with the actual situation. Discussing the political line without knowing anything about the actual situation is a waste of words. Knowing the actual situation but not the political line means working in the dark. Too often senior cadres only talk about the political line while subordinates only talk about specific tasks. We have to change that.

2. The subjective goals must be in keeping with the objective situation. Leading organs must make plans, execute them and check up on work in the light of objective conditions. They should keep in mind the distinctive characteristics of the current situation: we are in power in the base areas, operating mostly in the countryside; the main form of struggle is war; we have achieved a great deal in our work; and there are many new Party members.

3. Although plans are made subjectively, they must be based on objective possibilities. They should be in keeping both with the political line and with the objective conditions. The objective conditions constitute the basic factor in making plans.

4. Any new development proceeds from the existing base.

5. We should concentrate on the central task and give it top priority, without losing sight of other aspects of the work and always relating specific tasks to overall goals.

6. We should act quickly and carefully. We should identify the central task, understand it thoroughly and then go to work methodically and realistically. Don't take chances, and don't try to reach the goal in one step.

7. In reviewing work, we should offer criticism and self-criticism,

Notes for a speech written in Yan'an.

analyse our experience and draw the appropriate lessons. We should examine resolutions and revise them as necessary, gradually modifying our subjective goals in accordance with objective circumstances.

8. In checking up on the work done, we should start at the grass-roots level. It is useful to analyse the experience of one or two typical Party branches or townships before examining the work of others.

9. Correct handling of the relationship between superiors and subordinates is the key to successful leadership. The basic approach for superiors is to help their subordinates and draw on their experience to improve leadership methods. Superiors should take full responsibility for any wrong decisions. When their subordinates make mistakes in carrying out a decision, the superiors should also be held responsible for not having explained things clearly enough. Superiors should not criticize their subordinates and spare themselves. Their methods must never be autocratic. In general, superiors should be held responsible for any conflict between themselves and their subordinates. Subordinates, for their part, should respect their superiors and offer them constructive criticism and suggestions.

10. Leading organs should not only issue orders but also allow their subordinates to make suggestions. Orders are necessary, of course, but flexibility is necessary too, and some matters should be left to the discretion of subordinates.

11. Leading cadres of any big party that is in power tend to become bureaucratic. Bureaucratism should be firmly resisted.

The leaders should give different assignments to different subordinates; they should make clear what is urgent and what is less urgent, what is primary and what is secondary. They should be good at exercising leadership, pointing out the general direction for their subordinates and guarding against any deviations from it.

11. Leading cadres should make a clear distinction between the central task and day-to-day work. They should concentrate on the main task and not get bogged down in routine, but they shouldn't neglect day-to-day work either. They shouldn't try to do everything at once: the quickest and most efficient way to work is to take on and fulfil one task at a time. Nothing can be accomplished by laying equal stress on all tasks or doing things in a haphazard order. When problems arise, a leader should not be frustrated but remain cool and collected. To make sure that he is not kept busy all the time while his subordinates sit idle, he should learn to delegate responsibility instead of trying to do everything himself. Leaders need time to listen to reports from subordinates and they need time to think. It takes thought to move from perceptual knowledge to conceptual knowledge. Meetings should

be few, they should be prepared in advance and the resolutions adopted at them should help to solve practical problems; otherwise, there is no point in holding them.

RESOLUTION AND LETTER
ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF GRADUATES
OF SCHOOLS DIRECTLY UNDER
DEPARTMENTS OF THE
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

February 13 and 14, 1941

PRINCIPLES FOR
EMPLOYING GRADUATES OF SCHOOLS
DIRECTLY UNDER DEPARTMENTS
OF THE PARTY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE

February 13

1. All graduates of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism,¹⁷¹ the Central Party School¹⁶⁶ and the Northern Shaanxi College¹⁶⁴ shall be assigned jobs in various areas of Party work by the Organization Department of the Central Committee.

2. The Women's College,²¹⁹ the Youth Training Class,²²⁰ the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature¹⁶⁵ and the Academy of Natural Sciences²²¹ shall for the time being reserve half of their graduates of the advanced and regular classes as cadres to engage in the women's and youth movements, in literary and art work and in the natural sciences. The other half shall remain ready to be assigned by the Central Organization Department to various types of Party work. Future graduates of these schools shall be assigned in the same proportions.

Resolution drafted for the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

LETTER TO WANG MING²²²*February 14*

Your letter of February 13 has been received. Reply follows:

(1) According to the resolution just adopted by a majority of comrades in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Central Organization Department will be entitled to assign Party jobs, as necessary, to one half of the graduates of the Women's College. This applies to graduates from the regular and advanced classes of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region class and the class for wives of Military Commission cadres, regardless of their educational level and the state of their health, and whether or not they have children. We shall consult with the Border Region Bureau of the Central Committee and the Political Department of the Military Commission respectively about assignments to be given to the half of the graduates of the two classes for which they are responsible.

You suggested that the proportion of Women's College graduates at the disposal of the Central Organization Department should be cut to 25 percent. I'm afraid that given the present circumstances, I cannot agree with you. Now that our Party is no longer an entirely underground organization but one with a government and an army under its leadership, we must be able to assign large numbers of cadres to various types of work as the need arises. For example, in the past few days we have sent to work in the Central Hospital 40 women graduates of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Central Party School and the Northern Shaanxi College. If we didn't co-ordinate different sectors, our overall work would suffer. Therefore, I think that the resolution adopted by the majority of comrades in the Secretariat should be adhered to.

(2) The Secretariat decided in 1939 that, except for those who held leading positions in women's organizations and for whose transfer the Central Organization Department must consult the Women's Movement Commission, the department itself would determine the assignments for all women cadres. So far as I know, the Central Committee never decided that it was up to the Women's Movement Commission to assign jobs to women graduates from every school. If there were such a decision, I would certainly abide by it faithfully as required by Party discipline, which calls for the subordination of the individual to the organization and the minority to the majority.

Nor did the Secretariat ever decide that all women students coming to

Yan'an must be sent to the Women's College. The Central Organization Department has no right to assign graduates of the Women's College to jobs unless the College specifically asks the Department or the Secretariat to do so, or unless the women have to accompany their husbands elsewhere. On the other hand, all departments needing women graduates have to file requests with the Central Organization Department. Since the Department does have authority to make job assignments for graduates of other schools without the Secretariat's approval, it has sent to those other schools not only women who should have gone there but also some who should have gone to the Women's College. The only reason for this was to increase the pool of graduates available to it for assignment. In a sense, this practice cannot be justified. However, we do it reluctantly to cope with a situation that cannot be justified either, and that is justification of a sort. I do hope that, in the interest of all parties, we can rationalize the system of training and assigning women cadres.

The Women's College is one of the schools run by the Party. In principle, all its graduates should be assigned jobs by the Central Organization Department in accordance with the overall plan of the Central Committee. But in view of the particular importance of the College and other specialized schools, we set aside half of their graduates for women's movement work. This, I think, demonstrates that we fully understand the special features of such work.

(3) I want to make it clear that work with women is part of Party work. As a worker of our Party, I consider it a duty and a requirement to treat all kinds of work equally.

When you have time, I should like to meet with you and talk these things over.

PARTY MEMBERS MUST TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL WORK

May 1, 1941

1. The entire party should understand that economic and technical tasks are concrete, indispensable revolutionary work. Some Party organizations and members define revolutionary work in a narrow, abstract way, looking down on economic and technical work and not recognizing its vital political significance. These erroneous notions must be corrected.

2. All Party members should understand that they are duty-bound to engage in both theoretical study and practical work. Particularly at this stage of the revolution, when our Party has an army and a government under its leadership, Party members cannot devote themselves to theoretical work (although there can and should be a small number of people who specialize in theoretical research). Neither should they bury themselves in practical work to the exclusion of theoretical study. In short, we must overcome both the tendency to avoid practical work under pretext of studying theory and the tendency to immerse oneself in practical work so that there is no time for study.

3. Every Party member must accept Party assignments unconditionally. At present some Party members are unwilling to do economic and technical work and bargain with the Party over assignments. This must stop.

4. All Party members serving in economic and technical departments should learn from both Party and non-Party specialists. They must study hard and become professionally and technically skilled so they can contribute to construction work in various departments and so they can earn a living in society.

5. The Party should provide better leadership for both members and non-members working in economic and technical departments, to help them advance politically and to assist them in other ways.

Decision drafted on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and first published in *New China News* on May 8, 1941.

REORGANIZING PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GREAT REAR AREA AND EXPANDING OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES THERE

December 1941

1. Although we have had some success in strengthening the Party over the past two years, Party organizations in the Great Rear Area have remained basically unconsolidated. Some of the Party members there continue to carry out surprise attacks, but the majority remain inactive. More and more Party organizations are being destroyed. The chief reasons they are vulnerable to sabotage and hard to consolidate are that they are too large and that they are composed of activists who have been operating in the open in the movement for national salvation. Unless this changes, it will be impossible to consolidate those organizations, now that the Kuomintang is plotting to destroy them once and for all by spying on them and launching surprise attacks. To make themselves strong and secure, they must cut back their membership as far as possible and become tightly knit, efficient organizations suited to present circumstances.

2. The current Party organizations in the Great Rear Area differ both from the semi-overt organizations that existed during the first period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the early years of the war of resistance and from the extremely isolated underground organizations of the civil war period. These are Party organizations of the national resistance period. They are entirely secret, but they have an unprecedentedly broad, revolutionary mass following. Accordingly, they should be tightly knit, efficient organizations operating extensively outside the Party. The number of Party members is less important than the number of communists and sympathizers outside the Party. The appropriate form for an underground Party organization today is a small membership with a broad mass following.

3. To maintain a small and efficient Party membership we must put a stop to the misguided practice of recruiting as many members as possible at

An unpublished article written in Yan'an.

the expense of quality. Those who remain in the Party must be faithful, reliable, capable and active; they must not be Party members in name only. They should not only maintain ties with the masses but be true leaders or activists among them. To ensure this, unqualified members must be persuaded to leave the Party for the time being. In addition, some qualified members, even if they have not yet been exposed, should be persuaded to withdraw from the Party for their own protection. Meanwhile, in areas where there are no Party members or too few, we should recruit qualified ones on an individual basis. When a great many Party members withdraw and only a few are admitted, each provincial Party committee will have an appropriate number of people under its leadership: from 300 to 500, perhaps—no more than 1,000 in any event—depending on the size and quality of its present membership and the needs of its work.

4. The temporary withdrawal of the majority of Party members in the Great Rear Area will make it easier not only to form tightly knit Party organizations but also to expand activities outside the Party. Only by quitting the Party temporarily can members protect themselves from being identified with the organization, conveniently carry out activities outside the Party and avoid being shadowed by Kuomintang agents. Experience has shown that some Party members who lose contact with the Party find that they are no longer identified with the organization and can thus safely establish themselves in society. Therefore, when we ask members to leave for a while, we are not forsaking them but protecting them, not narrowing the scope of our work but expanding it.

5. To maintain tightly knit, efficient Party organizations, we must do away with the conventional notion that no one in the middle and upper classes is reliable. Since the Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat, its members must be primarily of worker, peasant or other petty-bourgeois origin. Nevertheless, under the special circumstances in China today, we can and should admit into the Party people who come from the middle and upper classes or who have connections with them, provided they are not careerists but can reject their original class interests and dedicate themselves to communism. While we are consolidating the existing foundation of the Party, therefore, we must improve our work among people of the middle and upper classes and admit revolutionary elements from among them, as appropriate, to increase the Party's strength in such circles. In admitting these persons we must neither lower our requirements nor take in everyone who is qualified. The Party organizations should consider not only whether candidates are qualified politically, but also whether admission will help them in their revolutionary activities. In accordance with the principle

of maintaining a small Party membership with a broad mass following, we should let most of the progressive persons in the middle and upper classes remain communists outside the Party for the time being, taking in only those whom it is essential to admit.

6. Members who withdraw from the Party temporarily will not stop working for the revolution; they will expand their activities outside the Party. Although the Party organizations will no longer maintain formal connections with them, they should maintain friendly ties. When the former members are eventually reinstated in the Party, this period will count towards their seniority. Although they are now outside the Party, they still have the duty to keep Party secrets. If they are forced by the enemy to “turn over a new leaf,” they can deal with the situation as non-Party people, but they must be careful not to harm the Party organization in any way. Anyone who protects the Party and continues to work for the revolution may be reinstated in the Party when the time comes. When persuading members to withdraw for a while, we must keep them from being disheartened: we have to convince them that withdrawal is a way of ensuring both their own safety and the progress of revolutionary work. At the same time, we must guard against dissension sown by anti-Communists and conspirators. As for those Party members who are unwilling to withdraw and refuse to be persuaded, we can retain their membership for the time being but terminate their regular activities inside the Party organization.

7. From now on, to avoid being destroyed by the enemy the Party must give up a standardized form of organization and begin operating in less predictable ways. Party committees at all levels should be separated from each other, maintaining contacts through individuals and requiring no Party credentials when a member is transferred to a new place. Those who have to maintain individual contacts will not be put in a Party branch. No Party branch should have more than three to five persons. Party branches and Party committees at all levels should seldom call meetings; rather, their members should contact each other on an individual basis. As for the Party members’ education, they should increase their general knowledge by studying independently, while self-criticism is conducted and discipline taught inside the Party. Cadres who have been exposed must not just be transferred to other locations. We must not hesitate to dismiss them from service, and we must make sure that those who cannot be sent back to the base areas lie low for a while. Every provincial Party committee must have a core of loyal, reliable, seasoned Communists who have a good grasp of the Party’s policies, and they should be assisted by trustworthy cadres who have regular jobs as their cover.

8. Most of an underground Party organization’s revolutionary work

consists of activities outside the Party, and the broader the scale of those activities, the better the cover for the organization. An organization that hesitates to engage in outside activities can never be consolidated. It is therefore a mistake to concentrate exclusively on inner-Party work, and the mistake must be corrected by combining three kinds of work:

a) Making the Party organization tightly knit and efficient and keeping it well concealed;

b) Becoming familiar with conditions in the Kuomintang and improving the work inside that Party; and

c) Studying the community and becoming integrated with it.

All comrades, whether they remain in the Party or leave it, must carry out the Central Committee's resolution on investigation and study.²²³ Everyone must become proficient in all aspects of his department's work and also acquire general knowledge about society.

9. To succeed in our public activities we must do away with closed-doorism, which would isolate us, and with putschism, which would expose us. Inside the Party we must refrain from interfering too much in the affairs of organizations at lower levels and tying them hand and foot. If a comrade wants to gain a firm foothold in society and climb to a higher position, he must seek common ground with public figures on major issues so as to obtain their co-operation, rather than isolating himself by stressing minor differences. He should expose the sinister deeds of the Kuomintang, but in the capacity of an ordinary person and not at the expense of forfeiting his social position. When he engages in a revolutionary struggle, he should do it on just grounds, under circumstances that are to our advantage and with restraint. He should never take ill-considered action in an effort to achieve quick results; he will fail and only expose himself to danger. As for the Party's methods of leadership we must not interfere in the activities of sympathizers or give them definitive answers when they approach us for advice. Instead, we should generally ask them to make their own decisions as they see fit. With regard to Party members and Party committees at lower levels, we should provide guidelines concerning major policies and strategy but not interfere in the details of their work. That way, they will be able to act freely and will improve their capabilities.

10. Since the Great Rear Area is ruled by the Kuomintang, Party committees at all levels must become experts on it. They should carefully study all aspects of the Kuomintang—its headquarters, its government, its army, the Three People's Principles Youth League,²²⁴ the civilian movement, etc. They must learn how to exploit its internal conflicts. Meanwhile, they should keep a sharp lookout for anti-Communists and unite with progressives

and middle-of-the-roaders inside the Kuomintang.

11. If an individual Party member in the upper echelon is forced by the Kuomintang to confess or make a political recantation, he may act according to his own discretion, in whatever way will allow him to continue his revolutionary activities without damaging the Party organization.

12. If underground Party organizations want to grow stronger, they have to establish and expand contacts with the masses. They must reject the erroneous putschist tactics that were adopted in mass work during the civil war years and master all Chinese forms of mass organization and struggle. They must not initiate struggles but should actively take part in those that are already under way and gaining momentum in the Great Rear Area. They should not try to organize the masses secretly but should enthusiastically join all spontaneous, legal and semi-legal mass activities. They should avoid any precipitate action that might expose them and should adapt their activities to the level of the masses' political consciousness. Through many kinds of activities, Party members should establish ideological and personal ties, both visible and invisible, with the masses.

The above guidelines are also applicable to underground Party organizations in cities occupied by the enemy.

IMPROVING UNDERGROUND PARTY WORK IN THE GREAT REAR AREA

December 1941

I

Party organizations in the Great Rear Area constitute an important part of the Chinese Communist Party. Without them it would be impossible for the revolution to develop and triumph. It is therefore wrong to belittle the work in that area or to fail to devote oneself to the tasks there.

During the Civil War our Party carried on heroic struggles in the White areas.³⁷ But it did not appreciate the actual social conditions in China at that time and misread the political situation after the defeat of the Great Revolution.²⁰³ Consequently, it did not pursue the correct policy, which would have been to make a tactical retreat and work underground for a long time in order to gather strength. It did not radically change its work methods and organizational forms to adapt to the general and particular circumstances then prevailing in China. As a result, even though thousands upon thousands of Communists fought heroically, shedding their blood and laying down their lives, most of the Party organizations, except those in north China, were wiped out. That was a most grievous and costly setback, although a number of cadres were steeled in the ordeal and we learned some lessons the hard way.

The errors the Party committed in the White areas during the Civil War were fundamental ones, attributable to the erroneous political line of the time. Although later, at a Conference of Representatives of Party Organizations in White Areas held in Yan'an in 1937,²²⁵ we made generally correct decisions with regard to changes in our method of work, the incorrect tactics of the Civil War period have been carried over, to one degree or another, by Party organizations in the Great Rear Area today. Now that the Central Committee has prescribed the task for those organizations—namely, to work

Excerpt from an unpublished manuscript written in Yan'an

underground for a long period, gathering strength and biding their time—they should reflect on past failures and draw the appropriate lessons from them. They should break away from conventional ideas, give up work methods and organizational forms that have proved unsuccessful in the past or are no longer suited to present conditions, and draw up correct guidelines.

II

Although Party organizations in the Great Rear Area must remain underground for a long time, they can and should carry out extensive revolutionary activities. Operating under the reactionary Kuomintang regime, they cannot survive unless they are well concealed. And because of the protracted nature of the revolution, that will be the case for a long time to come. In areas controlled by the class enemy all Party organizations must remain underground until the revolution achieves nationwide victory.

Working underground does not mean suspending revolutionary activities. On the contrary, it means expanding them. The whole purpose of operating underground is to be able to expand revolutionary work, which, in turn, will make it easier for the Party organizations to remain hidden.

The reason it is possible to expand revolutionary activity is that China is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country in a period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and national resistance to Japanese aggression. Since China is a colonial and semi-colonial country, the contradiction between it and Japan is of primary importance. Since it is a semi-feudal country that is politically and economically backward, there are intricate contradictions between the people and the ruling class and among various circles and groups within that class. Now that the national enemy is penetrating deep into Chinese territory and the Kuomintang has failed to make the necessary progress in resistance, the Communist Party's strength and influence have become the decisive factors. As a result, widespread and profound conflicts are developing between the people and the reactionary ruling class, and also within that class, over whether to persevere in the resistance or to compromise and surrender to the enemy. The existence and growth of these conflicts make it possible for the Communist Party to carry out extensive revolutionary activities throughout the nation but especially in the Great Rear Area.

To make best use of objective conditions favourable for revolutionary work we must dispel the wrong ideas long held by Party organizations in the

Great Rear Area. Although Party organizations in the White areas during the Civil War recognized that China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country and that the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic one, they failed to appreciate the characteristics of Chinese society and to work out appropriate principles and policies. For instance, for a long time they did not recognize that the national conflict was primary, and they equated the class antagonism and polarization in China with those in other countries that had had bourgeois revolutions. They believed in opposing the entire bourgeoisie and even the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. They ignored the conflicts within the ruling class and refused to exploit them. They paid no attention to social customs and practices that must be taken into account in revolutionary work in our country. They disregarded history and mechanically applied abstract theories to China. They mistook a changing country for a static one, a complex society for a simple one. They reduced a broad field for revolutionary work to a narrow plot difficult to manoeuvre in and regarded an easily accessible society as inaccessible. Consequently, Party organizations in the White areas failed to expand revolutionary work and divorced themselves from the people. And that is why most of them were defeated.

To preserve themselves and develop revolutionary work Party organizations in the Great Rear Area must reject subjectivism and formalism and stop mechanically applying concepts from books. They should proceed from the specific conditions of China and be mindful of its characteristics. That is the only way for them to recognize the wide opportunity they have for revolutionary work.

III

The fundamental task of Party organizations in the Great Rear Area is to work underground for a long period, gathering strength and biding their time. To fulfil this task, they must do three things: (1) keep the Party organizations tightly knit, efficient and well concealed; (2) become familiar with conditions in the Kuomintang and improve the work inside that Party; and (3) study the community and integrate themselves with it. These three things are all indispensable and they are all interrelated. If Party organizations want to work underground for a long time, they have to be tightly knit, efficient and well concealed. At the same time, they have to be familiar with the Kuomintang and its anti-Communist rule so as to protect themselves

from surprise attacks, and they have to melt into the community for cover. By gathering strength we mean not only preserving existing forces but acquiring new ones. Similarly, it is impossible to gather strength unless Party organizations are tightly knit, efficient and well concealed, unless they win over revolutionary-minded persons inside the Kuomintang and unless they form extensive connections in the community with people of various strata.

The most important of the above three things is to become integrated into the community. That is the prerequisite for concealing Party organizations, getting acquainted with the Kuomintang and its anti-Communist regime and winning over its revolutionary-minded members. To this end one must adapt oneself to the community. For the sake of revolutionary work, Communists should learn the ways of the community and make friends with people of all walks of life. They must stop looking down on connections with people outside the Party, dropping them readily and fearing to make use of them, as was the case during the Civil War.

IV

To make Party organizations tightly knit, efficient and well concealed, we must bear in mind the following points.

The first two characteristics are the guarantee of the third. Party organizations in the Great Rear Area should therefore emphasize the quality of their members, not the quantity. To qualify for membership a person must have the necessary degree of political consciousness, a steady job and close contact with the masses. Unqualified members should be sifted out of the Party to serve as sympathizers rallying around it. Those who are qualified to join the Party but would have difficulty being active after they had done so can remain outside for the time being. The others, however, can be admitted when local organizations need more members. Now members should be recruited mainly in key factories, government offices, schools and villages.

Party organizational structures should change with the circumstances and tasks. Rigid organizational forms and methods of work, such as customary commemorative meetings and demonstrations and conspicuously Communist practices, must be dropped. The more we abandon conventional methods, the harder it will be for the Kuomintang agents to predict our movements and the easier for Party organizations to survive and grow. It is imperative to reduce the size of Party branches and of leading organs at all levels; meetings should generally be replaced by individual contacts, and even

those should be kept to a minimum. Party organizations at all levels should work independently in keeping with the Party's basic guidelines, instead of relying on superiors for instructions. Subordinate Party organizations that have lost touch must try to keep functioning on their own whatever happens.

It is necessary to help find steady jobs for all Party members and to consolidate the positions of those who have jobs in middle-and upper-class circles, who will make many friends, establish numerous social connections and win a popular following as public figures. This will lay a solid foundation for the Party in society at large.

Underground work should be minimized, as few internal Party documents should be issued as possible—preferably none at all—and all internal Party contacts should be maintained by open and legal means. Those Party members who are not assigned confidential work should spend more than 90 percent of their time at their regular jobs. Those who are assigned such work should also recognize the importance of their regular jobs and social activities, which help camouflage their secret activities. As the Party increases its overt activities, it should decrease its covert activities. Only thus can we conceal the Party organizations and expand revolutionary work.

Under the complex circumstances in the Great Rear Area, where Party members must work independently, self-education should be considered one of a member's most important duties.

V

An important task for all Party organizations, especially those in the Great Rear Area, is to become acquainted with conditions in the Kuomintang, to combat its anti-Communist regime and to win over those of its adherents who are revolutionary-minded. We cannot accomplish this task if we are so absorbed in our own affairs that we neglect work inside the Kuomintang, as we did in the White areas during the Civil War. We have to study every aspect of the Kuomintang, and Party committees at all levels should become expert on the subject. They should study not only the Kuomintang's Party headquarters but also its government, its military and economic affairs, its policies regarding civilian movements, culture, education, etc., and its organs, systems and influential figures. They should not be content with obtaining a general picture but should become intimately familiar with the Kuomintang, and especially with conditions in the particular township, district, county or province where they operate. On the basis

of its own investigation and the investigations of its subordinate committees, a superior Party committee should analyse the conditions of the local Kuomintang organization with a view to understanding and exploiting the contradictions within it. The committee should then devise ways to combat the anti-Communist regime of the Kuomintang and to recruit revolutionary-minded persons from its ranks.

VI

Although intra-Party work should remain secret, external activities, which will make up the greater part of revolutionary work, should be open. And all open activities should be legal. Such activities can help conceal the number and identity of Party members and, in particular, they are an indispensable means of mobilizing the masses for broad revolutionary movements. Engaging in open activity is one way for an underground Party organization to hide from the class enemy. The nature of that activity depends on what is sanctioned by social custom and by the laws of the ruling class. We must not make foolhardy attempts to win open, legal status as we did during the Civil War, or take precipitate action as we did in the early days of the war of resistance and are even doing in some places today. When they are engaged in open work, Party members should avoid doing anything unconventional or introducing any new ideas in the workplace that might attract the attention of the Kuomintang. Open activity should involve the upper class as well as the lower and middle classes. To adapt it to social conditions Party committees at all levels must take up the important task of studying those conditions. By doing practical work and by reading books, periodicals and other publications, they can conduct general and specific research on society, on every aspect of each class, the past and present of all classes and their common and conflicting interests. At the same time, every Party member should make a special study of the particular sector of society in which he is working and become an expert on that sector.

To maintain and expand overt activity it is essential to keep a clear separation between open and secret Party work. No persons engaged in secret work should be in charge of one of our front enterprises, no confidential Party documents should be kept on the premises of those enterprises and no Party declaration or proposal should be distributed there. Under normal conditions persons doing secret work should not be transferred frequently from one place to another. Persons engaged in open activities should not

simultaneously take on secret work. No underground Party organs should keep documents concerning the front enterprises and their personnel. When we say that open and secret work should be kept separate, we do not mean that the Party line or leadership may be defied in open work. On the contrary, the Party line must be strictly followed and Party leadership obeyed, though in a different way.

VII

If we want to integrate ourselves with the community so as to expand open activities and co-operate with broad social circles, we must first of all reject the closed-doorism and formalism with which Party organizations in the White areas during the Civil War approached persons outside the Party. We should recognize that those who have strong views about communism, for or against, are only a minority of the population; the majority are middle-of-the-roaders who don't support communism but are not satisfied with the present state of affairs either. These people have some sense of justice, arising out of their personal interests or their social concerns. Although there is a difference between that common sense of justice and communist ideology, the latter does not exclude the former, which serves as a bridge between Party members and broad sectors of society. It is the first duty of Communists not to isolate themselves from the rest of society because of differences in thinking. Rather, they should unite with other people on the basis of common views and try to raise their political consciousness and reform their thinking. They must abandon old ways such as getting along only with Leftists (a manifestation of a closed-door mentality), dismissing the sense of social justice and mere "outdated morality" and scorning co-operation with so-called backward persons.

The thinking of non-Party people is often a complex mixture of progressive ideas and backward ideas. Our job is to distinguish between the two types and to determine whether a person is basically progressive or backward. Of course, we cannot co-operate with everyone regardless of the nature of his ideas; we shall co-operate only on certain specific issues and for a given period of time. That is the only way for us to make more friends and broaden our work.

When we oppose closed-doorism and urge Communists to co-operate with broad sectors of society, we aren't suggesting that they should water down their ideas to a common sense of justice. On the contrary, they must

uphold communism while skilfully co-operating with people who hold progressive ideas.

VIII

We have to do more work among the upper classes. The toiling people in the lower classes are the primary objects of the Party's revolutionary activities, but that doesn't mean we can neglect persons in the upper classes. In future, as the Party resolutely carries on the war of resistance, gaining strength and pursuing sound policies, while the Kuomintang becomes less and less progressive and the ruling class increasingly divided, it will become both easier and more important for us to do work among the upper classes. Under certain circumstances, such work can even be decisive, for when the upper strata refuse to budge, it is hard to push the lower strata into action, while an impetus from above often facilitates work at the lower levels. We must stop being afraid of work among the upper classes and holding back from it, as Party organizations did in the White areas during the Civil War.

This work can involve more people than the cultural and educational circles. It should also be done among people in the military, government, party and economic fields. We should work not only among the gentry and eminent figures who are not in office but also among those in power, not only among progressive people but also among the middle-of-the-roaders and certain reactionaries. The more active we are in the upper circles, the more deeply we can penetrate society and the more we can expand our revolutionary work.

The purpose of activities in the upper classes is to make the social positions of Party members secure and to organize the progressive elements in those classes that sympathize with the Communist Party to one degree or another, so that we can broaden our revolutionary work. First of all, we should co-operate with members of the upper classes on projects beneficial to the community and to their individual undertakings. We should not ask them to support the Party openly but should first help them to see more and more clearly how bad things are under the present regime, so that they will co-operate more closely with us.

Party members who have acquired positions in the upper circles should try to consolidate those positions and reach for even higher ones. They must remember that they are doing this in the interest of the Party's revolutionary work and that they must never divorce themselves from the masses. At the

office they should treat their superiors the same way other people do and not be overbearing or haughty with them, for that would stand in the way of their promotion. All Party members working in the upper circles should be placed under the direct control of the proper higher Party committees.

IX

The primary tasks of Party organizations in the Great Rear Area are to win over large numbers of intellectuals, to establish connections with workers and peasants by all possible means, and to give guidance in all kinds of mass struggles. Intellectuals provide a bridge between the Party and other circles. We must therefore improve our work among students, teachers and intellectuals in other professions, consolidating existing Party branches in schools and other institutions and establishing new ones where there are none. The Party should try to influence and educate workers and peasants through existing cultural, educational and economic associations or to set up new ones for the purpose. In order for these associations to survive it is absolutely essential not to alter their original character but to keep them politically neutral. The Party should never use them to conduct secret activities or take open revolutionary action. In places where there are no such associations and it is impossible to set them up, the Party should systematically train mass leaders through whom to keep in touch with the people. Party members should join Kuomintang trade unions and workers' organizations, whether they have a mass following or are only nominal, taking part in the cultural, educational and economic activities permitted by these organizations, making friends with the activists and becoming concerned with their welfare. Party organizations should also study existing superstitious and feudal groups in the countryside and then send Party members to join them and provide leadership. If we do a good job with such groups, we can gradually turn them into revolutionary peasant organizations.

The people are outraged by the growing corruption, political degeneration and repressiveness of the Kuomintang regime, by its pressganging, monopoly pricing and stifling of free expression. Widespread mass opposition is gathering. In some places struggles have already been waged. Communists should not stand idly by but support these struggles. Party organizations should lead the people's fight to improve their living standards and to win democracy, thus broadening the ties between the Party and the masses. To win each struggle the Party organizations must appraise the strength of

the people and of their opponents as well as the potential public support. They should adopt a flexible approach and wage mass struggle only “on just grounds, under conditions that are to our advantage and with restraint.”

RESPECT FOR AND UNITY WITH NON-COMMUNIST CADRES ARE IMPORTANT POLICIES OF THE PARTY

December 1941

1. Non-Party cadres who rally around the Party are progressive elements from different social strata, and they serve as a bridge linking the Party with the masses. The Party's policies cannot be totally correct unless they reflect the opinions of non-Communists. They cannot strike root among the masses unless non-Party people help to disseminate them. Indeed, the revolution cannot triumph unless we have the sympathy and co-operation of non-Communists. Therefore, we must not only unite more closely with the non-Party cadres who have been working with us but also try to enlist the co-operation of many more.

2. Thanks to a correct Party line and to a change in objective conditions, in recent years we have come into increasing contact with non-Party cadres. We have been learning how to work with them, and they for their part have drawn closer to the Party. The number of non-Party cadres rallying around the Party is far from sufficient, however, and in general the Party's relations with them still leave something to be desired. Our Party members have failed to show enough respect for men of wisdom outside the Party and to solicit their advice. On the contrary, they have a definite tendency to exclude outsiders. Quite a few Party organizations have a closed-door mentality; they don't respect non-Communist cadres, and they even discriminate against them. Many Party comrades claim to be friendly to non-Party cadres but actually distrust them, disdaining to use their skills and keeping them at a distance. Others are conceited, arrogant and overbearing with non-members because of their Party membership. They never open their mouths without preaching principles, and yet they themselves are not amenable to reason. As a result, some revolutionary activists who might like to work with us are given a cold shoulder, while those who are already doing so feel depressed and

An unpublished manuscript written in Yan'an.

uncomfortable. In short, it's not enough to have a principle of uniting with non-Party cadres: we need a clear-cut, detailed policy regarding them.

3. Some people think that if Party and non-Party cadres don't get on well together, it's primarily the fault of the latter. They say that non-Party cadres emphasize one aspect of a matter without seeing the overall picture, that they are obstinate, indulge in irresponsible criticism of others and so forth. That view is basically incorrect. It is true that some non-Party cadres don't completely understand the overall situation and that some of them have shortcomings, but that is inevitable. If we are not on good terms with them, the Party should take responsibility for the fact. Moreover, some of the failings of non-Party cadres are attributable to defects in our own work, and others can be overcome only with our help.

Our chief shortcomings in this respect are as follows:

a) Failure to appreciate the importance of non-Party cadres. Because the Party has been operating underground or has been the object of enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, it has maintained very limited contact with the rest of society and has had little access to assistance from persons outside its own ranks. Consequently, we have failed to appreciate the role of non-Communist cadres and have established a tradition of excluding them.

b) Distrust of non-Party cadres in political matters, groundless suspicion of them and the tendency to draw absurd inferences. Some Party members assume that all non-members are suspect and that if they apply for Party membership, it must be out of ulterior motives. They think that only their own views are correct, while the ideology and habits of non-Communists are questionable. They don't give such people jobs suited to their abilities or assign them to posts commensurate with their experience and competence. Consequently, non-Party cadres feel constrained politically, are upset at being treated unjustly and come to the conclusion that it is impossible to co-operate with the Communist Party.

c) Ideological and organizational sectarianism. This is manifested in the fact that while we require non-Party cadres to work with us in a collective way, we do not respect their own habits and ideas. So long as non-Party cadres join us in a common effort to advance the revolutionary cause, they should enjoy personal freedom in terms of their habits and ideology. Most Party members overlook the important things these people have in common with us and are intolerant of the ways in which they are different. They are always finding fault with non-members, reproaching them for one thing or another and complaining that they are hard to get along with. It has become a habit with them to elbow non-Party cadres aside. They refuse to recognize

that non-Party cadres share their views on major issues, and they go out of their way to find differences on minor points. This attitude has caused dissension between the two groups. In departments where non-Party cadres hold leading administrative positions they are required to follow Party leadership in political matters and to abide by Party guidelines in their work, but the Party members refuse to follow non-Party cadres' leadership in administrative matters. The result is that Party leadership has completely replaced administrative leadership, and when an administrative problem has to be solved, the organ that should deal with it is bypassed. This has made things difficult for the non-Party cadres, who find it hard to do their work.

d) Mistaking Party spirit to mean "purity" that is free from the taint of society. Few Party members are willing to make friends with outsiders or dare to introduce them to the Party, because they think it is the height of Party spirit to keep away from "evil influences." They are in constant fear of sullyng their pure Party spirit. As a result, the Party is unable to unite with the hundreds or thousands of non-Party cadres through its members. These cadres, for their part, feel that we are hard to approach and utterly incapable of friendship. Preservation of pure Party spirit is turned into a pretext for excluding non-Party cadres and for practising individualism at the expense of the interests of the Party. Thus, a man-made wall is erected between Party and non-Party cadres.

e) Lack of appropriate organs to link the Party with cadres who are not members. The Party, the government and the army have yet to create special departments to take care of non-Party cadres, and existing cadre departments do not consider working with them as an important part of their function. Consequently, there are no offices where non-Party cadres can directly submit reports, put forward suggestions or raise grievances, and many of their problems are left unsolved.

4. To improve relations between Party and non-Party cadres we must do the following things:

a) We must have greater appreciation for the role played by non-Party cadres and trust them more politically. Many non-Party cadres are revolutionaries who burned their bridges behind them when they joined us. In the past our misgivings about them—about their dubious social connections, unsound ideology, etc.—often stemmed from our own lack of understanding and social experience. Conversely, many of their complaints and their criticisms of our failings are entirely justified. So we should stop being suspicious of non-Party cadres and place more trust in them. A person's reliability or unreliability depends on his past record and current performance, not on whether he has a ticket of admission to the Party.

b) We must break down sectarianism, that is, the man-made wall between “them” and “us.” Party and non-Party cadres fighting on the same front are all revolutionary comrades; everyone has the right to make revolution, to work and to speak out, and Party cadres cannot monopolize revolution. In revolutionary work a non-Party cadre assuming the same responsibility as a Party member is rendering the same service to the revolution. To divorce oneself from non-Communists in order to keep away from “evil influences” is actually a sign of impure Party spirit. Party members should be broad-minded enough to respect capable, experienced persons and to solicit their advice even if they are of low rank. Party cadres have the duty to unite with non-Party cadres; they have no right to push them aside. Any tendency to exclude non-Party cadres or to discriminate against them is a sign of impure Party spirit.

c) We must follow the principle of appointing personnel according to both political integrity and ability. Party membership or Party standing should not be the sole consideration; emphasis should be placed on people’s competence as well. People should be ranked according to their capability, not their seniority in the Party. Party members should appreciate other people’s strengths and be critical of their own weaknesses. Denying other people’s good points or being jealous of them will help no one, neither the Party members themselves, nor the other people, nor the Party. They should learn all they can from non-Party cadres, drawing on their strengths. It is the duty of the leading members of the Party to bring out the best in non-Party cadres in the service of the revolution. They should provide those who are in leading positions with adequate working conditions, trust them and give them authority, as they do Party cadres, so that they too can make full use of their abilities. Of course this doesn’t mean that out of respect for non-Party cadres, leaders should assign them posts for which they are not qualified or give them meaningless titles.

d) We must respect non-Party cadres’ freedom of thought and habits. At the same time, they must adhere to the overall principles of the Party in their work. These are indispensable conditions for mutual co-operation. Non-Party cadres demonstrate their loyalty to the revolution by being devoted to their work and by trying to turn their abilities to account and set a good example. That’s all we can ask of them. It would be inappropriate to demand that they submit to the same organizational discipline that members do.

e) When a non-Party cadre assumes leadership in an administrative department, the Party organization there should require him to follow the Party’s principles in his work. But it should also urge Party members to be

exemplary workers, to respect the cadre and to co-operate with him in carrying out administrative tasks. As long as the responsible non-Party cadre follows the leadership of the higher-level Party organization, Party members in his department should follow his administrative leadership. Those who do not should be criticized or disciplined.

f) When Party members and non-Party people are working together in government departments and mass organizations, they must adhere to the principle of democratic centralism, under which the minority is subordinate to the majority.

g) Well-meant criticism should be offered on a mutual basis. When non-Party cadres bring up complaints or make cynical remarks, that doesn't mean they are ideologically opposed to the Party. Constructive criticisms from them should be regarded as beneficial and should spur us on to do better. We should encourage non-Party cadres to say all they have to say without reserve. At the same time we should make it clear to them how things stand with us and why there are shortcomings in our work. We have to help them to see the Party as a whole, not just the weaknesses of individual members, to see the overall picture of our work, not just the defects in a particular aspect of it. When non-Party cadres express wrong opinions or when their work fails to conform to Party principles or to meet objective needs, the Party organizations should not hesitate to criticize them candidly and ask them to make corrections. It is normal for Party and non-Party cadres to criticize each other; if they are not open with each other; they cannot co-operate wholeheartedly.

h) The Party should assist non-Party cadres in their work as well as politically and materially. Apart from the particular obligations and rights the Party prescribes for its members, non-Party cadres should be treated politically the same as Party cadres. Those who apply for Party membership should be given an explanation of the provisions of the Party Constitution. Under the present difficult conditions, non-Party cadres should be provided with as much material assistance as possible and be looked after in the same way as Party cadres.

i) We must specify the following points with respect to the organizational relations between Party and non-Party cadres:

—Non-Party cadres are invited to attend general Party branch meetings, having the right to speak there but not to vote;

—Joint meetings of Party and non-Party cadres should be held at regular intervals;

—Party organizational and cadre departments have the obligation to look after the welfare of non-Party cadres;

—Leaders of all departments should constantly consult non-Party cadres, and the latter should have direct access to the leaders of their own departments or to the Party's cadre departments at all levels;

—Like Party members, non-Party cadres have the right to lodge complaints with Party organizations up to and including the Central Committee;

—The Party continues to support specialized organizations set up jointly by non-Party and Party cadres, such as the Society of Natural Sciences, the Society of Jurisprudence and school alumni societies.

WHERE TO GO TO LEARN

March 24, 1942

The method of education used for some time in Yan'an tended to make new cadres reluctant to go to work and inclined to prolong their studies instead. This attitude has begun to change, but it still exists. Recently a number of senior cadres who have been Party members for a long time (ten years or more) but have insufficient experience—either because they operated underground and were divorced from Party activities for long periods or because they did little or no Party work for many years—requested that instead of being assigned jobs by the Organization Department, they be sent to study in the Central Party School.¹⁶⁶ The Organization Department has explained to them again and again that they are valuable assets to the Party but lack experience. It has assured them that it is for their own good, so they will become more experienced and capable, that the Party has decided to train them in practical work. But they are not satisfied with such explanations. To straighten this matter out I should like to make the following points.

Comrades who are unwilling to go to work right away and want instead to enter schools or embark on a long programme of study often insist, "Send me to school, where I can advance politically." Of course, the Party wants all its cadres to advance politically. But how are they to do that? This question needs to be studied. Facts have shown that revolutionaries who are brilliant politically emerge only from revolutionary struggles, not from specialized schools. True leaders of the Communist Party, whether in the Soviet Union or in China, are never inexperienced people who indulge in rhetoric but people with rich revolutionary experience who have genuine revolutionary theories. Similarly, the cadres who are advanced politically are always the ones who have had experience in revolutionary struggles. People without such experience can never advance politically simply by reading and attending lectures, no matter how well versed they become in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Practical experience in revolutionary work is the

A signed deitorial written for *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an.

essential condition and foundation of political progress.

Of course, this doesn't mean that every cadre who has engaged in practical work has advanced politically. Indeed, the political level of most comrades who have done practical work is low. Some of them are really empiricists, but that is not because they are experienced in a given field of work; it's because they try to apply their limited experience to all problems. So to help our cadres raise their political level and overcome their empiricism, we have to conduct political and theoretical education among them, explain the Party's line and policies and teach them how to think. At the same time, we have to make it possible for them to engage in all aspects of revolutionary struggle and to integrate their theoretical knowledge with their practical experience. That is the only way to raise their political level and overcome their empiricism. The reason is simple: political insight resides nowhere else but in a person's thinking. One is penetrating and advanced ideologically only because one has acquired rich perceptual knowledge of the objective reality in the revolutionary movement and raised it to the conceptual level.

If what I have said above is true, inexperienced cadres should first of all go to work and learn on the job, thus laying the foundation for their own political progress.

Which should come first—study or work? That is a question that cadres without work experience often find difficult to decide. Experience demonstrates that except for specialized education, cadres should generally work first. Two different methods have been used in training new cadres in Yan'an, one good, the other bad. First there was the method used by the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College¹⁶³ and the Northern Shaanxi College¹⁶⁴ in the early days of the anti-Japanese war. The students studied for only a few months before they went to work. And they didn't just study Marxist-Leninist theories; they also developed a dynamic revolutionary style. Many graduates from these colleges who are working today have gained experience, enhanced their abilities and made progress politically. This is all thanks to correct training methods. Later on, another method was used in Yan'an. New cadres were kept in school for a long time to "learn theory," which meant being presented with a host of abstract Marxist-Leninist principles as dogma. Consequently, the students never really mastered any theory and were at a loss what to do when faced with practical problems. This was not a sound method. Although the two groups of students started at the same political and educational level, they achieved quite different results owing to the two different training methods (one emphasizing learning on the job and the other emphasizing learning in school). In terms of experience, ability and political progress, those who had worked before

going to school have surpassed those who had not.

Our experience with the two training methods is valuable. The wrong method should be corrected, not repeated. We should make it a rule that cadres with little or no experience should first go to work and learn on the job, instead of staying in school for prolonged studies. It is impossible for new cadres with no work experience to master theory through academic study alone. Theories can only be understood gradually through practical work, because a theory is a reflection of reality, and in the final analysis it comes from reality, not from books. It's just like our experience with reading. You may have read a certain book several times and then picked it up again a few years later in connection with your work, only to find that you might as well be reading a new book, because you had never really understood it before. This shows the relationship between knowledge and practice. Knowledge can be derived only from practice, and it can be expanded only through practice. Therefore, cadres who are inexperienced and wish to make real ideological and political progress should work first rather than studying first (unless it is at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College or the Northern Shaanxi College, which offer only a few months' training).

I am not against sending cadres to school in general. The ones who need to go to school should do so. But I think that those who lack experience should work and learn on the job, in accordance with the Decision of the Party Central Committee on the In-Service Training of Cadres.²²⁶

Some comrades recognize that they don't have much experience and need to work and learn on the job, but now that the Central Party School has been reorganized²²⁷ and many members of the Central Committee have joined the faculty, they don't want to miss the opportunity of studying there. So, eager as they are to start work, they would still prefer to enter the Party School first. But as I see it, the comrades from the Central Committee are not only teachers for students at the Party School; in fact, they are also teachers for all cadres at their posts. Resolutions and directives issued by the Central Committee are the best teaching materials. Moreover, it is not just a few members of the Central Committee who are teaching cadres at their posts but all of them. The Party School has decided that the course of study for its students is to be no more than three years, but the Central Committee offers permanent instruction to cadres who are working.

Senior cadres who don't have enough work experience should be aware of that fact and not be complacent about their long Party standing. In the revolutionary ranks you can't live off seniority. The effectiveness of your revolutionary work is not determined by the length of time you have served in the Party, but by your experience, organizational ability, political level

and enthusiasm. Complacency about your seniority is bound to prevent you from exerting yourself and making progress. From the personal point of view, it is a manifestation of regression, and so far as the revolution is concerned, it is of no use whatsoever.

“I am a senior cadre. How can it be that I have less experience than new cadres?” The thinking behind that question is wrong. We agree that all senior cadres who have fought for many years have experience, but we must recognize that our work today is so complex that we cannot simply rely on past experience. For instance, when we were operating secretly, we never mobilized the people to transport salt, we never did such things as collect public grain for national salvation or launch a movement for spring ploughing, and we never did government work, army work, economic work involving food and clothing, or difficult and complex technical work such as we are doing now. We did none of these things when we were working underground, so we have no experience in any of them. Shouldn't we try to learn something? Shouldn't we try to catch up by taking “make-up lessons?” It is natural that new cadres have no experience in the above-mentioned fields. But although we are senior cadres, we don't have such experience either, and that means we must take make-up lessons. We have had no experience of this kind in the past because there was no such work to be done. But now we should not be content to remain as we are, or blame the past or complain about others. Rather we should make a determined effort to make up for what we have missed. This is what the revolution requires of us; it is a duty we must discharge in serving the revolution.

I do not mean at all to belittle cadres who lack work experience. I am one of them myself. But now such comrades should be clear about how to gain experience.

CADRES MUST BE STRICT WITH THEMSELVES

October 7, 1942

Many cadres today emphasize the Party's responsibility to carry out its policy with regard to them, but they don't think much about their own responsibility to measure up to the Party's requirements. As a matter of course, cadres should be concerned with those requirements and make strict demands on themselves. But right now certain cadres in Yan'an, whenever they talk about the policy on cadres, think only of how the Party should look after them, understand them and cherish them. When it comes to the four requirements they must try to meet (loyalty to the Party, close ties with the masses, the ability to work independently and acceptance of discipline), they are different, considering them of secondary importance or even forgetting them altogether. Obviously, this is wrong. When I discussed the cadre question with students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College¹⁶³ and other schools in 1938,²²⁸ I dealt only with the Party's policy, without mentioning the need for cadres to raise their moral standards. That was one-sided.

1. New cadres with intellectual backgrounds.

The strengths of these cadres are their keen minds and enthusiasm for the work. Their weakness is an individualistic aversion to discipline, a characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. They are ready to overcome that weakness, and they can do so with the help of the education provided by the Party organization.

Many new cadres with intellectual backgrounds feel that their jobs don't quite fit them. Those who have been placed in technical, economic and other departments are not satisfied with their work. Has the Party organization given them the wrong assignments, or is there something wrong with their thinking? As I see it, the problem lies in their thinking.

1) Their conception of a revolutionary does not correspond to the

Reconstruction of a speech delivered at a meeting of military cadres in Yan'an. The editors have incorporated material from a number of other manuscripts written by Comrade Chen Yun at about the same time.

revolutionary needed in reality.

According to their experience in the youth and student movements, their conception of a revolutionary is a politician, a voluble speaker at meetings who takes part in demonstrations and in literary and artistic events, agitating for the revolution.

The revolutionary needed in reality is one who knows how to resolve military and political questions and solve practical problems of food and clothing. Although organizing rallies and taking part in marches and literary and artistic events to agitate for the revolution are necessary activities, they are by no means enough. In other words, they are not primary activities, because they cannot solve the fundamental problems. What is really needed is someone who is capable in the work of Party, government, army and mass organizations. That work is divided up among many departments, and all of it is indispensable. The provision of food and clothing, for example, is of major importance and presents a difficult task. It is not enough for a revolutionary to be able to talk volubly; he has to be proficient in whatever trade or profession he is following—an industry, agriculture, military affairs, culture, education or commerce. Revolutionaries should be capable in all these fields; otherwise, they will fail in the revolution and their very existence may be in jeopardy.

That the ideal revolutionary does not correspond to the one who is really needed is owing to the differences between non-base areas and base areas and between old conceptions and new realities.

2) Intellectual cadres prefer political work to technical, economic and administrative work.

All technical, economic and administrative work has its political significance, and all political work involves technical, economic and administrative work. In the military apparatus there is not only a political department but a general staff and a logistics department as well. It's the same with civilian work: there are different departments in the Northwest Bureau and in the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. There is no work that is purely political.

Can people change jobs? A lot of people would like to work in literature and art, for example, but I don't think we need so many in that field. Literature and art are useful, but they alone are not enough. Not everybody can be involved in them. Moreover, those who are doing revolutionary literary and art work need to understand technical, economic and administrative work as well. Writers too should go to the countryside: without such experience they cannot hope to become competent writers.

Some people say there is a danger of getting bogged down in adminis-

trative work. They don't understand that administrative work is necessary today, that it is revolutionary work and that it will not lead to routinism if it is done under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism.

New Party members and new cadres should be tempered through practical work at the grass-roots level. A good example is provided by the several hundred new intellectual cadres who have been sent by the Organization Department of the Central Committee to do practical work among the people in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. They have been working hard and have made great ideological progress. They are no less capable of bearing hardships than senior cadres in the Border Region, they work well with the senior cadres and they maintain close ties with the masses and enjoy their trust. So we feel strongly that the tempering of new cadres must start with practical work at lower levels.

3) Some intellectual cadres complain that capable people are given trivial tasks.

First let's talk about "capable people." Middle-school and college students are assets, because intellectuals are of great use to China, which is economically and educationally backward. But they are capable only as ordinary people, not as revolutionaries. Isn't it enough for a person to have a middle-school or college education to work in the revolutionary ranks? For some people it is, but for others—and there are many of them—it is not, because revolutionary work requires not only book knowledge but also knowledge of society and experience gained through revolutionary practice. Some research workers have come to recognize this and regret that they didn't see it earlier. Of course, new intellectual cadres have an advantage over senior cadres, who joined the revolution during the period of the Agrarian Revolution, in that they have more book knowledge, but they have less practical experience.

New cadres from intellectual backgrounds often look down upon senior cadres of peasant origin, who they think are, unlike themselves, uneducated and narrow-minded. They say, "The peasant cadres joined the revolution out of self-interest, to gain land, but I came of my own accord, to make the revolution." Of course, that conceited attitude is all wrong. Although they are better educated than senior cadres of peasant origin, the latter have more revolutionary practice than they do. Instead of being arrogant towards the senior cadres, they should learn from them. As for "broad-mindedness" and "narrow-mindedness," I have a completely different view. I think the peasants are narrow-minded in small matters but broad-minded on major issues. When it comes to putting up a last-ditch struggle for the revolution, peasant comrades are always more courageous and ready to lay down their

lives than intellectuals. I don't mean that none of the intellectuals is good; what I mean is that intellectuals who have not become one with the workers and peasants are broad-minded in small matters but tend to be narrow-minded on major issues. The weaknesses of peasant comrades are their conservatism and their sense of private ownership, but their strength is a staunch revolutionary spirit, and that is the most important thing. We should have a correct understanding of our peasant comrades and see both sides of the coin. We should bear in mind that intellectuals must become one with the workers and peasants. It is no accident that the revolution relies chiefly on the masses of workers and peasants, for they are the ones who have a strong revolutionary spirit.

Now about being given trivial tasks. One should have a proper evaluation of oneself and not mind doing a petty job. Any major accomplishment begins with petty jobs.

4) Other intellectual cadres complain that there is no future for them.

Communists are devoted to their cause and have the highest aspirations, and they all hope for a bright future. But they tie their personal destiny to that of the revolution. There can be no future for them if there is no future for the entire revolution. Without the people there can be no heroes. Many persons are clamouring for position and the limelight, because they want their names to appear in the annals of history. But there are too many of them: the annals of history cannot record tens of thousands of names. Am I trying to discourage people's ambition? No. Every profession produces its own outstanding practitioners. The way to become one of them is to love one's job and become good at it.

2. Senior cadres who participated in the agrarian revolution.

Senior cadres are the backbone of our Party and army because they have endured long years of hard struggle. Nevertheless, they should pay attention to the following points:

1) They should not live off their seniority. There's no point in putting up a signboard to display your seniority. Senior cadres should know that there are three requirements for cadres: political integrity, ability and seniority. They can't stress seniority only but should attach importance to ability as well. Political integrity cannot be separated from ability. If you can't fulfil revolutionary tasks, your political integrity is imperfect. It is good to be a senior revolutionary, provided you don't allow seniority to become a hindrance to your progress.

2) They should raise their educational level. This is the key to progress. Learning to read and write provides the foundation for learning other things. Not to learn would be disastrous, in the sense that it would mean failing to

meet the needs of the revolution. The revolution waits for no man. How can we do more for the revolution if we don't make an effort to learn? Some comrades are worried that they might not be able to catch up with others in education. They needn't worry: the latecomers may surpass the old-timers. They should be confident that they can succeed in their studies and become capable in many different fields. As long as they are determined to learn, the Party is ready to help. Learning is not something that is accomplished overnight; it calls for painstaking effort over a long time. The best way to learn is to study on your own rather than in a school.

3) They should take the initiative in uniting with new cadres. We should explain to senior cadres that since they are veteran revolutionaries holding leading positions, it is mainly up to them to take responsibility in this regard. Of course, the new, intellectual cadres have a share of responsibility too. But senior cadres should try to understand them and not just point out their shortcomings but help them, teach them and look upon them as their comrades-in-arms and future successors. Besides, new cadres have their good qualities, and senior cadres can learn from them and enlist their help. When new and senior cadres are united, it shows that the senior cadres have made progress.

3. Cadres with special skills.

Although we have only a few cadres with special skills, they are indispensable to the Party and the army. These specialists are revolutionaries, living and working under harsh conditions and facing many difficulties, as all revolutionaries do. The Central Committee appreciates their spirit of dedication.

1) Expertise as opposed to politics. Don't suppose that specialists know nothing about politics. Why do you think they came to northern Shaanxi? Still, they need help politically. They are doing technical work for the revolutionary cause, and we must respect their technical expertise. A layman must not try to pass himself off as an expert. Of course, if he makes the effort—and he should—he can become one.

2) Co-operation among specialists. We should encourage co-operation among comrades who specialize in technical work. For the benefit of the revolution, they should freely discuss academic issues and co-operate with each other in practical work. As things stand now, they are co-operating well enough politically, but not in technical matters. There are problems between departments and between individuals. What is it, after all, that prevents them from co-operating with each other? Primarily, it is their ideology, not their habits.

Some people, although they have joined the revolutionary ranks, still

cling to old ideas and practices. The old society is individualistic, whereas ours is collective. There is no question that the collective is more powerful than the individual. Any accomplishment in this world is essentially the result of co-operative effort. Success in the revolution comes from the joint efforts of us all. Of course this is not to deny the value of individual effort in scientific innovation and invention. But unless we learn from the achievements of our predecessors, there can be no new inventions. If people refused to co-operate and simply went about pursuing their own selfish interests, they would become idiots and barbarians, and no books would be produced. Old, individualistic thinking still exists, and it must be corrected.

We should take a scientific attitude towards our own abilities and not regard ourselves as infallible. Some doctors don't like to call in others for consultation; they don't want anyone else to cure the disease when they themselves have failed. Some people love to talk about the weaknesses of others but resent anyone's speaking of their own shortcomings. These people like to appear infallible. That's because they are preoccupied with their reputation and status. But does one lose face by seeking advice from others? Not at all. There are many things in this world, and they are not all simple; it's inevitable that we should fail to understand some of them or that we should understand them wrongly. Of course, we should try not to make mistakes. Doctors or people doing other jobs—leaders in particular—should be very careful about things they don't understand or are not clear about. If they are they won't lose face, but if they are not they probably will. Chairman Mao is very cautious in his handling of affairs. When a person makes a mistake, he doesn't lose face if he learns a lesson from it. But if, on the contrary, he refuses to examine the mistake and draw lessons from it, he is bound to lose face, often to a serious extent. In short, honest people do not lose face. If a person behaves dishonestly for fear he might lose face, then he surely will. Seeking advice from others doesn't lower a person's prestige. He acquires prestige by doing his job well, not by putting on airs and acting superior. That will get him nowhere. The way to build one's reputation is to try not to make mistakes. One can never build it at the expense of others.

3) A bright future. Right now we have many difficulties. For instance, our scientific equipment is poor, and that is a difficulty that revolutionary specialists have no way to overcome. But the revolution holds great promise for them: when it succeeds, good scientific equipment will become available and then, with their technical knowhow, they will be able to innovate and invent. For now, they should gain experience, read books and engage in collective research. They needn't worry that when brilliant new specialists

emerge in the future they themselves will no longer be appreciated. The revolution will forge ahead, providing them with abundant opportunities to make use of and improve their skills. Will the Communist Party forget its old friends once it makes new ones? No, it will need both the old and the new. The more people the Party rallies to its cause, the more promising is the future of the revolution.

4. Leading cadres.

Comrades in leading positions bear heavy responsibility for using personnel effectively and for making sure that policies are implemented correctly. Making proper use of personnel is of first importance: only when a play is well cast can fine performances be staged. To ensure good leadership, leading comrades should bear in mind the following advice.

1) Study hard to improve yourselves. What should you study? Theory and a correct way of thinking. In this connection, comrades in leading positions, particularly those in military departments, should not hesitate to read books for fear of falling into dogmatism. It's dogmatism we oppose, not reading. The trouble with us now is that we don't have a sufficient mastery of Marxism-Leninism. To avoid both dogmatism and empiricism we need to study Marxism-Leninism, assiduously. Of course general knowledge is also necessary. Without general knowledge we will find it hard to understand Marxism-Leninism, let alone to absorb and assimilate it. Some of our comrades are taken in by other people and fall captive to dogmatism precisely because their theoretical knowledge is limited and their general educational level is low. Faith in your ability to learn is essential when reading. The key to sustained effort in reading is a painful awareness of your lack of knowledge and a determination to persist. When you have learned the necessary theory and cultivated a correct way of thinking, you will be able to be of great service to the Party and the revolution.

2) Keep the overall situation in mind and take the general interest into consideration. If you only see that part of the work which you yourself are in charge of, you are liable to put the interests of your own department first, to the detriment of the situation as a whole.

3) Met out rewards and penalties as appropriate. Some leading comrades don't bother to criticize cadres who have made mistakes so that they will learn to do a better job in future. Looking after cadres chiefly means looking after their political progress. It is not right to exaggerate a cadre's mistakes, but it is not right either to offer no criticisms and just leave him alone. If someone who has committed serious errors is not penalized, he will not learn anything from the experience, and neither will other comrades. If someone who has performed well is not rewarded, he will have no incentive

to make greater progress, and again, other comrades will learn nothing. Therefore, we believe in distributing rewards and penalties where they are due.

5. Military cadres.

In their dealings with other comrades in the revolutionary ranks or with the people, military cadres should be frank and straightforward but never rude and domineering. Is it possible that they could ever be rude and domineering? Indeed it is, because they have guns in their hands, and they are proud of their record of service. That is an undesirable aspect of the military. When anything goes wrong in relations between the army and civilians, each side should be more critical of itself and less of the other. That is exactly the way the Northwest Bureau handles these relations, and it is a very good one. It would be better still if there were only self-criticism and no criticism of others. The army is important, but without the support of local governments and the people it would be an army without a following and could not survive even a single day.

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CADRES OF THE CPC NORTHWEST BUREAU

November 16, 1942

Today I would like to talk on four points.

I. LOCAL PARTY COMMITTEES MUST TAKE THE OVERALL SITUATION INTO CONSIDERATION

At this conference we discussed how the Party can exercise unified leadership. To unify Party leadership we must first of all oppose any tendency to assert independence from the Party. At the same time, local Party committees must take the overall situation into consideration. If Party committees at the prefecture and county levels fail to do so, this will encourage a tendency to assert independence. Therefore, to centralize Party leadership, it is imperative to oppose any tendency to assert independence and to urge local Party committees to take a comprehensive view in their work.

In the past, local Party committees were not able to lead the army; they did not dare to do so. Local party committees have now been empowered by both the Party Central Committee and the Northwest Bureau to exercise leadership over the army. If local Party committees and the army fail to maintain good relations with each other in the future, not only should those units and individuals asserting independence be blamed, but we will also blame the local Party committees for failing to do their best.

How can local Party committees take the overall situation into account? Party committees at the prefecture and county levels have up to now been in charge only of Party affairs, but from now on they should also be responsible for the work of the government, the army and people's organizations. That is

Excerpts from a speech on Party consolidation delivered at a conference of senior cadres of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

to say, as the Party begins to exercise unified leadership, local Party committees will shoulder much heavier responsibilities. Only if local Party committees take the overall situation into consideration can Party leadership be consolidated. The main duty of leaders is to point out the direction, coordinate relations between various quarters and help them do their work well. Under no circumstances should local Party committees attempt to manage all the details concerning the work of the army, the government or people's organizations or to order them about. This is not the way to provide effective leadership. Local Party committees should not only sweep the snow from their own front doorsteps, so to speak, nor should they sweep the snow for others. What they should do is to lead and instruct the people in sweeping the snow.

Problems for the army are also problems facing the areas where the army is stationed because the army is an integral part of the local population. Supporting the army is tantamount to supporting the people. Do local cadres have a clear understanding of this relationship? That depends. Some comrades from Yan'an have told me that it would seem to be more advantageous not to mobilize ordinary people to provide so much support for the army because they are too poor to do so. This is not unreasonable. However, some comrades are pitting the army against the people, failing to regard the former as an integral part of the latter or to realize that the interests of the people cannot be protected without an army. For example, the people in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region would not have been able to protect what they had gained in the Agrarian Revolution without the joint defence headquarters or the garrison corps that remained there.²⁰⁵

To take the overall situation into consideration is easier said than done. Because the prefectural Party committees, county Party committees as well as other departments lack experience in this regard and are not well informed, it is inappropriate to require them to manage all quarters well right away. It is likely that in their handling of matters, shortcomings and problems will arise. Comrades in the army should not be too critical when this occurs. To sum up, comrades in the army and in the locality should understand and assist each other under the unified leadership of Party committees.

II. VETERAN CADRES SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ATTAINING A BASIC EDUCATION AND IN ACQUIRING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Who among us need to attain a basic education? It is the veteran cadres

of peasant origin who participated in the Agrarian Revolution. We must do our best to further educate them. To this end, they should not only learn to read and write but they should also study history, natural science and so on.

Over the past decade, we initiated the Agrarian Revolution¹⁵ in mountainous regions and in the countryside. Most of the participants in the revolution were poor peasants who rose against the landlord class. The overwhelming majority of cadres in the Party and officers and soldiers in the army are of peasant origin. They have been brave fighters but have one serious flaw, that is, they are illiterate to varying degrees. We should not blame them for this, but rather the old social system whereby poor people could not afford to go to school. The situation in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is now much better, as poor people there have the opportunity to learn to read and write. Yet some comrades do not believe in education and think that it is enough to be able to charge forth in battle. But Chairman Mao does not agree with this. He has often stated that we must accomplish two things: first, learn military science; and second, enhance our political awareness. It should be noted that our cadres will shoulder even heavier responsibilities and attempt greater tasks in the days to come. If they are not literate, they will be unable to do a good job.

Some veteran cadres of peasant origin are very willing to study, but what should come first, receiving basic education or studying political science? This question remains unanswered. Let us take a student in a Party school for an example. When he was offered basic education, he preferred to study *Since the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*²⁹ because he saw other students studying that document. As a result, the time he should have spent on an elementary education was used up, and what is worse, he did not even learn political science well. This shows us that those who are lacking in basic education should try their best to learn to read and write. Politics is important and we communists do engage in politics, but we do this only after we have reached a certain level of education. Chairman Mao's articles *On Protracted War* and *On New Democracy* as well as the works of Marx and Lenin were presented in written form, not through film; one cannot study these works if one is illiterate or lacks basic knowledge. In order to have a good command of political science, people must first improve their basic education. Otherwise, they will not be able to master political science.

We must further our education. Why? Because the scale of our revolution will become larger and larger and situations and conditions will become more and more complicated. Things will get out of hand unless we are well educated. As the situation develops, new well-trained personnel will be joining us. If you cannot read or write but they can, and if you are lacking

in basic knowledge while theirs is thorough and profound, how could you work with them? Of course, the Party will not kick the veteran comrades out as new ones join us. The Party will not do this, but we will also not necessarily place veteran cadres in higher positions than the newcomers. We should not promote by seniority; we can promote newcomers first. On what does this depend? It depends on whether they are well-trained, whether they are politically farsighted and whether they have practical experience. You may argue that you are a veteran cadre with a lot of experience, but the young people and new intellectuals will also become experienced. They will gain experience through work. The difference between the so-called “veterans” and “beginners” is only a matter of time. It is inadvisable for people of seniority not to improve themselves. The revolution requires that our cadres become better trained and more progressive. Can we ask the revolution to stop awhile and wait for us to catch up because we have fallen behind? No, we cannot do that. The revolution will not wait for us, and you will be left far behind if you fail to keep up. That is why I have said that we should engage in study now. And if we do this, what will take place? Everything will turn out fine! Why? Comrades, please consider this! We are veteran cadres who have gained rich experience in the revolution during these ten years of civil war. What a great thing it will be when we join our experience with basic education and the theories of Marxism-Leninism!

Many comrades wonder if they can still muster the courage to tackle new studies at an advanced age. An old saying in my hometown goes like this: “It is not too late for you to learn piping and drumming, even at the age of sixty.” A sixty-year-old man is liable to be short of breath, but he still desires to learn to beat drums and blow trumpets. We too should have such confidence. Many comrades complain that their memory has become poor. We must admit that the memory of the old is poorer than that of the young, but the old can comprehend better than the young. It was very difficult for me to learn English at school. When I travelled to the Soviet Union in 1935, I could not read English newspapers and had to have someone translate them into Chinese for me. Later, a college student arrived and became my next-door neighbour and I began to learn English from him. Several months later, I could manage to read the newspapers a bit. Why was I able to master some English grammar at that time while I had not been able to do so earlier? The reason is that I came across the English language repeatedly in my daily life, which made it easier for me to learn. When I was an apprentice in Shanghai at the age of 15, I could hardly read a newspaper, but within a few years, I had acquired this skill. In a word, we should be confident that we can learn to read and write.

Some comrades may say, "Well, I am very eager to learn, Minister Chen, please send me to school so that I may concentrate on studies!" But it would be very difficult to comply with this request. Our major means of learning must be self-education. Why do I say this? First, we usually cannot study at school for a period of more than two years. If we are really determined to learn, would two years of schooling be sufficient? I do not think so. Learning requires a long period of time; we must therefore have a long-range plan. Second, it is impossible for us to go to school all at once because there is work to be done. To study while engaged in work is of utmost importance and it is the most reliable method of learning. We need only to keep some books with us, perhaps in our ration bags, and study whenever we are free to do so. When we have more money in the future, let's not spend it all on new clothes; we should also buy books, a character dictionary and *A Dictionary of Character Origins*. We should develop the habit of looking up any characters we do not recognize when reading. If we do this three to five times for each new character, we will learn it by heart. *A Dictionary of Character Origins* is better than any teacher because it was compiled by many people. When the Commercial Publishing House compiled the dictionary, it invited dozens of nationally distinguished experts to work on it.

It is of great importance for us to acquire more education. It is a major duty of the Party to help the veteran comrades who participated in the Agrarian Revolution to further their education. If the Party fails to do so, it only means that our Party had not tried its best. But, on the other hand, veteran comrades should make great efforts in this direction themselves. Otherwise, any assistance from the Party will be of little benefit. We must try every means possible to help these veteran comrades further their education.

III. CONSCIENTIOUSLY CONDUCT SELF-CRITICISMS

At this conference of senior cadres, many comrades made self-criticisms. I have not had much contact with the army and do not have a comprehensive understanding of the situation there, but I have had the impression that comrades from the army have been willing to make self-criticisms at this conference. Is self-criticism necessary? The other day Chairman Mao told us that one of the 12 Bolshevik principles advanced by Stalin was the principle of self-criticism. In *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the

first party ever to lead a socialist revolution to victory, reviewed its decades of struggle and extracted six important lessons it has learned from the revolution. One of them concerns self-criticism. This demonstrates how important it is for us to make self-criticisms; we should not neglect this point. We should oppose all counter-revolutionaries and “Left” and Right deviations within our Party. At the same time, as part of this struggle, we must also rectify our own errors. This is to say we should make self-criticisms. Without this, our Party cannot accomplish good work. Self-criticism is indispensable to our Party.

The Communist Party works for a cause and communists are committed to that cause. They are bound to make mistakes in their endeavors. Every person is liable to make mistakes, no matter how wise or capable one might be. To derive policies we must study a situation and deliberate on it. If the ideas turning about in our minds are too subjective and do not conform to the facts, we will err. Since mistakes are hard to avoid, and since we cannot succeed in our revolutionary work in the midst of error, we must correct our errors and shortcomings when we become aware of them. But how? By making self-criticisms. Moreover, we should accept reasonable criticism from other people.

We criticize comrades only for their mistakes. This is a good, not a bad thing. Lenin once remarked that whether or not a political party is serious depends on the attitude it takes towards its own errors. Our Communist Party is serious. One of the criteria for testing a steadfast member of the Party is his attitude towards his own shortcomings and mistakes. If he courageously faces, studies and corrects these, he is a good member; if he does not take his own mistakes and shortcomings seriously, he cannot be a good member.

I am discussing this issue with you comrades from the army today because you are not ordinary Party members but Party members and cadres in the army. You must realize what an immense responsibility you are shouldering. On what does the Chinese revolution depend? It depends on armed revolution against an armed counter-revolution. This is what we call armed struggle. This term implies the necessity of maintaining an army. Of course, we should also do a good job in building political power and in guiding people’s organizations under the Party’s leadership. Of these efforts, which is the most important? In my opinion, it is the work of the army. Of course, the army is under the leadership of the Party. Without the Party, we could not accomplish anything; we would not even have been able to convene this conference. Without an army under the Party’s leadership, it would have been impossible for us to convene a conference here. The army is the most important component of our revolutionary ranks. The quality of

our revolutionary cadres will have a direct bearing on the success of the revolution. Certainly, the victory of the Chinese revolution depends not only on military work but also on politics and Party-building. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party of China can the Chinese revolution succeed. If we fail to do a good job, the liberation of China's 450 million people will be postponed for many years. Because we are now shouldering this great responsibility, we must rectify whatever shortcomings and mistakes we have experienced.

Some comrades hold that making self-criticisms will undermine their confidence. They argue that if we engage in much self-criticism, our strong army will lose its combat effectiveness. I must stress that this idea is incorrect. Will self-criticism cause us to lose heart? Take General He Long¹⁰⁰ as an example. In the report he made at this conference, he made a sincere and thoroughgoing self-criticism. Will this kind of self-criticism kill confidence in our work? I do not think so. On the contrary, it will inspire confidence. As long as we make objective appraisals of our own shortcomings and mistakes, not underestimating or exaggerating them, neither we nor our soldiers will lose heart. We should not cover up our shortcomings and mistakes, but neither should we write off our achievements. This will be very beneficial for our work.

Then, will we lose prestige if we make self-criticisms? Prestige is something that really counts in the army. Orders issued by leaders who are not respected will not be carried out by subordinates, and those leaders will not be able to lead. But it should be acknowledged that prestige is not something that can be bestowed by higher authorities or established with trappings alone. Prestige derives from correct military decisions and daily performance. If you remedy the shortcomings and mistakes in your work through self-criticism, your command will be more correct and hence you will do a better job. You will then acquire even higher prestige. Some comrades think that if you have made mistakes, you should make self-criticisms regardless of circumstances. This is not appropriate. One point should be made clear: our self-criticisms are made to our revolutionary comrades. We do not make these before the enemy. We must not deal with the enemy as we do when settling inner-Party issues.

We should always make a point of conducting self-criticisms. Meanwhile, we should listen attentively to other people's opinions. Our own ideas are not necessarily objective; others may have a sharper pair of eyes for our own shortcomings and mistakes and therefore approach problems more objectively. To be objective we should first take an impersonal attitude towards ourselves. If we can do this, we will be able to take an objective

attitude towards others. Making self-criticisms helps one become more modest and objective. If army cadres are not modest and objective, cadres in other departments will not dare to criticize them. Do we have overly self-important leaders in the army? Yes, I think we do. To be so unreasonable means not to be objective. For example, in fighting a war, we should follow this principle: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counter-attack." However, we should not follow this rule in handling issues within the Party or among revolutionary ranks. It is not beneficial to treat our own comrades and non-Party personages this way. This is an error that we must correct.

IV. RESOLUTELY COMBAT LIBERALISM

We should neither strike relentless blows at and wage a ruthless struggle against, nor adopt an erroneous liberal attitude towards those comrades who have made errors.

Since the War of Resistance Against Japan, we have adopted an erroneous liberal attitude towards the mistakes of new intellectual cadres. Some comrades say there are three reasons for this: first, we have gone to the opposite extreme as a result of the relentless blows we had struck at cadres who have erred; second, we now have a united front; third, our ranks have been replenished by a large number of intellectuals. I fully agree with this analysis. I underestimated the errors of the intellectuals. For this, I must shoulder some of the blame. In presenting my talk at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College¹⁶³ in 1938, I addressed only six policies on cadres advocated by Georgi Dimitrov;²³⁰ I neglected to lecture on the four requirements for cadres, namely, to be loyal to the Party; to keep in touch with the masses; to be capable of working independently; and to observe relevant disciplines.

We have failed to adequately oppose erroneous tendencies within the Party. We stressed "unity" to the neglect of "struggle." This has been a common occurrence. All of us have done this. What are the mistakes we have made? First, we have done our work passively rather than on our own initiative. The responsibility of the heads of organization departments is to look into and criticize any problematic phenomenon in sight and to warn people against it. This must be done on our own initiative. It will be too late if we delay until pressed from the outside or until the situation degenerates into an uncontrollable mess. Second, we have attached too much importance

to organizational issues and too little to ideological ones. One's shortcomings and mistakes cannot be uprooted unless one discovers their ideological basis. Third, attention has been paid only to the lower ranks. Generally speaking, tendencies among the lower ranks are insignificant and cannot cause big problems. It is also unlikely that the lower ranks will assert independence from the Party. It is of paramount importance to begin with senior cadres in rectifying erroneous tendencies. If the errors of the higher authorities are rectified, it will be much simpler to deal with matters at lower levels. Does this mean that we should disregard minor issues of concern to the lower ranks? No. The minor problems of the lower ranks should also be evaluated, but more attention should be focused on the more important problems facing the higher authorities. Fourth, in the past we paid attention to phenomena individually but failed to generalize on these cases for educational purposes. Comrades on the CPC Central Committee and in particular Chairman Mao are exceptions in that they always make a point of using individual cases for educational purposes.

All the above errors and shortcomings are manifestations of liberalism. Is liberalism good? Of course not, because it encourages errors. It can only bring harm both to individuals and to the Party. Then, in what way can we overcome liberalism? First, we must have a keen sense of smell as Chairman Mao has told us, and sniff out problems on our own initiative. Second, communists should take a clear-cut stand in approaching problems and should not try to play it safe. Third, we must always resolutely oppose erroneous tendencies. As long as we persist in doing so, we will be able to correct them gradually. Fourth, we should emphasize the importance of discipline. We should be strict but fair in meting out rewards and punishments in order to help comrades correct their mistakes and encourage those who have proceeded correctly to make further progress.

ON TWO TENDENCIES AMONG THE PARTY'S LITERARY AND ART WORKERS

March 10, 1943

Comrades,

You are now going to work among the masses, so I have come to bid you farewell. Literary and art workers of our Party have done a great deal of good work over the past decade, making an important contribution to the Chinese revolution and Chinese culture. This cannot and should not be denied. But I don't intend to dwell on that today. Rather, I should like to say something about two tendencies, or two shortcomings, found among our literary and art workers. Comrades, I hope you will consider whether my opinions are correct. What are these two shortcomings? One is seeking special treatment and the other is being conceited. I think both of these things are bad and should be eliminated. Or to put it more positively, I hope none of you will seek special treatment or become conceited.

I shall first discuss why we should not seek special treatment. Are there comrades working in the fields of literature and art—or more broadly, in the field of culture—who feel that as men of letters, they should not be lumped together with other Party members but should have a special relationship with the Party? I think there are. Not only do they regard themselves as exceptional, but other comrades treat them as if they were. Should such a phenomenon be permitted to continue within the Party? To answer that question we must first find out what qualifications these people have for Party membership. They can be of one of two types. The first type is essentially a man of letters for whom Party membership is a secondary commitment. He joined the Party as a man of letters, not as one of the thousands upon thousands of ordinary members. The second type is a Party member in the true sense of the word, and he is doing cultural work only because of the division of labour within the Party. There may be a third type

Speech delivered at a conference in Yan'an attended by literary and art workers of the Party.

who is 50 percent a man of letters and 50 percent a Party member. However, that would be only a transitional situation, and he would be bound to change into one of the other two types. What are the Party's views on the first two types? There is no question that the Party wants to confirm the attitude of the second and to discourage the attitude of the first. That is the only way it can be a united, militant Party of the proletariat. What would the Party be like if you joined merely in the capacity of a man of letters, and I joined merely as a soldier and somebody else simply as a peasant? It would not be what it is today; it would be just an association of people from all walks of life. A dispute on this question represents a difference in principle. Is the Party a true Communist Party? Are the members true Communists? This is a question of principle. Can there be a compromise? That would mean supporting the establishment of an association of people from all walks of life. So there is no room for compromise.

This being said, are there any differences among Party members? Yes, division of labour entails differences of a kind, but those differences don't mean that anyone is justified in demanding special treatment. In all the 53 articles of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, there is no mention of a change in the status of individual Party members after the division of labour.¹⁷³ Party members are just Party members. Speaking of division of labour, every Party member has a clearly defined responsibility. Has there ever been an "honorary Party member" who was not in charge of some specific work? And is cultural work superior to other types of work? That is not our view. It used to be the view of the literati and high officials, whose ideas might be summed up like this: "Emperors treasure scholars and therefore cause people to be taught from books. All occupations are base, only book-learning is noble."²³¹ In our view all work that is essential to the masses and the revolution is equally valuable, and if it is done well it deserves esteem. If one insists on asking what kind of occupation is the most essential, then we can only say that all work is essential. This answer conforms to realities. But the rank-and-file working people never ask for any special treatment from the Party or the community. If a Party member insists on special treatment, his demand doesn't represent a step forward but a step backward. It means that this Party member, who should be in the vanguard, places himself in the same category as ordinary people outside the Party, and that he regards the Party as simply an association of people from all walks of life. I hope none of our comrades will make such a demand, which only indicates a backward mentality.

Comrades may wonder: then why does the Party have to take into consideration the special characteristics of cultural workers? I think there are

two elements here. One is the nature of their work. Each field of endeavour has its own distinctive features. It would not serve any purpose if military work were performed in the same way as cultural work or vice versa. In cultural work there is a greater need for individual activities. This point is clearly explained in Lenin's "Party Organization and Party Literature."²³² It would be wrong to overlook it. The other element to be considered is that a number of cultural workers have certain failings. Most of them used to work separately, so they had relatively little access to Party education and failed to integrate themselves with workers, peasants and soldiers. As a result, their ideology is flawed. They are always asking others to be charitable and to make allowances for their shortcomings. That's not very nice, is it? That's my first argument against seeking special treatment.

If this first argument is clear, there are two other questions that must be addressed.

The first is: should discipline be observed? Discipline is no problem for the majority of Party members, but it has sometimes been a problem among cultural workers. Since our Party members are not guests who have been invited here to help out—and it's no good inviting guests to help out, they would only add to our problems—they must without exception abide by Article 44 of the Party Constitution: "Strict observance of Party discipline is the supreme obligation of all Party members and Party organizations at all levels." If we did away with discipline the inevitable result would be, in Chairman Mao's words, "the extinction of the Party, national subjugation and self-destruction." Ours is a fighting Party, and in our struggle the only weapon at our disposal is discipline. You may say that the machine-gun is also our weapon, but where did the machine-gun come from? It was obtained in struggle by the masses led by a well disciplined Party. In fact, the more machine-guns we acquire, the more we must rely on discipline. When a company of soldiers are fighting a battle, how can they help losing if one wants to charge this way and another that way and nobody obeys the company commander? If our Party lacks discipline, if controversy drags on endlessly, how can we achieve unity politically, organizationally and in action? How can we avoid the extinction of the Party, national subjugation and self-destruction? Discipline does not mean coercion. Basically, our discipline is observed voluntarily. But what is to be done if, on a given occasion, a Party member chooses to disregard discipline? In that case, coercion of some sort has to be applied. Won't that place restraints on people's ability? I don't think so. Our discipline is meant to restrain only what is non-proletarian and harmful to the revolution, much as the art of swimming restrains a swimmer's motions so that he doesn't drown. Genuine

swimmers feel free in the water and true revolutionaries feel free in disciplined revolutionary movements. If you set out to make revolution but insist on demonstrating your “talent” at the cost of the revolution, then we’ll have to stop you. If you don’t insist on that, you will always feel free. We all acknowledge the ability of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Comrade Mao Zedong, and all of them are models of discipline. So comrades needn’t worry that discipline will inhibit talent.

You comrades are not used to a disciplined life, and yet you are now going to the front or the countryside to work. Is there anything you should particularly bear in mind with regard to observing discipline? I think the important thing is to observe it sincerely and concretely. By doing it sincerely I mean honouring your verbal commitments and matching your words with deeds. It’s not hard to make a pledge at a meeting to observe discipline. But what is required of us is that what we say in private after the meeting should be no different from what we said in public. Moreover, we are required to practise what we preach. By observing discipline concretely I mean observing it under all kinds of circumstances. When we talk about the need to act in conformity with the truth and to subordinate ourselves to the interests of the revolution, there are plenty of people in agreement. When we say we must be obedient to the proletariat, to the Communist Party, the number of people who agree is no smaller. When we go on to say we must obey the orders of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, people still find that acceptable. But when it comes to obeying the Party branch or the immediate superior, that’s another matter. Why? Because some people can only observe discipline in the abstract, not in concrete circumstances. Observing discipline in the concrete requires, among other things, obeying the Party branch or the immediate superior as a matter of course. Even if your immediate superior is less capable than you are, you must still obey his instructions. Without such obedience, our Party would collapse. Because if everyone felt that he was very capable and his opinion was always right, we would end up with everybody being his own boss and obeying no one else’s instructions. Under those circumstances, it would be absolutely impossible to unify the whole Party.

The second question I want to talk about is: is it necessary for comrades involved in cultural work to study Marxism-Leninism and politics as it relates to practical problems? This is not a problem for most Party members, including those who are working in the social sciences, provided they have corrected any tendency towards dogmatism. Among comrades working in literature and art, however, there have always been differences of opinion on the question. Some say that writers and artists don’t need to learn about

politics; others say it may even hamper their work; and still others say nothing at all but just don't bother to study such things. But don't we refer to our work in literature and art as revolutionary? To make sure that it is revolutionary and meets the needs of the masses, we have no alternative but to study revolutionary theory and practice. Strictly speaking, no literature or art can be divorced from politics. For example, there is the question of how to describe the bright and dark sides of life. This is both a political question and an important question in literature. If we don't understand the question correctly, how can we produce works that will reflect a historical era and the struggles of the masses during our times? To say that writers need not study politics is, in effect, to deny that literature and art must serve politics and the masses. Last year Chairman Mao explained this in great detail at a forum on literature and art, and I will not elaborate now.²³³ I just wish to add one point and that is, political studies will help the writer not only to create artistic works but also to strengthen his character. Political studies help us widen our mental horizons and gain perspective. They help us discard pettiness and overcome depression. Some of our comrades are too swayed by their emotions: inspiration comes easily to them when they are glad, but when they are unhappy, they are overwhelmed. When a person is in a mood like that, he can do nothing well and he himself suffers. We are now undertaking a great task—the emancipation of mankind. If a person joins the Party at the age of 20 and his life expectancy is 60, he has only 40 years left to serve the Party's cause, and it's a waste of time and energy for him to be always worrying about trifles. Now that you comrades are about to plunge into practical work, political studies are of immediate importance. To do your work well and to unite closely with the comrades working with you, you need to study politics.

I have been talking about why people shouldn't seek special treatment. Now I want to discuss why they shouldn't be conceited. The two questions are related. If people feel entitled to special treatment, it's because they have too high an opinion of themselves. To combat one attitude we have to combat the other. I don't mean that all our writers and artists are conceited, but certainly some are. This fault can be traced to two sources: an unrealistic evaluation of literary and art work in general and an unrealistic evaluation of one's own accomplishments and capabilities in particular. Let's discuss the two problems separately.

Some comrades feel that they have every reason to be proud of themselves because they have written many articles, painted many pictures, composed many songs or acted in many plays. Is their pride justified? Not in the least. If, as a result of division of labour, a comrade is assigned to do

literary or a art work, he is under an obligation to do his work well. If he fails to do so, he will be considered either negligent of his duties or unqualified for the task assigned to him. In the final analysis, literature and art are a reflection of the life and struggle of the masses. The writer's duty is simply to depict them in literary form. If it weren't for other people's actions, writers would have nothing to portray in their works. Why, then, should those who portray other people's actions be prouder than those who actually perform the actions? There are many events taking place in the world today, great events. An example is the revolution, which is a gigantic event, an undertaking whose goal is the emancipation of the entire human race. Even if writers and artists succeeded in depicting this great undertaking, their contribution to the history of mankind still could not be equated with the revolution itself, not to speak of the fact that they can depict only a tiny part of it. Some comrades feel they have reason to be proud because they have lots of readers and followers. Does that make sense? I'm not sure it does. Why do the masses acclaim a writer? Chiefly because his works reflect their sentiments. So naturally, a revolutionary writer, a writer who sides with the revolutionary masses, is popular with them. If an artist takes this popularity for granted, believing that whatever he produces will always have a following, he is much mistaken. A writer who is moving in the same direction as the masses but not fast enough—let alone one who is moving in the opposite direction—is likely to fade from their memory. Moreover, we have yet to calculate how large a following most of our writers have. It must be acknowledged that their readers constitute only a fraction of the masses. A great deal remains to be done by our writers before they become integrated with the masses. Under these circumstances a writer would do himself much harm if he complacently assumed he already had a large following.

If we should not overestimate the role of literature and art, we should not overestimate the role of individual writers and artists either. I'm afraid not all our comrades engaged in literary and art work can evaluate themselves realistically. Some of them are eager to be called "experts." When people flatter them with the title of "expert" they don't decline it. And when that flattery is not forthcoming, they simply adopt the title themselves. After repeatedly referring to themselves as experts, they come to feel they really are experts and begin to put on airs. But pretensions never do any good, they are just so much baggage. When you have a heavy burden of pride on your back, every step forward is going to be difficult. These comrades overlook a simple truth: "A dish has to be judged by the people who can smell it outside the kitchen." The achievements of any individual must await the judgement of the masses and the test of time; they are not something to be affirmed by

the individual himself. It's not for us to say how knowledgeable we are; that's for other people to judge. Many of our comrades are still young, and their knowledge is quite limited. They call themselves Party members, but they don't know very much about the Party. For example, many comrades don't know enough about how factory workers produce, how peasants farm and carry out the Agrarian Revolution,¹⁵ or how the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army fight battles. They are ignorant not only about the revolution but also about society. Some comrades used to live in Shanghai, but that doesn't mean they are really familiar with the city. We all know there is a stock exchange in Shanghai. But few of these comrades know how the stock exchange works or how the markets of the cotton and cotton-yarn trade operate there.²³⁴ I have been told that when Mao Dun was writing the novel *Midnight* he made frequent visits to the stock exchange.²³⁵ Some of our comrades, even though they may have lived there for seven or eight years, don't know where the rice consumed in Shanghai comes from or how human waste there is disposed of. All this indicates that their knowledge is really meagre. You comrades are very young, and you don't know much. That's why you are not "experts" yet. That is understandable and it's nothing to worry about. What we should worry about is that some comrades don't want to study or to mix with the masses because they are complacent. When they reach the age of 40 or 50 they may find themselves still where they are today, knowing very little and producing no literary works that can be considered truly substantial and mature. Being self-satisfied and unaware of this danger, they are not interested in making progress or soliciting help from others. They fervently advocate criticism and love to criticize others, but they hate to be criticized themselves. Yes, sometimes they do say, "Your criticisms are welcome," but they are just being polite. Whenever a play is put on, before the curtain goes up someone comes out onto the stage and says, "Our play was rehearsed in a hurry, so it will leave much to be desired. We hope you comrades will kindly offer us your criticisms." But is the invitation sincere? Not always. If you really go ahead with your criticism, they cast hateful glances at you. In their hearts, they only want people to speak well of them. As a result, people are made to feel it's better not to go asking for trouble. Since they can't speak like true comrades and tell the artists what's good and what's bad, they just say nothing. If we want to promote the truly comradely attitude, we must encourage self-criticism. Some comrades may think that self-criticism is beneath their dignity. Just the opposite. People who are conceited and seldom criticize themselves are the most likely to lose their dignity, because the bigger they are, the harder they fall. Stalin said, "It is not conceit but modesty that is the adornment of the Bolshevik."²³⁶ Our

Communist Party acts in the light of reality and always speaks the truth. Our comrades in literature and art should likewise work in the light of reality, call a spade a spade and listen to candid advice, because that is essential. It will benefit not only them but the Party and the new literature and art movement as a whole. So much for the two subjects I wanted to take up today. As I have talked exclusively about shortcomings and taken the comradely attitude, what I have said may have been jarring to your ears. But you can tell whether I mean you well or ill. Only some of you have the shortcomings I have described, and even those comrades have many strong points. First and foremost, they stand for light and oppose darkness. They support our workers, peasants and soldiers and oppose aggressors. In this respect the non-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries can never compare with them. With help from the revolutionary communities, our comrades will soon overcome their shortcomings, because they are only temporary ones that have arisen in the course of making revolution or been carried over from the old society. Many of you comrades are highly intelligent. Now that you have participated in the rectification movement²³⁷ and are going to do practical work among the masses, I'm sure you will make rapid progress. I shall be more than pleased if my remarks today are of help to you in that connection.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE SHAANXI-GANSU-NINGXIA BORDER REGION

December 3, 1944

Since 1941 the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been under military and economic blockade. To overcome difficulties and continue the war of resistance, the Central Committee and its Northwest Bureau have made self-reliance the basic principle for financial and economic work here. By adhering to this principle we have already achieved notable successes.

First of all, we have taken measures to develop production in the Border Region as a means of overcoming our financial difficulties. Our troops, government functionaries and students are taking an active part in production. According to statistical reports, 20 million kg. of millet and wheat had been harvested by October, which indicates that this year's target will probably be exceeded. Some army units, government departments, Party organizations and schools have now become totally or partially self-sufficient. A few army units, such as the 359th Brigade, are not only totally self-sufficient but able to supply surplus grain to the government. As a result, the people's burden has been greatly lightened. This year, for example, the amount of grain that had to be supplied to the government by local inhabitants in the Border Region was reduced by 4 million kg. This proves the effectiveness of the measures we've taken and will continue to take in the years to come. Troop training will be stepped up next year, but the army must continue to engage in production, producing enough food for its own consumption for at least eight months.

Our way of solving financial difficulties by developing production is in striking contrast to the method of the Kuomintang authorities, who resolve their financial crisis by increasing the burden on the people. Our method results in ample food and clothing, while theirs results in the impoverishment

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Second Session of the Second Consultative Council of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The speech was first published in *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an on December 7, 1944. At the time, Comrade Chen Yun was deputy director of the Northwest China Financial and Economic Office.

of the people and depletion of the country's financial resources. Naturally, the Chinese people can tell which method is good and which bad, which one should be accepted and which rejected.

Our efforts to develop the economy and to become self-sufficient in industrial production have also been very successful. Because we have provided agricultural loans,²³⁸ rewarded refugees who have come to the Border Region to develop farm production²³⁹ and promoted labour exchange,²⁴⁰ peasants in the Border Region have reaped a harvest of more than 20 million kg of millet and wheat. When this amount is added to the output of army units, government departments, Party organizations and schools, the total increase will come to more than 40 million kg., valued at approximately 10 billion yuan in Border Region currency.²⁴¹ Thanks to the incentives offered to cotton growers and our encouragement of spinning and weaving, we have this year collected 1.5 million kg. of cotton, which can be turned into 1.5 million bolts of cloth. Because we have made vigorous efforts to develop industries under public, private and joint ownership, we have produced large quantities of daily necessities, such as cigarettes, towels, socks, matches, pig-iron products, soap, paper, salt, porcelain and chemical products. This year our imports from other areas of the country, including imports of cotton, will have been reduced by a total of 30 billion yuan in Border Region currency. This means that a fundamental change has been wrought in the economic status of the Border Region, and our capabilities in the war of resistance have been greatly increased. It is particularly noteworthy that all this has been achieved despite the war and the tight blockade imposed on the Border Region.

We should not be complacent, however, but must continue our efforts. We must strive for total self-sufficiency in cotton, which will require an annual output of 2.25 million kg., and in essential industrial products. Were it not for the enemy blockade, the Border Region could increase its revenues by tens of billions annually, which could be used to enhance our capabilities in the war of resistance. We demand that the Kuomintang immediately lift the blockade on the Border Region and that its government and supreme command, which are pursuing a policy detrimental to the nation, be reorganized at once.

Our policy is to supervise import, protect export and expand internal trade. This is to ensure that in spite of the tight blockade, we can transport products of the Border Region (chiefly salt) to other areas in exchange for essential goods and materials (cloth and other things), which are needed not only for the war of resistance but also for the people's everyday life. This policy is also aimed at supporting Border Region industries and helping the

Border Region market to flourish. The Kuomintang authorities have tried a thousand and one ways to embargo our salt exports. On June 26 of this year *Republic Daily*, a Kuomintang paper in Ningxia, had the impudence to slander us by calling salt exported from the Border Region “contraband salt from a treacherous party.” The salt produced by the toil of people of the Border Region and transported across long distances by carriers is sold at only 31.04 yuan per kilogramme (the average price between January 1 and December 5 of this year), and yet the Kuomintang authorities, reaping what they never sowed, extort as much as 28.06 yuan per kilogramme as “payment for the use of the road” (the so-called salt tax). Not content with that, they also engage in gratuitous vilification. This is really outrageous. We ask: when we supply salt to the people in the Great Rear Area in exchange for items needed for everyday life and for the war effort, why do the Kuomintang authorities go out of their way to sabotage our work? Is that what they call “putting the interests of the nation above everything else?” Inside the Border Region, trade is completely free, and our external trade is basically free as well. (It is only because of the blockade that the government keeps a monopoly on salt to ensure sufficient quantities for export.) Under the leadership of the Border Region government, our trade companies and salt-marketing companies are doing everything they can to protect the interests of the local population, especially of the salt producers and carriers. They are doing their best to keep prices and markets stable, to purchase the most essential goods from other areas, to block the import of luxuries and to help expand production and trade in the Border Region. Their function is entirely different from that of the Kuomintang agencies for monopolized purchasing and marketing. The function of those agencies is to enable a few people to get rich by hoarding and speculating, jacking up prices and bleeding the people’s enterprises white.

Organizing co-operatives serves an important purpose. Through the co-operatives people in the Border Region can organize themselves to develop production and transportation, expand internal trade and undertake numerous welfare projects. Our policy for the development of co-operatives is correct and we must adhere to it, but we still have some shortcomings in this regard. For example, people are sometimes compelled to buy shares; also, some of the co-operative directors are unqualified or incompetent and have failed to exercise effective leadership. These shortcomings must be overcome. The government of the Border Region provides assistance to all undertakings, be they under public, private or joint ownership, so long as they help to develop the economy. Meanwhile, it offers preferential treatment to co-operatives, particularly in the form of tax reduction. It is hoped that people

from all walks of life will take an active part in co-operative undertakings.

In recent years, thanks to our success in developing production, increasing agricultural and industrial output, promoting trade and improving financial management, the finances of the Border Region have remained basically sound and prices have remained stable. The situation will further improve if bigger advances are made in production.

To build our strength and prepare for a counter-offensive against the aggressors, we must increase production, practise economy, reduce unnecessary expenditures and foster among the people the virtue of protecting public property.

Finally, I hope you members of the Council will offer criticisms and suggestions on our financial and economic work. Let us make a concerted effort to build up the Border Region, defeat the Japanese aggressors and reconstruct the whole of China.

HOW TO DO A GOOD JOB IN FINANCIAL WORK

February 1, 1945

I

We have been through several years of economic difficulties and still have many problems to solve. It should be said that comrades in the Department of Finance and its bureaus have been working hard and well. On the other hand, they still have some shortcomings. That is, they have been too passive. When I was in charge of cadre affairs in the Organization Department, I too was guilty of passivity. At that time, I did no more than discharge my day-to-day duties.

Why the passivity? There are three reasons. One is carelessness, another is practical difficulties and still another is a lack of initiative. Carelessness is the first and foremost.

We should have a correct understanding of what mechanical routine is and what it is not. For instance, when a comrade who is in charge of a storehouse gives things out, he has to count up the items. If he is to give out a hundred pairs of shoes, he must make sure it is a hundred pairs, not ninety-nine pairs or one hundred and one. This is not just mechanical routine. When someone comes to get something, the supplier must examine the request and see if he should fill it. Even if a man in a senior political position comes along, the supplier must not give him whatever he asks for without checking. It is true that unlike the duties of the members of the Central Committee or the Political Bureau, who are busy discussing important matters and issuing directives, much of our work is of a very ordinary nature. Nevertheless, it is wrong to say that the necessary small jobs are just so many mechanical routines. No job is a mechanical routine unless you do it carelessly.

The Department of Finance is guilty of a certain degree of carelessness.

Speech made at a meeting held to examine the work of the Department of Finance of the Shaanxi-Guansu-Ningxia Border Region.

You have to know the estimates for overall revenues and expenditures, the major policies, the relative importance of the different items of expenditure, your own receipts and outlays and the resources of other units; otherwise, you have no right to speak and can take no initiative. You also have to know the problems in the companies, regiments and brigades of our army.

Since you are doing financial work, you must make a determined effort to become professionally competent, or you will be in trouble all the time. If you dispense less than the required amount of money or materials, it will not serve the purpose; if you give out more than necessary, it will be a waste. Both ways are wrong. If you do your job badly, you will be criticized at every turn. So you have to avoid being careless in your work. If you don't know what you are doing, you can't take any initiative.

Now, about practical difficulties. We do have some. For instance, some government departments in the localities turn in a pile of vouchers instead of cash, because they have diverted to other uses the revenue that should have been handed over to the Department of Finance. This makes your job as an auditor very difficult. Or you may be afraid of offending the official you are dealing with, because he represents a department at a higher level while you are a member of a small section, or because he's a senior cadre while you are a newcomer. However, if you adhere to principle and perform your duties in a fair and reasonable way, whatever problems there are can be resolved.

The third reason I mentioned for passivity was a lack of initiative. That is a criticism directed towards you all, and you yourselves can decide whether it is justified. I don't mean that you have been idling about. I mean you have not made enough suggestions or posed enough questions to higher authorities. For example, you should have gone to leaders of the Department of Finance, or telephoned the Financial and Economic Office,²⁴² to ask why there was a sudden increase of 3,000 people in logistics departments. Once you have identified a problem, you must investigate the reason for it. The Central Committee has clearly stated that when the instructions you receive from a superior are wrong, you may reject them. This is not an assertion of independence from the leadership, it is a manifestation of initiative.

II

In past years our revenue came from three sources: first and chiefly, from production for our own use; second, from taxes; and third, from the income of trading companies.

This year our revenue will come primarily from taxes. Estimated income includes 3 billion yuan to be collected by the Tax Bureau, 1.2 billion from substitute payments made by local inhabitants for the transport of public salt,²⁴³ 4 billion from salt taxes and 3 billion from trade taxes, totalling 11.2 billion yuan. Revenues from salt taxes and from those collected by the Tax Bureau may be somewhat less than anticipated.

Expenditures will include 3 billion yuan for daily meals and administrative expenses, 3 billion for special expenses,²⁴⁴ 3 billion for operating expenses, and 1 billion for the purchase of bedding, clothing and grain, totalling 10 billion yuan.

Therefore, there is no need for the bank to issue more notes or for other departments to grant subsidies. The crucial point is that we must make every effort to increase revenues and reduce expenditures.

As for reserves, we have four to five months' worth. In other words, if we had to live on them, we could manage for only four or five months. Since reserves are limited, they should not be used carelessly.

With regard to the relationship between budgeting on the one hand and banking and trade on the other, basically the latter should serve the former. This is a major policy. However, there are times when budgeting has to be subordinated to banking and trade. That was what happened in October and November last year. During those two months 400 million yuan in the Kuomintang currency²⁴⁵—equivalent to 3.4 billion yuan of Border Region currency²⁴¹—was spent on unauthorized purchases of gold from outside areas. Who was responsible for this? Some persons in government departments and army units. So first of all you must tighten up fiscal control and stop giving funds to departments and units that have made unauthorized purchases. Next, you must see to it that the salt companies stop hoarding salt. The departments and units affected will complain, but you don't have to worry about that. It's better to put up with some complaints and avert a major crisis. That's the only way to maintain financial stability.

III

To do financial work well, you have to remember the following three points.

First, problems should be addressed but money should not be wasted. You must not fail to help people who are in trouble: on no account should anyone be allowed to starve or freeze to death. Not being wasteful means

spending money sparingly and spending it where it is needed most.

Second, you should take the long view and concentrate our resources rather than dispersing them. Reserves should be set aside for emergencies. If every unit wants to have a surplus, our resources will be scattered. Then in an emergency you will be in an awkward position, having to collect small amounts of surplus grain and clothing scattered here and there. Only if you pool the resources will you be able to meet emergencies. This principle must be adhered to, and you should discuss it with the brigades, regiments and other units, urging them to consider the relationship between the whole and the part. Even if the issue is brought before the Central Committee, you will be able to justify your action.

Third, you have to achieve consensus. In matters concerning revenues and expenditures, there is always a certain conflict between the financial departments on the one hand and government departments, army units and schools on the other. Have you ever heard anyone complain that the budget you approved for his department was too generous? You must reach consensus through democratic consultation. You must explain the policies first to organization leaders and then to people working in the economic field and the masses, so that everyone will agree with them.

What are the guiding principles for our financial work? Production is primary and distribution secondary; revenues are primary and expenditures secondary. With regard to distribution of daily necessities, the army comes first, schools second and government departments third. The reason is that government departments have some material resources of their own and have fewer people. Problems should be addressed in the order of importance.

With respect to items of expenditure, food and fodder are the most important and next comes clothing. If there is enough money, more edible oil and salt should be supplied, so that everyone's diet can be improved. A good diet will help reduce illness. If meals are satisfactory, there will be few complaints. If not, there will be complaints three times a day. Next are expenditures for medical care, administration and recreation. These priorities correspond to the requirements of our daily life.

In view of present conditions in the Border Region, you should do the following when planning government expenditures:

1. Ensure enough supplies of grain and money for daily meals.
2. Economize on the use of cloth for bedding and clothing. Greater emphasis should be placed on winter wear than on summer wear, and old clothes should be recycled to save cloth. They can be made into shoe soles or the lining for cotton-padded coats. It is estimated that this alone could save 600 million yuan a year.

3. Stop building and decorating houses so that you'll have enough funds for administrative work and recreational activities.

4. Help both publicly and privately owned enterprises to develop production. However, to prevent waste you should see to it that investment in any given enterprise does not exceed one-third of its original capital.

5. Normally, try to make sure that sufficient funds are available to cover regular expenses. In an emergency, however, priority should be given to the provision of food and clothing.

6. Plan for the long term. When planning the distribution of bedding and clothing, for example, you should anticipate the needs over the next few years. In planning the distribution of grain, you should take into consideration the total amount that will be available next year and the year after.

IV

Should we act like bank managers or simply like tellers? All comrades, from bureau directors to section chiefs and section members, should act like managers. Everyone should have as strong a sense of responsibility as if he were in charge. This is not a minor matter: it is a question of whether we keep control of the financial situation or get into serious trouble.

Tell the truth. Give a definite answer, "yes" or "no." At first people may think you are stingy—never mind about that. It's no disgrace to count money in front of your comrades. What should not be given out must be resolutely withheld. You should not promise what you cannot deliver, and a promise made should generally be kept. However, if you have made a promise when you should not have done so, and keeping it could have an adverse effect on the overall situation, it is quite right to withdraw it.

Check the validity of requests carefully. As the saying goes, you can find fishbones in a piece of beancurd if you look hard enough. Business accounting and auditing demand attention to detail. Naturally, when goods are scarce our work is difficult, but even when goods are abundant we may still have trouble if we give people whatever they ask for without looking into each request carefully. Because there is no limit to the requests. If you ease up on your control of funds, people will come to you oftener and ask for more each time.

Anyway, you must take care to go through your account books and check every item, as if you were trying to find fault with someone else's work. That is the responsible attitude: it shows you have a sense of responsibility for the revolution.

SEEK TRUTH, NOT REPUTATION

May 9, 1945

If you were to ask me whether I had anything to tell you now that I have been director of the Organization Department for several years, I would say yes, I do have something I want to say. I'm going to leave the department and Comrade Peng Zhen will be taking over.²⁴⁶ He asked me that question one day when we were in Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi's room, and I told him about the number of Party members and cadres, about the Party forms²¹⁵ they had filled out and about the pamphlets that had been published. But that's not what I want to do today; I want to talk about something else. I think I ought to share with you fellow delegates to this Party Congress something that has come to my attention. I'll leave it to you to consider if what I say is correct: if not, you can refute it point by point.

Over the past seven years I have noticed that some cadres in the Party are quite conceited. Have I had dealings with a great number of cadres in my work during that time? No. Have I been to north China? To central China? Or to the Great Rear Area? No, I have not been to any of those places. But a lot of "pilgrims" have come from those places to Yan'an. In my contacts with these comrades I have become aware that many of them like other people to speak well of them but don't like it when they are criticized. Some can only stand being promoted, not demoted. They claim credit for any accomplishments and dodge responsibility for any mistakes. When there is a success, they attribute it to their own efforts, but if you criticize them when something goes wrong, they are always ready with excuses to show it wasn't their fault. They are pleased when people say they should be given credit and displeased when people say they should be held accountable for their mistakes. Some of our cadres tend to be that way.

Now, let me give definite answers to some questions. Are cadres in our

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Party's Seventh National Congress. Comrade Chen Yun was reelected member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at its First Plenary Session held on June 19, 1945. In August of the same year he was appointed alternate member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.

Party basically good or bad? They are basically good. Are they basically Bolsheviks? Yes, but they have some shortcomings. Has there been any improvement since the Party's rectification movement?²³⁷ Yes, marked improvement, but there are still cadres who have the attitude I've just described. One reason is that not all cadres have participated in the rectification movement. In fact, it's not just three or four of them who have not taken part in the movement, but a considerable number. You might ask if it's the military cadres or the civilian cadres who have not done so. I'd say both, but mostly the military cadres—that's my own judgement.

Conceited cadres can be found at all levels, including the top. The conceit of low-ranking cadres and high-ranking cadres is the same in nature, but I think it differs in degree. The load of pride carried by low-ranking cadres is a light one. It's like a company commander's pack that contains only a sheet, two pairs of shoes, a packet of tooth powder and a toothbrush. Is it good to carry around a burden like that? Not so good, even if it's only a small one. But the burden of pride carried around by a big shot in the Party or the army is like his heavy pack, which contains a quilt, or maybe two, a mattress and a blanket. And his luggage consists of suitcases of all sizes. High-ranking cadres are in more danger of becoming conceited than low- and medium-ranking ones. The burden I've been talking about consists of the pride mixed in with their communist ideas. How did it happen that they came to think so well of themselves? Well, they thought they had rendered great services to the revolution. Otherwise, they would have had no grounds for pride. A person becomes conceited because he believes he has contributions to his credit.

Here, in passing, I should like to give my views on contributions and mistakes. Assuming that you are working under the leadership of the Party and that you have been quite successful, how would you analyse your success? As I see it, there are three factors involved. First comes the strength of the people; second, the leadership of the Party; and third and last the effort you have made. Can this order be reversed so that you come first, the Party second and the people third? I don't think so. Why? Why must the people come first? I think it's obvious. I believe it is wrong for any hero to think: "If I didn't make revolution, the people would never be emancipated. Without me the people and the Party would be in real trouble." Would the revolution come to a halt if this hero passed away? Would the people just stop making revolution? They would continue to make revolution and the Party would continue its advance. So it is not the heroes but the people who come first.

Next comes the Party. We must not underestimate its role. Take the

army for example. It sometimes loses battles, but it will never be crushed. Let me tell you about my personal experience. What you hear is not reliable, but what you see with your own eyes is. During the long march the Fifth Army Group had to fight every day for a hundred straight days, until it seemed they could fight no more.⁶² Marching torch in hand to light the way, the troops looked exhausted. However, when they were ordered into action again, they unhesitatingly threw the torches away and plunged into battle to hold the enemy at bay. Those who were captured by the enemy found their way back one by one. Though life was hard on the Long March, no one wanted to leave, they all wanted to stay with us. That's because they were troops of the Communist Party. It is both easy and not easy to lead such troops. It is not easy because everyone follows revolutionary principles, and you cannot resort to coercion and commandism. It is easy because everyone is politically aware and conscientiously gives his utmost. In other armies if a company regiment or division commander defects, he has no difficulty getting his men to go with him. But not so with our troops. If a commander tries to defect, his men simply refuse to follow him. They may even kill him. There have been many such cases. What is the force at work here? The strength of the Party. Wherever the Communist Party goes, it is welcomed by the people, and the first thing they ask you is whether you belong to the Eighth Route Army. What does that mean? It means the people support the Communist Party. Because they are poor, they want to be emancipated, to overthrow the landlords and redistribute the land; they want some form of communal ownership of the land and other property. That's why they are for the Communist Party. What is at work is not the force of any individual but the force of the Party and the influence of its minimum and maximum programmes. Although we took the wrong political line during the later stage of the Civil War, we were still popular with the people. I am not saying this to defend the erroneous line, I am simply stating the facts. The people do not think of you as followers of a dogmatic line; in their eyes you are Communists, the Communist Party, trying to overthrow the landlords and redistribute land and working in the interest of the masses. All this shows that our Party has great strength. Therefore, the people come first, next comes the Party and lastly the individual.

Still, it would be wrong of me to deny the role of the individual. If the individual were of no importance, what would be the point of our supporting Chairman Mao? In my opinion, the individual does have a role to play, and sometimes a very important one. This is based on facts. Except for a handful of reactionaries, everyone, Chinese or foreign, has praised Chairman Mao for his leadership. However, in the final analysis it is the people and the

Communist Party that count. If what I have said is true, can someone who has worked a long time and done fairly well claim to have a lot of accomplishments to his credit? I don't think so. The right approach would be to say: in response to the people's revolutionary demands, under the leadership of the Party and in accordance with objective conditions, I have done my job without making too many mistakes. It is rare for a person to achieve 100 percent of what is objectively possible. More often than not, owing to his own weaknesses, he only achieves 80, 60 or 50 percent. So what is there to be conceited about? Then there is the situation in which because of a person's own weaknesses, he achieves very little while revealing many shortcomings. In spite of favourable objective conditions, perhaps only 10 or 20 percent of his work is successful and 80 or 90 percent is mistakes. In this case he has no achievement to his credit but he has many faults, so there is no ground for conceit at all. I think this is the right way to look at the matter. We really cannot afford to overestimate the role of the individual, giving it more than its due.

You should be on your guard when, out of personal regard for you, other comrades compliment you on your work. See that you do not relax your effort when others sing your praises. If you do, you will trip and fall. When is that likely to happen? We found out during the Long March: at first people were careful about every step they took for fear of falling. But once they become over-confident because they had never had an accident on the march, they soon found themselves stumbling and falling. So you must be on your guard when others speak well of you. You must ask yourself whether you are really as good as they say, recognize that you probably aren't and not let yourself be carried away. There are quite a few people in the Party who believe that their role as individuals is enormous, greater than that of the people and the Party. In the end such people stumble and fall headlong, never to rise again. So far as I know, the two most conspicuous examples are Chen Duxiu¹⁸⁶ and Zhang Guotao.¹⁴³ Chen was a very important person during the Great Revolution,²⁰³ when he was the acknowledged leader of the Party. And Zhang Guotao, who had been Chairman of the Border Region for a time, was called Chairman Zhang. But once they forsook the people and the Party, they were worthless. In the early days of the Qjng Dynasty, before solid coins came into use, people used little coins with holes in them, strung on hemp.²⁴⁷ Were they worth one of those? Not even that. What has become of them now? Chen Duxiu is dead. He lost the people's support because he organized a group of liquidationists to oppose us. Was this the same man as the Chen Duxiu of the Great Revolution days? One and the same. But in the beginning people supported him as their leader, while at

the end nobody paid any attention to him. Zhang Guotao, who used to be Chairman Zhang, is now an enemy agent. He still has some support: from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but not from the people. Didn't he have a very large faction? Yes, in the huge Fourth Front Army.⁶⁵ But when he defected, he was alone. The cadres all deserted him and his bodyguard returned to Yan'an. He left all alone in the drizzling rain during the festival to honour the dead. That should be a lesson to us. Every individual has his own role to play in the revolution, but he should not overestimate that role. We must remember that nobody who divorces himself from the people and from the Party will accomplish anything. To whom should we attribute our achievements? First and foremost, to the people, who want revolution. We as Party members have done our bit in accordance with the demands of the people and under the leadership of the Party. That's all there is to it. There is no reason to be conceited about that.

With regard to mistakes, I don't think people to the wrong thing only because they have taken a wrong stand or had wrong ideas. It can also be because they have not correctly understood objective reality. That has often happened in the past and it will happen again. When people say, "Old friend, you are wrong," you shouldn't feel embarrassed or chagrined. Of course it's not good to make mistakes, but it's not that bad if you take a correct attitude. Suppose you have made some mistakes and other people have pointed them out. If you seek their advice and ask their opinions before you set about correcting the mistakes, you won't make so many in future. We should seek truth, not reputation. We should make no bones about our mistakes and rectify them as we are required to do. Sometimes the harder you try to save face, the more likely you are to lose face. If you're not afraid of losing face, if you're not worried about your reputation but are only concerned with correcting your mistakes, then you will be able to save some face. When we Communists joined the revolution, we forsook everything and committed ourselves to serving the revolution even at the cost of our lives. Why then should we worry about so small a thing as reputation? We should cast that concern aside, seek truth and do whatever is beneficial to the people and to the revolution? We bear heavy responsibilities. If you're always worrying about your reputation, it will be hard for you to discuss issues objectively. You will approach them from a personal point of view. You will support an opinion only when it serves your purpose and enhances your reputation; otherwise, you'll discount it. If you approach everything from the point of view of personal reputation and examine all questions with a view to your personal interests, it will be impossible for you to see things clearly or to find the truth. An incorrect stand like that can only result in

harm to yourself and to others. Some mistakes stem from a wrong assessment of objective reality. For instance, if, because of faulty intelligence, we mistake a powerful enemy for a weak one, we may end up losing the battle. That sort of thing has happened in the past and no doubt it will happen again. No one can avoid that kind of mistake.

Why have I spent so much time on a question like this at the Seventh National Congress?²⁴⁸ Because I felt I had to. Having been director of the Organization Department for seven years, I have noted this problem and I thought it necessary to discuss it with you. I hope my fellow delegates will consider what I have said and decide how much of it is right and how much of it is wrong, or if it's 100 percent right or 100 percent wrong. If it's wrong, you can object to it point by point. But if the problem I've raised really exists, then I hope you will try to solve it. We are now at a critical moment. In his report Chairman Mao pointed out that in view of the current situation in China and in the rest of the world, we are now on the eve of a decisive battle. Our goal is to liberate all of China, to enlist the people across the country in an effort to take political power into their own hands. We are determined to achieve this goal, and we shall begin right away. It is precisely for this purpose that the Seventh National Congress has been convened. The task facing the whole Party is to increase its strength. To this end we must do a lot of things. We must expand the liberated areas and reduce the enemy-occupied areas. As far as individuals are concerned, they too have to both expand and reduce. By expanding I mean studying, and by reducing I mean getting the "load" off their backs. That's as good as increasing their strength. And the increase will be immeasurable. If all our comrades are upright, realistic and completely free from conceit, we will be as powerful as a hundred thousand troops or a million; we will constitute an invincible force.

Comrades, the Chinese Communist Party is a Party with an army. Making revolution consists of civilian work and military work; right now the military work—or armed struggle—is paramount. Since the army is wielding the gun, it needs a high degree of organization, and its cadres, the senior ones in particular, have very heavy responsibilities. Can all 450 million people be emancipated? Will their emancipation come soon or late? Will it cost a few hundred thousand lives less or a few hundred thousand lives more? People in the entire country are pinning their hopes on our Party and on our senior cadres. If we do a good job, victory will come relatively soon and so will the emancipation of the people. If we do a poor job, the 450 million people will not be emancipated soon, victory in the revolution will be delayed by a good many years and many more people will lose their lives. If that

happens, we will be letting the people down. The fate of the Chinese revolution depends on the quality of the Party's work. Communists are sent by the people to make revolution on their behalf and to lead them to emancipation. Shouldering such responsibilities, we cannot afford to fail, because failure will affect not just one or two individuals but all the 450 million people in the country. We must dedicate ourselves to the cause and rid ourselves of all bad traits. We must try to fulfil our responsibility to the people and not dodge it. People say that Communists are worthy sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. Whether we deserve that title depends on how we meet our responsibilities. We must never forget that.

Let me repeat that our comrades are in the main Bolsheviks and good Communists. What I have been saying is that even some good comrades have certain shortcomings—conceit, for example—and it is time they remedied them. During the Civil War there was a pamphlet entitled *The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, which was no good.²⁴⁹ We must cast off the burden of conceit and struggle for a genuine Bolshevization to strengthen ourselves and to strengthen the Party.

SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING OUR WORK IN MANCHURIA

November 30, 1945

1. The presence of Soviet forces obviously has a decisive impact on our strategy in Manchuria.²⁵⁰ From the events of the last three months it is clear that Soviet policies in Manchuria boil down to two things: to turn over to the Kuomintang the three major cities (Shenyang, Changchun and Harbin) and the trunk line of the Changchun Railway,²⁵¹ and to help us expand our forces in Manchuria. The Soviet Union has adopted those policies primarily for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East and the world. The extent to which it implements the Sino-Soviet agreements²⁵² and the extent to which it assists us may vary with changes in international and domestic conditions and with the tactical requirements of struggle, but its policy will remain essentially the same.

2. With the active support of the United States, the Kuomintang troops have now occupied places along the line from Shanhaiguan to Jinzhou. Although the Kuomintang is in an extremely difficult position, its troops are massed and poised for an advance on the three major cities and the trunk line of the Changchun Railway. The Soviet Union requires us not only to withdraw our troops from those cities but also to relinquish the political power we have already taken over there and to drop any measures we have instituted that hinder its implementation of the Sino-Soviet agreements. It must insist on these things in order to honour the agreements, and we should understand that. Instead of completing their withdrawal by the end of November as originally planned, the Soviet troops are now returning to Manchuria. This is both to ensure that the three major cities and the trunk line are officially handed over to the Kuomintang and to provide a powerful

Telegram drafted by Comrade Chen Yun on behalf of himself, Gao Gang and Zhang Wentian, to be sent to the Northeast Bureau and transmitted to the CPC Central Committee. Comrade Chen Yun was then member of the Northeast Bureau, secretary of the Sub-bureau of Northern Manchuria of the CPC Central Committee as well as political commissar of the Northern Manchuria Military Area.

backup force to prevent American forces from penetrating Manchuria.

3. In view of the situation described above, we must admit that at present it is impossible for us to occupy Manchuria by first taking the three major cities and the trunk line ourselves. Therefore, our basic strategy now should be not to focus all our attention on the three cities but, if possible, to concentrate some of our armed forces to attack the Kuomintang troops in Jinzhou and Shenyang, so as to gain time. Meanwhile, we should dispatch the rest of our forces and cadres, swiftly but in an orderly way, to strategic points in northern Manchuria,²⁵³ eastern Manchuria²⁵⁴ and western Manchuria,²⁵⁵ including small and medium-sized cities, feeder railways and certain places in the vast rural areas. These troops should try to clean out reactionary armed forces and bandits, liquidate traitors, fully mobilize the masses, expand the army and remould the local regimes so as to build stable base areas all around the three cities and along both sides of the trunk line. Before we can achieve an overall advantage in the protracted struggle against the Kuomintang, we must fight battles and build base areas in order to encircle and wipe out the enemy in the big cities and to make pincer attacks on the trunk line.

4. Right now we must unhesitatingly withdraw from the three cities, although afterwards we can continue our work there as appropriate. We must work in close co-operation with the Soviet army, try to obtain a continuous supply of funds and matériel and call a halt to our Leftist measures, so that the Soviet Union will not encounter additional difficulties when dealing with the Kuomintang and will be able to increase its assistance to us. Arrangements should be made in advance for work in those cities after the Soviet troops have withdrawn and the Kuomintang troops have arrived. For example, we should prepare to launch mass movements, set up newspapers, recruit skilled people, solicit funds and materials, infiltrate the Kuomintang and all other legal organizations and combine our open and secret work properly. At present, the aim of urban work in Manchuria is not to establish political power there but to accelerate the building of a large number of base areas.

5. We foresee that sooner or later the Soviet army will turn over to the Kuomintang Harbin and some major cities along the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria. Since northern Manchuria is the rear of southern Manchuria,²⁵⁶ we believe we should concentrate on building bases in the vast rural areas, in small and medium-sized cities and along the feeder railways. Such bases can be set up, for example, around Zhuhe²⁵⁷ and Mudanjiang, around Jiamusi and Yilan, around Suihua and Bei'an, around Taonan,²⁵⁸ Zhaodong, Zhaozhou and Zhaoyuan and around Neihe and Longjiang. We must take the initiative and transfer our troops, cadres, funds and materials

to those areas to establish positions from which we can advance and to which we can retreat.

6. We believe there are many conditions that favour the Party's achieving a dominant position in Manchuria. Among others, the assistance provided by the Soviet army. To achieve that position, however, we shall have to wage a hard struggle against the Kuomintang. We must disabuse our cadres of the notion that we could take all of Manchuria without much of a fight and that they can pin all their hopes on Soviet assistance; otherwise, they may become unduly optimistic if that assistance increases or pessimistic if it decreases. We must pay serious attention to the tendency towards pleasure-seeking and corruption that some cadres may develop after entering the cities. At the same time, we must try to prevent our cadres from becoming confused ideologically or in action, if the Kuomintang troops advance on us after they enter key cities. Cadres should be urged to adapt their working methods to the new situation and tasks in the new areas and not to mechanically apply outmoded experience gained in the old liberated areas. Political education and the teaching of discipline must be intensified in the army units so that they will establish closer ties with the people. We must make sure that the cadres coming from outside form good relations with the local ones and that the latter are given systematic training to make them more capable.

7. The greatest obstacle to the rapid building of base areas in northern Manchuria is a shortage of experienced troops. As of now, we have only 1,500 battle-seasoned troops, but there are already 25,000 new recruits, and we are expecting many more of them and also weapons. If in the next three months the Northeast Bureau can move four enlarged regiments from southern Manchuria to northern Manchuria, we will then have an effective fighting unit of 50,000 men. Without the southern regiments, however, the existing troops, although they are many, will have little combat effectiveness and might prove unreliable. Recently Binxian and Bei'an were taken by Chiang Kai-shek's bandit troops, and some of our new troops defected. We must therefore be extremely vigilant. There will no doubt be more serious defections once the Kuomintang enters northern Manchuria.

The above points are very important to the rapid construction of base areas. We hope that the Northeast Bureau will assist us in that endeavour. Please pass this telegram on to the Central Committee.

PROGRESS IN THE BUILDING OF BASE AREAS IN NORTHERN MANCHURIA²⁵³

April 20, 1946

1. The Kuomintang has taken over the two cities of Harbin and Qiqihar. With the exception of the five counties of Mohe, Oupu, Huma, Qike and Wuyun²⁵⁹ in Heilongjiang Province²⁶⁰ and the two counties of Tongjiang and Baoqing in Hejiang Province, all of which are still occupied by bandits and into which we are moving to wipe the bandits out, all counties in the five provinces of Nenjiang, Heilongjiang, Hejiang, Songjiang and Mudanjiang²⁶¹ are in our hands. Democratic provincial governments have already been set up in Nenjiang, Heilongjiang, Hejiang and Mudanjiang, and a people's congress is being held in Songjiang Province to elect one. New governments have also been formed in the vast majority of counties on the basis of preliminary elections. Village governments have been changed in only a few cases.

2. Since August 15th²⁶² all the remaining bandits in northern Manchuria have been political bandits.²⁶³ Only the seven counties mentioned, in Heilongjiang and Hejiang, are still in their hands.

Now that they have suffered heavy casualties, most of the bandits are lying low. About ten gangs of 200 to 300 men each and four or five larger ones of more than 500 each are still fleeing in various directions. Three to four thousand bandits have fled to Harbin and Qiqihar. Whether there is war or peace in the Northeast, there is no doubt that the Kuomintang will use the remaining bandits to harass northern Manchuria. Our vigorous conduct of the campaign to exterminate bandits has resulted in the recovery of a large number of county seats and has helped increase the combat effectiveness of our new troops.

3. Of the 65 counties in northern Manchuria, 58 are already in our

Report from the Sub-bureau of Northern Manchuria to the Northeast Bureau and the Central Committee. Comrade Chen Yun then held, among others, the post of secretary of the Sub-bureau.

hands. Peasants have been mobilized in 16 of them. In the counties of Binxian, Ning'an, Mulan, Fangzheng and Tonghe intensive mobilization is under way, while in others the effort has just started. The peasant struggle at present takes the form of the "movement to settle accounts."²⁶⁴ At the same time, land that was seized by the reclamation teams of the puppet Manzhouguo regime, by the Manchuria Reclamation Corporation of Japan and by Chinese collaborators²⁶⁵ is being redistributed among the peasants, rents are being reduced and wages increased. That has to be done because peasant cannot achieve emancipation economically through "settling accounts" alone. Many of the people in northern Manchuria came from Shandong and Hebei provinces to reclaim wasteland, and quite a few of them have become big tenant farmers and sub-landlords who lease land and sub-let it. Hired labourers and casual workers account for 60 percent of the peasants. Unless we meet the demands of these 60 percent, we cannot win the support of the majority. Right now their chief demands are that all land formerly seized by Manzhouguo's reclamation teams and by Japan's Manchuria Reclamation Corporation be redistributed, that landlords be made to rent land to them, that rents be reduced and that the government assist by redistributing farm implements and oxen. In northern Manchuria the landlords' armed forces are everywhere, and they usually operate in collaboration with bandits. If the peasants are not armed, they will not have the courage to fight. Our policy is to arm the peasants as soon as possible after economic struggles are launched and to supply them with weapons captured from the landlords' armed forces and from bandits. Once the peasants are armed, economic struggles should be intensified. To put it briefly, the policy is to launch economic struggle, arm the peasants and then expand economic struggle. Now in Binxian there is a self-defence corps composed of 1,000 peasants with 700 rifles captured from landlords. There the self-defence corps has in fact become the supreme power in the area, and similar corps are being organized in other counties. The degree to which the peasants are armed should be the measure of the degree to which they have been mobilized. After four and a half months of our efforts to suppress bandits and to organize mass movements, the peasants in northern Manchuria have come to see that the Communist Party is helping them and that the return of the Kuomintang, which is working hand in glove with the puppet troops and bandits, would bring them nothing good. People are generally impressed by our strict discipline and plain living. Most of the people who visit Harbin from surrounding counties have a good word to say about our army. Very few of them have complained.

4. We have also been successful in recruiting students. Twelve hundred

college and high school students have joined the army or departments in charge of mass movements. County high schools in Songjiang Province have all reopened. It would have been difficult to enrol students in the training corps of the Military and Political School at the outset. For the time being, therefore, our policy is for the counties to run short-term training courses that last a couple of weeks, and then to organize their graduates into work teams and send them to work among the peasants. That has proved highly effective. Party members experienced in the student movement should be sent to work among the students and to win over progressive teachers. It doesn't cost much to reopen the high schools, and the population will be generally sympathetic to the measure. That is the fundamental way of winning over large numbers of students.

5. As of the end of February, new Party members in the army and the localities in northern Manchuria totalled only 1,000, with those in the army accounting for 60 percent. We are cautious about admitting Party members. In the army, new Party members must be those who have been through combat or the struggle against hidden traitors and defectors. As for peasants, only those who have stood the test of struggle are chosen for admission. We expect greater progress in admitting new members beginning from March.

6. We have made the following preparations for an assault on Harbin. The main force of the 359th Brigade and the Songjiang Unit, totalling 11,000 men, have reached the suburbs. Our troops have been garrisoned in seven of the ten districts of the city, because Soviet troops have not yet withdrawn from the other three—Nangang, Daoli and Daowai. The 1,500 men dispatched from Bei'an are now massed at Songpu.²⁶⁶ Thanks to our efforts, well-known figures from all walks of life and major mass organizations in Harbin have published on open telegram demanding that the Kuomintang halt its northward march, and they are going to ask the people's self-defence corps to enter the city to maintain public order.²⁶⁷ The Kuomintang, for its part, is trying to retain its municipal government. All our preparations are based on the plan to take the city by armed force, and we shall refuse to discuss the possibility of retaining the puppet municipal government. The attack on Harbin should not be approached lightly, but the conquest of the city is virtually assured.

7. As a result of our work over the past eight months, we have gained the initiative in northern Manchuria. From September through November last year, when we remained in the big cities trying to expand our armed forces, our troops defected in several counties, and bandits of the Chiang Kai-shek clique attacked us on all sides. That was partly because we were not sufficiently on guard against the scheme devised by the Kuomintang and the

remaining forces of the puppet regime in Manchuria²⁶⁸ to encourage people to join the Eighth Route Army and then defect to the Central Army,²⁶⁹ and partly because we did not have enough cadres and battle-seasoned troops in northern Manchuria. From December last year to late January this year, however, we concentrated on gaining control of our troops at the company level and consolidating the army units, at the same time organizing mobile forces for offensives against the enemy. We were thus able to hold our ground and move from a passive, defensive position to an active, offensive one. When our main forces arrived between February and mid-March, we waged a war against the bandits throughout northern Manchuria, recapturing 22 county seats. Our great success in suppressing bandits made it possible to initiate the peasant movement. But in Heilongjiang and Hejiang the movement has just started, because not nearly enough cadres have come to northern Manchuria to do local work here.

8. It is imperative to turn northern Manchuria into a great rear area and the most stable base area of the entire Northeast. We have three tasks at hand: 1) We must continue to take vigorous action to clean out remaining bandits. 2) We must consider mobilization of the masses the key to success in all our endeavors. To meet the demands of hired labourers and casual workers, who make up 60 percent of the rural population, we are going to adopt the following measures: redistribute to peasants who have little or no land all the land formerly seized by Manzhouguo's reclamation teams, by Japan's Manchuria Reclamation Corporation and by Chinese collaborators; increase the wages in kind of hired labourers or reduce their rents; and help casual workers to rent land from landlords and big tenant farmers. 3) Make northern Manchuria a training base and a source of reinforcements. Not only must the army be constantly expended so as to replenish the ranks in southern Manchuria,²⁵⁶ but highly combat-ready units must also be formed to replenish the main force.

We hope the Northeast Bureau will do the following three things to help us accomplish these tasks: 1) Transfer some of the cadres in southern and western Manchuria²⁵⁵ to northern Manchuria to strengthen the local authorities and the work in the big cities and to keep control of railways, mines and factories. 2) Send military cadres and army instructors to northern Manchuria to expand the army and train troops in the provinces, and send enough cadres to organize ten replacement regiments, in order to prepare for a steady march south. 3) Increase the number of leaders in the Sub-bureau of Northern Manchuria so as to provide more effective leadership.

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS IN NORTHEAST CHINA

July 7, 1946

1. In August of last year the courageous Soviet Red Army came to China and launched an attack on the Japanese aggressors. Our Northeast Democratic United Army²⁷⁰ and the people of northeast China joined with the Red Army in the fight to wipe out the Japanese aggressors and the puppet Manzhouguo regime,²⁶⁸ thereby opening the way to freedom for the people in the Northeast. Ever since the Japanese aggressors entered that region, our Party has provided leadership for the people there, helping them to organize the Anti-Japanese Volunteers¹⁴⁸ and to wage a long, hard struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's policy of non-resistance. Moreover, since the counter-attack against the Japanese aggressors was launched, our Party has dispatched a large number of troops and cadres from south of the Great Wall to the Northeast to help the people there create the vast Northeast Liberated Area. However, Chiang Kai-shek, who was responsible for the fall of the Northeast but contributed nothing to its recovery, and who was aided and abetted by the American reactionaries, violated the peace agreements and launched a large-scale offensive against the Northeast Liberated Area. During the period from the battle of Shanhaiguan²⁷¹ last November to the signing of a truce on June 7,²⁷² the Northeast Democratic United Army and the people in the Northeast courageously carried on a war of self-defence. Although both sides have maintained the truce so far, the Kuomintang is preparing for further attacks. In the Northeast mass work and land redistribution are just beginning, and the rural base areas are yet to be consolidated. Many of our cadres do not fully understand the necessity and importance of our going to the countryside to build base areas through long years of hard struggle. The current international and domestic situation is a favourable one in which to

A resolution drafted on behalf of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee by Comrade Chen Yun, who was deputy secretary of the Bureau at the time, as well as deputy political commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army. On July 11, 1946, the Central Committee approved the resolution after making some revisions.

build base areas in the Northeast and to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's troops when they attack us again. But we must recognize our weaknesses and overcome them if we want to succeed.

2. In light of the above, the Northeast Bureau has decided that our current tasks are as follows:

a) We should eliminate the ideological confusion about the question of peace and war and prepare to win peace through long, hard struggle. The conflicts between Britain and the United States have increased, and the internal dissension in the United States is very serious. Chiang Kai-shek does not have enough forces to deploy nationwide, the people are displeased with him and he faces difficulties in the economy. Moreover, the growing strength of our Party and army and the determined struggle we are waging forced him to announce an indefinite truce after the 15-day and 8-day truces expired. The truce is benefiting Chiang Kai-shek in the areas where he has too few troops; where he has enough, such as in the Central Plains and along the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway, he has launched an all-out offensive.²⁷³ It is probable that he will soon launch a major offensive in Jiangsu and Anhui.²⁷⁴ In the Northeast, where his forces are inadequate, it is in their interest to maintain the truce. But they will most probably assault us again as soon as they receive reinforcements. In the recent Nanjing negotiations,²⁷⁵ Chiang Kai-shek made it clear that he expects to take every place except Xing'an Province, new Heilongjiang Province and a part of Nenjiang Province²⁵⁹ and the Yanji area. He wants to occupy not only key points but also contiguous areas, a position that was categorically rejected by our side. It is better for us to lose so large a territory in battle and recover it later than to relinquish it without a fight and be unable to claim it again. Moreover, there is a strong possibility that we will be able to defeat the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops and recover many lost areas, except for certain cities and key communication lines. The entire Party must therefore redouble its efforts and prepare with great determination to smash those attacks so as to win peace by victory in war. We must eliminate vacillation and the notion that we can achieve peace by sheer good luck. Under the general guideline of achieving peace by waging a long, arduous and well prepared struggle, we shall try all possible means to increase the revolutionary forces, weaken the reactionary forces and bring about a change in the balance of power. We shall fight battles, do mass work, improve the people's life by solving the land problem, etc. The most important thing is mass work to mobilize the people so we can forge strong links with them. If we can win more people to our side, we shall bring about a change in the relative strength of the enemy forces and our own. Thus we will be able to consolidate the base areas and become invincible. In short,

peace can and must be achieved, but we will have to rely mainly on our own strength, not on outside forces. Only if we rely on ourselves, stand on our own feet, have our own means of dealing with the situation and gain an invincible position can domestic and international assistance be effective, and only then can we win a stable peace. Otherwise, the peace will not be stable but constantly endangered.

b) We shall adhere to the correct policy adopted by the Central Committee of building stable base areas in the Northeast.²⁷⁶ We need big cities, but they are not easy to keep in our control under the present circumstances. If we stress capturing big cities and neglect the building of base areas, we may one day find ourselves in the dangerous position of having neither the one nor the other. So building base areas should be made the top priority in our work now and for some time to come. But that does not mean that we do not want big cities, that we should give them up without a fight or that we should destroy them if we are forced to abandon them. On the contrary, we must adapt our work to the situation in each city, whether or not it has been occupied by our army. Furthermore, the purpose of establishing base areas is precisely to facilitate the capture of the big cities. The base areas we are going to build will encompass small and medium-sized cities as well as minor railway lines. But we must realize that the building of base areas consists essentially of mobilizing the peasant masses. We must not emphasize cities to the neglect of rural areas, because that approach doesn't conform either to the actual situation or to our needs. We should mobilize the peasants by involving them in the struggles to combat collabourators, to settle accounts with landlords and to obtain reductions of rents and interest rates. We should also distribute grain, redistribute land and implement the Central Committee's May 4th Directive on the land question swiftly and on a large scale.²⁷⁷ In the struggle for the emancipation of the peasants we should raise their political awareness, arm activists among them and reform village governments and place them in the peasants' hands. We should then establish peasant associations, organize popular armed forces and involve the peasants in the war effort, so as to make the war of self-defence in the Northeast truly a people's war. As the mass movement develops, we should recruit activists into our Party and establish Party branches to serve as our bastions in the rural areas. As long as the peasants are aroused and actively participate in the war of self-defence, we will not be vanquished in battle. In order to rapidly create base areas over wide stretches of territory in the Northeast, we must send some of our main forces to help local armed forces clean out political bandits.²⁶³ We should also organize cadres into local work teams that will focus on key places in the base areas, and we should gradually apply their

experience to the rest of the areas. We hope the masses will be mobilized within six months.

c) We should clearly explain the goals of the current struggle and the war effort to the entire Party and army. There is considerable confusion about them. We are fighting to defend the liberated areas. The people in the Northeast have been emancipated from the rule of the Japanese aggressors and the puppet regime and have established liberated areas where they can enjoy freedom. But the reactionaries in China, aided by foreign reactionaries, have launched attacks on those areas. Our Northeast Democratic United Army and the people in the Northeast have no choice but to wage a war of self-defence for survival. The war is therefore necessary and completely justifiable. It must be pointed out that its goal is the realization of democracy in the economic, political and military fields. Economically, we are struggling to obtain land and houses for the poor, to distribute grain, reduce rents and interest rates, increase wages, eliminate unemployment and develop production. Politically, we are struggling to overthrow the rule of the enemy and the remnants of the puppet regime, the special agents and the police, to end the dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to establish democracy by placing political power in the hands of the people. Militarily, we are struggling to resist oppression by the army, the police and the political bandits, who are controlled by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and to organize popular armed forces. These are the goals of our struggle and war effort and this is the concrete content of our fight for democracy. To achieve these goals, we have to anticipate that the various classes will play different roles in this war than they did in the anti-Japanese war. We must also point out that it is still imperative for us and for the people throughout the country to oppose civil war and dictatorship and to demand peace and democracy. We must be aware that the U.S. imperialists' attempt to invade China and Chiang Kai-shek's acts of betrayal have resulted in a movement against them, a movement which will gradually involve the entire nation. That is why while guaranteeing the masses' basic interests, we must concentrate all our efforts on forming a broad united front against civil war, dictatorship and betrayal and in favor of peace, democracy and independence. This is the most important thing and must never be neglected. But we must understand that the Northeast is no longer the enemy's rear area, as it was during the anti-Japanese war. We should not let ourselves be deceived by the landlords: we should not designate their armed forces as people's army units and allow them to expand. Rather, we should firmly rely on the labouring masses.

d) Under present circumstances, in which the enemy is strong but we

are weak, our army's strategic principle should be to wipe out enemy troops instead of worrying about the temporary gain or loss of a particular city or key point. It should be to lure the enemy troops in deep, wait for them to disperse and then destroy them one by one with a superior force. Only by annihilating the enemy can we defend our base areas. In general, we should engage him in mobile and guerrilla warfare, not positional warfare. All our troops should have the people's interests in mind and do mass work in co-ordination with the local armed forces. They should strictly observe the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention,"²⁷⁸ and their conduct in this regard should be monitored. Any violation will be tantamount to a military defeat. We must carry forward our army's glorious tradition of being good both at fighting and at mobilizing the masses.

e) Adhering to the principle of waging protracted war and building base areas, we must work out policies based on the actual situation, including tactics for military operations and for the suppression of bandits. We must also have policies relating to mass movements, agrarian reform, finance, logistics, munitions, transportation, urban work, culture, Party building and the establishment of governments. In addition, we should monitor the progress of the work, analyse major results and enable different localities to exchange experiences promptly so as to make our cadres more capable and efficient.

f) We should encourage cadres to volunteer to go to the countryside, and we should help them correct any erroneous ideas on the subject. Many cadres who have come to the Northeast fail to understand the need for protracted warfare and hard work and are not mentally prepared for it. Some are infatuated with city life, are reluctant to go to the countryside and don't have the people's interests in mind. The tendency towards pleasure-seeking, war-weariness and deterioration of moral standards is increasing inside the Party, and it is a very dangerous phenomenon. This unhealthy tendency has emerged partly because cadres are not sufficiently dedicated to serving the people and partly because they do not understand the current situation in the struggle in the Northeast. We must explain that situation to them clearly and repeatedly. We must make it plain to them that the struggle in the Northeast will be long and intense and that the key factor determining our success or failure will be whether the peasants are mobilized. If the peasants are not mobilized we shall fail in the Northeast. We must emphasize Communists' responsibility to serve the people and call on cadres to leave the city, give up their cars, take off their leather shoes and put on peasant clothes. All cadres who are able to go to the countryside should do so, whether they are civilian or military, men or women, junior or senior. The criterion of a

Communist's quality is whether he or she can get close to the peasants. We should commend those who go deep into the countryside and criticize those who are reluctant to. There should be a drive for Communists to go to the countryside and mingle with the peasants. Thus, the central task of mobilizing the peasants will be accomplished, and at the same time unhealthy tendencies among cadres will be eliminated.

3. The Northeast is in the midst of a long and difficult struggle, but the future of the struggle is bright. We are already in an advantageous position: our Party now leads a powerful army here, together with a contingent of tens of thousands of cadres, both local and from other parts of the country. In addition, the labouring masses are eager to free themselves from political and economic oppression. but the Kuomintang reactionaries have done nothing for the people in the Northeast. In collusion with the enemy and the puppet regime, they have massacred the people and pushed aside anyone who disagreed with them. They have become corrupt and degenerate and have thus lost all popular support. The Kuomintang reactionaries may increase their armed forces in the Northeast, but they cannot occupy the entire territory. Their troops will be destroyed one by one as they disperse to occupy cities and other areas. Although in the present military situation the enemy is stronger than we are, the disparity is not so great as it was during the Civil War (1927-37) and the anti-Japanese war. Since we were able to defeat the enemy even during those periods, we are confident that we can do so now. Given the present positions of ourselves and the enemy, no matter how he attacks, he can no longer launch "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, as he did during the Civil War, or "mopping-up" campaigns from all directions, as during the anti-Japanese war. Besides, we are not alone in our struggle in the Northeast. We are supported by more than 100 million soldiers and civilians in liberated areas throughout the country, as well as by the nationwide popular movement against civil war, dictatorship and betrayal and for peace, democracy and independence. If the Kuomintang reactionaries carry on the Civil War in collusion with the United States, more of their troops will follow the example of Generals Gao Shuxun and Pan Shuoduan.²⁷⁹ The development of the nationwide struggle shows that the revolutionary forces are on the rise while the reactionary forces are on the decline. The Chinese Communist Party is stronger than ever before, while the Kuomintang has never been so unpopular. Under these favourable circumstances, provided our cadres in the Northeast clearly understand the situation here, unite as one, establish close ties with the masses, work conscientiously and march step by step towards our objective, we are sure to succeed. We will change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves so that we are

in an invincible position, smash the attacks of the reactionaries and usher in a new era of peace and democracy in the Northeast and in the rest of our country.

4. The Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee has decided that Party organizations at all levels should discuss this resolution so as to clarify the cadres' thinking, and that they should report results of self-criticism to the Northeast Bureau.

MOBILIZING THE PEASANTS IS THE KEY TO ESTABLISHING THE NORTHEAST BASE AREA

July 13, 1946

1. In the Northeast the enemy is still strong and we are still weak.

We must make a clear-headed assessment of the present situation here. The Northeast is being contested not only by Chinese revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries but by foreign ones as well. If we can hold our ground in the Northeast, the Chinese revolution will be in an invincible position. That is why we and Chiang Kai-shek, who is supported by the United States, have to contend for the region. They are afraid we are going to link up with the Soviet Union and are therefore trying to wipe us out in the Northeast. If we increase our forces here, they will do the same by dispatching troops from south of the Great Wall. It would be better for us to mobilize the masses to establish base areas and expand our armed forces locally than to move our main forces several hundred kilometres from south of the Great Wall to the Northeast. By attacking first on one side of the Wall and then on the other, the Kuomintang is trying to avoid fighting on two fronts at once. Accordingly, the Central Committee of our Party has adopted the tactic of obliging it to fight on two fronts, in order to reduce pressure on the Northeast. Chiang Kai-shek has ordered Du Yuming²⁸⁰ to expand his armed forces by recruiting puppet troops and police and Chinese collabourators, special agents and bandits, thus increasing his underground army from one to three corps. The United States has stockpiled in Qingdao large quantities of arms and ammunition with which Chiang Kai-shek is to arm new recruits in the Northeast.

Because the Japanese aggressors have ruled this area for 14 years, the ordinary people in the Northeast are under the illusion that the Kuomintang is a legitimate, powerful party supported by the United States. Although we have been working here for several months, we have less influence with the

Excerpt from a speech delivered at a meeting of the Western Manchuria Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

masses than the Kuomintang. So far, we do not yet have any secure base areas in the Northeast, and it would be unrealistic to wage a people's war here now.

Our army has 300,000 men—a considerable number, including 100,000 regular field soldiers and 20,000 cadres. However, new recruits and recently organized troops make up a large proportion of the total, so the army is not well consolidated. Unless we work closely with the civilians, our army will not achieve significant victories.

These facts indicate that we will be up against an enemy of superior strength for some time to come. The enemy is strong chiefly because he is aided by the United States; we are weak chiefly because the masses have not yet been mobilized and because some troops and cadres are confused in their thinking. Of course, we should neither exaggerate the enemy's strength nor underestimate it. We should take advantage of favourable conditions, stop leaving things to chance and prepare for the worst.

2. The general principle is to mobilize the masses, so as to change the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves.

To that end we must arouse the people and increase our numbers. We cannot move our troops from south of the Great Wall, because they are engaged with the enemy there. We are preparing for an all-out combat with the enemy both north and south of the Wall, which will be to our advantage. It would not be good to move our main forces from south of the Wall to the Northeast. If we just fight recklessly without the support of the people, in the end we'll have no one left.

We must obtain the support of the masses if we want to hold our ground. Without their support, even if we occupy large areas far from the enemy, we shall be unable to stay there for long. With their support, we shall be able to hold the territory we occupy even if it is only a small area close to the enemy. We passed through many places during the Long March, but we didn't hold any of them until we reached northern Shaanxi, where the masses were mobilized. So far, we are still just renting a house and have yet to build a house of our own. If the masses are not mobilized, our cadres will become aliens in our own land, and that will mean the end of the 100,000 men of our main forces. If the masses *are* mobilized, all will go well. We shall be able to build our army, wipe out the bandits and obtain financial support. Without the masses we are doomed to fail, and our dead bodies will lie unburied.

Can the masses be aroused? The answer is, of course. They will provide the objective conditions for waging class struggle.

Since the landlords' forces are generally armed with rifles, the peasants must also have weapons for their struggle. Economic struggle should be

followed by armed struggle, which will lead to deeper economic struggle and then further armed struggle. In this way, the peasants will dare to fight not only against the landlords, but against the Kuomintang as well.

We should try to establish a people's militia and a Party organization in every village. For the next six to eight months we must concentrate all our efforts on mobilizing the people. Everything is ready for the mass work: we are only waiting for cadres to come and do it.

Cadres must go to the countryside. Men and women, old and young, junior and senior, should all go. Every army regiment should send one-third of its officers and men to the countryside to help the peasants. We can cut back on our work in cities, government departments and schools and even suffer some losses. But 80 percent of all our work should be in the rural areas.

3. The six tasks before us at present are as follows:

a) We must clear up any confusion in our cadres' minds and prepare them to fight a long war. No one should harbour the least illusion that peace will come soon, because peace can only be won through combat and it will be the outcome of a test of strength between the two sides. The policy of the U.S. imperialists is not to mediate impartially but to back Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. Under cover of mediation Marshall would like to destroy us,²⁸¹ either now, if possible, or later, when Chiang Kai-shek's forces grow stronger. Wedemeyer has called for destroying us now.²⁸² In short, the United States is doing everything in its power to turn China into a U.S. colony. It is hypocritically employing two-faced tactics, so we must be careful and prepare both to negotiate and to fight. We must not pin our hopes on a change in the international situation.

Struggle in the Northeast will be fierce. It will be a long-drawn-out war, with intervals of truce. The present truce will not last long: the Kuomintang will renew its attacks as soon as it completes its preparations. The Central Committee has decided that if the enemy raids Harbin, we shall attack him south of the Great Wall. Our recent attack on Shandong is an example of that tactic.²⁸³ The negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have been fruitless. The Kuomintang is building a "cage" in an attempt to destroy us once and for all.²⁸⁴ We should therefore be prepared for long-term warfare.

b) We have to mobilize the masses on a wide scale and establish base areas. Base areas should consist chiefly of the vast rural areas, small and medium-sized cities and secondary railway lines—these are our first consideration. We can take larger cities later. Even without them we can retain control of the small and medium-sized cities and the rural areas. Mobilizing the peasants is the key to building base areas now, just as it was the key to

building guerrilla zones in the past. It would therefore be wrong to belittle the work in rural areas.

In organizing the masses in the Northeast, the most important thing for us to do is to set up armed units and then to establish organs of political power and Party branches. We should especially stress peasant associations. There should be a peasant association in every county and on every county Party committee there should be a commission responsible for the work in that association.

Mass work consists of training local cadres and of raising the peasants' political awareness so they will struggle against the landlords.

The three qualifications for new recruits are that they should dare to ask for land, dare to struggle and dare to take up arms. They should not be afraid of the landlords or of the Kuomintang or of leaving home. When we have recruited a considerable number of Party members, we should stop to consolidate this work by building a strong-hold²⁸⁵ in every village. We should avoid recruiting large numbers and having to expel them afterwards. We must actively recruit new members but admit them on an individual basis.

c) We should put forward a correct slogan for our struggle and mobilize the masses to fight for it. Right now we are fighting for peace and democracy. The most important thing is to realize democracy in the economic, political and military spheres. Economic democracy means providing the peasants with a means of livelihood, political democracy means raising their political status, and military democracy means arming them.

The Northeast is now the scene of fierce class struggle. Class relations have changed since the anti-Japanese war: the Kuomintang and the landlord class have become our primary enemies.

d) We should combine mobile warfare with guerrilla warfare, avoiding positional warfare in general. We should prepare for protracted war. There are many problems in the army. A healthy atmosphere is not being encouraged and unhealthy tendencies are growing. We must discharge from their posts those cadres whose moral standards have deteriorated. One violation of mass discipline can mean defeat in a military operation. We should prevent our troops from taking advantage of the special consideration given them by the local community. In building our army we should emphasize political work, helping our officers and men, when necessary, to change their way of thinking and acquire the mass viewpoint.

Before land redistribution is begun in rural areas, our main forces will reorganize the armed forces in districts and counties where they have proved unreliable. After land redistribution, new armed units will be set up in those places.

e) We should help cadres to acquire a correct attitude. Many of them who have come here were not mentally prepared: they long for city life and lack the determination to fight a long war and work hard in rural areas. Some of them are only looking for an easy life, promotion and material comfort. They are weary of war and their will to serve the people has flagged.

We should make it clear to these comrades that the Northeast is a newly liberated area where the masses have not yet been mobilized and that the struggle we are waging here is therefore full of hardships. We should call on them to change their attitude and prepare to face the greatest difficulties.

These explanations will help our cadres to understand the current situation and tasks. We shall organize many comrades into work teams to go to the countryside, where they will learn through struggle. Cadres who do mass work, although they may be members of district committees or even of the Central Committee, are all on the level of the masses, performing ordinary Party work.

f) We should correct the tendency to work haphazardly. For Party, government, army and mass work we must formulate policies and plans and review them from time to time, analysing and exchanging experience. Of these six tasks the central one is to mobilize the masses.

4. The struggle in the Northeast will be hard, but its future is bright.

We have made some progress in the last eight months. By opening up this new area, we have been able to pin down 21 enemy divisions equipped with American arms. We have thus made it possible for our troops in the liberated areas south of the Great Wall to rest and reorganize for six months, to begin to solve the land problem there and to expand the local militia to seven million men. Our unremitting struggle in the Northeast has contributed greatly to the struggle in the base areas south of the Great Wall.

The Kuomintang will do nothing for the masses. So long as we do mass work well, the people on the Northeast will follow us to fight the Kuomintang.

Chiang Kai-shek has shamelessly offered the United States many advantages, such as inland navigation rights,²⁸⁶ the right to station troops in Tianjin ND Qingdao²⁸⁷ and so on. The people in the Kuomintang areas are weary of war and are against the United States. Chiang Kai-shek's prestige has plummeted. He is faced with economic difficulties and he lacks adequate military forces. He is no longer what he was during the ten-year civil war and the eight-year anti-Japanese war. He can no longer launch "encirclement and suppression" campaigns or "mopping-up" operations against us.

The military situation for the nation as a whole is as follows. The Kuomintang army makes up one-third of the total number of combatants,

miscellaneous troops make up another third and our army one-third. In the course of fighting, the miscellaneous troops will come over to our side. Our army will grow.

Both at home and abroad the people are on the rise and the enemy is on the decline. If we mobilize the masses and consolidate our base areas in the Northeast we are bound to win.

CARRYING ON THE STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTHERN MANCHURIA BASE AREA

December 1946-April 1947

I

1. Du²⁸⁰ has already ordered attacks on Ji'an, Mengjiang, Linjiang and Fusong counties²⁸⁸ in an attempt to destroy our main forces in the narrow Changbai Mountains area. The attacking forces include the 91st, the 2nd and the 195th divisions and part of the 30th division, all stationed in Huanren, which are now concentrated in Sanyuanpu;²⁸⁹ the 22nd division, which has already assumed the defence of Meihai with two armored corps already in Longmei;²⁹⁰ part of the 207th division which has already assumed the defence of Yongling²⁹¹ and Xingjing;²⁹² and the main forces of the 14th division deployed along both sides of the Andong-Fengtian Railway²⁹³ for "mopping-up" operations. We have information that the 88th division has already moved south and is concentrated at Bamiancheng,²⁹⁴ but its purpose is unclear.

2. Given this situation, we have decided to move the entire Fourth Column²⁹⁵ to the west of Tonghua, Huanren and Hunjiang to "disturb the

In the early period of the War of Liberation, the Northeast Democratic United Army, in carrying on the struggle in the Southern Manchuria Base Area, engaged the Kuomintang army from December 17, 1946 to April 3, 1947 in four battles to defend Linjiang and three forays south of the Songhua River. Within three and a half months, the Northeast Democratic United Army shattered four attacks launched by the Kuomintang army on the Linjiang area, annihilating more than 40,000 enemy troops and recapturing 11 towns, thus foiling the Kuomintang army's strategic plan of "attacking in the south and defending in the north; first south, then north." This forced the Kuomintang army to switch from offensive operations to defensive ones, which changed the war situation in the Northeast. This article includes seven telegrams drafted by Comrade Chen Yun on behalf of himself and other leaders of the Liaodong Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee and of the Liaodong Military Area. Included are two letters and two telegrams written by Chen Yun. During this period he concurrently served as secretary of the Liaodong Sub-bureau and as political commissar of the Liaodong Military Area. The Liaodong Sub-bureau was also known as the Southern Manchuria Sub-bureau at that time.

peace” on both sides of the Andong-Fengtian Railway, wipe out weak enemy forces, force enemy relocation and support the localities. We have also decided that if there is no change in the enemy plan to surround and annihilate us, part of the Third Column²⁹⁶ should hold the Changbai Mountains area, and that the main force should penetrate the enemy’s rear. In that case, all counties in the area except Changbai²⁹⁷ will be occupied by the enemy. It is expected that the two corps fighting in the enemy’s rear will experience extremely serious difficulties due to casualties and supply problems. But, unless we engage in this long, tortuous and difficult struggle, we will not be able to hold southern Manchuria.²⁵⁶

3. We hope that (1) eastern,²⁵⁴ western²⁵⁵ and northern Manchuria²⁵³ can pin down the enemy forces there and that (2) northern Manchuria can send us 10,000 tons of grain.

Are all the above points acceptable? Please advise.

(Telegram sent by Xiao Jinguang, Chen Yun,
Xiao Hua and Cheng Shicai to Lin Biao,
the Northeast Bureau and the Central
Committee of the CPC on December 16, 1946.)

II

1. We arrived in Linjiang²⁹⁸ on the evening of November 27. The leadership of the Third Column was reorganized on November 16 and new leadership was dispatched. Cheng, Luo and Tang²⁹⁹ have all arrived in the Liaodong Military Area.³⁰⁰ Comrade Xiao Hua³⁰¹ told me that this had been agreed to by Commander-in-Chief Lin.³⁰²

2. After land was distributed to peasants, they realized that the Eighth Route Army³⁰³ was acting in their interests. Before our army withdrew from our base areas, we were able to enlist stretcher-bearers and to accomplish all our tasks. This demonstrated that the masses had truly gained political awareness. This time when our army had to withdraw, there were no cases of people seizing stragglers. To the contrary, some local people protected them. This change of attitude resulted from four months (since July) of land reform.³⁰⁴

Because of their experiences in the Russo-Japanese War³⁰⁵ and the September 18th Incident⁴⁷ and the August 15th Event,²⁶² the masses concluded that the withdrawing troops would not return. They believed that our army has had its day and would not be able to protect their gains and that,

more importantly, that the benefits they had obtained were not worth a life and death struggle. So, when the enemy arrived, no one ran away. Village leaders came forward with support for the diehard troops.³⁰⁶ All the materials which we had left with the masses or buried were turned over to the diehard troops, to the peace preservation corps or to the police. Some of the militia were persuaded by bad elements to give themselves up to the enemy, while most of them disbanded. It was the same with district detachments. Local cadres were unwilling to leave their homes, or if they did, spent only a few days with our army then filtered back home, and only a small number (about 20 from each county) are still with our local armed forces. County battalions deserted in force, completely unable to resist the peace preservation corps and the police.

The situation in southern Manchuria is a warning to us that throughout the Northeast (and particularly in northern Manchuria which has not yet fallen), if the enemy attacks eastern, northern or western Manchuria this winter or next spring, the situation in any area they occupy is likely to become the same as it is in southern Manchuria. We distributed land to the peasants, but because they have possessed this land for a very short period of time and have not yet been able to benefit very much from this, we cannot expect these people to rise up in guerrilla warfare or to set mines and fight shoulder to shoulder with us. (Those areas which we have held for three or more years may be exceptions). Currently I am greatly aware of the need to carry out a “seesaw” struggle; there is no other way to further rouse the people. Both the civil war³⁰⁷ and the anti-Japanese war experienced such a period. To make up for the absence of an immediate response by the masses in taking up arms and joining the fighting, please consider whether there are alternate ways of reversing the military situation. For example, a telegram from Commander-in-Chief Lin two days ago requested that all units should harass the enemy, not allowing them any chance to relax. Also, many comrades have suggested that we should fortify some locations, which of course does not mean we should defend these locations to the bitter end. I think we should consider all these possibilities.

In the past, some areas of southern Manchuria bordered on enemy-occupied areas. Some base areas (for example, united counties³⁰⁸) were surrounded on three sides by the enemy. In all these areas, experience has taught us that we can hold off an ordinary attack (not a “large-scale mopping-up operation”) by the enemy and that the situation is either much the same as in our central areas with regard to the masses or that the masses have an even deeper perception of the villainous unruliness of the Kuomintang troops. But we have no experience in areas completely surrounded by

enemy troops. Most areas in southern Manchuria are now in the later situation. Observation and study of our work and experience in those areas has become our central task in southern Manchuria.

Is there any hope of holding on in the enemy rear or of establishing guerrilla bases or other small or large base areas? To answer this question, we must consider two factors. We more or less have a grip on one of these, while a grip on the other is a clear possibility. What are these two factors? One is to wipe out local enemy armed forces so that the number of soldiers in the regular enemy armies will be inadequate. In the areas between the Andong-Fengtian Railway and the Southern Manchuria Railways³⁰⁹ the enemy has only the 41st regiment of the 14th division, the transport regiment of the new sixth army and remnants of the 184th division. All the rest are peace preservation corps, county police or “big corps” (landlord forces). Also, stationed between the Changchun, Jifeng and Pingmei railways³¹⁰ there are very few regular enemy forces. Of the more than 30 enemy strongholds built for “mopping up” campaigns in the past, only 12 still exist. Three of our armed forces—altogether 11 companies—have been active in this area now for 20 days. They captured four of these strongholds and then telegraphed us requesting the dispatch of reinforcements and cadres. This shows that the enemy’s regular troops are insufficient there. We must take full advantage of this weakness which causes the enemy, when attending to his rear area, to be unable to attend to his major front, and when attending to the front line, to be unable to attend to the rear. Viewing the Northeast as a whole, we shall make the enemy unable to attend to northern Manchuria by drawing his attention to southern Manchuria. To this end we are planning to launch more attacks on peace preservation forces in the enemy rear (the main local enemy force composed largely of former bandits), county police (partly former bandits and the rest consisting of puppet Manchurian²⁶⁸ police and agents) and on the “big corps” (landlord forces). If these are annihilated, the regular enemy army will have to replace them, which will actually amount to a reduction in the number of enemy reserves which are directly employable for attacks on the Northeast. At the same time, local enemy forces are the greatest menace to our base areas through both their “mopping-up” campaigns and the destruction they can cause. Moreover, we must attack these reactionary local forces if we are to protect the peasants’ interests. Wiping out the enemy and mobilizing the masses are two aspects of one task. (Of course, the purpose in mobilizing the masses is not merely to attack the local armed forces of the enemy.) To carry out this task, our troops behind enemy lines must have the combat capability to wipe out the peace preservation forces and they should not fear regular enemy troops. I believe we can achieve

this.

The second factor is that we must protect the peasants' immediate interests. The peasants are extremely practical-minded and their motivation is based on their immediate interests—the more benefits they reap, the more involved they will become. We must provide benefits to peasants living in the enemy rear area. At present we must look into what sort of benefits we can offer them and in what way we can protect them. For this, it is necessary to be aware of problems as they arise in enemy-occupied areas. These can be surmised more or less by considering the following. Are they being forced to give the landlords the grain which they harvested this year from the land that we distributed to them? By next year, will we be able to ensure that the peasants can farm the land they received this year? What can we do about landlords taking revenge for the “movement to settle accounts”²⁶⁴ with them or about young men being drafted into the army? These are all the points I can think of at present. When the enemy arrives, there will certainly be many incidents such as fraud, looting, rape, etc. According to our information on peasants, landlords and Kuomintang diehards,³¹¹ there is actually an intense class struggle in progress in the enemy rear, so our troops will certainly be welcome there. I even predict that the degree of welcome will exceed that which we received there initially before we lost these areas, since at that time the Kuomintang had only indirectly oppressed the peasants there, whereas at present the peasants are being oppressed directly. It is of primary importance to protect the grain which the peasants harvested this year from the land we distributed to them. Once they start to consume the grain which they produced from their own land, the peasants will be more determined to carry on the struggle in order to secure their land. Secondly, we must free them from the daily oppression from which they have been suffering since the Kuomintang arrived. And lastly, we must do everything possible to ensure that next year the peasants can farm their own land. Once the peasants have invested energy in the land, we can safely predict that they will not lightly give up their autumn harvest or winter stores. All this is no more than conjecture; it remains to be seen what will happen. But most of the peasants do want to keep the grain they harvested from their land this year. This was demonstrated by the following information. I talked with seven peasants who retreated to Linjiang from Andong, Saima³¹² and other places; they said that the peasants are already hiding their grain in secret caches, keeping only 10 or 20 percent in their grain stores to use to settle with landlords. When the landlords demand grain, they will say that the harvest was bad or that the Eighth Route Army ate the grain. I have heard that this method of hiding grain was used by peasants during the rule of the puppet Manchurian regime

to avoid levies.³¹³ The peasants are our teachers; we can learn all sorts of devices from them which we can then refine and improve for our own use. According to the head of the organization department of the prefectural Party committee who returned yesterday from Kuandian, Huanren and Fenghuangcheng,³¹⁴ the peasants' grain has already disappeared from the threshing grounds, so they have probably also already hidden their grain. From this we can see that there is certainly a struggle going on between the peasants who are hiding their grain and the landlords who are demanding it. Moreover, it is certain that the landlords will take revenge and that there will not be many disinterested bystanders, so there is no doubt that class struggle exists in the enemy rear. This winter represents an opportunity which we must not pass up.

Here I particularly want to stress the issues of coordination in holding on in the enemy rear, which should be viewed from three aspects. One of these is coordination between guerrilla areas. If one acts but another does not, the enemy will be able to wipe them out one at a time. Next is coordination between the front line and the rear. The front line must draw enemy so as to lighten the burden on the rear. Third is coordination between southern Manchuria and northern, eastern and western Manchuria. To accomplish this, we should first of all request southern Manchuria to draw the enemy's attention at all costs to stop them from moving north, which will gain time for northern Manchuria. On the other hand, eastern, western and northern Manchuria must pin down the enemy in front of them, with a guerrilla unit in eastern Manchuria infiltrating along the Jifeng railway, and with Liaoxi³¹⁵ carrying on the struggle in Tie-Fa-Kang.³¹⁶ We will oversee the coordination between the areas in southern Manchuria. In considering the larger picture, the areas south and north of the Great Wall must cooperate. Battles are currently in progress south of the Wall in coordination with our forces on the north side. Given this coordination, the enemy cannot augment its troops north of the Great Wall and there is great hope for northern, eastern, western and southern Manchuria. I hope you will keep a close watch for any news of troop reinforcements from south of the Great Wall.

3. I should like to talk on an issue relating to our local armed forces. District militia companies which in the past fought bandits are not militarily effective. Before the enemy arrives, these should either be reorganized as part of our main forces or made to retreat and then reorganized with emphasis on quality rather than quantity. Commander-in-Chief Lin suggested that they first retreat and be reorganized and then return. This is a practicable plan. Some county battalion soldiers have defected while most have deserted, so that it would be best to incorporate some of the battalions into our main

forces in order to prevent further defection. What units did not disintegrate when the enemy arrived? It was only the core regiments led by Party cadres, though these also experienced desertions. They are unable to fight regular diehard troops, but even after some of their members desert, they still carry on their struggle. Because of this, each district in eastern, western and northern Manchuria should have two such regiments which should try to be as strong as Wang Kuixian's³¹⁷ 7th regiment in Songjiang or Wen Yucheng's³¹⁸ 1st and 3rd regiments. Without such regiments in place, we will have no way of supporting the localities when the enemy arrives.

In order to provide training for core regiments led by Party cadres as well as for county battalions and independent regiments, please consider sending local core regiments from the north for active duty in border areas so that they can gain some experience through fighting diehard enemy troops under the protection of our main forces. All the county regiments which have been trained through combat with diehard enemy troops now have good fighting capability and will not disintegrate upon the enemy's arrival. This is the case with the county battalions and independent regiments north of Qingyuan and the independent regiments of the united counties. When it is necessary to retreat, they can retreat in an orderly way. County regiments which have never tangled with diehard enemy troops will simply crumble.

4. During periods of enemy occupation, we must keep the loss of cadres and matériel to a minimum. Currently there is a high mortality rate among cadres. According to a report from Liaonan,³¹⁹ 300 cadres died in Xiuyan County alone, and the major losses were due to not having trimmed our forces earlier. There were a large number of cadres, many of them women and physically weakened people. Those who are unable to travel in the mountains or sleep in the open air on mountain tops for a couple of months at a time when the enemy comes to "mop up" should be employed at the rear. As to each county's material resources, departmentalism should be overcome and everything should be handed over to the provincial Party committee in an organized manner to be kept in a distant rear area, such as Heihe or Hulin. One or two enemy attacks will not be able to reach there and so these supplies will be available for future use. If they are left with the people, they will all be handed over to the enemy and there will be nothing left to replenish shoes, socks and clothing for our guerrilla forces. In addition, guerrilla leaders and those of county organs should bury cooking pots, grain and other articles in mountain ravines so that they can conveniently recover these supplies at times when there is no foods. Feng Zhongyun³²⁰ and cadres in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army³²¹ are experienced in this.

5. It is necessary to suppress the reactionaries and reactionary landlords

in enemy-occupied areas. They are murdering us, so we cannot be lenient with them. But we must not engage in indiscriminate killing; and we should allow onlookers to continue to observe. The practice in Shenyang County³²² was to “capture more and release more, capture quickly and release quickly.” This is a method that truly combines suppression with leniency. Some people were executed, but not many. I believe we can utilize this method.

6. Relations among leading comrades in our sub-bureau are not very good; it seems as though they are having many personal disagreements. Our solution is to engage these comrades together in enthusiastically combating the enemy and in winning the support of the masses. These comrades have all been very friendly to us, and their welcome is sincere. Comrade Xiao Hua worked very hard.

7. I do not have difficulties in matters of personnel, which I am quite able to handle, but in military affairs, with which I have had no experience whatsoever. When an argument arises, I am unable to express an opinion. I must find out the truth and try to discern the advantages and disadvantages of a situation before I can muster the nerve to speak. For those who already understand military science, many things are common knowledge, whereas I need to expend great efforts to learn about those affairs. This matter is much harder for me than my work in northern Manchuria, particularly since military affairs so often force themselves to the fore and demand quick decisions which I cannot refuse to make. But I have the courage and am now plucking up my nerve to try to make up for the lessons I missed during the ten-year civil war and the eight-year anti-Japanese war.

Up to the 13th I was in Linjiang. At midnight on the 13th I went to the front to handle a major problem; there was an argument going on about how to handle this. On the 15th I returned to Linjiang to discuss the problem all day. I have already sent you a telegram about the events which followed.

In a letter like this, although I have thought about these problems, the words just flow freely onto the paper and sometimes may not exactly express my ideas. Please try to comprehend my main intent.

(Excerpt from a letter of December 20,
1946 to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen and Gao Gang.)

III

1. We all believe that, as the main enemy forces are currently converging

around our bases of operation, we would not profit from engagement and we could even be forced to evacuate our positions, which would be disadvantageous. It would be better for some of our main forces to penetrate the enemy's rear position. This will make it difficult for the enemy, who will have to guard both his front and rear. Moreover, our local armed forces in the enemy's rear area depend on backup from our main forces. Because of this, on the 18th, the 4th Column moved to the enemy's rear to establish base areas. Its advance troops have recovered Balidianzi (west of Huanren), wiping out about 170 puppet police and a squad of diehard enemy troops. The main force of the column is now marching towards Pingdingshan.³²³ The 12th Division³²⁴ is marching towards the Xiuyan region in southern Liaoning Province.

2. On the 22nd the enemy occupied Ji'an. It is not yet clear whether they will first attack either the bases of operation or the 4th Column, or carry out both operations at the same time.

(Telegram sent by Xiao Jinguang, Chen Yun
and Xiao Hua to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Gao Gang
and the Central Military Commission of the CPC
on December 24, 1946.)

IV

1. We agree with your telegrams of December 17 and 26, and are prepared to do what we did under the conditions of eastern Hebei, Rehe³²⁵ and north China in the anti-Japanese war. In addition we are determined to have the 3rd and 4th Columns hold the ground in southern Manchuria. The enemy's 5th regiment has transferred to the north because of our offensives in northern Manchuria. We are taking this opportunity to destroy some enemy troops in an attempt not only to keep the Changbai Mountains region, but also to recover some of the positions in Huanren, Ji'an, Jinchuan and Huinan counties.³²⁶ If we can do so, southern Manchuria will remain a strategic flank position for the Northeast, from which we can move northward toward the Jifeng Railway or westward toward the Andong-Fengtian Railway. If the enemy cannot get reinforcements north of the Great Wall, and as long as we win battles in north Manchuria, we will be able to continue fighting in southern Manchuria.

2. It will be a struggle to create the above-mentioned favourable situation; many small and medium-scale annihilation battles must be fought

and we will have to pay a price. Our main forces were not at full strength when Andong and Tonghua fell;³²⁷ there were little more than 6,000 soldiers in each division on average. Their numbers were further depleted by battle casualties. The local armed forces suffered heavy losses under enemy attack as well—perhaps 10,000 by rough estimate. We now have no more local forces to replenish our main forces. Furthermore, the total population of the four counties under our control in the Changbai Mountains region³²⁸ is only 220,000. It is not clear whether we can accomplish our plan to expand our forces by 1,000 men by the end of the first month of the lunar calendar. There is no hope for quick recruitment in areas lost to the enemy. Because of the above factors, our main forces cannot be replenished and are suffering further attrition. Since our companies are not at full strength, the cadres are afraid of suffering heavy casualties and morale is low. It takes time to win battles and then replenish our strength with prisoners.

3. Lack of replenishment is a serious obstacle to wiping out the enemy. If the size of divisions is reduced too quickly, this will affect the morale of our troops. Could northern Manchuria, in addition to providing 10,000 tons of grain, quickly form two large supplementary regiments of new recruits for southern Manchuria? The cadres for those regiments can be provided here. Please make padded clothes for them; we will provide the cloth.

4. In light of the fact that the southern Manchuria base areas have shrunk and morale there is low, which makes it more difficult for us to get recruits, please consider seizing any opportunity to undergo a large expansion of forces in northern Manchuria.

(Telegram to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen
and Gao Gang on January 16, 1947.)

V

Having carefully considered your telegram of January 18 concerning the difficulty of replenishing our forces in southern Manchuria, I offer the following observations for your reconsideration:

1. Southern Manchuria is drawing the attention of the enemy's new sixth army, 52nd army, the whole 21st division of the 60th army and two new regiments of the 184th division in addition to many independent peace preservation divisions. So, it is important to northern Manchuria that southern Manchuria pins down the enemy.

2. There are two likely prospects for southern Manchuria. (1) We can retain Linjiang and Mengjiang so that the Changbai Mountains region, consisting of four counties and a population of 220,000 will be held and further, we can recover two or three out of the four county towns of Ji'an, Liuhe,³²⁹ Jinchuan and Huinan. This will facilitate holding out in the enemy's rear area. Our forces in the mountains and in the enemy's rear area can take concerted action, thus posing a great impediment to the northward movement of the enemy. This is the best strategy. (2) If we fail to keep Linjiang and Mengjiang, most of our main forces will be encircled by enemy troops in the enemy's rear area and it will be difficult to rapidly establish base areas, in which case the enemy will have two choices. One would be to cope with southern Manchuria with a small force while pressing northward with a large force; the other would be to take advantage of the spring thaw when our main forces in northern Manchuria will not be able to cross the Songhua River and assemble massive forces in the Northeast to sweep southern Manchuria. This later possibility is the most likely one. If the enemy adopts the strategy of destroying us one by one, wiping out southern Manchuria and then attacking northern Manchuria, then southern Manchuria will suffer heavy casualties. There would be no hope of replenishing our forces within a short period of time and our forces in southern Manchuria would be less able to impede the northward advance of the enemy. Based on this scenario, we must strive to create the former prospect, accepting the latter only if we have to, though we are prepared for it.

3. To create the former situation, we must annihilate large numbers of enemy troops by using our main forces for mobile warfare. (Southern Manchuria should conduct extensive guerrilla warfare; it should employ positional warfare when necessary, but mainly mobile warfare.) At present, it is extremely difficult to replenish our main forces in southern Manchuria. Over 10,000 local armed forces have defected or deserted and it is now too late to do anything about this. All local armed forces have been incorporated into our regular forces, except for a small number left in each county. The former 1st, 2nd and 3rd independent divisions constitute only five small regiments. They are all engaged in independent operations at the enemy rear and should not be merged into new formations. After repeated discussion, we have decided to replenish our forces by (1) trying to put 70 percent of the wounded back in service; (2) trying to persuade 50 percent of the prisoners of war to join our companies; (3) having the localities mobilize 1,000 new recruits; (4) transferring office staff and bodyguards to the companies; (5) effectively reducing casualties by adopting proper tactics and consolidating companies in order to reduce defections; and (6) recruiting in

Han Guang's area³³⁰ mainly for the purpose of reinforcing southern Liaoning. Resulting increases in personnel from these six endeavours, however, will not be immediate. In order to recuperate we must immediately recruit personnel. Therefore, can 3,000 persons be transferred in March from local county brigades in northern Manchuria to supplement our forces?

4. If we can sustain and take advantage of southern Manchuria's favourable conditions and positions and with the help of a few thousand recruits from northern Manchuria, we can check the northward advance of the enemy. I think this is the best we can accomplish.

5. It would seem unreasonable for one region to request recruits or grain from another region, and this cannot last long. But, believing that a favourable situation in southern Manchuria is important for protecting northern Manchuria, and considering that objective conditions exist for improving the situation in southern Manchuria. Thus I repeat my request for aid. I am asking you to reconsider assisting southern Manchuria with recruits.

6. Such favourable conditions as we now perceive in southern Manchuria cannot be found in any other region of Manchuria. Aside from this temporary need for aid in the form of recruits and grain, I predict that southern Manchuria will be self-sufficient.

(Telegram to Gao Gang on February 8, 1947.)

VI

1. The Military Commission's telegram of the 10th has been received.
2. On December 18, the entire 4th Column penetrated the enemy's rear area. Later, because of our offensives in northern Manchuria, the 91st division of the enemy's 71st army was dispatched north and six regiments of the 4th Column's main forces returned to the Changbai Mountains in mid-January to join the 3rd Column in offensives against the 195th and 2nd divisions of the 52nd army in the Tonghua³³¹ and Ji'an regions. Most of the enemy escaped; only five companies of the 195th division were wiped out. Thereafter, four regiments of the 4th Column's main forces and the entire 3rd Column were concentrated. The entire 11th division of the 4th Column remained west of the Hunjiang River and east of the Andong-Fengtian Railway, pinning down the enemy and coordinating with and supporting our local armed forces. The headquarters of the 12th Division led its main force, the 34th Regiment to join the Liaonan Independent Division and they have

withdrawn to Guandongzhou³³² for rest and reorganization. They are pinning down four battalions of the 22nd division of the enemy's new sixth army, five battalions of the 14th division, two regiments of the 184th division of the 60th army and two divisions of the provincial defence forces. Because the enemy's rear area is extensive and has good roads, many of our local armed forces have been crushed by enemy attacks. To disperse enemy forces, our entire 11th Division and part of the 12th Division were dispersed in the enemy rear, which is beneficial to our overall situation.

3. The 91st division of the enemy's 71st army has returned to Meihekou and is preparing to launch a third offensive on the Changbai Mountains. We are preparing to smash this offensive. Enemy forces stationed now in eastern Liaoning consist of the entire new sixth army and 52nd army, the 91st division of the 71st army, the entire 21st division of the 60th army, two regiments of the 184th division of the 60th army and several divisions of provincial defence forces.

4. We will take advantage of the period before the Songhua River thaws to annihilate the enemy, to improve the situation in southern Manchuria and to prepare for the difficulties we will encounter when the Songhua River thaws. At that time, Northern Manchuria will be unable to send reinforcements and the enemy will concentrate its forces to tackle southern Manchuria alone.

5. The present population of the four counties in the Changbai Mountains region is only 220,000; because we cannot yet expect recruits from the enemy rear for the time being, our greatest difficulty is lack of manpower. We are attempting to solve this problem ourselves while at the same time seeking help from northern Manchuria. We maintain that although both extensive guerrilla warfare and necessary positional warfare are currently being employed in southern Manchuria, mobile warfare is still our principal tactic.

6. Jinguang³³³ is still in command at the front.

(Return telegram sent by Chen Yun and Xiao Hua to the Central Military Commission of the CPC, the Northeast Bureau and Lin Biao on February 11, 1947.)

VII

The three telegrams, two on the fifth at nine o'clock and 12 o'clock

(saying that the enemy had placed water mines) and one on the sixth (reporting that the enemy's 184th division has been transferred to Zhengjiatun³³⁴ and that the 93rd army would probably be transferred to the Northeast), were all received. Taking southern Manchuria and the overall situation in the Northeast into consideration, we offer the following opinions:

1. We anticipate that after the 93rd army arrives, the enemy will not launch offensives in the south and the north at the same time (their forces are still insufficient), nor will they take the offensive in the north while engaging in defence in the south (because our 3rd and 4th Columns pose a serious threat for the enemy). We expect that the enemy will attack first in the south and then the north in an attempt to destroy us one by one.

2. If the main forces in northern Manchuria do not come to our aid when the enemy attacks the south and then the north, we anticipate that southern Manchuria will be crushed and northern Manchuria will be vulnerable soon thereafter.

3. After our main forces in northern Manchuria are moved south, it will still be possible for the enemy to launch an offensive in the north while defending in the south, but by then our forces in southern Manchuria will be very large and we would quite possibly be able to stop any advance northward. In case we should fail to do so and lose the city of Harbin,³³⁵ that would still be better than having the enemy wipe out our forces in the south and then move north to capture Harbin because we would still have bases in the north and the south and the whole Northeast could carry on a protracted struggle.

4. Even after our main forces in northern Manchuria have moved southward, the danger remains that southern Manchuria could be crushed if the enemy concentrates its forces. But an even more likely possibility is that, in utilizing the main forces that are transferred south plus the 3rd and 4th Columns, we can wipe out the enemy piecemeal by taking advantage of the mountain areas of southern Manchuria, thus keeping southern Manchuria in our hands and delaying the enemy's northward advance, and even holding northern Manchuria. If we can annihilate the new first army and two divisions of the new sixth army, things will go well in the Northeast. Even if more diehard enemy forces arrive from areas south of the Great Wall, their combat effectiveness will be relatively poor, so this will not represent a big problem for us.

5. If our forces in southern Manchuria are crushed despite of our best efforts, we could leave some forces in the enemy rear in southern Manchuria and transfer a portion of our main forces to eastern and northern Manchuria

so that all of our forces will not be pinned down in the enemy rear in southern Manchuria.

6. Our main forces in northern Manchuria must seize Huadian and Heishizhen in their move southward. It would be better still if they could occupy Panshi and other places. However, it is likely that they will not be able to take Huadian and Panshi and will have to join the 3rd and 4th Columns in Jinchuan, Huinan and Liuhe. Even so, the possibility still exists that our southern Manchuria forces can wipe out the enemy and hold and expand our base areas.

7. We ask you to decide in light of the overall situation how many divisions in northern Manchuria should be transferred south. Please brief us on the route they will take once this southward move is decided upon so our operations can support them.

8. After our main forces have moved south, we will still have to rely on northern Manchuria for help with recruits and money.

9. Water in the Xiaofengman reservoir is being released. Will our forces be able to cross the river in the lower reaches? If they are forced to cross in the upper reaches of Fengman, they should strive to get across before the ice thaws.

Please consider the above opinions.

(Telegram sent by Xiao Jinguang,
Chen Yun and Xiao Hua to Lin Biao
on March 7, 1947.)

VIII

Your telegram of the 28th has been received.

1. Xiao and Cheng³³⁶ have returned to Linjiang to discuss deployment. We believe that the enemy poses a serious immediate threat³³⁷ in southern Manchuria, which will become even more serious in the days to come. Although the enemy forces are large, its present main force consists of only two regiments of the 22nd division and four regiments of the 13th army. All other divisions are either weak or not at full strength. If we can annihilate the bulk of the 22nd and 89th divisions, it will be possible to smash future enemy attacks. We have concentrated five main divisions of the two columns for mobile warfare. We have decided to strive to maintain the whole Changbai Mountains region even at the cost of two-thirds to three-quarters of the 3rd and the 4th Columns. From an overall perspective, this decision

was quite necessary. The enemy is now and will continue to be numerous and closely spaced. Therefore, we are determined to fight a few fierce, tough and risky battles by persisting in mobile warfare. Without this determination, we would be indecisive as to what battles to fight, and consequently, our troops would undoubtedly become worn out and we would lose the mountain bastions, which would be damaging to the overall situation. Experience shows that when we are afraid of losses, the losses become amplified. From February 5 until now, our troops have fought eight battles and captured about 10,000 enemy troops; at the same time, our main forces suffered 3,000 casualties.

2. For northern Manchuria we suggest:

(1) For the moment there is no need to send troops south because in the face of multiple blockades and frequent pursuit in enemy areas the cadres will only become demoralized (based on our experience in the enemy rear in eastern Liaoning). If we engage in battles, we would not be able to take care of the wounded, in which case it is most likely that even with losses we would fail to accomplish our task, or we would accomplish our task by fighting the enemy in a state of fatigue. It will be more advantageous if these troops join the main forces in northern Manchuria in persistent and hard fighting northwest of Changchun.

(2) Northern Manchuria can send a main division to eastern Manchuria to reinforce Huadian and pursue active operations against the enemy, train our eastern Manchurian troops in combat style and maintain our transportation links with eastern Manchuria. This division can be transferred to southern Manchuria if necessary.

(3) Our main forces in northern Manchuria can launch offensives ahead of schedule before the enemy sends more troops to southern Manchuria.

(4) Your decision to provide southern Manchuria with additional recruits has strengthened our determination. We hope that large numbers will arrive quickly. We need the first group to come down as soon as possible. In addition, we ask you to send two ready-formed supplementary regiments. In seven days we will dispatch to northern Manchuria cadres at and above the level of squad leader to lead three supplementary regiments of new soldiers south. With your support in manpower, we will fight courageously.

(Telegram sent by Xiao Jinguang,
Chen Yun, Xiao Hua and Cheng Shicai
to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen and Gao Gang
on March 31, 1947.)

IX

Through the combined efforts of our main forces in eastern Liaoning and all of our Party organizations and troops behind enemy lines, the three offensives launched by our main forces in crossing the Songhua River from northern Manchuria,³³⁸ we smashed the three attacks mounted by the enemy on Linjiang over the past three months;³³⁹ nearly 10,000 enemy troops were captured, 20 enemy battalions (excluding those wiped out behind enemy lines) were annihilated and five towns were recovered.³⁴⁰ These victories, however, should not throw us off guard. The enemy still plans to concentrate their forces in an attempt to destroy southern Manchuria first when the Songhua River begins to thaw, making it more difficult for our main forces in northern Manchuria to support southern Manchuria. The enemy has already transferred five divisions of reinforcements from Rehe, Beiping and Tianjin to the Northeast (most or all of which are likely to engage in offensives against southern Manchuria), and they have begun their fourth offensive on the Changbai Mountains region. Having learned from their first three failures, they have strengthened their forces and better organized their offensive. Nevertheless, our positions in southern Manchuria must be maintained. At present, conditions have improved in eastern Liaoning. Although enemy forces are large, their main forces consists of only the 22nd and 89th divisions. Therefore, the enemy offensive can and must be smashed.

The current tasks for all Party organizations in eastern Liaoning are as follows:

1. High-ranking cadres in our armed forces should acquire a clear understanding of the importance to the whole Northeast and to the whole country of smashing enemy offensives and maintaining southern Manchuria. We must be determined to engage in fierce and difficult battles at any cost to wipe out enemy troops and smash enemy offensives. Losses are inevitable in continuous fighting, but achieving overall victory at the cost of local interests is a necessary precondition to ensure the recovery and development of each locality.

2. Our troops in enemy rear areas should maintain a spirit of fearing no hardship, conduct active operations and strictly carry out the task of supporting our operations at the front. They should mobilize the peasants whenever and wherever they can and protect the peasants engaged in spring plowing on the land they received in the land reform. Meanwhile, supplies should be prepared in advance for any break in communications or even more difficult situations which may arise during the fighting. This also calls for a spirit of subordinating local interests to overall interests.

3. All comrades working in the localities as well as in logistical and government organs must show even greater initiative and unlimited willingness to improve their efforts so as to ensure victory on the battle front.

4. Our struggle will have the complete cooperation of our forces throughout the Northeast in addition to their aid in manpower and supplies, but we must think entirely in terms of self-reliance in order to avoid dependence or lack of initiative.

(General order from the Eastern Liaoning
Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC
on mobilizing all Party members to smash the fourth
enemy offensive on March 31, 1947.)

X

The enemy has now concentrated fairly large forces and has begun to attack southern Manchuria. We must demonstrate strong determination to smash enemy attacks. We should not waver in the slightest in carrying on the struggle in southern Manchuria. We should not recoil or show fear before the enemy. Since the loss of Andong, southern Manchuria has resolutely smashed three enemy offensives against the Changbai Mountains region, wiping out more than two divisions of enemy forces, capturing 10,000 enemy troops and recovering five county towns; this has encouraged the masses and sustained our struggle behind enemy lines. True, this turnabout and development of the situation has come about through northern Manchuria sending troops south three times which created conditions favourable for victory in southern Manchuria, but it is also due in part to the efforts and resolute struggle of all the Party organizations, the government, the army units and the people in southern Manchuria. Our main forces, which have struck at the enemy with deadly blows and consequently changed the relative strength of the two sides as well as the situation in southern Manchuria, played a vital role. Experience shows that as long as we carry out resolute struggle and have unfaltering determination and confidence, we will be able to smash enemy offensives, change the balance of forces, improve the situation and hold southern Manchuria. Today, conditions are even more favourable than before for shattering enemy offensives. After being barraged by our continuous attacks on various battlefields in the Northeast, the enemy's combat effectiveness has decreased while our strength has increased with each

battle. Having suffered devastation at the hands of the Kuomintang, the masses have come to understand and sympathize with us. Their cooperation in eastern, western and northern Manchuria has not slackened despite the thawing of the Songhua River. At present, the main enemy forces which were transferred to reinforce southern Manchuria are not large, and most of these have been defeated. Moreover, the morale of the Yunnan troops is low. Enemy troop organization is in disorder and enemy reserves are more numerous than before but poorer in quality. If one to two divisions can be annihilated in the near future, the situation in southern Manchuria will undergo a fundamental change. The problem facing us at the moment is how to raise our morale and muster the staunch determination to fight major difficult and fierce battles. The key to victory in war is to try to gain the initiative, weaken the enemy and seize any favourable opportunities, even minor ones, to assemble superior forces and destroy the enemy forces one by one. If we adopt a passive faltering attitude which stifles any sort of action and wait for opportunities that suit us, then the more we draw back, the closer the enemy will bear down on us, forcing us to take the defensive while they maintain the offensive. Proceeding that way, we will never be able to create favourable conditions or fight decisive battles. The outcome of this kind of passivity will certainly be defeat. In fighting major difficult and fierce battles, we will most certainly suffer casualties. To win and wipe out the enemy, we must be determined to make sacrifices. Our strength cannot be sustained unless we pay a price in exchange for a higher price to be paid by the enemy. In other words, only by making some sacrifices in return for victory can we survive and grow. We should promote revolutionary heroism and display courage in the face of a numerically superior enemy, striking the enemy hard with an active, responsible, hard-working, resolute, courageous and indomitable spirit. These are the most noble qualities of our revolutionary soldiers. Such officers and men deserve the respect, love and admiration of the entire Party and the people of the whole country. War is the most arduous, the cruelest and the most serious of struggles. All officers and men must resolutely carry out orders, strive to fulfill their tasks, strictly observe rules of discipline and take good care of the manpower and material in the base areas. The commanders must be well informed about the enemy and the terrain and must carefully organize their forces, paying close attention to cooperation, coordination and communication. They must also avoid a rash style of fighting and take good care of the soldiers. In order to improve and coordinate the operations of the forces at the front, it has been decided that Zeng and

Han³⁴¹ will form a provisional headquarters at the front. Han arrived at the 10th Division on the 4th and took up joint command with Zeng.

(Telegram sent by Xiao Jinguang, Chen Yun, Xiao Hua, Cheng Shicai, Luo Shunchu, Wu Kehua, Mo Wenhua and Tang Kai to the commanders of the various corps and to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen and Gao Gang on March 31, 1947.)

XI

We are now dispatching cadres for three supplementary regiments to receive the new recruits. Your support has greatly encouraged us. Of course, even if there were no new recruits we would make repeated efforts to hold the Changbai Mountains region. These new recruits have improved our favourable situation.

It can be said that we have solved one problem, that is, how to inspire an unequivocal determination to persist in fighting in southern Manchuria—not just in southern Manchuria where we are carrying out guerrilla warfare, but in the entire Changbai Mountains region. Only by so doing will we be able to deter the enemy very effectively in northern Manchuria. Since this question has been settled, we now dare to exclaim bravely and responsibly that even if all of our present forces were exhausted and southern Manchuria still could not be held, we would continue fighting anyway, for this is important to the entire Northeast and to the country as a whole. We have dismissed the idea of retreating to conserve our current strength, which would lead to the loss of southern Manchuria and all of the Northeast. If we act shortsightedly, we will do harm both to ourselves and to the overall situation. [Xiao] Jinguang's greatest achievement in his command at the front has been to resolve the military cadres' fear of casualties and their tendency to conserve strength. Having solved this problem, our tactics have become more flexible. In southern Manchuria today, we now understand the meaning of the saying "as long as the green mountains remain, there will be no shortage of firewood." This refers not only to the strength of the armed forces, rather, it refers mainly to maintaining at any cost the entire Changbai Mountains region.

We do not dare to say that all our problems in southern Manchuria have been solved, but we can say that this is the case for most of them.

Now, I should like to raise for your consideration a different issue. I have thought this matter over, and I hope that you will also give it careful consideration.

Judging from our experience in the entire Northeast and in the country as a whole, we know that we are outnumbered by the enemy (less so in the Northeast). However, their current military strength is still inadequate. Therefore they had no choice but to adopt a plan calling for “determining priorities and assembling large forces to destroy us one by one.” The enemy has benefited from this strategy somewhat in northern Jiangsu and southern Shandong because the enemy has two advantages over us—more soldiers and good transportation.

Our forces under enemy attack are in difficulty. I have no idea what it is like in northern Jiangsu or southern Shandong, but taking southern Manchuria as an example, the primary difficulty is the sparse population in the Changbai Mountains region, which means paucity of grain, housing, manpower, transportation and facilities for caring for wounded soldiers. As far as local conditions are concerned, this region is suitable only for guerrilla warfare, but from the perspective of the overall situation, we need to conduct mobile warfare. In regions like this, without support in manpower and necessary supplies from other regions, mobile warfare is out of the question. The second difficulty is the continuous fighting. For example, when northern Manchuria starts its offensives, we cannot and must not rest, since we have to impede the enemy in order to assist northern Manchuria in annihilating them. Only by taking every opportunity to attack the enemy can we improve our positions and get ready for further enemy attacks. If northern Manchuria ceases its offensives, the enemy will immediately rush south to attack us, forcing us to fight when we need to rest, and so the fighting will drag on. We have had no chance to rest and reorganize over the last 20 to 30 days. If this situation is not understood by the rest of Manchuria, their aid for us may be slow in arriving, which will be very disadvantageous for southern Manchuria.

In summary, eastern, western and northern Manchuria must understand our situation in southern Manchuria and afford us sufficient and timely assistance in military matters, manpower and necessary supplies.

After considering this matter, I have come to the conclusion that those under enemy attack, such as in southern Manchuria, must overcome the shortsighted Rightist tendency to conserve strength and bow before difficulties. Generally speaking, if this problem is recognized, it will be easy to overcome. Communists are revolutionary by nature; furthermore, under direct enemy suppression this conservative tendency is not likely to pass

unnoticed, so it can be easily overcome through education. On the other hand, the cadres who are in a more advantageous situation where the enemy is on the defensive are not likely to be greatly aware of the difficulties confronting those under enemy attack or of the vital significance that their successes and failures have for other battle fronts. Since the enemy is not attacking them for the moment, these cadres tend to be shortsighted and relax out of satisfaction with the status quo. This tendency is easily overlooked and therefore difficult to quickly and completely overcome. This tendency could slow efforts to hinder enemy actions and cause us to overlook possibilities for coordinating manpower and supplies. I would say there are two factors behind this tendency. 1. Having not been directly attacked by the enemy, these cadres are unlikely to take into consideration both local and overall as well as immediate and long-term interests. 2. During the eight-year anti-Japanese war and the ten-year civil war, our experiences were different and we had neither the same possibilities nor the same needs as we do now. During the anti-Japanese war, we had the enemy on the defensive in several stages (after the Pacific War³⁴² began, they were on the defensive throughout China), and there was not much need for coordination among our forces. In today's civil war, the enemy is on the offensive and trying their best to concentrate large forces to destroy us one by one. During the ten-year civil war, it was not possible for various strategic regions to coordinate their actions and they were not accustomed to such a practice. In today's civil war, however, coordination has become an absolute necessity, and any weakness, carelessness or delay in this regard will undoubtedly hurt us.

The strategy of the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau for countering the enemy's policy of destroying us one by one is to coordinate our operations in order to destroy the enemy one by one. This strategy has been decided on and is being implemented. But I believe we must overcome the obstacles to accomplishing this. That is, during enemy attacks, any Rightist tendencies must be eliminated, and in supporting a battlefield the tendency not to provide active and timely support must also be corrected. I propose that the Northeast Bureau hold a meeting during which relevant personnel from various battlefields can exchange opinions, those under enemy attack can make known what assistance they require and the supporting side can discuss to what extent they can render aid. The two sides respectively can be assigned different tasks pertaining to persistence and support in order to increase our efficiency in fighting. I believe this is more than just a temporary measure. Even if Harbin is lost and northern Manchuria is divided, the enemy's strategy remains the same—to destroy us one by one. It is necessary for us to be mentally prepared in advance and make

realistic calculations of the possibilities of coordination in military operations among various regions in Manchuria and of the extent to which manpower and material support can be provided. Please consider the need to call such a meeting.

(Excerpt from Chen Yun's letter
of April 2, 1947 to Gao Gang.)

HOW TO MAKE FEWER MISTAKES

February 7, 1947

Can we make fewer mistakes? This is a good question. If I, a member of the Central Committee, act incorrectly, this can have many consequences.

How can we make fewer mistakes and avoid grievous ones? When I was in Yan'an, I attributed my errors to inexperience. Chairman Mao explained to me that I was not inexperienced, but that my method of thinking was incorrect. He suggested that I study philosophy. Some time later he reiterated that my errors originated in my way of thinking, citing Zhang Guotao¹⁴³ as an example of a man who was not inexperienced. In discussing this matter with me a third time, Chairman Mao again insisted that my mistakes were due to my way of thinking.

Later I read the works of Chairman Mao written from the Jinggang Mountain period to the period in Yan'an, studied his way of solving problems and tried to discover the root of my errors. I drew the conclusion that I had strayed from actual situations at a given time and in a given place. Faulty results always follow from mistaken actions, and mistaken actions always derive from faulty understanding. Action is governed by understanding, and action is the product of understanding. For example, how was it that Chiang Kai-shek could proclaim he would eliminate us within three to five months? He made this incorrect judgement because he underestimated the close ties between our troops and the masses, and he exaggerated the power of his sophisticated weapons while ignoring his troops' low morale and serious divorce from the masses. The failure of the enemy's 195th Division was due to the mistaken ideas of Zhao Gongwu³⁴³ and Chen Linda,³⁴⁴ who thought that our troops were scattered and could not be concentrated. Presently we are operating behind enemy lines and some comrades get a bit frightened because they overestimate the enemy's strength, as if taking a skullcap for Mao'er Hill.³⁴⁵ So I think that in working on any task, we should

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the meeting held by the Liaodong Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

expend 99 percent of our energy on ascertaining actual conditions. If we clearly understand the situation, we will be able to make correct decisions. In Yan'an, I worked at the Financial and Economic Office²⁴² after leaving Zaoyuan.³⁴⁶ Whenever I was to deliver a speech, I would always busy myself in gathering information on relevant matters up to the last night. Do not make hasty decisions before understanding a situation.

Seeking truth from facts can be easy or it can be difficult. In seeking truth from facts, we try to discover how to deal with a specific situation through making concrete analyses of actual conditions. The reason why a person will err is that he makes a hasty decision before he understands the situation; his subjective view is divorced from the real situation. Of course, it was not the case that we knew nothing at all about actual conditions when we made mistakes in the past. But we took a one-sided view and not a comprehensive one, mistaking a part for the whole. A one-sided viewpoint cannot reflect reality. This is what causes the difficulty in seeking truth from facts. I have been involved with the revolution for over 20 years and my errors were due to one-sidedness of understanding.

To make fewer mistakes we should avoid one-sidedness in our understanding. I have concluded that there are three ways to do so: one is exchange, two is comparison and three is reconsideration.

Exchange means to exchange positive and negative viewpoints in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of things. We should especially elicit opposing views, which can make up for any deficiency in our understanding of things. Even if contrary opinions are incorrect, they may reflect some aspect of things or include some points drawn from experience. Because of this, we need to analyse opposing viewpoints and draw something useful from these. Chen Duxiu,¹⁸⁶ Li Lisan³⁴⁷ and Wang Ming²²² made mistakes not because they were foolish or crazy, but mainly because they paid attention to one aspect of things and ignored other aspects. The revolutionary "high tide" of 1930 could be said to be "high" when contrasted with the low ebb following the failure of the Great Revolution of 1927, but it was not "higher" than the situation before it. At that time Red Army forces were stronger than they had been, but not strong enough to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's troops. The January 28th Incident³⁴⁸ in 1932 gave rise to a high tide in the nationwide anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement, but nationally, a revolutionary high tide had not yet appeared. The faulty conclusion at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee³⁴⁹ and the Provisional Central Committee's incorrect Resolution on Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces³⁵⁰ were based on that erroneous appraisal of the situation at the time. We should not judge that the comrades involved

misread the situation completely, but they did exaggerate one aspect of things. This demonstrates that we should elicit contrasting opinions. If any of these are correct, they can make up for the deficiency in our understanding of things; if they are fallacious, we should refute them. The more fallacious they are, the more thoroughly we should refute them. Refutation requires that we derive antitheses. This process will deepen our understanding. Correct ideas generally result from the systematic refutation of erroneous ones. Erroneous bourgeois and pseudo-Marxist-Leninist ideas actually assisted in the establishment of Chairman Mao's correct Marxist-Leninist theory. In writing "On Protracted War," Chairman Mao first collected arguments for the theories of national subjugation and quick victory, and through analysis and refutation he was able to draw the correct conclusion that the anti-Japanese war would be a protracted war. In "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Chairman Mao first criticized the erroneous ideas that the problems of strategy in China's revolutionary war could be solved by studying war in general, by learning from the experience of the Russian revolutionary war, and by copying the methods of the Northern Expedition. He then put forth the correct view that we must study the character, laws, strategies and tactics appropriate to a Chinese revolutionary war, especially those of the ten-year Agrarian Revolutionary War. In "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art," Chairman Mao first refuted the viewpoints that literature and art are "supra-class" endeavours and that the position of writers and artists is of little importance, and then he expounded the basic principle that literature and art must serve the people. So in exchanging views, especially with those who disagree with us or with representatives of other classes, first we should be clear that the aim of exchange is to gain a comprehensive understanding of things. In trying to achieve this, we should put ourselves in the other person's position and consider whether or not their opinions are sound. Whatever ideas are sensible and realistic should be accepted. Some comrades among us are often unwilling to discuss or exchange ideas with those who hold contrary opinions. This is not helpful.

To exchange views is to gain a comprehensive understanding of things, and to compare is to judge the nature of things more accurately. Without comparison we cannot be clear about the causes and nature or essence of matters. A touchstone is used when testing the purity of gold, and there is also a standard which is used as a reference in testing blood. If we had compared the revolutionary high tide of 1932 with the aftermath of the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927 and with the three armed uprisings in Shanghai,³⁵¹ we would have been able to correctly evaluate this high tide of 1932 and then work out appropriate strategies; we would not have adopted

a “Left” adventurist policy. Several years ago, an American general named Stilwell³⁵² brought an investigative team to Yan’an to compare our policy towards the USA with the USA’s policy towards us, and he finally changed his attitude towards us. After making comparisons we can more clearly and thoroughly understand any issue. As to whether we should persist in fighting in the Southern Manchurian Base Area, if we compare the hardships we are presently experiencing in persisting in fighting there with the problems which would probably arise out of a future retreat to the Changbai Mountains, and if we weigh all the advantages and disadvantages, it will be seen that we are more likely to continue fighting in the Southern Manchurian Base Area than to retreat.

Comparison too is a process of understanding, but reconsideration involves both understanding and experience. To reconsider is first to have made a decision, then to elicit opposing viewpoints and attempt to refute those views in order to further improve our understanding. The most important thing is to deepen our knowledge during actual practice. We should adhere to and develop that which proves to be correct. When shortcomings are discovered, we should correct these; when mistakes are found, we should rectify these at once. In short, to judge, practise, review, and to rectify are our methods for avoiding serious errors.

According to my experience, if we satisfy the above three requirements we can understand things more comprehensively, avoid one-sidedness, make correct decisions, and seek truth from facts. With regard to this, we should not attempt to save face. We should make no bones about our mistakes and openly correct them. Otherwise, we are bound to meet with setbacks. The harder you try to save face, the more likely you are to lose face. If you are not afraid of losing face, then you will be able to save face. We should seek truth, not reputation. If you are doing so, you will not be displeased when you are criticized.

We must examine what a person who has made mistakes did, without trying to save face for him; we should just explain the facts to him. If everyone is willing to base their thinking and decisions on facts, we will be able to reach consensus within the Party.

To seek truth, not reputation, involves the issue of viewpoints. If we have a correct point of view, we can do things this way. If one examines all issues with a view to personal interests, he won’t be able to find the truth even in a lifetime. This is where the conflict between individualism and Marxism-Leninism lies. To seek truth from facts, one must adhere to the viewpoint of the proletariat. If everyone does so, we are more likely to adopt the same methods and views, and our work can be done smoothly. Within

the Party we should take only this stance, which is appropriate for members of the Communist Party. We can admit our mistakes in talking one to one, at Party group meetings or at larger meetings, and even before thousands of people. What we should be examining is what has been done, regardless of who did it or whether someone might lose face. In doing so, there will be less wrangling and our work can be accomplished smoothly.

IMPROVING INNER-PARTY ACTIVITIES

April 22, 1947

There are some irregularities in the activities of the Party organizations at both higher and lower levels in eastern Liaoning. Their origin can be traced partly to outside influences and partly to the local Party organizations themselves.

Party cadres in eastern Liaoning come from all parts of the country. Some arrived earlier, some later. In a complicated situation in which fighting is sporadic, petty disputes are liable to occur and must be resolved according to principle.

I want to propose three points:

1. We should publicly and frankly make our position clear as to what is right and what is wrong. This is a principled attitude and no one should be offended by it. If we don't take that attitude, it will only create more problems rather than solve them.

If you are criticized, you shouldn't fly into a rage. It is better for your critic to speak out in public than to gossip within a small circle, better for him to confront you face to face than to whisper behind your back. Direct contacts help clarify the facts immediately.

2. All Party organizations should firmly adhere to democratic centralism.

Democracy is not only necessary in normal situations; it is also and particularly important under the current circumstances. Unless all members exchange their views, a centralized opinion will not emerge. Even if a formal consensus is reached, it may not be the correct one.

Centralism cannot be achieved if we emphasize it to the neglect of democracy. On the other hand, when opinions are exchanged frequently, a consensus can easily be reached.

A central leadership can be established only through strict adherence to

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Working Conference of the Eastern Liaoning Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

democratic centralism and through practice.

There can be no democracy without centralism. When someone's opinion is not accepted, therefore, he should neither be angry nor disregard the decision that has been made on the basis of centralism.

3. Every Party member has the right to express his views and join the discussion of problems inside the Party. But at the same time he has the duty to obey the decision of the Party organization and to carry it out.

It would be wrong for anyone to stop working or become passive just because he was having trouble dealing with certain matters or people. Observing discipline is especially important when one's opinion has been rejected and when one is personally affected by a decision.

Within the Party, the individual member must subordinate his interests to those of the Party as a whole. The individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level and the entire membership to the Central Committee. These four rules are indispensable. They represent the iron discipline of our Party and serve as a powerful tool for improving inner-Party activities and increasing the Party's effectiveness.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE AGRARIAN REFORM IN EASTERN LIAONING

April 16, 1948

Last July and August 2,000 cadres from eastern Liaoning and four work teams from northern Manchuria²⁵³ went to the countryside, where they concentrated on expropriating landlords and despotic rich peasants. In July they worked slowly so as to achieve the best possible results in the agrarian reform. However, as the people came to realize that the Eighth Route Army was good and the Central Army²⁶⁹ was bad, and as their morale was raised by our army's victorious advance on all fronts, they became so eager for agrarian reform that they would seek out work teams and ask them to come and help carry it out. At the same time, after prolonged fighting in eastern Liaoning, we were in desperate need of reinforcements of both soldiers and civilian auxiliaries. Since most of our main force in northern Manchuria had moved to positions along the Siping-Meihekou Railway in Jilin,³⁵³ we also had to organize local armed forces to eliminate bandits. It was against this background that the reform accelerated and broadened in scope.

In the seven months from last July through January, land was distributed among the peasants in most of Liaoning, with the exception of the areas recently liberated in the autumn-winter offensive. Land was also distributed in two-thirds to three-fourths of Andong³⁵⁴ and Liaonan. In general, the reform was successful. We abolished the feudal land system and mobilized the peasants, 100,000 of them joined the army, and bandits were wiped out in most of our areas. But as the reform rapidly expanded, we failed to differentiate the classes properly, firmly unite with the middle peasants and distinguish between tenant rich peasants and old rich peasants. As a result, in many places rich peasants were wrongly classified as landlords. The policy of protecting industry and commerce was not closely followed. For a period people were expropriated indiscriminately and many were killed. Also, we made many other "Left" mistakes, which we did not rectify until last January

Excerpt from a report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

when the Central Committee and its Northeast Bureau required us to do so. We are still working to correct our mistakes in the old liberated areas, and in the new ones we are first expropriating the big landlords, in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee. In both old and new liberated areas we are concentrating on spring ploughing and at the same time correcting mistakes and mobilizing the masses.

I was responsible for directing the agrarian reform, so I should bear the main responsibility for the mistakes. They were made because we didn't have a clear understanding of certain questions.

First, we were not clear about the degree of emancipation that was possible for the poor and tenant peasants at that stage. In retrospect, we should have considered them basically emancipated when the surplus land and draught animals of the landlords and rich peasants had been distributed among them. Such problems as the shortage of draught animals should have been solved gradually as production expanded. But we couldn't wait; instead, we expropriated more than we should have, and the result was that we isolated ourselves.

Second, we were aware that the rich peasants were taking a wait-and-see attitude towards the agrarian reform, but we overlooked the need to firmly unite with them. Consequently, we distributed the draught animals of the well-to-do middle peasants and encroached on the interests of other middle peasants. This was of no great economic benefit to the poor peasants and farm labourers, and to us it was politically damaging.

Third, we classified all those who hired labour on a long-term basis as rich peasants, regardless of how much labour they exploited. We didn't realize that those who derived less than 25 percent of their total income from exploitation should be classified as middle peasants. Many middle peasants were therefore wrongly classified as rich peasants. As for tenant rich peasants, we overemphasized their status as sub-landlords who sublet the land they rented. Since they enjoyed a high political position in the countryside and owned many draught animals, they were generally treated the same way as the old rich peasants.

Fourth, confusion arose about industrial and commercial policy. That was because we did not clearly appreciate that protecting industry and commerce and developing the economy would benefit both the cities and the countryside, the workers, the urban poor and the peasants and also support the war.

Fifth, there was the problem of people being beaten. That was because we didn't realize that while the peasants beat the landlords out of a sense of justice, the mass movement took in all sorts of people, and that if you

allowed beating to go on, it would lead to chaos and terrible things. If, instead, despotic landlords had been punished in accordance with court judgements, justice could have been upheld without creating turmoil.

Sixth, in the movement the peasants always had good cause to make their demands. But looking back now from an overall, long-term perspective, we can see that many of those demands were not reasonable. Indeed, even at the time we recognized that some of them were not. Therefore, we should not merely drift along with the movement, tailing after the masses.

Seventh, when the morale of the masses is high, it is all right to expand the movement. But unless we have explicit guidelines and enough capable cadres, expanding it will only lead to trouble.

ON THE PROPER MANAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEES IN ENTERPRISES THAT HAVE BEEN RECENTLY TAKEN OVER

August 1, 1948

I

During the past two years we have taken over many large, technically advanced enterprises, such as railways, mines, power stations, post and telecommunications services, factories in both light and heavy industries and public utilities. At the time we took them over, the situation in these enterprises was as follows:

A. There were large numbers of manual workers and also many administrative personnel. Both groups were wage earners in the enterprises run by the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang government, but they held different positions in the enterprises and in society. The workers laboured under the most difficult conditions but received the lowest pay. The low-level administrative personnel had hardly better working and living conditions than the workers, yet many of them retained the old attitude of intellectuals and looked down on workers. In the days when the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang reactionaries ruled and oppressed the Chinese people, some managerial personnel had become accustomed to controlling the workers in a bureaucratic way.

Before the surrender of the Japanese imperialists all the senior and some of the middle-level administrative personnel in the enterprises in northeast China were Japanese, but after August 15, 1945,²⁶² they were all replaced by Chinese. The senior Chinese administrative personnel promoted after that

Decision drafted on behalf of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was first published in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on August 7, 1948, under the title "Decision Concerning Employees in Publicly Owned Enterprises." Comrade Chen Yun then served as chairman of the Northeast Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs.

date had all been middle staff before. When we took over these enterprises, the senior and middle staff were in charge of production and business operations. Some of the middle staff had been promoted from the lower levels, and their social status was close to that of their junior colleagues. The rest of them and the newly promoted senior administrators—even though they held high or relatively high posts in the enterprises—had a social status no higher than that of professionals. Both before and after the Japanese surrender the senior and middle administrators controlled the workers and junior staff. The workers resented the managers in general, and they hated a few who had been particularly tyrannical.

B. When we took over the enterprises, both workers and administrative staff were confused about the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but their confusion differed in nature and degree. Even the workers were unaware of the realities and took a more or less orthodox view of the Kuomintang, but soon after the democratic government was installed, they became enthusiastic about it. They were worried that our army might withdraw and hoped very much that it would win. The junior administrative staff belonged to a social stratum close to that of the workers. At that time, however, the workers were not yet mobilized, and since the senior and middle staff still occupied the important posts, most of the junior staff followed their lead. To a considerable degree, the upper levels of management regarded the Kuomintang as the legitimate government and greeted the democratic government with indifference or even resistance. A few administrative staff members took part in disruptive activities organized by the Kuomintang's underground corps. Under these circumstances, quite a few accidents occurred in many enterprises and productivity was very low.

To remedy this situation, we adopted the policy of mobilizing the workers while uniting with and remoulding the administrative staff. Our method was as follows: First, we explained to the workers that the working class was the leading class of the new-democratic society, that they were the masters of their enterprises and that in the past they had worked to create profits for the Japanese and the Kuomintang capitalists but that now they were working for the people and for themselves. At the same time, we dismissed and replaced some evil persons whom the workers detested, and we resolved the contradictions between the workers and some of the administrative staff. As a result, the workers' political awareness was raised and they became responsible about production. Thanks to these changes, productivity increased and the enterprises advanced. Thus, we relied on the workers and united with the administrative staff.

As things stand, the workers are somewhat more enthusiastic about

production than the administrative personnel, but over the past two years the latter, including both the senior and middle staff, have greatly raised their political consciousness, and their enthusiasm for work has risen as well. There are two reasons for this:

(1) We have mobilized the masses of workers in the enterprises and united them with the administrative personnel.

(2) The military situation in northeast China indicates that we will be victorious. Furthermore, the reactionary character of the Kuomintang regime, its corruption and its hateful practice of discriminating against the native personnel have been fully revealed. All this has shattered the staff members' illusions about the Kuomintang.

The morale of the administrative staff is very different today from what it was one or two years ago. Since then, those working in the Kuomintang government's enterprises have gradually come to recognize, through their own experience, how reactionary and corrupt the regime is. This has made it possible for us to unite with and remould the old administrative personnel in enterprises that have been or will be taken over.

Over the past two years we have made both Right and "Left" mistakes in handling the relations between workers and administrative staff in a few enterprises. The Right mistake was that we put too much trust in the old administrative staff and not enough in the workers. As a consequence, we neither aroused the enthusiasm of the latter nor educated and remoulded the former, so we were unable to increase productivity and transform the enterprises. The "Left" mistake was that we paid attention only to the workers and neglected the office staff. We did not analyse their strengths and weaknesses and sometimes allowed the workers to attack them indiscriminately. The result was antagonism between the two groups, which undermined their unity and was bound to impede production and harm the enterprises. Our experience indicates that we must keep two things in mind when dealing with the contradictions between workers' and administrative staff. First, the workers are the basic productive forces, but the administrative staff are also an essential part of the enterprises. In order to increase production and transform the enterprises, we must make sure that manual and mental workers co-operate and that their enthusiasm and initiative are brought into full play. Second, in order to raise the political consciousness of the workers and enhance their enthusiasm for production, to unite with and remould the administrative staff and to get the two groups to unite and help each other, we must handle the contradictions between them properly.

And to do that we must remember that during the rule of the Japanese and the Kuomintang different types of administrative staff maintained different relations with the workers. We should deal with these different types in accordance with the following principles:

1. From 70 to 90 percent of an enterprise's administrative staff are low-level clerks who are not in charge of production, business or personnel. Although many of them have the old intellectuals' habit of looking down on workers, their working and living conditions are similar to those of the workers. We should therefore unite with them and treat them the same way we do the workers. Meanwhile, we should help them get over their prejudices.

2. Technicians, engineers and specialists are important in running complex, large-scale modern enterprises. So we should offer jobs to all technical personnel, including those who are not in favour of communism, so long as they are devoted to their work and do nothing to sabotage the enterprise. Insofar as possible, we should also give them whatever special treatment is necessary to enable them to perform their professional functions and serve the people. Those technicians who co-operate with the workers and make innovations, rejecting conservative ideas and surmounting difficulties, should be encouraged.

3. Special agents who oppressed the workers in enterprises run by the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang government, and labour contractors in mines (not ordinary foremen in other factories) who made careers out of exploiting miners are different from regular administrative personnel. The contradiction between these persons and the workers, who hated them, was acute. Today, in the people's enterprises there shall be no special agents or labour contractors whatever, and no former labour contractors shall be permitted to take charge of production. The workers should be allowed to take contractors who are guilty of heinous crimes to court for punishment and to demand compensation from them.

4. Many persons who were in charge of general management or business matters abused their power and bullied people, pocketed a portion of the employees' rations and wages, took bribes and used their positions for private gain. If they held lucrative posts in enterprises run by the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang government, it was not because of their professional skills but because they had influential connections. To dismiss and replace such persons corresponds not only to the demands of the workers but to the wishes of most of the administrative staff as well. As for those who have embezzled huge sums of money, both managers and employees should ask them to make restitution in accordance with the law. While getting rid of corrupt administrators, we must be careful to differentiate them from those

administrators who did nothing wrong and from junior staff in the same department who were not in positions of authority. These latter categories should be treated differently, so that innocent persons do not come under attack.

5. The middle and senior administrative staff consisted mostly of persons in charge of production and business management, such as station masters and section chiefs of railways; directors, department heads and section chiefs of factories; directors and pit chiefs of mines, and so on. During the Japanese and puppet regimes, most of these positions were held by Japanese. But after August 15, 1945, the Japanese were replaced by Chinese. By the time we took over the enterprises, almost all senior administrators and a number of middle-level ones had been evacuated by the retreating Kuomintang troops. Those who stayed behind have technical knowhow and business skills and are experienced in organizing production and business, so they are very important to the enterprises. During the Japanese and Kuomintang rule, when many of them were to one degree or another in charge of production, business and personnel, their specific functions and the methods they used were very different from those of the labour contractors and special agents. Nevertheless, there are still some contradictions between them and the workers. We must therefore be cautious about employing these people and deal appropriately with the contradictions.

The Japanese and the Kuomintang government managed their enterprises in a capitalist way, relying on the administrators in charge of production and business to control the workers through exploitation and oppression. That kind of management is bound to be bureaucratic. In form, the contradiction arising in the management of production and business was between the workers and the administrators, but in essence it was between the workers and the Japanese and the bureaucrat capitalists. When we take over the enterprises and they become people's enterprises, the source of this contradiction is removed. To achieve unity, the workers' resentment of managerial personnel, stemming from the contradictions of the past, should be resolved through criticism, but not through "sanguinary struggle" or physical violence. It would be wrong to ignore this resentment, for that would only dampen the workers' enthusiasm. The right approach, therefore, is to carry out criticism by the workers and self-criticism by the managers. Those who have offended the workers should apologize to them in the interest of unity.

Although in general the administrators have certain defects in their ideology and work style, their professional and managerial skills are needed for the people's enterprises and for the country's economic development, and

they will continue to be needed in future. We Communists must learn these skills from them. With the exception of a few senior executives who were bureaucrats themselves, enjoyed special status in the old society and are now unwilling to serve the people, and of those administrators who are detested by the workers for the wrongs they have done them and therefore cannot be kept on, all managerial personnel who are devoted to their jobs and don't engage in disruptive activities should be employed. In the matter of assignments, two considerations should be borne in mind. One is that the jobs given to managerial staff should suit their special training. The other is that some of them may have to be transferred to other more appropriate jobs, if their remaining at their original posts would dampen the workers' enthusiasm or discourage the democratic activities essential for enterprises. Those who work with a will, co-operate with the workers and make contributions in production and business management should be rewarded.

II

Junior administrative staff, including technicians and those in charge of production and business, and the middle and senior staff in particular, must change their attitude towards their work and towards the workers as well as their methods of management. To help them change their attitude towards work, we must explain to them the following truths: the Kuomintang regime is bound to be overthrown, and the people's liberation movement is bound to triumph. The transfer of enterprises from the Kuomintang government to the people entails a fundamental change in the nature of those enterprises. In the past they belonged to the bureaucrat-capitalists, so all the workers were creating wealth for a handful of owners. Now that they belong to the people as a whole, the workers are working for the people and for themselves. In the enterprises of the Kuomintang government, personnel were appointed through favouritism, whereas in the people's enterprises, they are appointed on their merits. In the old society it was difficult for the sciences to develop and scientists had few opportunities to apply their knowledge. In the new-democratic society, however, and in the future socialist society—both under the leadership of the Communist Party—boundless prospects will open up for the sciences and for scientists. To help them change their attitude towards workers, we must make it clear to administrative staff that the workers constitute an overwhelming majority in the enterprises, that they are the most important part of the personnel and that they are the fundamental

force creating social wealth. The Japanese and the Kuomintang government managed their enterprises in a capitalist way, forcing the workers under the whip and the threat of starvation to create profits for the Japanese and the bureaucrat-capitalists. Instead of stimulating any enthusiasm for production, they only aroused the workers' resistance. But in the people's enterprises, the workers are the masters. Successful management of a factory or store calls for the enforcement of rules, but also and especially for the workers' voluntary observance of discipline, reinforced by the pressure of public opinion. The people's enterprises therefore should not, and indeed must not, be managed by bureaucratic or oppressive means but by democratic means under centralized leadership.

The remoulding of the managerial staff involves protracted, painstaking educational work, starting from the top level, designed to change their ideology and work style. It demands patience and gentleness. In addition, we must have criticism and self-criticism conducted by the workers and administrative personnel. For this purpose, we can hold discussion or run training courses.

III

To meet the needs of the country's economic development and their own, all enterprises must promote excellent workers and administrative staff and train them to become new managers and technicians. At the same time they should remould the ideology and work style of those administrators who have been kept on after our takeover and help them also to improve their skills through training.

IV

In the enterprises taken over early on, there were some people who had joined the Kuomintang or the Three People's Principles Youth League,²²⁴ either before or after the Japanese surrender, but in those that have been taken over recently, there are more. Both the Kuomintang and the Youth League recruited large numbers of people, individually or collectively, in the enterprises they controlled. Many employees had to join if they wanted to keep their jobs. However, among the members of the two organizations were a small number of special agents who were assigned to keep watch on the

employees. Since we took over the enterprises, these special agents have remained in hiding and engaged in sabotage. We should therefore adopt different policies towards different members of the Kuomintang and the Youth League. Those who joined to keep their jobs must register with the new authorities of the enterprises and explain how they came to join. Then, if they guarantee not to take part in disruptive activities, they can be assigned jobs, but it will be some time before they are allowed to hold important posts. Those who held responsible positions in the Party or the League will be investigated and either dismissed or kept on, depending on whether they are found to be secret agents. We must be on the alert for special agents who stay hidden and eliminate them from enterprises.

V

Even after the old contradictions in production and management between workers and administrators have been resolved and the old methods of management reformed, the people's enterprises will still need a strict system of management, and they will still need administrative personnel who represent the interests of the state and the people. Otherwise, it will be impossible to organize production and business. The new managerial staff will include not only cadres who have been in the revolutionary ranks for many years and newly promoted workers and office staff but also many members of the old managerial staff. So long as these old managers are devoted to their work and exercise their functions and powers according to the rules of the enterprise, all their subordinates, both workers and administrative personnel, including those who are Communist Party members, must obey them.

THE MAIN TASK OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN CHINA TODAY

August 3-4, 1948

The Sixth All-China Labour Congress³⁵⁵ has set forth the main task of the labour movement in China today. What is that task? It is to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the Kuomintang reactionaries, and establish a new-democratic people's republic. On other words, it is to overthrow the Kuomintang reactionaries and the old counter-revolutionary government and set up a new revolutionary government. That is the supreme task the Chinese working class is faced with at the present stage. Workers in both the liberated areas and the areas under Kuomintang rule should strive to accomplish it. The comrades present here are representatives of the workers and serve their interests. We should therefore discuss this main task carefully and publicize it among workers throughout the country, so that every one of them will understand that to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and build a new China is of vital importance to the fundamental interests of the working class and of all our people.

When we put forward the main task of the working class, does that mean we are going to ignore the problems workers face in their daily lives—for example, in the Kuomintang areas, the problem of long hours and low wages, or the fact that workers are not free to organize trade unions? The answer is, no. We shall concern ourselves with and help to solve all the problems relating to the vital interests of the workers. But unless we accomplish the main task, it will be impossible to solve those problems completely, and even if some can be partially solved, the results will not last long. The workers in the Kuomintang areas are still leading a hard life, suffering from exploitation and oppression and being denied freedom. The workers in the liberated areas have obtained democracy, but their standard of living is still very low. Why?

Excerpt from a report to the Sixth All-China Labour Congress. On October 10, 1948, Comrade Chen Yun was elected chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, at the First Plenary Session of its Sixth Executive Committee.

In the final analysis, it is because of exploitation and oppression by the U.S. imperialists and their tools, the Kuomintang reactionaries. Unless we overthrow them, our workers will have no way out.

The only solution is to overthrow the Kuomintang. That is the conclusion to be drawn from history. We have been struggling against the Kuomintang for more than 20 years, ever since 1927. I want to say something about historical facts. During the period of the Great Revolution²⁰³ I was in Shanghai and took part in the three armed uprisings against the northern warlords.³⁵¹ At the time, we workers supported the National Revolutionary Army, and the trade unions sent representatives to Xinlonghua to meet the Kuomintang. But after the troops arrived in Shanghai, they perpetrated the April 12th Massacre³⁵⁶ and then went on to wage civil war for 10 years, "encircling and suppressing" the Soviet areas¹⁹ with hundreds of thousands of troops and ruthlessly murdering Communists and revolutionary workers in the White areas.³⁷ During the period when the Japanese imperialists occupied northeast China and were attacking north China, the policy proposed by the Communist Party was to stop the civil war and unite to fight Japan, while Chiang Kai-shek adhered to the reactionary policy of pacifying the country internally before resisting foreign aggression. The result was the Xi'an Incident in which Chiang was arrested.³⁵⁷ Holding the survival of the Chinese nation to be of paramount importance, the Communist Party urged that he be set free if he promised to fight against Japan. But during the eight years of the anti-Japanese war he was very passive in fighting Japan while very active in fighting the Communist Party and the people. After the war Chairman Mao went to Chongqing to negotiate with him, and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party signed the Agreement of October 10.³⁵⁸ But Chiang played his old trick again, going back on his word and working hand in glove with the U.S. imperialists to launch a full-scale civil war in an attempt to wipe out all the revolutionary forces at one stroke. In the Kuomintang areas he ruthlessly oppressed the people, who were demanding food, peace, democracy and freedom. He had newspapers closed down and many people including workers, Communists and leading democrats arrested, beaten or killed. Comrade Zhu Xuefan, who is present here today, was one of the victims.³⁵⁹ What is most abominable is that Chiang Kai-shek, ignoring the fact that the Japanese had been attacking China for more than eight years, recently employed Yasuji Okamura,³⁶⁰ former Commander-in-chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China and the arch-criminal among all war criminals in the Japanese forces, as his secret military advisor to help him in the civil war. What Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang has done over the past 20 years shows that we shall meet disaster unless we defeat it.

Therefore, to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the Kuomintang reactionaries, and build a new-democratic people's republic is the task of prime importance for us. All problems relating to workers' wages and hours or their freedom to organize trade unions are secondary in comparison. When we have brought the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang to an end—that is, when we have solved this major problem—the secondary ones will be easier to solve.

Right now the working class is struggling for New Democracy; when that is obtained, it will proceed to build socialism. Democracy is good, but socialism is better, because socialism will mean abolition of the exploitation of man by man, the rapid development of the productive forces and greater prosperity for the whole Chinese people. But before trying to build socialism, we must struggle for New Democracy. We cannot embark on socialist revolution before we accomplish the new-democratic revolution. China's new-democratic revolution is led by the proletariat through its vanguard, the Communist Party. Overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek will enable us to control the lifeline of the national economy and develop a co-operative economy among the labouring people, so that we can start the transition from the new-democratic revolution to socialist revolution. The more successful our working class is and the greater contributions it makes, fighting bravely and fearing no sacrifice, the better it will serve as the leading class and the sooner China will achieve socialism.

The great victory we have won is without precedent in the last few decades. According to the New China News Agency, we have so far wiped out 2.64 million enemy troops, and the population of the liberated areas has risen to 168 million. The initiative in the war has shifted from the enemy to us. The counter-revolutionary regime is on the verge of collapse. We are approaching the summit of the mountain. It is a great victory for the Chinese working class and our people as a whole. Foreseeing disaster, the Kuomintang will be busy with plots and intrigues, and the U.S imperialists will try to help it find a way out of its difficulties. Their new plot consists of assembling some military men and politicians and making use of middle-of-the-roads and right-wingers to bring about a phony peace. They may go so far as to topple Chiang Kai-shek and raise up a Zhang Kai-shek or a Wang Kai-shek or a Li Kai-shek. Why would such a peace be phony? Because they don't want to give up their power and, on the contrary, are trying to reorganize their forces to attack us again. What should we do under these circumstances? Comrades, we should make sure that we are not deceived and that we don't fall into their traps. So long as we persevere in the struggle, there can be no doubt that victory will come in our generation.

Now I would like to say a few words about the general line and policy for the present stage that have been set forth by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, waged by the masses under the leadership of the proletariat, is China's new-democratic revolution. To make that revolution is the general line and policy of the Communist Party. The working class should unite and ally itself with the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie to form the broadest revolutionary united front against the U.S. imperialists and their tools, the Kuomintang reactionaries, and to establish a joint dictatorship of democratic classes under the leadership of the proletariat. Political power will then belong to the people, and no part of it to the imperialists, feudalists or bureaucrat-capitalists, over whom they will exercise dictatorship. To achieve this goal we are going to hold a new political consultative conference at the proper time to discuss such topics as convening a national people's congress, setting up a democratic coalition government, supporting the war effort and winning final victory. The Central Committee is also asking us to carry out a well planned, thorough agrarian reform in the countryside, that is, by relying on the poor peasants and uniting with the middle peasants, to abolish the feudal system of exploitation by the landlord class and the old rich peasants and give land to the tillers. In the cities, meanwhile, we are to confiscate bureaucrat-capital, protect national industry and commerce, increase production and develop the economy, taking into account the interests of both public and private enterprises and benefiting both workers and capitalists. This congress should call upon the working class of the whole country to act according to the Central Committee's instructions.

There are four tasks for the labour movement in the Kuomintang areas:

(1) To consolidate and swell the workers' movement in preparation for the arrival of the People's Liberation Army;

(2) To correctly carry out the policy of struggle and unity and accord different treatment to the national bourgeoisie and bureaucrat-capitalists, uniting with the former to oppose the latter and the imperialists;

(3) To protect all enterprises, both publicly owned and privately owned, keeping their machines and materials intact, and at the same time to send experienced technicians to the liberated areas to help build new industry and commerce there; and

(4) To ensure the safety of the workers' organizations and leaders, strengthen solidarity among the workers and guard against dissension sown by the enemy. If the workers in the Kuomintang areas can accomplish these tasks, they will have done their duty, contributing to the revolution and the

people's cause.

In the liberated areas the labour movement is developing under entirely new circumstances. The working class has been emancipated and has become the leading class in the people's governments. The workers have become masters of all enterprises, whether they are owned by the state,³⁶¹ by the local government or by the collective. Although the labour-capital relation still exists in privately owned enterprises, the leading political position of the working class in the government ensures that the workers will not be oppressed or over-exploited. In the liberated areas, therefore, the labour movement should be guided by new principles and policies.

Under these circumstances the primary tasks for the workers in the liberated areas are to raise their political consciousness, to study hard and to organize, so as to participate voluntarily and vigorously in the building of New Democracy on all fronts. Above all, they should work to develop industrial production, so as to ensure our victory in the revolutionary war and to meet the people's needs.

Since it is of paramount importance to restore and expand industrial production in the liberated areas, we must address a series of problems.

First, we should do more planning for industrial production; right now we are doing very little. Everything should be done according to a specific plan and method. In the Kuomintang areas planning is in the hands of the bosses, not the workers. We in the liberated areas should give first priority to planning. We should see to it that enterprises which are owned by the state or by local governments produce under unified leadership and in accordance with unified, overall plans which have been drawn up on the basis of investigation and study. In northeast China we are running out of scrap iron and steel. It is time for us to draw up plans for building iron mines and iron and steel mills. We should determine what the needs are at present for the war effort and what they are and will be in future for peaceful reconstruction. For instance, the Anshan Iron and Steel Mill, which cannot be put into operation at present, should prepare to resume production as soon as Benxi and Shenyang are captured. That needs overall planning based on investigation and study. A proper balance should be maintained in the development of the munitions industry, heavy industry and light industry. Materials and machines should be allocated and technicians deployed according to a unified plan and not distributed haphazardly. At the same time, we should obtain materials and sell goods in a planned way and ensure a quick turnover of capital. Industry, agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade should be in general harmony with each other. Without a unified administration we cannot make our economy a success. Local facto-

ries should not go their own ways and keep each other in the dark, because that would be very damaging. To encourage planning we should first of all see that it is done by the state and local-government enterprises; only then can we exercise leadership over enterprises owned by private capitalists and joint state-private enterprises. To put it briefly, lack of planning will result in waste, whereas planning will help promote production and also lay a foundation for drawing up national plans when the time comes.

Second, to improve the operation and management of state and local-government enterprises, it is essential to follow the principles of sound business management and to practise democracy. Only by working hard to improve operation and management can we ensure sufficient materials, low cost of production, high quality, increased output and good marketing. Business management is of prime importance in running factories. A factory is not a government department or an army unit, and it cannot be run in the same way they are. To manage a factory one has to practise business accounting, examine costs and calculate the consumption of raw materials and the depreciation of machinery. What is the cost of production? What quantities of raw materials are needed? What is the rate of depreciation of the machines? How much will the product sell for? We have to know how to balance all these factors. There must be an efficient and rational system for appointing personnel, in which competence, skill and qualifications are taken into account. Our comrades in the liberated areas are experienced only in matters of politics and military strategy; they have yet to become entrepreneurs. We know how to fight revolutionary wars, but when it comes to running factories we are laymen and must learn from the experts. In order for a factory to be successful, rules must be observed. A factory should have its rules and regulations and a system for the division of responsibilities. It should also have a system of quality control for evaluating the products and a system for appraising the performance of workers and managers and meting out rewards and penalties on the basis of performance. Otherwise, we will be encouraging bad work styles and closing our eyes to backwardness, which will damage our cause.

Democracy in the management of enterprises means pooling the wisdom of all our workers and office staff and relying on them to run the factory well. When a problem arises, people should consult each other. You know one thing and I know another, and we can put the two together to come up with the best solution. As the old saying goes, "Three cobblers with their wits combined match Zhuge Liang, the master mind." How can we put that saying into practice in the factory? a) We should set up a board of management, half of it consisting of the director or manager, the engineers

and other responsible personnel, and the other half of representatives elected by the workers and office staff. The director or manager will serve as chairman, and the board will exercise unified leadership over the factory. b) In any factory that has more than 500 workers, a congress of workers and office staff should be convened at regular intervals. This will give the rank and file an opportunity to be promptly informed of the board's decisions and to discuss the production plan, sum up their experience in production, evaluate the managers' performance and talk over problems of common concern relating to production or to their own lives. At the congress the representatives can express their views freely, c) Meetings of production groups should be organized. When a suggestion is made, the group can hold a meeting to discuss it. Democracy doesn't mean that there is no leadership or that everyone can do as he pleases. The democracy we are talking about is subject to centralized leadership and should function in an organized way. The purpose is to run the factory well.

Third, we should recognize the importance of technicians and managers and make efforts to train them. We now have very few technicians and even fewer managers. This is a big problem. How are we to solve it? First of all we should rely on the technicians and managers who are already in place, at the same time promoting some from among the skilled and experienced workers and office staff, who constitute the main source of our cadres. We should run schools and training courses for employees. Wherever conditions permit, we should also open institutes of technology or polytechnic schools. In addition, we can transfer to the factories some persons in other departments who formerly worked in factories or who have had training in technology. With the exception of counter-revolutionaries, all former engineers and administrators in the liberated areas who are willing to work in factories should be welcomed. Engineers should remain engineers and administrators administrators. We should do all we can to help them—help them remould their ideology, change their attitude towards work and workers and get rid of the bureaucratic style of work characteristic of the old factories.

When setting wages, we must oppose egalitarianism and introduce a system of overlapping wage scales with graduated rates. The amount of pay should be based exclusively on the employee's job category, the difficulty of the work performed, the skill it demands and his own competence. Women should enjoy equal pay for equal work, and so should children and adolescents. The period of apprenticeship should not exceed three years; masters should love their apprentices and apprentices should respect their masters. The factory and the trade union should take joint responsibility for the employees' health, safety and welfare. The factory's budget should include a

fund for this purpose (an amount equivalent to a certain percentage of the total payroll), and the workers should also contribute a certain percentage of their wages. As for hours, since a large-scale war is under way, workers in the liberated areas will generally work eight to ten hours a day. No one should be allowed to work more than 12 hours a day, including overtime, unless it is necessary to meet urgent war needs.

In state and local-government enterprises, the drive to promote emulation among workers and to designate heroes of labour has helped to develop production. We shall continue to encourage this drive, although we must guard against the tendency towards formalism and individualistic heroism. The general policy in the liberated areas is to increase production and develop the economy, taking into consideration the interests of both public and private enterprises and benefiting both workers and capitalists. In accordance with that policy, the tasks before the trade unions are as follows: a) to unite all employees, encourage them to take an active part in production and observe discipline, protect their general interests and educate them so they can participate in the management of enterprises, whether owned by the state, by local government or by the collective; b) to supervise management of privately owned enterprises; and c) to stimulate technical innovation and co-operation in production among individual households. The trade unions should try to recruit all the employees, bearing in mind, however, the principle of voluntary participation. They should regularly concern themselves with the problems of the masses and do practical work to solve those problems. And they should overcome their present bureaucratic, formalistic style of work, so as to become organizations that truly belong to the employees.

To ensure that the decisions made by this congress are carried out, it is essential to re-establish the unified national organization of the Chinese working class, that is, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which will guide the workers and office staff of the whole country. Our congress should urge the new executive committee of the Federation to uphold the revolutionary traditions it established during the first Great Revolution (1925-27). We should instruct it to organize workers and office staff across the country as quickly as possible and, under the leadership of the Communist Party, to unite with democratic parties, mass organizations and national minorities in the struggle to overthrow the rule of U.S. imperialism and its running dog, the reactionary Kuomintang government, and set up a unified new-democratic people's republic.

ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC WORK

August 1948

In June and July we concentrated on a review of our financial and economic work, because two events affecting those areas had taken place in February and March. First, a “Left” mistake: during a drive to mobilize workers at the Hegang Coal Mine, unjustifiable attacks were made on some of the administrative personnel. Second, in March soaring prices reduced the real income of workers, throwing them into panic, while publicly owned enterprises had to sell their goods at exceedingly low prices and suffered losses. I shall now analyse those events in detail.

(1) The “Left” mistake with regard to administrative personnel that was made at the Hegang Coal Mine was also made at coal mines in Jixi and Xi’an [now Dongliao—Tr.] and in a few railway sections. The chief mistake made in state-owned enterprises in the Northeast was not that the workers were paid extraordinarily high wages but that, on the contrary, they were not paid the necessary minimum. In our treatment of the administrative staff the “Left” errors were more serious than the Right ones. They were made chiefly because we underestimated the role of office staff in general and of administrators in particular. Such problems were found in all the enterprises that were recently taken over. They can be solved in accordance with the August 1st decision adopted by the Central Committee.³⁶²

(2) The price rises in March occurred for two reasons. First, we issued too many paper notes. That was because there was a large increase in troops, both in the main force and in the reserves, and we needed to buy an additional 400,000 tons of grain. Because we didn’t have enough material reserves as means of payment last winter and spring, we had to increase the amount of currency issued from 14 million yuan at the end of February to 60 million yuan today,³⁶³ and consequently the consumer price index more than tripled. Second, last year’s harvest was poor. The grain deficiency

Report submitted to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. At the time, Comrade Chen Yun was chairman of the Northeast Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs, while holding other posts as well.

combined with the excessive currency issue sent the price of grain soaring tenfold, from 160 yuan a *jin* [1/2 kg.] at the end of February to 1,600 yuan a *jin* now.

We have collected 1.34 million tons of public grain this year, and the trade departments have purchased 400,000 tons. All this grain must be used to meet the people's everyday needs, and there is no surplus with which to regulate the market. But we must be aware that in the Northeast Liberated Area there are now eight to nine million urban residents, whose annual consumption of grain in all forms totals 2.5 million tons. Except for the residents of Harbin, all these city people have to depend on the grain offered for sale by the 20 million peasants. Since the government is not in a position to balance supply and demand, prices in the densely populated cities soar as soon as demand exceeds supply. Moreover, there were poor harvests last year in both southern Manchuria²⁵⁶ and northern Manchuria.²⁵³ Southern Manchuria had suffered regularly from a shortage of grain, and since it is difficult to transport large quantities from the north, grain was cheap in the north and expensive in the south, prices there being as much as seven times higher. But last year's poor harvest has made the price of grain go up in northern Manchuria as well. Meanwhile, since the purchase of grain is mostly monopolized by the government, grain traders are allowed to carry no more than 50 *jin* with them. Thus they can do little to help regulate the market.

(3) The soaring price of grain resulted in a substantial reduction in the real income of employees in state-owned enterprises who depended on cash wages (some 50,000 people) or who partly depended on them (some 250,000). On the other hand, the enterprises did not pay enough attention to workers' needs, and the wages set in March for state-owned enterprises in the Northeast were too low. All this accounted for the unrest among workers in April and May. After May we gradually raised their wages and drew up a new wage scale. To increase real income, a large proportion of wages (about 70 percent) is now paid in kind.

(4) Despite the rocketing price of grain, prices for the services provided by state-owned enterprises (such as railways, shipping lines, the post office and power plants) and for products under state control (such as coal, salt, cloth and gold) remained basically unchanged. That was because the comrades in charge dared not raise these prices for fear of starting an inflationary spiral. The result was a series of irrationalities. For instance, a ticket for a 300-kilometre train trip cost the same as 10 cigarettes. The monthly charge for electricity for a 20-watt bulb was no more than the price of one cigarette. In Tonghua, which is near a salt-producing area, a kilogramme of salt sold for 2,400 yuan, while in northern Manchuria, which does not produce any

salt, the price was only 1,000 yuan. Cloth prices under our control fell by half. A foot of cloth that had formerly been worth 5 kg. of grain could be purchased for just 2.5 kg. The price of gold also fell by half. However, because the low prices were maintained for only 40 days before we raised them, and because sales were only moderate during that period, our losses were not great.

In Harbin, the only city in the Northeast where grain was rationed, we hesitated to raise the price even though it was three to four times lower than in other cities. But that did not keep the price from going up elsewhere, and the only results were that the government lost money and that some of the rationed rice flowed out of Harbin. Keeping prices of commodities produced by publicly owned enterprises too low does not stimulate industrial and agricultural production; it only encourages petty trade. Some factory workers and office staff, seeing that grain traders were making more money than they, asked for leave to go into business.

(5) To check the price rise, the government issued an order instituting a monopoly on the purchase of grain at the retail price. But instead of selling their grain, the peasants hoarded it. In order to tide the people over a period of shortage in areas where crops had failed and to encourage the peasants to sell their grain, on July 10 we issued an order permitting grain to be freely marketed and forbidding private merchants to store it.³⁶⁴ As a result, prices fell or became stable in areas where grain was in short supply and rose in areas where it was ample, so that prices were balanced in the Northeast as a whole. In this hard month of continued shortages, prices rose by only 40 to 50 percent, showing greater stability than in April and May.

(6) Prices are expected to rise steadily until the autumn harvest and until we start collecting public grain. Since we are unable to keep the price of grain under control, we should raise the prices of coal, salt, cloth, gold and public services to balance it. During the slack business season not much currency will be withdrawn from circulation, while government expenditure will remain at the same level, so we shall have to issue more currency. Nevertheless, we will do our best to keep prices from skyrocketing.

(7) Now that industry is being rapidly rehabilitated in the Northeast, it is becoming more important in the economy of the area. Many enterprises owned by the state,³⁶¹ by provincial, city and county governments or by private individuals have worked out their own production plans and signed contracts with each other for processing materials or for supplying manufactured goods. But there is still a lack of planning in industry as a whole. Consequently, raw materials, machinery and personnel have not been properly allocated, and production and marketing have not been co-ordinated.

This has caused waste and losses. The Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee has therefore decided to draw up this year industrial production plans for 1949 or, if possible, for both 1949 and 1950. In this way we shall learn how to do more planning in future. We should work out production goals and plans first for enterprises owned by the state and then for those owned by provincial, city and county governments. Meanwhile, we should conduct investigations in both privately owned factories and those under joint public-private ownership, so as to help them set their production goals. Wherever conditions allow, we should use the contract system for processing and manufacturing.

(8) The situation outlined above shows that much of our financial and economic work in the Northeast is unplanned. There are two reasons for this. First, that sort of work is expanding and becoming more complex, and we are inexperienced at it. And second, during the past two years we have concentrated on the war and on agrarian reform and have failed to familiarize ourselves with the financial and economic situation in detail. We have now come to realize that in the present circumstances we should pay as much, or nearly as much, attention to work in this field as we do to military affairs.

EXPERIENCE GAINED IN TAKING OVER SHENYANG

November 28, 1948

Our preparations for taking over Shenyang were conducted in a great hurry. On October 27 the Northeast Bureau of the Party appointed a military control commission and sent 4,000 new and veteran cadres, headed by Chen Yun, to take over several large cities. On October 28 we held a mobilization meeting to explain the takeover policies and the necessary discipline, and on the same day we set out from Harbin. We held a few meetings along the way and entered Shenyang on November 2, as soon as the military campaign was over.³⁶⁵ Fortunately, the city fell without heavy fighting. Because our people entered immediately, the takeover went relatively smoothly and most of the factory machines that the Kuomintang had been unable to remove were found intact. The following is a brief account of how we took control of the city and what we learned from the experience.

1. Measures should be adopted to ensure a quick takeover so as to allow no time for sabotage. Before we left Harbin, the military control commission made the following decisions: a) different aspects of the work should be assigned to different divisions; b) in each enterprise or government department we should start at the top; c) the original staff of each unit should be left unchanged; and d) the commission should take over all units before placing each under the administration of the appropriate division. These were the methods we had used when we entered Harbin in 1946 and were short of cadres. I shall explain them in turn.

a) Assigning different aspects of the work to different divisions. In addition to the municipal Party committee, the military control commission had under it five divisions in charge of economic, financial, logistical,

Report made to the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for transmission to the Central Committee. As an account of a successful experience, it was distributed to all Party bureaus and front committees. As the time, Comrade Chen Yun was chairman of the Special Military Control Commission of Shenyang, while holding other posts as well.

railway and political affairs respectively, as well as the new municipal government (including the public security bureau and the general administrative office) and the garrison headquarters. Our experience indicates that four more divisions should be added to take care of foreign, military, social and cultural affairs.

b) Starting at the top. As soon as we entered the city we put up notices ordering the heads of the various government departments and enterprises to begin the hand-over procedures. When the person in charge was absent, the work was done by the second or third person in the hierarchy. Meanwhile, we tried to obtain all necessary information from the agents we had planted earlier or from the rank and file.

c) Leaving the original staff unchanged. Former administrative staff remained at their posts. Factories and other enterprises carried on as usual, except that a few representatives from the military control commission were sent to supervise them. This was also true of the old government departments, where only the heads were replaced. All workers and office staff, with the exception of a few senior administrators, were given 100,000 yuan for living expenses, which was the equivalent of 20 kg. of grain.³⁶³ These were interim measures adopted mainly to avoid confusion and social unrest. The first thing we did in taking control of a specific organization was to take possession of the assets and records; the second was to reorganize the personnel.

d) Taking over all units before placing each under the administration of the appropriate division. The divisions were authorized only to take control of organizations, not to own or dispose of their assets. They were not allowed to remove any assets or records. Members of the divisions were responsible only to the military control commission and not to their former superiors; they had to obey unconditionally the orders of the commission, which had overall authority. It was not until the takeover was complete throughout the city that the factories, buildings and other assets were placed in the charge of the commission's various divisions in accordance with a unified plan. No person or division was allowed to conduct a takeover without a warrant issued by the commission and bearing the signature of one of its responsible members. Before entering the city we publicized our policies and procedures repeatedly through radio broadcasts: this is very important. All such things as proclamations, official envelopes and seals, passes, police armbands and signboards bearing the name of each division were prepared in advance, so that we could start work within a few hours after entering the city. The office of the military control commission was located in a place where board and lodging, public transportation and communication facilities, including tele-

phones, were readily available.

Experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of these methods, which can prevent confusion and accelerate the takeover (for example, in Shenyang, all divisions of the military control commission started functioning within just two days). If we had not divided the work among different divisions of the commission and had not started the takeover at the top, it would have caused great losses and other undesirable effects.

2. To quickly restore public order and to maintain social stability, we must deal with five key problems:

a) Electricity should be restored first. Without electricity, light bulbs and telephones will not work, there will be no tap water and trolleys and trains will not move. As a result, the residents will be in desperate straits and it will be impossible to maintain public order. Shenyang depended on other places for the supply of electricity. Soon after Fushun was liberated, it started supplying electricity to Shenyang. The people were very pleased about that. To ensure that electric service is promptly restored, we must above all have a large number of technicians. Fortunately, we had with us several hundred technicians from various units in Harbin. They were loyal, skilful and courageous enough to work under extremely difficult circumstances. For example, one night during the takeover of the city they loaded all the ammunition and explosives that had been left behind by the enemy troops onto trains and moved them to safe locations outside the city. The local people were amazed by the success of this dangerous operation and no longer spoke of us Communists as ignorant country bumpkins.

b) Problems of currency and prices should be solved without delay. To prevent traders from other places from coming to the city to make speculative purchases, to prevent local merchants from hoarding and to keep prices from fluctuating sharply, we promptly publicized the price lists from other liberated areas. This gave the merchants some certainty, so that they went on with business as usual. In order to attract grain to the city, we set the price higher than in other places, with the result that during the past 26 days grain has kept flowing into Shenyang. This has helped prevent other prices from skyrocketing, although merchants are selling grain at a price somewhat higher than that charged by our own food stores—they sell husked sorghum, for example, at 6,000 yuan a kilogramme.

During the first four days after we entered the city, we waited to see what would happen to the Kuomintang gold yuan.³⁶⁶ When its value fell to 150 yuan of our Northeast currency, we began a week-long drive to exchange our currency at an officially announced rate of 100 yuan of Northeast currency for one gold yuan. Being devalued, the gold yuan began to flow out

of northeast China to areas south of the Great Wall. During the same week we also tried to drive out another Kuomintang currency, known as the *jiushengquan*,³⁶⁷ by exchanging our Northeast currency for it at the rate of 3,000yuan of *jiushengquan* to one yuan of ours. The two exchanges cost us a total of 200 million yuan of Northeast currency. But a week after Shenyang was liberated most businesses started up again and prices remained fairly stable.

c) Enemy police should be deprived of their weapons but allowed to perform their duties unarmed. Traffic policemen should resume their duties as quickly as possible. Firemen should remain at their posts, and most of the police in charge of residence registration can stay on. Twenty days after the liberation of Shenyang we assembled those members of the criminal police and military police who had served as the enemy's special agents and started to re-educate them. It is inadvisable to simply let such persons go.

d) Newspapers are the chief media we should use to publicize our policies and to clam the public. City people always read newspapers, which are an essential part of their daily life. People of all strata will read our publications carefully. In addition to posters and notices to reassure the public, we should prepare in advance articles and other newspaper materials that can be published immediately after we enter the city and that will provide enough copy to last a few days. In our own newspaper we should first publish documents outlining our basic policies, announcements and news stories from the liberated areas. In the beginning we should not make a special effort to publish exciting news reports or to cater to the tastes of our audience. Old documents that are to be reprinted must be carefully selected. All notices should be clearly worded. Proofs must be read and advertisements closely examined. During the first two weeks after we entered Shenyang our newspaper and the wire service responsible for dispatching news abroad each assigned a reporter to the headquarters of the military control commission to attend its meetings, keep informed of events and file reports, so that the newspaper could appear regularly. Both composing and proofreading were done by the former workers of the press we had taken over, and I only had to send five or six cadres there to help. Thus we were able to publish the newspaper by the third day after the city's liberation.

e) The problem of wages should be solved. There were some 150,000 government functionaries, teachers, workers and administrative personnel in the Shenyang area (including Fushun and Benxi). If we didn't deal with the wage problem, the public would panic. But it was difficult to find a satisfactory solution promptly, so on the fifth day after we entered the city, we gave all wage-earners the money necessary for subsistence. This also

helped us to replace the Kuomintang currency with our Northeast currency. Later in the month we were able to issue provisional wages. Since Shenyang had been under siege, grain was extremely expensive before liberation. We therefore had to stop paying wages according to grain value, as was the usual practice. We have no alternative but to pay wages mostly according to the low wage scale that was in effect during the Kuomintang days, so that the workers, administrative personnel and technicians now get the equivalent of 40 to 200 kg. of grain per month. This is still much more than they received when we were besieging the city, and the majority of them are now satisfied with their pay. Of course, senior technicians should be given higher pay than the average. While we are not obliged to pay the back wages owned by the Kuomintang, we must provide relief to people in special need.

Our garrison troops were not a specially trained unit but soldiers assembled in haste shortly before we entered the city. This accounts for their poor organization and inefficiency. During the first few days, for instance, the garrison headquarters found it hard to send orders to the desired places. Because it had no mobile units, when there was a traffic jam, it had no one to dispatch to the scene, and when it received urgent requests for help sent by the takeover divisions, it was unable to respond. Our experience in Shenyang shows that in addition to the regular soldiers, the garrison command should have one and a half mobile regiments that can be sent to factories or government departments whenever necessary to provide security. Garrison troops should be an independent unit organized for special tasks and composed of well trained, well disciplined men. During the early period after the city was liberated, no less than three garrison divisions were needed to protect warehouses, guard prisoners, stand sentry, remove mines and serve as temporary guards wherever needed.

3. Measures should be taken to dispose of prisoners and remove enemy ammunition dumps without delay. If we fail to do a good job in these two respects, public order will be seriously damaged. As a large city, Shenyang was one of the enemy's rear bases, and it contained many enemy government departments whose personnel were from dubious backgrounds. In addition, we came across many prisoners whom we had freed after previous battles and a large number of disbanded soldiers who had fled to the city after their recent defeat. One of the major problems facing us upon our entry into the city was to deal with these people and find accommodations for them. Because we weren't adequately prepared, it took us a long time to do that, and public order suffered as a consequence. The first thing to do was to provide them with food and housing; the second was to consider how to disperse them to other places. We now feel that it would have been much

better if we had had several special Liberation Corps³⁶⁸ to round up the stragglers and released prisoners of war. This time the problem was basically solved only after the municipal district governments and the garrison command had set up centres where prisoners could be assembled and had done a great deal of work registering and checking them.

Another problem demanding immediate attention after we entered the city was to disperse the stores of ammunition abandoned by the enemy. However, we had made no advance preparations for doing that either. Shenyang was a supply depot during the war, and a great deal of ammunition had been loaded on freight cars ready for shipment. A great quantity of ammunition also remained unloaded near the railway depots. These places, therefore, became the main targets for the enemy's bombers in the first few days. The moment we discovered that, we organized a three-man committee that mobilized an enormous amount of manpower to disperse the ammunition under cover of night, moving it several, or even tens of, kilometres away. Thanks to this effort, the ammunition was spared. If the main depots had been bombed, half of Shenyang would have been destroyed. Our experience shows that when entering a city we must have enough railwaymen and troops to protect railway stations, ensure transportation and move ammunition to safe places.

4. The military control commission should not waste time on trivial matters. Its leading members should observe the guidelines for the takeover process and handle the claims of the various divisions impartially. They must make a determined effort to prevent the divisions from scrambling for houses, automobiles, factories and so on. Fortunately, there was little of that sort of competition during the takeover of Shenyang, because the commission itself set a good example by its impartiality and strict adherence to principles.

5. The military control commission must be mentally prepared for any event that could cause serious problems. Its leaders must take enough time to study matters of major importance. In the present takeover the commission was more or less prepared to address important matters such as foreign affairs, provisions, finance and the problem of arresting and executing criminals. But unfortunately, some trouble arose in foreign affairs.

6. To ensure success in taking over a city, it is most important that the troops be well disciplined. Many troops entered Shenyang this time, and all of them were well aware of the importance of protecting factories and the city. The instruction they had been given in recent months on urban policies produced good results: there were only a few violations of discipline. In making arrangements for board and lodging we should give special consideration to troops who have been engaged in heavy fighting.

7. Our experience in Shenyang has taught us that to take control of a large city we must have not only sound methods but also adequate preparation and capable cadres. It has demonstrated that under the present circumstances the Central Committee and every field army operating in a strategic region should set up a special team to be responsible for the takeover of large cities. After the major tasks of the takeover have been accomplished, this special team should hand over its authority to the permanent municipal Party committee and its subordinate departments. Such a team can accumulate experience, and its core members may serve as specialized cadres to be assigned to take over more and more large cities in future.

SPEECH AT THE SHENYANG WORKERS' CONGRESS

January 5, 1949

This congress has been a successful one. The factory representatives have informed us of many facts and many opinions of the workers. We are very happy to learn that our workers are not thinking only about their own benefits, about their wages and other problems of daily life, but are more concerned with production and development. This shows that the workers have become true masters of the nation. Under the puppet Manzhouguo regime²⁶⁸ or the Kuomintang they would not have offered opinions on such matters; indeed the authorities would not have allowed them to do so. Only now, under the leadership of the People's Government, can they express their views freely and become involved in the great issues of production and national development. This shows that the Communist Party and the People's Government under its leadership truly represent and serve the workers, peasants and other people and act in accordance with their ideas. The workers are the masters of their factories and of the nation as well. At this congress all of you have displayed your sense of responsibility as masters of the country and the high level of political awareness of the working class. That is particularly inspiring. I hope that when you return to your factories you will tell your workmates that the government will do everything possible to help improve their lives and to solve as many problems as can be solved at present. On the other hand, they should shoulder the burden too and do all they can to make a success of production and to help overthrow the reactionaries as soon as possible. Only thus will it be possible for all of us to improve our lives.

Congresses of this sort will be held regularly in future, so that we can keep informed of the situation in the factories and of the opinions of the workers and thus improve our work. What magic weapon has enabled the Communist Party to lead the revolution over the last 20 years to the point

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where the revolutionary forces have grown so strong and nationwide victory is so near at hand? It is the wisdom of the people, nothing else. As the saying goes, "Three cobblers with their wits combined match Zhuge Liang, the master mind." When a problem arises, we hold a meeting to consult the people and we find a solution. I suggest that leading members of the departments concerned attend the congresses in future.

As for the problems that have been raised today, we will do our best to solve those that can be solved. But that doesn't mean we can solve each and every one right now. Since we are not familiar with specific conditions in the factories, it will be hard for us to give specific answers. Take the complaints about an unfair wage for a particular worker, for example. That is something that can only be resolved through consultations in the factory. The workers will understand my failure to solve every problem immediately. But you can be sure that I will relay your questions to the appropriate departments and leave it to their discretion to settle them.

PUT UP WITH TEMPORARY HARSHIPS AND SUPPORT THE FRONT

Your suggestions fall into several categories, which I shall now discuss briefly. Some of the suggestions relating to wages, living conditions and benefits should be adopted, since they are feasible at present. For instance, wages can be paid twice a month, a small library can be set up in each factory and families can be brought back from Shanhaiguan, Tangshan and other places. You can ask the trade unions for the necessary passes.

There are many other suggestions that ought to be adopted but cannot be, because of the many difficulties. I hope you can understand that.

The first one concerns coal. The coal³⁶⁹ we are now supplying for daily use doesn't burn well. That makes it hard to prepare breakfast and so delays the start of work. Why are we supplying you with anthracite? Let me explain. When Shenyang was liberated, most of the coal we found here came from Huazigou,³⁷⁰ with only about 20,000 tons from Fushun. Now that our Northeast Army has moved to places south of the Great Wall, many trains are needed to transport its supplies. But the locomotives can only burn coal from Fushun. Please consider which alternative you would prefer: we can supply you with coal from Fushun for cooking, while starving the People's Liberation Army south of the Great Wall and undermining its effort to capture Beijing and Tianjin. Or we workers and other people in the rear

areas can put up with some hardships for the time being and use anthracite for cooking. Of course you would prefer the latter. Why can't some coal be sent here too, since Fushun is so near by? The Fushun Coal Mine was wrecked by the Kuomintang. In the open-cut mine the miners are extracting coal, but they are not digging to expose new veins. All the vertical shafts are flooded. The more than 30,000 miners are producing only about 3,000 tons of coal a day. It will take quite a while to repair the mine. In the Fuxin Mine the shafts are also flooded, and it will not be possible to produce coal there for some time. There is coal in northern Manchuria,²⁵³ but the trains are too busy to transport much of it for the time being. It all boils down to the following question: shall we support the PLA at the front and help liberate the people of Beiping and Tianjin, or shall we use the coal for cooking in the rear areas? Which is more important? Of course it is the former. If we do not finish the job of overthrowing the reactionaries, the victory of the working class cannot be consolidated. We have to put up with the difficulties of using anthracite for the sake of the long-term interests of the whole working class. I hope that when you go back you will explain clearly to the workers that the government is deeply concerned about their living conditions and is trying every possible means to provide them with good-quality coal as soon as it can be transported here.

The other problem you raise is that there are not nearly enough food distribution points, which makes the process too slow. It is true that in a factory with thousands or tens of thousands of workers, one or two food distribution points are not enough. Compare this with a county town. How many stores selling grain, oil, salt and coal do you have in a town with a population of 50,000 to 60,000! A factory with 10,000 workers plus their families is almost the equivalent of a county town, but it is not easy to open as many stores there. It's an enormous job. Of the payment in kind that was made to employees of government-owned enterprises in Shenyang in December, grain and coal alone amounted to 35,000 tons, which it took 1,166 freight cars to transport. It was another hard job just to distribute those supplies to the factories within a few days. To get them quickly and correctly from the factories to each individual worker proved even harder. When you go back, you should all call on the workers for suggestions, talk it over and devise better methods of distribution. You can ask them to lend a helping hand and set up consumers' co-ops in the factories.

There is another problem, one that you have not raised today: the grain we are supplying now is poor, and we can't guarantee to provide better in future. That is a hard job too. The grain at the government's disposal is public grain turned over to it by the peasants. Most of the emancipated

peasants send good grain, but a few who have a lower level of political awareness send inferior grain. Moreover, it is hard to take proper care of so much grain. Corn, in particular, is likely to mildew unless it is kept cool and is aerated frequently. That is why grain stored by the government is not so good as grain sold on the private market. If we had paid wages in cash and asked you to buy grain in the market, the money would have depreciated and you would have lost out in the end. The government will make every effort to provide you with good grain. But we hope you will understand our difficulties when the grain is not so good.

Another problem is that the windows in the factories were shattered in Kuomintang air raids, and that makes the workshops very cold. Since the plate-glass factory hasn't resumed production, we have to use sheets of iron and wooden boards instead of glass. It is still cold, of course, and the light is shut out. But I hope you can put up with this hardship too for the time being; things should improve once the glass factory goes into production again.

There are some other problems that you must solve through consultation, such as how to differentiate between light and heavy labour in some enterprises and how to make the wage rates more rational in consequence. You should solve all these problems when you return by calling on the workers to consult with the managers.

OVERTHROW THE REACTIONARIES AND BUILD A HAPPY FUTURE

Many representatives have said today that life is better now than it was under the rule of the Kuomintang. That is true. But measured against the goal of the revolution of the working class, our present life still leaves a great deal to be desired. The goal of the revolution is to ensure that all working people have food and clothing in adequate amounts and of better quality. Our present standard of living is still very low, and we have a long way to go to attain a relatively high one. The obstacle on the road is the Kuomintang reactionaries. So long as they are around, there will be no possibility of achieving our goal. The Chinese working class has been oppressed by capitalist imperialism and bureaucrat-capital for more than 100 years. Seeing that their power in China is on the verge of collapse, Chiang Kai-shek cries, "Let's stop fighting! I want peace!" He is trying to lull our people so that he can have a chance to catch his breath and stage a comeback. Are we going

to let him do that? (*Shouts of "No!"*) Right! We will not relax in the least but will work with determination to overthrow the reactionaries. Only when we have done that will we be able to devote ourselves wholeheartedly to developing production and building a happy future. After the victory of the Russian revolution the people didn't become prosperous until three five-year plans had been completed. Once we have overthrown the Kuomintang reactionaries across the country, we too will work hard and engage in large-scale construction. Older workers may be dejected: "How many years will construction take? I may not be able to wait that long." But even if you can't wait that long, won't you have sons and grandsons? Our working class works not for itself alone but for the whole people and for the enduring happiness of future generations. In its pursuit of a better life, the working class has struggled for so many years to end the hardships caused by oppression and exploitation! One hundred and one years ago Marx and Engels wrote the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, calling on the working class to free itself by making the revolution. It was 32 years ago that the revolution of the Russian working class triumphed. The Chinese working class has been struggling for 20 to 30 years and victory is now in sight. The working class in Shenyang suffered for decades, from the time of the reactionary regime of old China through the period of oppression by the Manzhouguo puppet regime and Japanese imperialism, up to and including the rule of the Kuomintang, or the "Second Manzhouguo."³⁷¹ Everything changed in Shenyang on the second of November last year. On the first of November Shenyang was under the rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries, but on the day after, the working class and the people became masters of the city. That was emancipation. It seemed to have happened overnight. But in reality, it was the result of 20 to 30 years of hard struggle. Even when nationwide liberation is achieved, we will have to rely on our own effort to provide ourselves with enough good food and clothing. We should anticipate that that is going to take quite some time.

You have made suggestions regarding study, and that shows the strong enterprising spirit of the working class. Insofar as possible, we should satisfy those who want to attend classes in political affairs and general subjects. It is also very good that the workers want to learn technical skills and that they ask us to provide them with technical books translated from foreign languages and with pamphlets on general subjects and various industrial technologies. We should meet their wishes as and when we can. Some workers want to attend specialized technical schools for further study. That is also very good. We should not just have university graduates as our engineers. We should select from among the workers those who have a high level of political

consciousness and are hard-working, enterprising and eager to learn. We should send them to school to raise their educational and scientific level, so that they can integrate the practical experience they have gained in production with scientific theory. If we do that, we can surely turn many workers into excellent engineers. This approach has been followed in Russia for many years and has turned out many engineers from among the workers for socialist construction. We are not in a position to set up these specialized schools right now. But we can start with some training classes, part-time schools and night schools.

ALL EMPLOYEES SHOULD UNITE AND MAKE A SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION

Some representatives have said that in their factories workers have complaints against a few individual members of the office staff. Our approach should be that the workers, who are directly engaged in production and make up the majority in the factories, should be considered the most important employees. Many administrative staff used to despise manual labour and look down on the workers. They thought they were a cut above the others just because they wore long gowns and worked in offices. Some of them offended the workers. Nevertheless, we should understand that the administrative staff are just as indispensable to production as workers. We need them to draw designs, keep accounts and use the abacus. The engineers and managers are even more indispensable. Moreover, many workers will eventually become office staff, technicians and managers.

But for now, since the workers have complaints against the administrative staff, we should try to solve this problem, we should use appropriate methods and deal with each case on its merits, bearing in mind the Decision Concerning Employees in Publicly Owned Enterprises³⁶² issued by the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee on August 1, 1948. With the exception of a few managers who have been particularly oppressive and should be dismissed, the employees in each factory should unite to increase production. Workers who have been offended by administrative personnel should be forgiving, once the persons in question have made self-criticisms and apologized. The workers should strive resolutely to overthrow the reactionaries, and they should co-operate with the administrative staff, regarding any friction with them as a trivial matter. The working class should concentrate on matters of importance. It is our task to liberate the 470

million people of China, or in broader terms, to liberate the two billion people of the world, and to replace the unreasonable social systems that have lasted for thousands of years with a new, reasonable one. That is a great and glorious task. The working class should stand aloof from trivial matters and devote all its energies to the one great cause. When the conflicts between them and the office staff are properly resolved, both should unite to develop production, support the front and overthrow the reactionaries, so as to create a world of freedom for the working class and the rest of the people.

The suggestions about production that have been offered today are excellent. But the workers should anticipate at least two difficulties in this connection. First, our veteran cadres are laymen when it comes to managing production, and they lack experience. Second, we don't have enough raw materials or equipment, and it is hard to get more while the war is going on. This means that the workers must offer suggestions and show the true spirit of the working class by finding ways to overcome all difficulties. They should make full use of all available equipment, try every means to conserve raw materials, even using what is now regarded as waste, and make further efforts to devise substitutes. As soon as you go back to your factories, you representatives should consult with the directors or managers and pool the wisdom of the workers to draw up a production plan for three months or a year. You should make it clear to the workers that we all have to share the burden. They should work hard not only as producers but also as true masters of the enterprise, attending to managerial tasks under the leadership of the directors and uniting with the office staff in the interests of production. In particular, you should ask the workers to volunteer their ideas for improving production. Any helpful suggestion can be put into practice after consultation between the managers and workers. Now the leaders of factories welcome workers' suggestions, and workers should raise their ideas on production and other aspects of the work with a sense of responsibility. Everything should be settled through consultation in the interest of increased production.

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMMISSION

June 4, 1949

Not long after I came to Beijing from the Northeast, the Military Commission³⁷² charged me with the preparations for setting up a central financial and economic commission. A draft outline³⁷³ on the establishment of this commission has been distributed to you for your consideration.

We have had regional financial and economic organs in the Northeast, North China, the Northwest and in other liberated areas. But it is now necessary to establish a central financial and economic organ. Why? The number of financial and economic concerns, which are often of nationwide significance, has been gradually increasing with our continuing victories in the War of Liberation. We now need an organ to deal with many previously nonexistent concerns. For example, after Shanghai was liberated, concerns relating to Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Sichuan provinces importing and exporting goods by way of Shanghai have cropped up. Similar concerns arose about northwest China importing and exporting goods by way of Tianjin after Tianjin was liberated. This organ is to be provisional. It will be temporarily placed in the charge of the Military Commission for a number of months only and will be taken over by the Central People's Government after the founding of New China. The establishment of a central financial and economic commission is of great importance and requires the cooperation of comrades both inside and outside the Party, the cooperation of comrades working for the Financial and Economic Commission, as well as the mutual cooperation of different sectors such as

In mid-May 1949 Comrade Chen Yun left Shenyang for Beijing to assist in establishing a central financial and economic commission and to direct its work. He presented this report at a meeting held by Comrade Zhou Enlai and attended by democratic parties, non-party democrats and by leading comrades of Party and government organs in Beijing.

industry, agriculture and communications. We have had relatively little or no relevant experience with many of these issues. Dating back to the time of the early Red Army, we had only one or two chief stewards in charge of economic affairs, which was a far cry from actively engaging in economic work. Later on we created base areas, border region governments, people's governments and also supply departments and trading companies, thereby experiencing a step-by-step financial and economic expansion. But we did not yet have any big cities under our control. At present we control large urban areas and this has brought up various issues relating to foreign trade. One day at ten o'clock at night I had to detain Mr Zhang Naiqi³⁷⁴ in order that he might lecture me on foreign currency. In short, we cannot achieve success in our work unless we cooperate with each other.

I will not explain in detail the draft outline for setting up a central financial and economic commission. I will discuss only two issues.

First, the organizational structure of the central financial and economic commission will consist of six bureaus³⁷⁵ and a secretariat under which there will be 13 subordinate departments³⁷⁶. Some aspects of that organizational structure are still undecided. The salt industry will temporarily be placed under the financial department. It needs to be further considered which departments should take charge of the fishery, wine and tobacco industries. The industrial department has been divided extensively. We used to call the industrial department the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce; this was later divided into a Ministry of Communications and a Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Now we will have departments for fuels, metals, textiles and for industries other than railways and communications. The reason for this extensive division is that each department has a special role to play in meeting the needs of industrial development.

Can these six bureaus and one secretariat be set up in a single day? Can we formulate a national plan in one day? No, we cannot. We have to do this work step by step. We must carry out economic construction in a planned way.

Second, although we are stressing centralization and unification, the last part of the outline still places the local economies in an essential position and there is a financial and economic commission for each of the greater administrative areas³⁷⁷, provinces and large cities. Is this contradictory? Our answer to this question is that it does involve a contradiction. But because we are in a military period and China is a vast country with inefficient means of communication, we need to facilitate cooperation between local organs and the central government. There are two aspects to consider in centralization and unification. One relates to needs and the other to possibilities.

Neither can be disregarded. Just as our railways have been under unified management, foreign trade too must be placed under unified management. It will not do to have one provision for Shanghai and another for Tianjin. However, much of what we are undertaking cannot be placed under unified management at present. The most serious problem we face is that about two million of our three million soldiers are currently stationed at the front. Can the rear areas supply their material needs? No, this is not being done. This job can only be done locally through purchasing, borrowing and requisitioning. The army must under no circumstances go hungry. But we should not drive civilians into rebellion, either. As an example, if it requires one bolt of cloth to clothe one soldier each year, then every year we will need to come up with three million bolts. This has to come from the areas in which the soldiers are actually situated. Supply of food and clothing should be a unified effort, but it cannot be completely unified. This situation will extend for a rather long period of time. Not until the war is over and communications are restored can these problems gradually be solved. For the present, some matters cannot be taken over by the central government. We can let local governments attend to them. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company,³⁷⁸ for example, is managed by Chen Yi¹⁴⁶ and his colleagues, but it is owned by the central government and, if conditions warrant, it can be completely taken over.

To sum up then, the financial and economic commission is to be a provisional organ requiring cooperation inside and outside the Party. This work has to be done gradually and local financial and economic organs will continue to maintain an appropriate position.

IN MEMORY OF COMRADE YAN PU

June 10, 1949

Comrade Yan Pu (also known as Yan Daren) was born to a landlord's family in Wuxi in Jiangsu Province. He studied at Shanghai Normal College, Shanghai University and at Southern University. In his early years, being influenced by *New Youth*, *Guide* and books on socialism, he took part in revolutionary activities. In 1925 he joined the Communist Party of China and became actively involved in the workers' movement and the students' movement. In 1925 he delivered speeches at the May 30th Movement⁵ demonstrations and was among the first to be arrested together with fourteen others. In response to the Party's instructions, he returned to Wuxi after he was released that summer to participate in revolutionary activities there. First he served as a secretary of the prefectural Party committee and then as head of the Department of General Affairs of the Federation of Trade Unions, leading the workers' movement there. He sold his own land and property to raise funds to establish Wuxi Jiangsu Secondary School. He acted as principal of the school and was the head of the teachers' federation, and so Jiangsu Secondary School became an important centre where the Wuxi Party organization led workers and intellectuals in revolutionary activities.

After Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution on April 12,³⁵⁶ trade unions and peasant associations in Wuxi and the Jiangsu Secondary School were forced to close down and revolutionaries were slaughtered during a period of severe "white terror" in Wuxi. Comrade Yan Pu went to the countryside of Wuxi to lead the peasants in their armed struggle against rents and taxes. He was appointed chairman of the peasant association. He allowed peasants to till his own land without charging rent and led them in their harsh struggle with armed Kuomintang troops who were combing the countryside, thus winning the support of the peasants in Wuxi, Jiangyin and Changshu, who recognized him as their leader. During the most trying months for the revolution (from the winter of 1927 to the summer of 1928), the enemy concentrated large numbers of troops and police to pursue and arrest Communists day and night. But Comrade Yan Pu was protected by

the peasants. In a single night he would be moved repeatedly from village to village by the peasants in an effort to protect him from the pursuing enemy. Comrade Yan Pu was like a god in the eyes of the Wuxi peasants. Even later during the anti-Japanese war, the peasants in Wuxi expected Yan Pu to return and the Party organization in Wuxi organized their anti-Japanese armed forces under his name.

Because Yan Pu's leadership was supported by the peasants in Wuxi, he was elected deputy to the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. After the Congress, he worked in the Songpu Special Party Committee and led the peasants' movement there. In organizing peasants in Fengxian to launch an attack on Zhuangjiaying, an enemy stronghold, he himself prepared bombs and took the lead in charging forth with gun in hand. Under his courageous command the enemy's stronghold was finally taken and their weapons captured. In 1929 he worked in Fanan District in Shanghai where he had been sent to organize a rickshaw drivers' trade union. He lived with those people day and night, took his meals with them and slept with them on pavements by the roadside. In the autumn of 1929 he was arrested for revolutionary activities at the French Concession in Shanghai. For over forty days in jail he suffered many tortures which were inflicted on him by the French imperialists and their running dogs. He was given electric shocks and many whippings and kickings. But, he never gave in before the enemy. Neither the police nor the Kuomintang reactionaries knew that the person they had arrested was the famous Yan Pu, and so he was released after his elder brother bribed the reactionaries. But his health had now been seriously impaired by these cruel tortures. Soon after he was released from jail he was sent to work in the Songjiang Central County Party Committee and served as secretary of the Qingpu County Party Committee. A year later he was appointed secretary of the Military Committee of southern Zhejiang where the peasants' movement was expanding. Concurrently, he was political commissar of the 15th Red Army and participated in the battle at Wenzhou.

In the winter of 1931, the Shanghai Party organization was sabotaged. Comrade Yan Pu was dispatched to the leading body of the Party Central Committee in Shanghai in charge of overseeing the transfer of the central leadership to the soviet area. During this period he was vigilant day and night. He himself did not go to the Central Soviet Area in Jiangxi until most of the leaders of the Party Central Committee in Shanghai had been safely moved there. After arriving at the Central Soviet Area, he first worked in the Xinquan Trading Company. When the Fujian Incident⁷⁴ took place in 1934, he was appointed commercial representative of the Soviet Area to Fuzhou. After returning to the Soviet Area he served as deputy director of

the National Economic Department and later took part in the Long March. Throughout the Long March he was often ill, but whenever the Party organization would offer him a draught animal, he would decline in order to allow other comrades to ride them and he continued on foot using a walking-stick. By the time that the Red Army arrived at northern Guizhou and southern Sichuan, Comrade Yan Pu was too ill to continue marching. So the Party decided that the guerrilla forces in southern Sichuan should escort him to Chongqing and Yichang where he could organize liaison stations. Before long, the Shanghai Party organization sent him to the Soviet Union to study. After he returned to China in 1938 he served as chief of the No. 2 Section of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee in Yan'an; later he became secretary-general and chief of No. 2 section at the Eighth Route Army's Offices in Xi'an and Chongqing. When Japan surrendered, Yan Pu was sent to work in Northeast China. Thereafter, in response to the Party's instructions he went south, but he was hospitalized because of illness. His health continued to deteriorate despite prolonged medical treatment and he died at 14:30 on June 5, 1949 at the age of 52.

Comrade Yan Pu gave his whole life to the cause of liberation for the working people and never wavered in his loyalty during the last 25 years of his life. On his death bed he talked only a little about his personal affairs but mostly about his unfulfilled aspiration to help drive the imperialists out of China and liberate the whole country. Even after losing consciousness before death, he shouted "Down with imperialism." In his will he expressed the hope that inner-Party education would be strengthened and that Party members would improve their theoretical understanding, and he urged his wife and daughter to work and study diligently. Comrade Yan Pu was always modest. Even ten hours before his death, he was still making self-criticisms for the mistakes in his work. Also, he requested that his body be donated to medical research in pathology.

As a good member of the Chinese Communist Party, Yan Pu led a simple life. He did all the work assigned to him by the Party organization without considering position. His death was a loss to the Chinese revolution. Although he passed away just when the cause of liberation of the Chinese people was being completely realized, Comrade Yan Pu's iron will and unyielding revolutionary spirit will live on forever.

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD CHILDREN
OF CADRES
TAKE ON AN AFFECTATION AS CHILDREN OF
REVOLUTIONARY HEROES

June 19, 1949

My Dear Nephew Kaiti,

I have just received your letter of June 10.

It is 18 years since I last saw you. From your letter I am very pleased to see that you can already write quite lucidly. Speaking of personal matters, neither your father³⁷⁹ nor I had the time to tend to the schooling or livelihood of our children—we have failed in our responsibilities as fathers and elder brothers. We reckoned the cost at the time. If we took charge only of the youngsters in our own families, we would have been able to contribute little effort to reforming the whole society. So we decided to forsake our families and live an itinerant life. Now our aim of liberating the entire nation will soon be achieved, but this is still only the first step in the reconstruction of society; the standard of living of the common people throughout the country is still very low. Our commitment is not only to overthrow the reactionary forces, but to further improve the people's living conditions, so a long and difficult job is still ahead of us. The next stage of this work will require the concerted efforts of the whole nation.

I shall never forget your grandfather and grandmother; they made the deepest impression on me. After the failure of the 1927 revolution, your father, Comrade Wu Zhixi³⁸⁰ and I were conducting the peasant movement in Xiaozheng, and we stayed in your home. Following the defeat of that movement,³⁸¹ your whole family escaped to Shanghai, where your grandfather continued to practise medicine to support his numerous dependents, and we continued to have our meals in your home. Your grandfather was a man of great integrity. He deeply believed in the victory of the revolution, and

Letter to Comrade Lu Kaiti.

in the midst of adversity he never expressed the slightest complaint or regret; he was truly exceptional.

It is my responsibility as an uncle to counsel you on a certain matter, and you may copy this part of the letter for Niyun³⁸² and ask him to heed its message as well. You and Niyun should under no circumstances take on an affectation as children of revolutionary heroes. This kind of behaviour in front of your fellow countrymen or doing anything improper or illegal is absolutely impermissible. You must remember that communists have only the same rights as common people do under the laws of the state, and, moreover, they should be exemplary in observing these laws. The activities of members of a revolutionary party should have the sole purpose of serving the people; there must be no thoughts of reward. Whoever considers rewards does not qualify as a communist. Your father and I are not heroes, and you are not children of heroes. You must very firmly keep this in mind. You must remember that the true heroes are the common people throughout the country, and it was only because they opposed the reactionaries and supported the liberation army that the People's Liberation Army was able to liberate all of China. You must abide by the law and behave yourselves. Not the slightest illegal behaviour can be permitted. To write this in my first letter may seem discourteous, but I feel deeply that it is my duty to admonish you.

I will probably be making a trip south, but the date is not yet fixed. I do not know if your father will be able to take time off from his work, but I will set a date if possible so that we can get together.

If Zhangliantang³⁸³ and Xiaozheng are still without a telegraph office, please provide me with an address. That way, if anything urgent comes up, I will be able to telegraph you, as it takes two weeks to get an answer to a letter. Your last letter of June 10 arrived on June 17.

Please relay my respects to your grandmother and my regards to your mother. With best wishes for yourself!

NOTES

¹ The Shanghai Commercial Press, established in 1897, was an important cultural and educational institution. P. 13

² On January 11, 1851, Hong Xiuquan and other leaders launched an uprising in Jintain Village, Guiping County, Guangxi Province, and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. This touched off a nationwide revolutionary peasant revolt against the feudal rule of the Qing Dynasty and the aggression of foreign capitalist powers. Proceeding from Guangxi in 1852, the Taiping army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hubei provinces. In 1853 the army marched through Jiangxi and Anhui and took Nanjing. Then it launched expeditions to the north and west. The revolutionary Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement expanded to 18 provinces and lasted 14 years. After establishing its capital in Nanjing (renamed Tianjing), its leading group committed many political and military errors. It was therefore unable to withstand the combined onslaughts of the Qing government and the British, American and French aggressors and was finally defeated in 1864. P. 13

³ The Yi He Tuan was a mass organization, composed mainly of peasants, that fought against foreign aggression at the end of the 19th century. With the slogan “Aid the Qing government and eliminate the foreign foe,” it aimed its spearhead at the imperialists. Starting from Shandong Province, the Yi He Tuan swept across north and northeast China and grew into a large-scale anti-imperialist, patriotic movement. In 1900 the forces of the eight imperialist powers—Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, Russia, France, Italy and Austria—united in armed intervention against it and occupied Tianjin and Beijing. Under the combined attack of the imperialist aggressors and the Qing troops, the Yi He Tuan Movement collapsed. P. 13

⁴ The May 4th Movement was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal patriotic movement that began on May 4, 1919. In that year, shortly after World War I had ended, the victors—Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other imperialist countries—convened a peace conference with Germany in Paris, at which it was decided that Japan should take over all the privileges previously enjoyed by Germany in Shandong Province, China. China was one of the victorious countries, but the northern warlord government was prepared to accept the decision. On May 4, the students of Beijing held rallies and demonstrations to protest the imperialists’ unjust decision and the warlord government’s compromise. The student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. After June 3 it developed into an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, patriotic mass movement embracing the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The May 4th Movement was also a movement for a new culture and against the feudal culture. Beginning with the inauguration of the magazine *New Youth* (originally named *Youth*), this new cultural movement, under the banner of democracy and science, advocated new ethics and a new literature. Progressive persons in the movement, who embraced Marxism, helped develop it into a Marxist ideological movement. They integrated Marxism with the Chinese workers’ movement, thus laying the ideological and organizational foundation for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. PP. 13, 177

⁵ The May 30th Movement was an anti-imperialist, patriotic movement that grew out of events occurring on that date in 1925. Early that May the Japanese imperialists and the northern warlords suppressed strikes that had broken out in Japanese-owned cotton mills in

Shanghai and Qingdao. On May 15 the Japanese owners of the Shanghai No. 7 Naigai Cotton Mill shot and killed Gu Zhenghong, a worker and a Communist Party member, and wounded a dozen others. On May 30 some 2,000 students staged demonstrations along the streets of the International Settlement; the police arrested more than a hundred of them, detaining them at the Laozha Police Station on Nanjing Road. This action aroused widespread outrage, and about 10,000 people rallied in front of the station, demanding the release of the arrested students. The British imperialist police opened fire on the masses, killing and wounding many patriots. This event, which shocked China and the rest of the world, became known as the May 30th Massacre. Then, in June, the British and Japanese imperialists aroused fierce nationwide indignation by killing more people in Shanghai and other places. Large numbers of workers and students, together with some industrialists and businessmen, held protest demonstrations and strikes in many cities and towns, launching a nationwide anti-imperialist, patriotic movement. PP. 13, 177, 376

⁶ To express support for the May 30th Movement, more than 100,000 Hongkong workers called a strike on June 19, 1925. Later, the strike expanded to involve some 250,000 workers, more than 100,000 of whom returned to Guangzhou (Canton). On June 21, the Chinese workers in the foreign concession at Shamian (Shameen) in Guangzhou also walked out. The two strikes together were known as the Guangzhou-Hongkong strike. On July 3 the strikers officially established the Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike Committee, which set up an armed picket of more than 2,000 workers and blockaded Hongkong and the Shamian foreign concession, inflicting heavy political and economic losses on British imperialism. The strike lasted 16 months and ended in victory in October 1926 after the Northern Expeditionary Army took Wuhan. P. 14

⁷ A reference to the Naigai Cotton Corporation Ltd., which was a prosperous Japanese cotton textile company. It was called “Naigai” (meaning inside and outside Japan), because it had mills both at home and abroad—in Shanghai, Qingdao and Liaoning, for example. At the time, it had 11 cotton mills in Shanghai. A joint strike of six of those mills was held in June 1926 to protest the summary dismissal of certain workers by the Japanese capitalists. The Japanese were finally forced to reinstate all the dismissed workers, and thus the strike ended in victory. P. 14

⁸ The “national revolution” is an old term that appeared in some of the documents of the Chinese Communist Party. It refers to the movement to overthrow not only the rule of the imperialists in China, but also that of the feudal warlords. The “Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement,” adopted in January 1925 by the Fourth National Congress of the Party, recalled that at the Second National Congress, held in 1922, “it was decided that the Chinese proletariat should take part in the national revolutionary movement and support the Kuomintang. The slogans put forward were, ‘form a democratic united front’ and ‘overthrow imperialism and warlords.’” The resolution went on to say, “it is true that the proletariat, the most revolutionary force, should be in the lead. But that leading class should also rally all the oppressed classes against the common enemy—the imperialists and their tools (the warlords, and the landlord and comprador classes), if it wants to win complete victory in the national revolutionary movement and avoid being isolated.” P. 14

⁹ In the first half of 1926 the peasant associations in China had a total of about one million members, the majority of whom (600,000) were in Guangdong Province. After the Northern Expedition, the peasant movement spread swiftly throughout the country. It was most active in Hunan Province, where membership of the peasant associations, which had been 400,000 before the Northern Expedition, rose to 5.18 million in April 1927. In Hubei Province the membership increased from 70,000 before the expedition to more than 2.5 million in May 1927, and in Jiangxi Province the number jumped from 6,000 to more than 380,000 in June 1927. The peasant movement was also growing in Henan, Shandong, Shaanxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces. P. 14

¹⁰ Chen Sheng (?-208 B.C.), a native of Yangcheng, Henan Province, was the leader of a peasant uprising towards the end of the Qin Dynasty. The Red Eyebrows Army was a peasant insurrectionary army headed by Fan Chong towards the end of the Western Han Dynasty. The army was so named because its soldiers painted their eyebrows red. The Yellow Turbans Army was a peasant insurrectionary army led by Zhang Jue towards the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty. It was named after its soldiers' headgear. Huang Chao (?-884), a native of Yuanju, Caozhou (now Heze, Shandong Province), was the leader of peasant revolts towards the end of the Tang Dynasty. Li Zicheng (1606-45), a native of Mizhi, Shaanxi Province, led another revolt towards the end of the Ming Dynasty. He was originally a subordinate to Gao Yingxiang. After Gao's death, Li succeeded him, becoming King Chuang. Zhang Xianzhong (1606-46), a native of Liushujian (east of Dingbian), Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, was the leader of a peasant revolt towards the end of the Ming Dynasty. P. 14

¹¹ The Red-tasselled Spear Society was a superstitious armed organization of peasants, named for its weapons. It was first organized in Shandong Province and gradually spread to Henan, Shaanxi and many other provinces. The policy of the Communist Party towards members of this organization was to educate them and help them to become a revolutionary force, so that they would not be used by warlords and local tyrants. PP. 14, 121

¹² Zhili became Hebei Province in 1928. P. 14

¹³ Inflexible rent means that peasants were required to pay a fixed amount of rent regardless of the success of the harvest. P. 16

¹⁴ Xuzhou and Haizhou are both in Jiangsu Province. Haizhou is now under the jurisdiction of the city of Lianyungang. P. 16

¹⁵ The Agrarian Revolution, the purpose of which was to eliminate the feudal and semifeudal system of landownership, was carried out by the peasants under the leadership of the Communist Party. At an emergency meeting held on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee made the decision to carry out the Agrarian Revolution, and at its Sixth National Congress, held in 1928, the Party drew up a programme for it. In the years that followed, while leading the peasants of the revolutionary base areas in the Agrarian Revolution, Mao Zedong and other leaders gradually drew up a series of correct principles, policies and methods and solved many problems which had been left unsolved at the Party's Sixth National Congress. PP. 17, 35, 163, 171, 255, 268

¹⁶ The Big Sword Society was a popular armed organization that had certain superstitious beliefs. It emerged at the end of the Qing Dynasty and was closely tied to the Bailian (White Lotus) religious sect. The Society operated mainly in Shandong, northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui. The majority of its members were poor peasants. The Society waged struggles in a number of areas against oppression by bureaucrats and landlords and against intrusions by foreign missionaries, and it joined the patriotic, anti-imperialist Yi He Tuan Movement. However, it was often used by the landlord class to suppress peasant uprisings. P. 18

¹⁷ The "yellow" peasant associations were those that were directly or indirectly controlled by the Kuomintang. P. 18

¹⁸ Leading Party members' groups were leading bodies established by the Communist Party in government departments, trade unions, peasant associations and other mass organizations. P. 19

¹⁹ Soviet, a transliteration of the Russian COBET (council or conference), was the name of the organs of authority in Russia after the October Revolution. The revolutionary regime set up in various places by the Chinese Communist Party during the Second Revolutionary Civil War were called Soviets. The areas under the control of the Soviet regime were known as Soviet areas, and this historical period was known as the Soviet period. PP. 20, 25, 32, 35, 40, 45, 102, 157, 184, 348

²⁰ On June 23, 1932, while preparing for the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppres-

sion” campaign, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic decided to raise 600,000 yuan by selling short-term bonds among workers and peasants in the revolutionary base areas. On October 21 of that year, second-term bonds in the amount of 1.2 million yuan were issued to increase the funds for the revolutionary war. At its preparatory meeting held on February 17, 1933, the Trade Union of Chinese Shop Assistants and Handicraftsmen called on its members to return the second issue of bonds to the government and demand no repayment of principal or interest. In early March *Red China*, the organ of the Provisional Central Government carried the news of the union’s initiative, which elicited widespread response from the workers and peasants. By mid-May they had returned bonds amounting to over 900,000 yuan. P. 20

²¹ The campaign to check up on the distribution of land was a mass movement launched after the land was distributed in the Central Revolutionary Base Area in June 1933. The purpose was to discover landlords and rich peasants who had escaped being classified as such and to confiscate their land and property for distribution in accordance with the Land Law. To rectify the “Left” errors made in the movement, on October 10 of the same year the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued a “Decision on Some Questions of the Agrarian Struggles” and approved “How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas,” a document written by Mao Zedong to establish criteria for determining class status in rural areas. PP. 20, 30

²² “Workers” here refers mainly to farm labourers and handicraftsmen in the countryside, including a number of unemployed urban workers. P. 20

²³ “Agricultural workers” here refers to farm labourers. P. 20

²⁴ “Rural workers” here includes farm labourers, handicraftsmen and shop assistants in the rural areas. P. 20

²⁵ Employment agencies were set up by the Central Ministry of Labour and its local departments in revolutionary base areas to recommend unemployed workers to employers. This was in accordance with the Labour Law adopted in November 1931 at the First National Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Confronting large-scale unemployment, many localities compelled employers to hire workers, regardless of whether they needed them or not. This caused many private enterprises to shut down. On May 1, 1933, the First Congress of Chinese Shop Assistants and Handicraftsmen adopted a resolution putting a stop to the practice of assigning unemployed workers to employers by compulsory means. PP. 21, 31

²⁶ This was the Labour Law of the Soviet Republic of China, which was adopted at the First National Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of the Chinese Soviet Republic, held in November 1931, and promulgated on December 1 of the same year. PP. 21, 24

²⁷ Syndicalism, a petty-bourgeois opportunist trend in the international workers’ movement, was widespread in France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Its most influential representatives were Georges Sorel and Hubert Lagardelle in France. The Syndicalists opposed political struggle and denied the leadership role of the political party of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the proletariat. They advocated leadership by the trade unions, which would organize production and replace state organs. P. 21

²⁸ A collective contract was one signed by a trade union, on behalf of workers and administrative staff, with an employer in a revolutionary base area. P. 22

²⁹ A labour contract was one signed by one or several individual workers with an employer in a revolutionary base area. P. 24

³⁰ “Central Soviet Area” or “Jiangxi Soviet Area” refers to the Central Revolutionary Base Area under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party during the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37). It was located in southern Jiangxi Province and western Fujian Province

with Ruijin, the seat of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, as its centre. At the time of its greatest expansion, the area had 21 counties under its jurisdiction, with a population of 2.5 million. PP. 24, 42, 46, 102, 119, 158, 161, 163, 187

³¹ Tingzhou is now Changting County in Fujian Province. P. 24

³² “Grocery trade” refers to the local grocery stores that sold special or local products of both northern and southern provinces (such as cakes, fruit, mushrooms, noodles made from bean starch or sweet-potato starch, etc.). P. 25

³³ This was the First Congress of Chinese Shop Assistants and Handicraftsmen, held in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province on May 1, 1933. The congress adopted a resolution on rectifying “Left” errors in the economic struggle, such as the assignment of unemployed workers to employers by compulsory means. It also adopted the draft of a revised Labour Law prepared by the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and decided to establish a Trade Union of Chinese Shop Assistants and Handicraftsmen and mobilize its members to join the Red Army. P. 25

³⁴ Shuixidu is situated about three kilometres to the northeast of Shanghang County, Fujian Province. P. 25

³⁵ Sixteen months of implementation of the Labour Law, which had been adopted in November 1931 at the First National Congress of the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of the Chinese Soviet Republic, demonstrated that because some articles did not correspond to the realities in the revolutionary base areas, many erroneous “Left” tendencies had emerged. On March 28, 1933, at its 38th regular meeting, the People’s Council of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic decided to amend the Labour Law, and in April of the same year a drafting committee was set up for the purpose. On October 15, 1933, the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated the revised Labour Law of the Soviet Republic of China. P. 25

³⁶ Shop assistants here refer to those whose families lived out of town. P. 26

³⁷ White areas were the Kuomintang-controlled areas during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. The organizations set up by the Communist Party in these areas were called White-area Party organizations. Under the White terror, they had to work mainly underground. PP. 27, 35, 46, 184, 198, 225, 348

³⁸ The Central Government was the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, formed in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, in November 1931. It was also known as the Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Central Government. PP. 28, 30, 103

³⁹ The Trade Union of Chinese Agricultural Workers, formed in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, in April 1933, was under the leadership of the Central Soviet Area Executive Bureau of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. P. 30

⁴⁰ It was also known as the Executive Bureau of the All-China Federation of Trade Union of the Soviet Area of the CPC Central Committee which was established in 1931. P. 30

⁴¹ At the time the persons in charge of the work of trade union branches in the Central Revolutionary Base Area were called directors. P. 30

⁴² The Workers’ Division was organized by the Central Soviet Area Executive Bureau of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in the mobilization drive to enlarge the Red Army in the Central Revolutionary Base Area after victory over the enemy’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign in March 1933. Officially established on August 1, the entire division joined the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and became the Central Guards Division. P. 30

⁴³ In the campaign launched in the Central Revolutionary Base Area to lend grain to supply the Red Army, grain coupons were issued starting from March 1, 1933, by the People’s Financial Commission of the Provisional Central Government. If those coupons were returned

the government would not have to repay them in kind or in cash.

P. 30

⁴⁴ These stations, also known as ploughing-oxen co-ops, were mutual assistance organizations for agricultural production. They were founded by peasants in the Central Revolutionary Base Area, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with the principle of mutual benefit, to make up for the shortage of draught animals and farm tools during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In March and April 1933, the People's Agrarian Commission of the Provisional Central Government promulgated "Measures for Setting Up Ploughing-Oxen Stations" and the "Directive on Organizing Ploughing-Oxen Co-ops." According to these documents, most of the members of the ploughing-oxen stations were to be farm labourers, poor peasants and family members of Red Army soldiers. They would start with the surplus oxen and farm tools confiscated from landlords and rich peasants, and they would be encouraged to purchase more with pooled shares. To borrow cattle or farm tools, members would pay a given sum to cover the expense of raising oxen, repairing farm tools and providing allowances for management personnel.

PP. 30, 154

⁴⁵ The armed bandits were organized and trained by the landlords to protect their own interests.

P. 35

⁴⁶ It refers to the Party organizations in the border areas of the revolutionary base area.

P. 35

⁴⁷ On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in northeast China attacked Shenyang. Soon afterwards it launched an all-out offensive on the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. The Chinese troops (the Northeastern Army) at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast carried out Chiang Kai-shek's order not to resist, and the Japanese forces were therefore soon able to occupy the three provinces. This was known as the September 18th Incident. In February 1933, the Japanese troops attacked Rehe Province (which has now been incorporated into Hebei and Liaoning provinces and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) and occupied it in no more than 10 days. Soon afterwards, they went on to attack the areas along the Great Wall. In May, they invaded northern Qahar Province (now incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Hebei and Shaanxi provinces) and eastern Hebei and continued to advance on north China.

PP. 36, 307

⁴⁸ Ferreting out and confiscating Japanese goods was a tactic often adopted by the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese imperialist aggression in the first half of the 20th century. It was used, for example, in the May 4th Movement of 1919, in the days following the September 18th Incident of 1931 and during the anti-Japanese war.

P. 37

⁴⁹ The "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan," put forward by the Communist Party and supported by Soong Ching Ling and He Xiangning, was published on April 20, 1934 in the name of the Preparatory Meeting for the China National Armed Self-Defence Committee. The programme consisted of the following points: 1) mobilize all sea, land and air forces for battle; 2) mobilize the people throughout the country; 3) arm all the people; 4) confiscate the property of Japanese imperialists in China and of traitors to defray war expenditure; 5) establish a China National Committee for Armed Self-Defence, to be elected by representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and businessmen; and 6) form an alliance with all forces opposed to Japanese imperialists and establish friendly relations with all countries observing a benevolent neutrality.

P. 37

⁵⁰ On April 15, 1932, the Provisional Central Government issued a declaration of war against Japan. The declaration stated: "The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic hereby officially declares war on Japan. It will lead the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the oppressed people in a national revolutionary war and drive the Japanese imperialists out of China in order to achieve the complete liberation and independence of the Chinese nation."

P. 37

⁵¹ Daiying County was named after Comrade Yun Daiying. In order to maintain close ties

with the masses and provide them with more effective leadership, the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government of Fujian Province formed the new county on September 3, 1933, by incorporating Taiba, Taiyang, Lufeng, Lanjiadu and Chadi from Shanghang County. For a time after the main force of the Red Army set off on the Long March, Daiying County was renamed Hangdai County; it was later abolished. P. 40

⁵² The Red Guards and Young Pioneers were formed in the revolutionary base areas during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. The Red Guards was a local, armed mass organization. In some regions the ages of its members ranged from 23 to 50. The Young Pioneers was a semi-military youth organization. Its members were generally between 16 to 23. They also took part in production. There were among them Model Red Guards Battalions and Model Young Pioneers, consisting of volunteers at or above the age of 18. Serving as replacements for the Red Army, they often fought in co-ordination with the Red Army and guerrilla units. During the anti-Japanese war, the Red Guards changed its name to self-defence corps. P. 41

⁵³ This was the month-long drive to enlarge the Red Army launched in the Central Revolutionary Base Area in December 1933. At that time the Red Army was composed mainly of youths recruited in the revolutionary base areas. It also included many captured Kuomintang soldiers who joined of their own accord after receiving re-education. P. 42

⁵⁴ Starting from March 1, 1933, a campaign to supply the Red Army with millet was launched in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued a directive setting out methods by which the revolutionary masses could voluntarily lend millet to the Red Army. Because the need was urgent, the counties were required to fulfil the task by the end of the month. P. 42

⁵⁵ Party organizations in war zones were those operating in areas where the Red Army was fighting the Kuomintang. PP. 42, 158

⁵⁶ The Zunyi Meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held during the Long March at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935. The meeting focused on rectifying the "Left" errors in military affairs, put an end to the domination of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurist line in the central leading body and established the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Red Army and in the central leading body. Thus, it saved the Red Army and the Party from destruction at a most critical juncture, ensured the subsequent defeat of Zhang Guotao's schism and the successful conclusion of the Long March, and opened up new prospects for the Chinese revolution. Chen Yun attended this meeting. PP. 45, 192

⁵⁷ During the Second Revolutionary Civil War, the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army fought the Kuomintang army's fifth military "encirclement and suppression" campaign which was aimed at the Central Revolutionary Base Area. In September 1933 Chiang Kai-shek assembled some 500,000 troops and adopted a new strategy of protracted warfare and of building blockhouses in an attempt to besiege this revolutionary area. At that time, the Communist Party leadership influenced by Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism erroneously practised positional instead of guerrilla and mobile warfare. As a result, after a year of arduous fighting, the Red Army had failed to break through the "encirclement and suppression." In October 1934 the Red Army was forced to withdraw from the Central Revolutionary Base Area and began the Long March. P. 45

⁵⁸ The term "Westward march" refers to the attempt to break out of the fifth encirclement and to effect a major strategic shift of position by the Central Red Army in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. The westward march was later called the Long March. P. 45

⁵⁹ This is a reference to the First Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In June 1930 in Changting, Fujian Province, the Fourth Army, the Sixth Army (to be renamed the Third Army soon afterwards) and the 12th Army were combined to form the First Route Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Later, the name was

changed to the Red Army's First Army Group. The Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was established in Liurenba, Daye County, Hubei Province, in June 1930 and had under its command the Red Army's Fifth and Eighth armies. P. 45

⁶⁰ Lin refers to Lin Biao (1907-71), a native of Huanggang in Hubei Province, who was then commander of the First Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen (1899-1992), a native of Jiangjin, Sichuan Province, who was then political commissar of the First Army Group. PP. 45, 54

⁶¹ Peng refers to Peng Dehuai (1898-1974), who was then commander of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Yang refers to Yang Shangkun (1907-), a native of Tongnan, Sichuan Province, who was then political commissar of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. PP. 45, 54

⁶² The Fifth Army Group was formed by troops from the Ningdu Uprising, which took place in December 1931, and was one of the main groups of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It served as the rear guard in the Long March. Dong Zhentang was commander of the army group, Li Zhuoran its political commissar and Chen Yun representative of the Central Committee. PP. 45, 281

⁶³ This refers to Li Fuchun (1900-75), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, who was then Acting Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. P. 45

⁶⁴ A reference to Liu Bocheng (1892-1986), a native of Kaixian County, Sichuan Province, who was then chief of the general staff of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. PP. 45, 99

⁶⁵ The Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, one of the three front armies, was formed by the Red 4th and 25th Armies from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui revolutionary base area at Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei Province, in November 1931. PP. 46, 102, 283

⁶⁶ Xikang was originally a province. In 1955 the Xikang provincial administration was officially abolished and the territory under its jurisdiction incorporated into Sichuan Province. PP. 46, 55

⁶⁷ This paragraph was contained in the original outline. P. 46

⁶⁸ A reference to the campaign launched by the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to smash the fourth Kuomintang "encirclement and suppression" of the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. At the end of 1932, Chiang Kai-shek assembled 400,000 to 500,000 troops in a concerted attack on the Central Revolutionary Base Area by employing converging columns. From February to March 1933, drawing on the experience gained in the previous three campaigns against "encirclement and suppression," Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, in command of the Red Army's First Front Army, adopted a strategy of wiping out the enemy units one by one through mobile warfare. The Red Army annihilated nearly three enemy divisions in ambushes in Huangpi, Caotaigang and Dongpi in Yihuang County, Jiangxi Province, thus smashing the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression." P. 46

⁶⁹ A reference to "Resolution on the Five Encirclement and Suppression Campaigns Launched by the Imperialists and Kuomintang Government and the Task of Our Party," adopted by the CPC Central Committee on July 24, 1933. P. 46

⁷⁰ Bo Gu (1907-46), otherwise known as Qin Bangxian, a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and held overall responsibility for the central leadership of the CPC. P. 46

⁷¹ From January 1931 when the Party's Sixth Central Committee held its Fourth Plenary Session until the Zunyi Meeting in January 1935, most comrades did not yet realize that the CPC Central Committee had carried out an erroneous political line. Furthermore, because of

the pressing war situation there was no time to discuss this issue further at the Zunyi Meeting. So here Chen Yun writes that “The enlarged meeting expressed the belief that the general political line of the Party at that time was basically correct.” This helped to focus on rectifying the “Left” errors in military and organizational matters of decisive importance and to encourage the entire Party to unite to overcome the difficulties of the Long March. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party,” adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee on April 20, 1945, is a comprehensive summary of that topic. P. 46

⁷² The Central Red Army, also known as the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, was one of the three main forces of the Red Army. It was developed in the Jiangxi-Fujian area directly under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. PP. 47, 102

⁷³ A reference to the battle fought on July 30, 1933, by the Red Army against the 78th Division of the Kuomintang’s 19th Route Army in the Pengkou and Juxi areas of Liancheng County, Fujian Province. Two regiments of Kuomintang troops were destroyed in this battle. P. 47

⁷⁴ On October 26, 1933, under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-Japanese policy, Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai, in alliance with Kuomintang leaders including Li Jishen, signed a preliminary agreement with the Provincial Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army to resist Japanese aggression and oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The main points of this agreement were as follows: (1) Each side immediately ceases military operations against the other. (2) Both sides restore trade and adopt the principle of mutual aid and cooperation. (3) The Fujian provincial government and the 19th Route Army immediately release all political prisoners in Fujian Province. (4) The Fujian provincial government and the 19th Route Army permit all revolutionary organizations to engage in activities in Fujian Province. In Fuzhou in November of the same year, “the People’s Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China (i.e., the Fujian People’s Revolutionary Government) was established and publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek. In January 1934, the Fujian People’s Revolutionary Government was defeated by Chiang Kai-shek’s military forces. Committing “Left” closed-doorism, the CPC provisional central leadership had failed to provide any military assistance for the Fujian People’s Revolutionary Government. PP. 47, 377

⁷⁵ Dongpi and Huangpi are two towns in Yihuang County, Jiangxi Province. PP. 47, 54

⁷⁶ Jianning and Taining are two counties in Fujian Province. Lichuan is a county in Jiangxi Province. P. 48

⁷⁷ Yanping is now Nanping, Fujian Province. P. 48

⁷⁸ Luo Fu (1900-76), alias Zhang Wentian, a native of Nanhui County, Shanghai, was then member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the People’s Council of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. P. 48

⁷⁹ This refers to Xiao Jingguang, who was then in charge of the Fujian-Jiangxi Military Command. The principal exponents of the “Left” adventurist line placed the blame for the fall of Lichuan during the initial stage of the campaign against the enemy’s fifth “encirclement and suppression” on this commander. This outline report was written before that error was redressed. P. 48

⁸⁰ A reference to a battle fought from April 10 to April 27, 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in Guangchang County, Jiangxi Province. The Kuomintang army gathered 11 divisions to attack Guangchang, the northern gateway to the Central Soviet Area, and then to capture Ruijin. The “Left” adventurist leaders assembled nine divisions to defend the city. The Red Army suffered heavy casualties and had to withdraw from Guangchang.

even though they had dealt significant blows to the enemy. P. 48

⁸¹ “Short range, swift thrusts” was a tactic advocated by Li De (Otto Braun, a military adviser from the Communist International) during the campaign against the enemy’s fifth “encirclement and suppression.” Whenever the enemy would build blockhouses to entrench its forces at every step, the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was also to build blockhouses to defend its positions; whenever the enemy troops would leave the blockhouses to advance, the Red Army was immediately to attack them. The leaders who employed this tactic were later judged to be committing “Left” errors and following a purely defensive strategy. P. 48

⁸² A battle fought on June 8, 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in the Longgang area of Guangchang County, Jiangxi Province. P. 49

⁸³ A battle fought in mid-March 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in the Sanxixu area of Nanfeng County, Jiangxi Province. P. 49

⁸⁴ A battle fought on March 23, 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in the Taiyangzhang area, Taining County, Fujian Province. P. 49

⁸⁵ A battle fought on September 26-28, 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in Shicheng County, Jiangxi Province P. 49

⁸⁶ A military tactic adopted by Kuomintang troops for the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, who would build blockhouses and entrench themselves at each step towards Red Army base areas. Chiang Kai-shek chose this tactic at a military meeting held at field headquarters in Nanchang in June 1933. According to incomplete statistics, by October 1934 when the Central Red Army broke through the enemy’s encirclement and began the Long March, Kuomintang troops had built over 14,000 blockhouses in Jiangxi Province. This counter-revolutionary tactic of using blockhouses could have been defeated by following Mao Zedong’s strategy of “a people’s war.” P. 49

⁸⁷ A battle fought on September 1-4, 1934, between the Red Army and the Kuomintang army in the Wenfang area of Liancheng County, Fujian Province. P. 50

⁸⁸ Li Yannian (1904-74), a native of Guangrao, Shandong Province, was then commander of the fourth column of the second route army and concurrently commander of the ninth division of the Kuomintang “bandit suppression” army. P. 50

⁸⁹ This refers to the vanguard detachment of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army which was marching north to resist Japanese invaders. It was at the same time an advance unit sent by the Chinese Communist Party to break through the Kuomintang army’s “encirclement and suppression” against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Initially, the unit was formed from the Seventh Army Group of the Red Army led by Xun Huaizhou. In July 1934, it moved northward from Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. In November of the same year, it joined forces with the Red Army’s Tenth Army led by Fang Zhimin in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Base Area. Later, the vanguard detachment continued northward in the face of interceptions and encirclements by Kuomintang troops and suffered heavy losses. The surviving troops persisted in guerrilla warfare under the leadership of Su Yu and were incorporated into the New Fourth Army after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. P. 50

⁹⁰ Mao Zedong (1893-1976), a native of Xiangtan, Hunan Province, was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Zhang refers to Zhang Wentian. Wang refers to Wang Jiaxiang (1906-74), a native of Jingxian County, Anhui Province, who was at that time an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic and Director of the General Political Department of the Red Army. P. 51

⁹¹ Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), a native of Huai’an, Jiangsu Province, was then member of

the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and general political commissar of the Red Army. P. 51

⁹² “A” refers to Li De (1900-74), alias Hua Fu, whose real name was Otto Braun, a German. In 1932 he was sent to China by the Communist International. In 1933 he arrived at the Central Revolutionary Base Area and served as adviser to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Actually, he held supreme command authority for the Red Army. During the campaign against the enemy’s fifth “encirclement and suppression” and in the early days of the Long March, Li De, together with Party leaders who clung to the “Left” line, adopted a series of ineffective military strategies and tactics, thus causing the Red Army to suffer heavy losses. After the Zunyi Meeting, Li De was deprived of supreme command over the Red Army. He left China in 1939. Bo refers to Bo Gu and Zhou to Zhou Enlai. P. 51

⁹³ “Bolshevik” is the English transliteration of a Russian term which means “the majority.” In 1903, when the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party drew up its Party programme and constitution, the Marxists, led by Lenin, waged an intense struggle against Martov and other opportunists. It was Lenin’s supporters who won the majority in the election of the central leading organ, and so they were called Bolsheviks. Since that time, Marxist-Leninists call themselves “Bolsheviks.” P. 51

⁹⁴ The three-person group was a CPC Central Committee decision-making body for military command composed of Bo Gu, Li De and Zhou Enlai. P. 51

⁹⁵ Zhu refers to Zhu De (1886-1976), a native of Yilong, who was then member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. P. 51

⁹⁶ The “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party” adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee on April 20, 1945 drew conclusions about the “Left” mistakes committed by Bo Gu (otherwise known as Qin Bangxian). Bo Gu supported this resolution and corrected his mistakes. He was again elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC. P. 52

⁹⁷ Kai Feng (1906-55), alias He Kequan, a native of Pingxiang, Jiangxi Province, was then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League and representative of the Party Central Committee to the Red Army’s Ninth Army Group. P. 52

⁹⁸ Mao refers to Mao Zedong, Zhang to Zhang Wentian and Chen to Chen Yun. P. 52

⁹⁹ Xu Xiangqian (1901-90), a native of Wutai, Shanxi Province, was then the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. P. 53

¹⁰⁰ He Long (1896-1969), a native of Sangzhi County, Hunan Province, was at this time the commander of the Second Army Group of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. When the second and sixth army groups of the Red Army were reorganized as the Red Army’s Second Front Army in July 1936, He Long became the commander-in-chief. PP. 53, 259

¹⁰¹ Xiao Ke (1908-), a native of Jiahe County, Hunan Province, was then the commander of the Sixth Army Group of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. When the second and sixth army groups of the Red Army were reorganized to become the Red Army’s Second Front Army in July 1936, he became the deputy commander-in-chief. P. 53

¹⁰² Lifan is now Lixian County, Sichuan Province. P. 55

¹⁰³ Maogong is now Xiaojin County, Sichuan Province. P. 55

¹⁰⁴ Yazhou is now Ya’an, Sichuan Province. P. 55

¹⁰⁵ Zhang Huizang (1885-1931), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, served as

commander of the 18th Division of the Kuomintang Army. His division was wiped out by the Red Army in December 1930, at which time he was taken captive. P. 55

¹⁰⁶ This refers to “All for the Protection of the Soviet” written by Zhang Wentian and carried in the newspaper *Red China* on September 29, 1934. P. 55

¹⁰⁷ Dayu is now Dayu County, Jiangxi Province. P. 56

¹⁰⁸ Daozhou is now Daoxian County, Hunan Province. P. 57

¹⁰⁹ Yongming is now Jiangyong County, Hunan Province. P. 57

¹¹⁰ Xue Yue (1896-), a native of Lechang County, Guangdong Province, was at the time the frontline commander-in-chief of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang Bandit Suppression Army. Zhou Hunyuan (1885-1938), a native of Xin’an County, Hebei Province, was then the commander of the Second Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang Bandit Suppression Army. P. 57

¹¹¹ The Yuecheng Mountain Range was formerly known as the Xiyan Mountain Range in Ziyuan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. P. 61

¹¹² One foot is approximately 0.3 metre. P. 61

¹¹³ A reference to Lin Boqu. P. 62

¹¹⁴ A reference to Chiang Kai-shek. This article was written for circulation in the area under the control of the Kuomintang, so it was not appropriate to use Chiang’s name here. P. 63

¹¹⁵ Lianghekou is now Hekou Village in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. P. 64

¹¹⁶ Liuji is now Liuji Village, Xinliu Township, Jianhe County, Guizhou Province. P. 65

¹¹⁷ Taigong is now Taijiang County, Guizhou Province. P. 65

¹¹⁸ This was a local term for opium. P. 67

¹¹⁹ This refers to metre. P. 68

¹²⁰ Tuanxi is a town in Zunyi County, Guizhou Province. P. 69

¹²¹ Wu Peifu (1874-1939), a native of Penglai, Shandong Province, was chief of the Zhili clique of the northern warlords. For a time in 1918 he opposed Duan Qirui’s policy of unifying the nation by force and advocated peace negotiations between the South and the North. As a patriotic soldier after the May 4th Movement of 1919, he was against signing the Paris Peace Treaty and for abrogating the Sino-Japanese secret agreement. In 1922, after the first Zhili-Fengtian War, he supported Cao Kun’s bid to control the Beijing Government. In 1923 he cruelly suppressed the movement of the Beijing-Hankou Railway workers. He was defeated in the second Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924. In 1926 he joined forces with Zhang Zuolin, a warlord of the Fengtian clique, and attacked the National Army under Feng Yuxiang. In the same year he fled to Sichuan after his troops were routed by the Northern Expeditionary Army in Hubei. He died in Beijing in 1939. PP. 69, 118

¹²² This refers to remittance fees. P. 69

¹²³ This refers to February 9, 1935. P. 74

¹²⁴ Long Yun (1887-1962), a native of Zhaotong, Yunnan Province, was then Chairman of the Kuomintang’s Yunnan Provincial Government. P. 74

¹²⁵ Luo Binghui (1897-1946), a native of Yiliang, Yunnan Province, had been the commander of a company, and later of a battalion under Zhu Peide’s command in the Yunnan Army. When the Red Army was marching westward, he was commander of the Ninth Army Group of the Red Army. P. 74

¹²⁶ Lanbandeng is now called Nanbai Town, Zunyi County, Guizhou Province and is the seat of the people’s government of Zunyi County. P. 76

¹²⁷ Dingfan is now Huishui County in Guizhou Province. P. 78

¹²⁸ Changzhai was a county in Guizhou Province; it was called Changshun County after

- merging with Guangshun County in 1942. P. 78
- ¹²⁹ Guandu refers to a district of Kunming in Yunnan Province. P. 79
- ¹³⁰ In 1915, Yuan Shikai, who had exploited the fruits of the 1911 Revolution, stepped up his attempts to restore imperial rule. On December 12, he proclaimed himself emperor and changed the name of the “Republic of China” to the “Chinese Empire.” On December 25, Cai E, Tang Jiyao, Li Liejun and others announced their rebellion by telegram from Yunnan. They organized the Protect-the-Republic Army and launched the campaign to protect the Republic and oppose Yuan Shikai. P. 81
- ¹³¹ Zhanyi was a county in Yunnan Province; it was called Qujing City after merging with Qujing County in 1983. P. 81
- ¹³² Jiaoxidu, or Jiaochedu, is now Jiaopingdu, which is located in northwestern Luquan County, Yunnan Province. P. 82
- ¹³³ Huili Prefecture is now Huili County, Sichuan Province. P. 82
- ¹³⁴ Tong’an Prefecture is now Tong’an Town in Huili County, Sichuan Province. P. 82
- ¹³⁵ A reference to Yuexi County, Sichuan Province. P. 86
- ¹³⁶ *T h i s* refers to the pre-liberation policemen of Indian nationality in Shanghai who were employed by the British and who usually rode horses. P. 88
- ¹³⁷ Kailuochang refers to Caluo Township, Shimian County, Sichuan Province. P. 89
- ¹³⁸ Dajianlu refers to Kangding County, Sichuan Province. P. 89
- ¹³⁹ Nitou refers to the Yidong area in Hanyuan County, Sichuan Province. P. 94
- ¹⁴⁰ Hualinping refers to a village in Sanjiao Township, Hanyuan County, Sichuan Province. P. 94
- ¹⁴¹ Shuizitian refers to Shuizidi Village in Sanjiao Township, Hanyuan County, Sichuan Province. P. 95
- ¹⁴² Maoxian County refers to Maowen Qiang Autonomous County, Sichuan Province. P. 96
- ¹⁴³ Zhang Guotao (1897-1979), a native of Pingxiang, Jiangxi Province, attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1921. He was elected member of the Central Committee and later member of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee. In 1931 he served as secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-bureau of the Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In June 1935, when the First Front Army of the Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army in the Maogong area of Sichuan Province, he became general political commissar of the Red Army. Being opposed to the Central Committee’s decision to have the Red Army continue its march north, he tried to split the Party and the Red Army and set up a separate “party central committee.” In June 1936, forced to abolish the separate “party central committee,” he joined the Second and Fourth Front Armies on the march and reached northern Shaanxi in December. In September 1937 he became vice-chairman of the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and later its acting chairman. In April 1938, while allegedly attending a traditional ceremony to sweep the grave of the Yellow Emperor, *Huangdi*, he fled to Xi’an and then Wuhan, where he joined the Kuomintang secret police. He thus became a renegade from the Chinese revolution and was subsequently expelled from the Party. He died in Canada in 1979. PP. 98, 143, 191, 282, 329
- ¹⁴⁴ Dong Zhentang (1895-1937), a native of Xinhe, Hebei Province, was a brigade commander of the 26th Army of the Kuomintang. On December 14, 1931, he led his troops to revolt in Ningdu and joined the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army; he thereafter served as deputy general commander of the Fifth Army Group and commander of the 13th Army. In 1932 he joined the Chinese Communist Party. During the Long March he served as commander of the Fifth Army Group of the Red Army. P. 99

¹⁴⁵ Zhou Kun was then commander of the Eighth Army Group of the Red Army. After the anti-Japanese war broke out, he served as chief of staff of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. In 1938 he absconded from Shanxi with funds. P. 99

¹⁴⁶ Chen Yi (1901-72), a native of Lezhi, Sichuan Province, served as director of the political department and secretary of the military commission of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and as general commander and political commissar of the Jiangxi Military Area. In 1934, when the Central Red Army began the Long March, he remained in the South to pursue guerrilla warfare. During the anti-Japanese war and the War of Liberation, he served as commander of the New Fourth Army and of the East China Military Area, commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army, chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Military Control Commission and as Mayor of Shanghai. PP. 99, 375

¹⁴⁷ Zhao Bosheng (1897-1933), a native of Huanghua, Hebei Province, was chief of staff of the 26th Army of the Kuomintang. In October 1931 he joined the Chinese Communist Party. On December 14, he and Dong Zhentang led their troops to revolt in Ningdu, and he joined the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, afterwards serving as the chief of staff of the Fifth Army Group and also the commander of the 14th Army. P. 99

¹⁴⁸ After the September 18th Incident of 1931, the Communist Party called upon the people to resist Japan by means of armed struggle. Under the influence and leadership of the Party, the people in the Northeast and some of the patriotic Kuomintang troops stationed there organized themselves into various anti-Japanese armed forces—volunteers, national salvation corps and self-defence corps—all of which came under the general appellation of Northeastern Volunteers. PP. 106, 293

¹⁴⁹ On August 1, 1935, the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued an "Appeal to All Fellow-Countrymen for Resistance to Japan and for National Salvation," also known as the August 1st Declaration. It appealed to all Chinese in the following terms: "Whatever the past or present differences of political opinion and of interests among the political parties, whatever the differences of views and of interests among our countrymen in their various walks of life, whatever the past or present hostilities between the various armies, we should all truly awaken to the realization that 'brothers quarrelling at home join forces against attacks from without' and, first and foremost, we should stop the civil war so as to concentrate the nation's resources (manpower, material and financial resources, and the armed forces) on the fight for the sacred cause of resisting Japan and saving the nation." The declaration called upon all those willing to join in the struggle to resist Japan and save the nation—all political parties, all organizations, all prominent public figures, scholars and statesmen and all local military and administrative bodies—to hold talks with a view to establishing a national defence government. It called upon all troops willing to fight Japan to form an anti-Japanese united army. P. 106

¹⁵⁰ These were secret agents employed by the police stations in the settlements of the British and French imperialist aggressors in China. P. 107

¹⁵¹ Ma Yufu had been a member of the Labour Movement Commission of the Shanghai Party Committee and a member of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. On November 15, 1929, with the approval of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, he was expelled from the Party, together with the Trotskyite Chen Duxiu and others, because he closely followed Chen in opposing the line of the Party's Sixth National Congress. He was one of those who signed the Chen Duxiu liquidationist programme entitled "Our Political Views" on December 15 of that year, and he was a member of the Society of Proletarians, a faction of Trotskyites headed by Chen Duxiu. Later, he sought refuge with the Kuomintang and became one of its secret agents. P. 110

¹⁵² The February Revolution was the second bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. On February 18 (March 3 by the Gregorian calendar), 1917, workers in Petrograd, the capital

city, went on strike. Under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, the strike quickly turned into an uprising. The garrison forces in Petrograd participated in the uprising, which drew nationwide response, and the autocratic tsarist system was overthrown. After the revolution, a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was established, while the bourgeoisie, supported by petty-bourgeois compromisers, formed a provisional government, which meant there were two centres of political power. The people, led by the Bolsheviks, then prepared and carried out a socialist revolution. P. 112

¹⁵³ A rickshaw is a two-wheeled vehicle drawn by a human. P. 114

¹⁵⁴ A bowler is a stiff-felt hat with a round crown and curved brim. P. 114

¹⁵⁵ Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) was a native of Changzhou, Jiangsu Province. In 1922 he joined the Chinese Communist Party and was one of the leaders of the Party in the early days. At the critical moment of the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, he and Li Wei-han presided over the August 7th Meeting. After the meeting, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, taking charge of the work of the Central Committee. From November 1927 to April 1928, Qu Qiubai made the mistake of "Left" putschism. In September 1930, he presided over the Party's Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, which put an end to Li Lisan's "Left" adventurist mistakes. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in January 1931, he was subject to attacks from the "Left" dogmatists and factionalists headed by Wang Ming and was removed from the leading body of the Party Central Committee. Henceforth, Qu Qiubai, working together with Lu Xun, was engaged in the revolutionary culture movement in Shanghai. In 1934 he arrived in the Central Revolutionary Base Area and became a member of the People's Educational Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. While moving from Jiangxi Province to Fujian Province in February 1935, he was arrested by the Kuomintang army and faced execution bravely in Changting, Fujian Province, on June 18, 1935. P. 114

¹⁵⁶ Yang Zhihua (1900-73) was the wife of Qu Qiubai. She was a native of Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Province. P. 114

¹⁵⁷ J. V. Stalin, "Address Delivered in the Kremlin Palace to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies," *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1976, p. 772. PP. 117, 204

¹⁵⁸ A reference to the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base area, which extended from northern Shaanxi to northeastern Gansu. Between 1932 and 1934, under the leadership of Comrades Liu Zhidan and Xie Zichang, the 26th and 27th Armies of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army were organized and the Shaanxi-Gansu border area and the northern Shaanxi revolutionary base area were set up. After the revolutionary forces smashed the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns conducted by the enemy troops from Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Shanxi provinces in July 1935, the two areas were joined. In September of the same year the 26th and 27th Armies joined forces with the 25th, which arrived in northern Shaanxi after breaking through the enemy's encirclement of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi revolutionary base area, and the three merged to form the 15th Army Group of the Red Army. By this time the northern Shaanxi base area had grown to embrace nearly 20 counties, with a population of over 900,000, and it was there that the Central Red Army and the Second and Fourth Front Armies concluded their Long March. P. 117

¹⁵⁹ Etatism, a popular bourgeois ideology in 19th-century Europe, preaches an abstract concept of the state to conceal its class nature. In the 1920s certain political representatives of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie in China also espoused Etatism and became known as Chinese Etatists. Because they presented themselves as patriots, they were able to deceive a number of young intellectuals for a time. Through their journals, the *Guide* and *Chinese Youth*, the Chinese Communist Party and Youth League exposed the fallacies of the Etatists, winning over the patriotic youth. P. 118

¹⁶⁰ The Three People's Principles put forward by Dr. Sun Yat-sen were nationalism, democracy and the people's livelihood. As time went on, new content was added to them. The old Three People's Principles were the programme for China's early democratic revolution. In January 1924, at the suggestion of the Communists, Dr. Sun Yat-sen restated them at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, transforming them into the new Three People's Principles. These included the three great policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to peasants and workers. P. 118

¹⁶¹ Mao Zetan (1905-35), a native of Xiangtan, Hunan Province, joined the Communist Party in October 1923. He served successively as member of the Southwestern Jiangxi Special Party Committee, secretary of the Central County Party Committee, commander of the Independent Division of the Red Army and secretary-general of the Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee. After the main force of the Red Army began its Long March, he stayed behind to carry out guerrilla warfare in the South. He died heroically in action in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, in April 1935. P. 119

¹⁶² The Lugouqiao Incident is also known as the Incident of July 7, 1937. Lugouqiao [the Marco Polo Bridge], about 10 kilometres from Beijing, is the southwestern gateway to the city. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lugouqiao. Influenced by a vigorous, nationwide anti-Japanese movement and encouraged by the Communist Party, the Chinese troops there rallied to resist Japan. This incident marked the beginning of the people's heroic war of resistance against Japan, which lasted for eight years. P. 120

¹⁶³ At the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College the Communist Party trained military and political cadres for the anti-Japanese war. Its predecessor, the University of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the Central Revolutionary Base Area, was renamed the Anti-Japanese University of the Red Army after it moved to northern Shaanxi, and was changed to the present one in 1937. PP. 120, 129, 242, 245, 260

¹⁶⁴ The Northern Shaanxi College was set up in Yan'an in September 1937 by the Communist Party to train cadres for the anti-Japanese war. It recruited progressive youths from all parts of the country and gave them a short-term course in revolution. In 1939 part of the college was merged into North China Associated University; the rest stayed behind in Yan'an and in 1941 became a part of Yan'an University. PP. 120, 216, 242

¹⁶⁵ The Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature was set up in Yan'an in April 1938 by the Communist Party to train cadres for literary and art work. It was moved to the Northeast during the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1946-49). PP. 120, 216

¹⁶⁶ A reference to the Central Committee's Party School where leading cadres could receive a systematic education in Marxism-Leninism. Its predecessor, the Marxist-Communist School, was established in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, in March 13, 1933. In the winter of 1935, after the Long March, it was restored in Wayaobu in northern Shaanxi and renamed the School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was moved to Yan'an in early 1937. PP. 120, 176, 216, 241

¹⁶⁷ The Revolution of 1911, led by the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League), a bourgeois revolutionary party headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, overthrew the autocratic regime of the Qing Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a number of revolutionaries inspired the New Army to mount an uprising in Wuchang, Hubei Province. It evoked enthusiastic response from other provinces, and very soon the reactionary regime of the Qing Dynasty, which was supported by imperialist powers, crumbled. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established in Nanjing, with Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president. Thus China's feudal monarchic system, which had lasted more than 2,000 years, was brought to an end. The idea of a democratic republic had taken hold among the people, but the bourgeois revolutionary forces were too weak and conciliatory to mobilize the masses and make a thoroughgoing revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The fruits

of the 1911 Revolution were soon seized by the northern warlord Yuan Shikai, and China remained a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. PP. 121, 178

¹⁶⁸ The Society of Brothers was a secret organization whose members were mainly impoverished peasants, unemployed handicraftsmen, demobilized soldiers and vagrants, along with a few landlords. Influenced and led by the revolutionaries, they took part in a number of armed uprisings during the Revolution of 1911. P. 121

¹⁶⁹ In ancient China the three religions were Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and the nine schools of thought were represented by the Confucians, the Taoists, the *Yin-Yang*, the Legalists, the Logicians, the Mohists, the Political Strategists, the Eclectics and the Agriculturists. Later the “three religions and nine schools of thought” took on a broader meaning to indicate the different religious sects and academic schools. In the old society the phrase was used to mean people in dubious trades. P. 121

¹⁷⁰ The Trotskyites were originally an anti-Leninist faction in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Here, however, the reference is to Chinese Trotskyites. After the failure of the revolution in 1927, a small number of capitulationists, represented by Chen Duxiu, adopted the reactionary Trotskyite stand. They held that the Chinese bourgeoisie had triumphed over the imperialist and feudal forces and that the bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed. The proletariat, they believed, would have to wait to carry out the socialist revolution: for the time being it should call off all revolutionary movements and conduct instead legal movements calling for the convocation of a national assembly. They were called “Trotskyite Chen Duxiu liquidationists.” Expelled from the Party in November 1929, Chen Duxiu and others, with the help of Trotsky, formed a Chinese Trotskyist clique known as the Chinese Communist League in May 1931. Chen Duxiu was made its secretary. Soon afterwards the leaders of the League were arrested by the Kuomintang and the clique disintegrated, but some Trotskyites and small Trotskyite groups continued their activities. P. 126

¹⁷¹ The Institute of Marxism-Leninism was set up by the Chinese Communist Party in Yan’an in May 1938 to train cadres for theoretical work. In July 1941, in accordance with a decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, its General Knowledge Division and the Central Party School were merged to form the Marxist-Leninist Research Institute, with the research departments of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism as the mainbody. Shortly afterwards, the M-L Research Institute was renamed the Central Research Institute. PP. 129, 176, 216

¹⁷² The Commission for Party Affairs was established by the Central Committee on August 8, 1933 in accordance with a decision reading in part as follows: “In order to ensure that Party constitution and decisions are abided by and that Party discipline is observed and to combat bureaucratism and corruption within the Party, a Central Commission for Party Affairs will operate until a Central Control Commission has been formally established.” P. 130

¹⁷³ The Constitution referred to here was the one adopted by the Communist Party at its Sixth National Congress in July 1928. PP. 132, 135, 149, 263

¹⁷⁴ V. I. Lenin, “*Left-Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, p. 6. P. 133

¹⁷⁵ The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Enlarged) was held in Yan’an from September 29 to November 6, 1938. During the session, Comrade Mao Zedong made a report entitled “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” and delivered concluding speeches on “The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front,” on “Problems of War and Strategy” and on other subjects. The session adopted a “Political Resolution,” approved the line of the Central Political Bureau headed by Mao Zedong and criticized the error of capitulationism

made by Wang Ming on the question of the united front. In view of the fact that Right capitulationists in the Party had violated organizational discipline and that Zhang Guotao had set up a separate “party central committee” and had even opposed and betrayed the Party, the session also adopted two resolutions on rules and discipline governing the work of the Central Committee and the Party branches and several others on the building of Party organizations. These were designed to improve the Party’s democratic centralism and enhance its solidarity and unity. PP. 133, 145, 183, 204

¹⁷⁶ “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 204. P. 133

¹⁷⁷ The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was a proletarian party established in March 1898. At its Second Congress held in 1903, the Party was divided into two groups: the Bolsheviks (from *большевик* meaning majority) and the Mensheviks (from *меньшевик* meaning minority). During its Sixth National Conference, held in 1912, a decision was made to drive the Mensheviks out of the Party. The Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, formally became an independent Marxist party named the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks). In 1918, at its Seventh Congress, the Party took the name Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); in 1925, at its 14th Congress, it was renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks); and at its 19th Congress held in 1952, it dropped the double name, becoming simply the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. PP. 135, 149

¹⁷⁸ L. Martov (1873-1923) was one of the Mensheviks of Russia. After the October Revolution of 1917, he took a hostile stand with regard to the Soviet regime, and in 1920 he fled abroad. P. 136

¹⁷⁹ V. I. Lenin, “Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.,” *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, Vol. VI, p. 502. P. 136

¹⁸⁰ Li Hanjun (1890-1927), a native of Qianjiang, Hubei Province, became in 1920 a member of the Shanghai group that helped found the Communist Party of China. In 1921 he attended the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, but later he left the Party. He was killed by the Guangxi warlords in Hankou, Hubei Province, in December 1927. P. 136

¹⁸¹ In 1921 the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the First Programme of the Communist Party of China. In 1923, at its Third National Congress, it adopted a new draft programme. By 1939, when this article was written, the Party had not yet worked out a complete programme of its own. It was not until 1945, at the Seventh National Congress, that a general programme was drawn up as a preamble to the Party Constitution, serving as both the basic programme of the Party and the general principles of the Constitution. P. 136

¹⁸² The Comintern, also known as the Third International, was an organization uniting the Communist Parties of different countries. It was established in March 1919 and dissolved in June 1943. The Chinese Communist Party became one of its affiliates in 1922. The Action Programme of the Comintern was adopted by the First Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in March 1919. P. 136

¹⁸³ The ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation was adopted at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Luochuan, northern Shaanxi, in August 1937. The programme consisted of the following points: 1) the overthrow of Japanese imperialism; 2) mobilization of the military strength of the whole nation; 3) mobilization of the people of the whole country; 4) reform of the government apparatus; 5) formation of an anti-Japanese foreign policy; 6) formation of wartime financial and economic policies to resist Japan; 7) improvement of the people’s standard of living; 8) formation of an anti-Japanese educational policy; 9) the weeding out of Chinese collaborators, traitors and pro-Japanese elements and consolidation of the rear areas; and 10) national

unity against Japan. See “For the Mobilization of All the Nation’s Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 25-28. P. 136

¹⁸⁴ J. V. Stalin, “The Foundations of Leninism,” *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1976, p. 99. P. 137

¹⁸⁵ The provisions regarding candidate members was contained in “The First Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China” adopted by the Third National Congress of the Party in 1923. In 1928 it was deleted from the Constitution adopted at the Party’s Sixth National Congress but was later restored by decision of the Central Committee. At various times the length of candidature also varied. In the Constitution adopted by the Party’s Eighth National Congress in 1956, the term “candidate member” was changed to “probationary member” and “candidature period” to “probationary period.” This Constitution also stipulated that no new recruit should be transferred to full membership until he or she had been observed during a one-year probationary period. The Constitution adopted in 1982 by the Twelfth National Congress contained the same provision. P. 140

¹⁸⁶ Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), a native of Huaining, Anhui Province, began editing the magazine *Youth*, or *New Youth* as it was later called, in September 1915, and in 1918, together with Li Dazhao, he founded the *Weekly Review*. He was an advocate of the new culture and one of the chief leaders of the May 4th new cultural movement. After the May 4th Movement, he accepted and propagated Marxism. He was one of the main founders of the Communist Party of China and served as its chief leader for the first six years. In the last period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27) he committed a serious error of Right capitulationism. Later, he lost faith in the future of the revolution and embraced the ideas of the Trotskyites. He formed a faction inside the Party, engaged in anti-Party activities and was consequently expelled in November 1929. He later openly joined and worked for a Trotskyite organization. In October 1932 he was arrested and imprisoned by the Kuomintang. Released in August 1937, he died of illness in Jiangjin, Sichuan Province, in 1942. PP. 143, 282, 330

¹⁸⁷ Cf. “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 197-98. P. 145

¹⁸⁸ V.I. Lenin, “Better Fewer, But Better,” *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, Vol. III, P.715. P. 147

¹⁸⁹ “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, P.210. P. 147

¹⁹⁰ Social-democratic parties were also known as social-democratic labour parties, socialist parties and labour parties. Most of these parties developed during the period between the failure of the Paris Commune and the beginning of the 20th century when capitalism was expanding in relative peace. In 1889 the social-democratic parties of different countries together formed the Second International. Under the leadership of Engels, the Second International played a positive role in spreading Marxism and developing the international workers’ movement in its early days. After the death of Engels, most of these parties, with the exception of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), gradually degenerated into reformist bourgeois parties as a result of the growth of opportunism inside the Second International. P. 148

¹⁹¹ V. I. Lenin, “A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organizational Tasks,” *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. VI, p. 243. P. 149

¹⁹² The *bao* and *jia* were the primary administrative units by which the Kuomintang controlled and oppressed the people. On August 1, 1932 the Kuomintang government promulgated “Regulations for the Organization of *Bao* and *Jia* and for a Population Census in the Counties” in Henan, Hubei and Anhui provinces. From November 7, 1934 the regulations were enforced in all areas under Kuomintang rule. The *bao* and *jia* were organized

on the basis of households: there was a head of each *jia*, which was made up of several households; a head of each *bao*, which was made up of several *jia*'s; and a head of each joint *bao*, which was made up of several *bao*'s. P. 151

¹⁹³ The able-bodied brigades were originally armed organizations under the Kuomintang regime. In the "Principles for Guiding Local Work in the Anti-Japanese War" formulated on August 12, 1937, the Central Committee declared that it was imperative to "make use of all forms of armed organizations of the old regime, such as the local armed bands, the peace preservation corps, the able-bodied brigades and volunteers, organize the masses and equip them with arms, and gain the leading positions in these organizations." P. 154

¹⁹⁴ Mutual-aid working groups, based on individual farming, were formed by peasants in the revolutionary base areas during the Second Revolutionary Civil War to facilitate production through a better organization of labour power. On the principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, all members did an equal amount of work for each other. If a member could not give another as much help as he received, he made up the difference in cash. Apart from helping each other, the members looked after the families of Red Army soldiers and worked for the aged, widowed and those who had lost their children. During the anti-Japanese war, mutual-aid teams, sometimes called mutual-aid working groups or labour-exchange teams, continued to function in agricultural production in various anti-Japanese base areas. P. 154

¹⁹⁵ The border areas were the anti-Japanese base areas built by the Communist Party at the common borders of two or more provinces, e.g., the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the Shaanxi-Qihar-Hebei border area, the Shanxi-Suiyuan border area, the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan border area and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area. P. 158

¹⁹⁶ The Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to consolidate the Party beginning on August 25, 1939. After July 7, 1937, when the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression broke out, and particularly after March 15, 1938, when the Central Committee decided to recruit large numbers of Party members, the Party organizations had expanded very rapidly. Many of these organizations now had to be consolidated. For this reason, the Political Bureau decided to strengthen the Party organization. To enable the Party to overcome the danger of national capitulation and dismemberment and to lead the people to total victory in the war of resistance, it emphasized the following: stop expanding in this period; make a thorough investigation of members' class backgrounds, weed out persons from alien classes (landlords, rich peasants and businessmen), careerists and enemy special agents who had made their way into the Party, and enhance its security and covert activity; step up education in Marxism-Leninism, class education and Party education, particularly among cadres; and enforce strict Party discipline, solidify the ranks of the Party and help all members to unite as one man. P. 158

¹⁹⁷ *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* is a famous Chinese historical novel by Luo Guangzhong (about 1330-1400). P. 160

¹⁹⁸ A reference to the "Decision on Intensifying Work Among Women" made by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on February 20, 1939. P. 161

¹⁹⁹ "Ban *Jin* (half a *jin*) Ba *Liang* (eight *liang*)" is an expression like "Six of one and half a dozen of another" because a half *jin* equals to eight *liang*. P. 161

²⁰⁰ During the anti-Japanese war, the Communist Party changed its policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and distributing it to the peasants to one of reducing rents and interest rates in the anti-Japanese base areas. Meanwhile, it instituted a system of reduced taxes. A 25 percent reduction in land rent was introduced for all forms of tenancy. Interest rates were reduced to the extent acceptable to the parties concerned. To lighten the burden of the working people, all exorbitant taxes and levies were abolished, and the amount of taxes paid was determined on the basis of income. P. 163

²⁰¹ “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975 Vol. II, p. 198. P. 168

²⁰² A reference to the Second Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held in Ansai, Shaanxi Province, from November 13 to December 17, 1939. At the congress Mao Zedong made a report on political matters, and Chen Yun, Li Weihan and others delivered speeches. This congress made an important contribution to building the Border Region and supporting the anti-Japanese war. P. 169

²⁰³ The Great Revolution was a revolutionary movement against imperialism and feudalism lasting from 1925 to 1927. In 1927 Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei successively staged a counter-revolutionary coup d’état, massacring Communists and other revolutionaries. The Great Revolution thus ended in defeat. PP. 169, 225, 282, 348

²⁰⁴ Liu Zhidan (1903-36), a native of Bao’an (now Zhidan), Shaanxi Province, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. That same year he went to study at the Huangpu (Whampao) Military Academy. During April and May of 1928, together with Xie Zichang, he launched the Weihua Uprising. In 1932 and 1933 he helped organize the 26th Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and establish the revolutionary base area on the Shaanxi-Gansu border. In February 1935 he became member of the Communist Party’s Northwest Working Committee and leading member of the Northwest Revolutionary Military Commission. In September of the same year he served as deputy commander and chief of staff of the 15th Army Group of the Red Army. After the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi in October, he became deputy director of the Northwest Office of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, commander of the Red 28th Army and general commander of the Northern Column of the Red Army. In April 1936 he led the Red 28th Army to resist Japan east of the Huanghe (Yellow) River, but his troops were checked by Kuomintang reactionaries, and he died a heroic death in battle in Sanjiaozhen, Zhongyang County, western Shanxi. PP. 169, 178

²⁰⁵ The garrison corps was composed mainly of the 385th Brigade (not including the 769th Regiment) of the 129th Division, which stayed behind after the main forces of the Eighth Route Army left in September 1937 to fight Japan. The security troops were made up of local guerrilla units. Both the garrison corps and security troops were assigned the task of defending the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. PP. 170, 254

²⁰⁶ Diehards refer to those within the Kuomintang who stubbornly opposed the CPC during the War of Resistance Against Japan. P. 170

²⁰⁷ Peng Pai (1896-1929), a native of Haifeng, Guangdong Province, was a famous peasant leader in the early days of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1922 he helped found a peasant association in Chishan, Haifeng County. In January 1923 he was elected chairman of the Haifeng Federation of Peasant Associations. In 1924 he joined the Communist Party. In the same year he helped found the Peasant Movement Institute in Guangzhou and became member of the Party’s Guangdong Committee as well as leader of its Peasant Movement Commission. In November 1926 he served as member of the Peasant Movement Commission of the Central Committee. In 1927 he took part in the Nanchang Uprising, serving as member of the Front Committee of the Party. In November of the same year he helped found the Haifeng-Lufeng Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet, the first Red regime in China, and became its chairman. In November 1928 he served as secretary of the Peasant Movement Commission. He was elected member of the Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau of the Provisional Central Committee, and alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. He was killed by Kuomintang reactionaries in Shanghai in August 1929. PP. 171, 178

²⁰⁸ An administrative village was a primary administrative unit in the rural areas, consisting of one or more actual villages. P. 173

²⁰⁹ The decision was issued on December 1, 1939. See *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 301-03. P. 177

²¹⁰ On December 9, 1935, several thousand students in Beijing held a patriotic demonstration under Communist leadership, raising such slogans as "Oppose the movement for the autonomy of the five northern provinces!," "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" The demonstration was suppressed by the Kuomintang government. The following day, however, students from every school in Beijing declared a general strike, and on December 16 more than 10,000 students and city residents held a second demonstration. This patriotic movement, which received a warm response from people throughout the country and brought about a new upsurge in the people's movement against Japanese aggression and for national salvation, became known as the December 9th Movement. PP. 177, 199

²¹¹ V. I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1973, p. 28. P. 183

²¹² Between November 1930 and October 1934 the Kuomintang troops launched five large-scale military "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. The First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, defeated the enemy's first three campaigns, and it defeated the fourth under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Zhu De. In September 1933 Chiang Kai-shek assembled about 500,000 troops and launched the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign. Wang Ming exercised a "Left" adventurist leadership, and instead of adopting the correct strategy of mobile and guerrilla warfare, chose positional warfare. As a result, the Red Army failed to break this campaign despite a year of hard fighting. In October 1934 the main body of the First Front Army was forced to withdraw from the Central Revolutionary Base Area and began the Long March. P. 187

²¹³ J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," *Works*, Eng. ed., FLP, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379. P. 190

²¹⁴ After the Zunyi Meeting, in June 1935, the First Front Army of the Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army in Maogong, western Sichuan. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a "Decision on Strategic Principles to Be Followed After the First and Fourth Front Armies Have Joined Forces," requiring them to "concentrate the main force to advance on enemy troops in the north, eliminate large numbers of them in mobile warfare and first capture southern Gansu, in order to create a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet base area." Thus the Political Bureau rejected Zhang Guotao's incorrect suggestion that the Red Army retreat to the borders of Sichuan and Xikang provinces. But Zhang Guotao refused to carry out the Central Committee's policy of going north to resist Japan. He tried to compel the Central Committee to take the armies south and even resorted to threats. Thereupon, the Central Committee decided to lead the First and Third Army Groups of the First Front Army to continue the northward march and leave the dangerous area quickly. The army arrived in northern Shaanxi in October. In order to save Zhang Guotao, on September 12, 1935 the Central Committee adopted the "Decision on Zhang Guotao's Errors" (the document was distributed only to members of the Central Committee), asking him to correct his mistakes. However, Zhang Guotao was not to be dissuaded from his wrong course, and without obtaining approval of the Central Committee he ordered the Fourth Front Army to move south. He openly established a separate central committee, splitting the Party and the Red Army. On January 22, 1936, the Political Bureau ordered Zhang Guotao, by telegraph, to abolish the separate central committee and decided to publicize the Decision of September 12 within the Party. Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Ren Bishi and the cadres and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army waged a firm struggle against Zhang Guotao. In June 1936 he was forced to abolish his central committee and joined the Second and Fourth Front Armies on the march north. In October of the same year the three main units of the Red Army, the First, Second and Fourth Front Armies, joined forces in the area of Huining, Gansu Province,

and the Long March came to a successful end.

P. 192

²¹⁵ Party forms refer to registration forms of Party members and cadres, including membership application form.

PP. 195, 279

²¹⁶ See Note 192 above.

P. 201

²¹⁷ “The role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 202.

P. 204

²¹⁸ From *Mencius*, Book III, “Teng Wen Gong,” Part II.

P. 205

²¹⁹ The Chinese Women’s College was founded in Yan’an in July, 1939 by the Communist Party to train women cadres. In September 1941 it was merged with Yan’an University.

P. 216

²²⁰ Also known as the Chinese Young Cadres’ Training Class, where the Communist Party trained young cadres. It was named Wartime Youth Short-Term Training Class when it was founded in Doukou Village, Jingyang County, near Yan’an in autumn 1937. It moved to Yunyang Township and then to Anwubu and became known as the Anwu Young Cadres’ Training Class. In autumn 1939, part of the class was merged with the North China Associated University, and the rest moved to Yan’an in spring 1940 and was later incorporated into the Zedong Young Cadres’ School.

P. 216

²²¹ The Academy of Natural Sciences, established in Yan’an in the summer of 1939, was a school where the Communist Party trained scientific and technical cadres. It later became one of the colleges of Yan’an University.

P. 216

²²² Chen Shaoyu (1904-74), alias Wang Ming, was a native of Jinzhai, Anhui Province. Joining the Chinese Communist Party in 1925, he served as member of the Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the Committee’s Changjiang Bureau and president of the Chinese Women’s College. He was the principal exponent of the “Left” adventurist line in the Party from January 1931, when the Sixth Central Committee held its Fourth Plenary Session, until the Zunyi Meeting in January 1935. He also made Right capitulationist mistakes in the early days of the anti-Japanese war (1937-45). For a long period he rejected the Party’s criticism and help and finally, during the 1960s, degenerated into a renegade to the Chinese revolution. He died in the Soviet Union in 1974.

PP. 217, 330

²²³ On August 1, 1941, the Central Committee adopted the “Resolution on Investigation and Study.” The resolution declared: “Now that our Party has become a great political party engaged in a great revolutionary cause, we should guard against empty talk and perfunctoriness, and overcome subjectivism. We should apply specific methods in conducting rigorous investigation and study of the past and present circumstances and of the specific conditions at home and abroad, and the realities inside and outside a province and a county. Only thus is it possible for us to organize the revolutionary forces to overthrow the rule of the Japanese imperialists and their lackeys.”

P. 223

²²⁴ Established in 1938 and incorporated into the Kuomintang in September 1947, this reactionary organization was used by the Kuomintang to deceive and control young people.

PP. 223, 345

²²⁵ The conference was held in Yan’an in May 1937. At the conference Liu Shaoqi made a report entitled “The Party and Its Mass Work in the White Areas.” The conference summed up the experience gained in the Party’s work in the White areas during the 10 years of civil war, criticized the “Left” error of closed-doorism and set forth the basic principles and tactics for the Party to apply in the White areas after the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

P. 225

²²⁶ This decision was adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on February 28, 1942. It pointed out that although such education had drawn general attention in the Party since the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, held in 1938, it was still often neglected and professional education was not being stressed. Attention had

been given to political education, but the Party had failed to conduct it on a regular basis and with stress on major questions. The leading organs of the Party, government and army at various levels had not paid enough attention to education in general knowledge. Theoretical education among senior cadres, on which the outcome of the revolution depended, was either neglected or divorced from reality, so that theories were turned into dogmas. All this, the decision said, had to be reformed and improved. The in-service training of cadres should include professional, political, theoretical and general knowledge. In professional education, it was to teach what people needed in their work. Political education should cover current affairs and general policies. Those cadres who had not received enough school education should, first and foremost, learn how to read and write, and they must not belittle that basic education. The senior and middle-level cadres who were qualified (in terms of general knowledge, comprehension and interest) to study theory should do so in addition to acquiring professional knowledge and studying politics. It was emphasized that academic records should serve as one of the criteria for appraising the performance of cadres. The leading organs of the Party, government and army at various levels were expected to pay close attention to education among cadres (both in-service training and training at cadres' schools). P. 243

²²⁷ The Central Party School was reorganized in accordance with the "New Decision on the Principles Concerning the Organization and Education of the Central Party School," adopted by the Political Bureau on February 28, 1942. According to this decision, the school became attached directly to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, with Mao Zedong in charge of its political work and Ren Bishi responsible for its organizational work. P. 243

²²⁸ See "On Our Policy with Respect to Cadres" in this volume. P. 245

²²⁹ *Since the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* is a collection of inner-Party confidential documents in two volumes, compiled and printed by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee in December 1941. It was reprinted and distributed by People's Publishing House in 1980. P. 255

²³⁰ Georgi Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian, served as a member of the Central Council of the Red International of Labour Unions in 1921. He was Secretary-General of the Executive Committee of the Communist International from 1935 to 1943. P. 260

²³¹ See *The Poems of a Child Prodigy*, "Quan Xue," by Wang Zhu and others of the Northern Song Dynasty. P. 263

²³² See V. I. Lenin, "Party Organization and Party Literature," *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1962, Vol. X, pp. 44-49. P. 264

²³³ See "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art," Parts I and III of the Conclusion, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. III, pp. 74-79 and 86-88. P. 266

²³⁴ A reference to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, its predecessor being the Shanghai Share Trading Association, which was reorganized in 1920 and was then known as the Shanghai Chinese Stock Exchange. In those days it engaged mainly in speculation in government bonds. It closed down after Japanese invaders attacked Shanghai on August 13, 1937. The Shanghai Stock Exchange re-established in 1943 mainly conducted speculation in Chinese shares. It suspended operation after victory in the anti-Japanese war. It opened again in 1946 but was shut down in June 1949 after Shanghai was liberated. The Shanghai Chinese Cotton Goods Exchange was the biggest market for cotton and cotton yarn in China before the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. It was established in July 1921 and ceased doing business in August 1937. The purchase and sale of cotton and cotton yarn were conducted in terms of immediate delivery and future delivery, future delivery being mostly speculative. P. 268

²³⁵ Shen Yanbing (1896-1981), whose pen name was Mao Dun, was a native of Tongxiang, Zhejiang Province. He was a pioneer of modern China's progressive culture, a great revolutionary writer and one of the earliest members of the Chinese Communist Party. His

novel *Midnight* was published in 1933. In his depiction of Wu Sunpu, a character typical of the national bourgeoisie, and his milieu, he portrays the complex social contradictions and trends of the early 1930s, expounding the theme that under imperialist aggression and oppression China could not develop capitalism independently but would be gradually reduced to a colony. P. 268

²³⁶ J. V. Stalin, "Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders," *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1955, Vol. XIII, p. 258. P. 268

²³⁷ The rectification movement was a Party-wide Marxist-Leninist ideological education movement conducted by the Communist Party in 1942 and 1943. It is usually known as the Yan'an rectification movement. Its purpose was to combat subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, to combat sectarianism in order to rectify the style of Party relations, and to combat Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of writing. The movement helped awaken the entire Party membership to the fundamental need to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. PP. 269, 280

²³⁸ To develop agricultural production and improve the financial situation in the countryside, in March 1943 the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region issued "Regulations for Agricultural Loans." Four kinds of loans were envisaged: for agricultural production, for sideline production, for the supply and marketing of farm products, and for the construction of water conservancy projects. First priority was to be given to agricultural production. The interest rate was to be 1 percent per year for long-term loans and 0.1 percent per month for short-term loans. The usual term for a loan would be one year. P. 271

²³⁹ Refugees and poor people who came to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to reclaim wasteland for farming and residents of the region who left densely populated areas for the same purpose enjoyed preferential treatment. On March 1, 1943, the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region issued "Regulations for Giving Preferential Treatment to Migrants and Refugees Who Reclaim Wasteland of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region." The Regulations read in part as follows: "Public wasteland reclaimed by migrants and refugees themselves or by their hired hands shall be owned by the migrants and refugees, to whom county governments shall issue registration certificates and who shall be exempted from grain tax for three years. Those who reclaim privately owned wasteland shall be exempted from land rents for three years according to the Regulations for Landownership. After that, the Regulations Regarding Tenancy shall be applied to such land, and the landlords shall not be allowed to take it back at will." P. 271

²⁴⁰ Labour exchange was a means by which the peasants of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region traded labour power among themselves. Man-workdays were exchanged for man-workdays, ox-workdays for ox-workdays, man-workdays for ox-workdays, etc. Peasants who joined labour-exchange teams contributed their labour power or animal power to cultivate collectively and in rotation the land of each member household. In settling accounts, the workday was taken as the unit of exchange; those who contributed more man-workdays or animal-workdays were paid for the difference by those who contributed less. P. 271

²⁴¹ The Border Region currency consisted of notes issued by the Bank of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region starting in 1941 and circulated within the Region. After the bank was incorporated into the Northwest Peasants' Bank of the Shanxi-Suiyuan border area in January 1948, it ceased issuing these notes, but they remained in circulation simultaneously with the notes issued by the Northwest Peasants' Bank, at an exchange rate of 20 yuan of the former to 1 yuan of the latter. PP. 271, 276

²⁴² The Office in Charge of Financial and Economic Affairs of the Northwest was set up in June 1942, with He Long as its chairman. In March 1944 Chen Yun began to serve as vice-chairman in charge of day-to-day work. The office was placed under the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee and was in control of the financial and economic affairs of both the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi-Suiyuan border area.

²⁴³ This was a kind of provisional tax levied by the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Starting in autumn 1940, in order to overcome the financial difficulties caused by the Kuomintang blockade, the government organized the masses in the areas of Dingbian, Anbianbu and Jingbian in northwestern Shaanxi to produce salt and transported it to the Kuomintang areas for sale in exchange for materials needed by the Border Region. Between 1941 and 1945, some of the people in the Border Region took part in transporting salt, but those who didn't had to pay for the portion that was done by transport co-ops on their behalf. P. 276

²⁴⁴ These included expenses for matériel, allowances for technicians and subsidies for health care, maternity care, food for the sick and so on. P. 276

²⁴⁵ In order to exert monetary control throughout the country and stop the circulation of silver dollars, the Kuomintang government, on November 4, 1935, endorsed the paper notes issued by the Central Bank, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and later the Farmers' Bank as the unified currency for the whole country. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, all the Kuomintang areas suffered from galloping inflation, and the currency endorsed by the Kuomintang was devalued sharply. On August 19, 1948, a "gold yuan" currency was issued as a substitute. P. 276

²⁴⁶ Peng Zhen, born in 1902 in Quwo, Shanxi Province, was acting director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee at the time and became director of the department in August 1945. P. 279

²⁴⁷ The Chinese word for this kind of money was "Ma Qian," "Ma" means "hemp" and "Qian" means "money." P. 282

²⁴⁸ The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yan'an from April 23 to June 11, 1945. Mao Zedong made a political report entitled "On Coalition Government," Zhu De delivered a military report entitled "The Battle Front in the Liberated Areas," Liu Shaoqi presented a "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution" and Zhou Enlai made an important speech entitled "On the United Front." The congress decided that the line of the Party would be "boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China." The congress also adopted a new Party Constitution and elected a new Central Committee. The new Constitution defined Mao Zedong Thought—the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution—as the guide for the work of the Chinese Communist Party. The congress was one of unity and victory. P. 284

²⁴⁹ The pamphlet, written by Wang Ming, preached Leftist dogmatism. It was published in 1931 under the title *The Two Lines* and was reprinted the next year under the present title. P. 285

²⁵⁰ People of the Man ethnic group called themselves Manchus in the Qing Dynasty. Most of them lived in northeast China, which was therefore known as Manchuria. P. 286

²⁵¹ The railway ran from Harbin to Manzhouli in the west, Suifenhe in the east and Dalian in the south. Known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, it was first built and operated by Russians. After the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the section south of Changchun was seized by the Japanese and renamed the Southern Manchuria Railway. After the October Revolution in Russia, the section north of Changchun was jointly run by China and Russia and continued to be called the Chinese Eastern Railway. This section was seized by Japan following the Incident of September 18, 1931. After China's victory in the anti-Japanese war, the Southern Manchuria Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway became one railway known as the Chinese Changchun Railway, owned and run jointly by China and the Soviet Union. In December 1952 the Soviet government transferred the ownership of the Changchun Railway

to the Chinese government. The railway is now divided into three sections known as the Harbin-Manzhouli, the Harbin-Suifenhe and the Harbin-Dalian railways. P. 286

²⁵² These were the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; the agreements concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Dalian, and Lüshun (Port Arthur); the agreement on the relationship between the Soviet Supreme Commander and the Chinese authorities after the Soviet troops, which were fighting side by side with the Chinese against Japan, entered the three northeastern provinces; and others signed by the Kuomintang government of China and the government of the Soviet Union in Moscow on August 14, 1945. P. 286

²⁵³ Northern Manchuria covered the area including Harbin, Mudanjiang, Jiamusi, Bei'an, etc. PP. 287, 289, 307, 336, 356, 368

²⁵⁴ Eastern Manchuria covered the area including Jilin, Xi'an (now Dongliao), Yanji, Antu, Dunhua, etc. east of the Shenyang-Changchun line of the then Chinese Changchun Railway. PP. 287, 307

²⁵⁵ Western Manchuria included Qiqihar, Taonan (now Tao'an), Fuyu, Shuangliao, Kailu, Fuxin, etc. west of the Shenyang-Harbin line of the then Chinese Changchun Railway. PP. 287, 292, 307

²⁵⁶ Southern Manchuria included Zhuanghe, Andong (now Dandong), Tonghua, Linjiang and Qingyuan, east of the Shenyang-Dalian line of the Chinese Changchun Railway, and Liaozhong, southwest of Shenyang, etc. PP. 287, 292, 307, 356

²⁵⁷ Zhuhe used to be a county of Heilongjiang Province. After liberation it was merged with Weihe County into Shangzhi County. P. 287

²⁵⁸ Taonan used to be a county of Heilongjiang Province. In 1954 it was incorporated into Jilin Province and in 1958 it was merged with Baicheng County to become Tao'an County. Zhaodong, Zhaozhou and Zhaoyuan counties were all in Heilongjiang Province. P. 287

²⁵⁹ Oupu County in Heilongjiang Province has since been merged with Huma County. Qike and Wuyun counties have been merged with Xunhe County into Xunke County. PP. 289, 294

²⁶⁰ After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang government divided the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang into nine provinces: Liaoning, Liaobei, Andong, Jilin, Songjiang, Hejiang, Heilongjiang, Nenjiang and Xing'an. P. 289

²⁶¹ Mudanjiang was actually Suining Province. It was established on April 10, 1946, after the Northeast Democratic United Army liberated Mudanjiang and other places. It was reduced to a prefecture on October 8, 1946. On August 27, 1947, the prefecture and Dong'an prefecture of Hejiang Province were merged to become Mudanjiang Province, which was abolished in July 1948, the Mudanjiang area came under the jurisdiction of Songjiang Province and the Dong'an area under that of Hejiang Province. P. 289

²⁶² On August 15, 1945, Japan announced unconditional surrender, ending World War II. PP. 289, 307, 339

²⁶³ During the War of Liberation, the bandits in northeast China were troops and policemen of the puppet Manzhouguo regime and armed bands of landlords. PP. 289, 295

²⁶⁴ The "movement to settle accounts" was launched among the masses in areas liberated after victory in the anti-Japanese war. Its purposes were to expose and punish the crimes committed by Chinese collaborators and puppet troops, to recover the land and property they had seized, to overthrow the puppet regime and to set up democratic governments and mass organizations. PP. 290, 294, 310

²⁶⁵ A reference to land seized by the reclamation teams that were organized after the Incident of September 18, 1931 and the establishment of the Manzhouguo puppet regime, by the Manchuria Reclamation Company under the Japanese Ministry of Reclamation (the company was later expanded to form the Manchuria Reclamation Corporation) and by the

reclamation department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs under the Manzhouguo regime (the department was later expanded to become the General Reclamation Bureau). In its "Directive on Handling Land Seized by Japan and the Puppet Regime" issued on March 20, 1946, the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee stated that "all landed estate owned by Japan and the puppet regime, all land seized by reclamation teams of the puppet Manzhouguo regime, by Japan's Manchuria Reclamation Corporation, by Japanese and by big Chinese collaborators in northeast China shall be distributed free of charge among the peasants and poor people with little or no land, which will facilitate spring ploughing, increase food for the people and prevent the land from lying waste." P. 290

²⁶⁶ Songpu was a district in Harbin at the time. P. 291

²⁶⁷ On April 23, 1946, the People's Congress of Songjiang Province adopted a "Motion that the People's Self-Defence Corps Enter Harbin to Protect the People and Their Property." The People's Self-Defence Corps was formerly the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. P. 291

²⁶⁸ A reference to the puppet Manzhouguo regime created by the Japanese imperialists after they occupied northeast China in 1931. Manzhouguo was founded in Changchun in March 1932 with Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as its head, the title of his reign being Datong. In March 1934, Manzhouguo became the Manchurian Empire, and Pu Yi became Emperor under the title of Kangde. The Empire was overthrown in August 1945 when the Chinese people won the anti-Japanese war. PP. 292, 293, 309

²⁶⁹ Chiang Kai-shek's clique called its own troops the Central Army, but here the term refers to the Kuomintang troops in general. PP. 292, 336

²⁷⁰ The Northeast Democratic United Army was formed in spring 1946, when the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army arrived in the Northeast and joined with the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army there. In January 1948 it became the Northeast People's Liberation Army, the following August it was reorganized as the Northeast Field Army and again in March 1949 as the Fourth Field Army. P. 293

²⁷¹ After the Kuomintang troops landed at Qinhuangdao on November 1, 1945, they launched a sudden attack on Shanhaiguan. The garrison troops there defended the city until November 16, when they withdrew to defend Suizhong County. P. 293

²⁷² When the truce agreement was to be signed on January 10, 1946, the Kuomintang reactionaries insisted on the exclusion of the northeastern region, hoping to seize it by force. Under pressure of nationwide opposition and the counter-offensive launched by the Northeast Democratic United Army, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to sign a truce agreement for the Northeast on March 27, 1946, in Chongqing. But hardly three days had passed before Kuomintang troops, with the help of the United States, launched fresh attacks on Yingkou, Anshan, Sipingjie and other places under Communist control. Since the Party insisted on stopping the civil war unconditionally, and since the Kuomintang was short of forces because of its overextended battle line, on June 6 Chiang Kai-shek ordered his armies in the Northeast to cease fire for 15 days from noon of June 7. On the same day, Zhou Enlai issued an announcement agreeing to a 15-day ceasefire and expressing his readiness to do everything in his power for the success of the negotiations. On June 21, the two sides announced that the truce would be prolonged for eight days, after which it was made indefinite. Chiang Kai-shek announced the truce in order to prepare a fresh attack. P. 293

²⁷³ On June 26, 1946, the Kuomintang reactionaries broke the truce agreement and launched a large-scale offensive against the Central Plains Liberated Area with 300,000 troops. At the end of June, in order to preserve its strength and gain the initiative, the Central Plains People's Liberation Army, under the command of Li Xiannian, Zheng Weisan and others, broke through the encirclement at different points. This strategic shift tied down large numbers of enemy troops, giving effective support to the operations of other liberated areas.

Kuomintang troops and encourage them to revolt, the Central Committee started a propaganda campaign, calling upon other Kuomintang officers and men to follow the example of Gao Shuxun and his troops and come over to the side of the people. This was known as the Gao Shuxun movement. Pan Shuoduan (1901-78), a native of Weixin in Yunnan Province and commander of the 184th Division of the Kuomintang's 60th Corps, came over with his troops at Haicheng, Liaoning Province, in May 1946. Afterwards, he became commander of the 1st Army of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. P. 298

²⁸⁰ Du Yuming (1904-81), a native of Mizhi, Shaanxi Province, was then commander of the Northeast Peace Preservation Headquarters of the Kuomintang army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. PP. 300, 306

²⁸¹ George Marshall (1880-1959), former Secretary of State and of Defence of the United States, was appointed special envoy to China by President Truman in December 1945. Using mediation as a cover, he participated in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations but supported the Kuomintang government in its anti-Communist and anti-popular civil war. On August 10, 1946 he declared the "mediation" a failure, and on January 8, 1947, he returned to the United States. P. 302

²⁸² Albert C. Wedemeyer, born in 1897, was an American career officer. In October 1944 he came to China as commander of the American troops in the China Theatre and chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek. After World War II he supported the Kuomintang government in launching a civil war against the Communists and the people. In July 1947 he came to China as special envoy of President Truman to "make investigations" in China, seeking ways both to support and control the Chiang Kai-shek clique. P. 302

²⁸³ A reference to the offensive launched by the Shandong People's Liberation Army against the Kuomintang troops along the Qingdao-Jinan and Tianjin-Pukou railways in June 1946. It liberated more than 10 cities and towns, including Jiaoxian, Zhangdian, Zhoucun, Dezhou, Tai'an and Zaozhuang. P. 302

²⁸⁴ This was a policy adopted by the Japanese imperialists in an attempt to eliminate the people's armed forces operating behind enemy lines and to destroy the anti-Japanese base areas. With railways as "bars," highways as "chains" and blockhouses as "locks," plus blockade walls and ditches, the Japanese imperialists tried to construct a network to encircle the troops and people operating in the base areas. P. 302

²⁸⁵ A stronghold here refers to a Party branch. P. 303

²⁸⁶ This means that U.S. vessels, including warships, had the freedom to sail inland waters of China. Thus, after the Japanese surrender the Kuomintang government sold an important part of China's sovereignty to the U.S. imperialists. On June 5, 1946, the Supreme National Defence Council of the Kuomintang government adopted a resolution allowing foreign vessels to enter the ports of Nanjing, Wuhu, Jiujiang and Hankou for loading and unloading during the so-called demobilization period. On November 4 of that year, the Kuomintang and U.S. governments concluded the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. The treaty provided that vessels of the signatories were free to navigate in any waters of their countries that were open to foreign commerce or navigation, and their personnel and freight had the right of passage through the signatories' territory "by the routes most convenient." In the event of distress, the signatories' vessels, including warships, could sail in any waters not open to foreign commerce or navigation. Nominally, the treaty insured reciprocal rights for both sides, but China had no ocean-going freighters in those days, so that in effect the United States was given unilateral rights. The Chinese people were strongly opposed to this unequal treaty. P. 304

²⁸⁷ On September 30, 1945, two divisions of the U.S. Marines landed in Tianjin. Later, the United States stationed Marines in Shanghai, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao and other major

cities. By June 1946, in an effort to control the country and support the Kuomintang in the civil war, the United States had stationed as many as 90,000 of its Marines in China. P. 304

²⁸⁸ Ji'an County, Mengjiang County (now Jingyu County), Linjiang County (now Hunjiang City) and Fusong County are all in Jilin Province. P. 306

²⁸⁹ Sanyuanpu is now a town in Liuhe County, Jilin Province. P. 306

²⁹⁰ Both Meihai and Longmei refer to the areas surrounding Hailong and Meihekou. P. 306

²⁹¹ Yongling is now a town of Xinbin County, Liaoning Province. P. 306

²⁹² Xingjing is now Xinbin County, Liaoning Province. P. 306

²⁹³ Andong is now Dandong, Liaoning Province. Fengtian is now Shenyang, Liaoning Province. P. 306

²⁹⁴ Bamiancheng is now a town in Changtu County, Liaoning Province. P. 306

²⁹⁵ The 4th Column of the Northeast Democratic United Army was one of the main troops of the Northeast Democratic United Army. In 1948, the Northeast Democratic United Army was renamed the Northeast People's Liberation Army and thereafter the Northeast Field Army. It was reorganized as the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in March 1949. P. 306

²⁹⁶ The 3rd Column was one of the main forces of the Northeast Democratic United Army. P. 307

²⁹⁷ Changbai is now Changbai Korean Autonomous County, Jilin Province. P. 307

²⁹⁸ On October 31, 1946, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided to establish a Liaodong Sub-bureau (or the Southern Manchuria Sub-bureau). Chen Yun served as secretary of the Liaodong Sub-bureau and political commissar of the Liaodong Military Area. Xiao Jingguang served as deputy secretary of the Liaodong Sub-bureau and Commander of the Liaodong Military Area. P. 307

²⁹⁹ Cheng Shicai (1912-90), a native of Lishan (now Dawu), Hubei Province, was then Deputy Commander of the Liaodong Military Area. Luo Shunchu (1912-81), a native of Shanghang, Fujian Province, was then chief of staff of the Liaodong Military Area. Tang Kai, (1916-), a native of Huangpi, Hubei Province, was then deputy political commissar of the Liaodong Military Area. P. 307

³⁰⁰ The Liaodong Military Area, also called the Southern Manchuria Military Area was one of the military areas of the Northeast Democratic United Army. Here were the 3rd and 4th Columns, forces of the Andong, Liaoning and Liaonan military sub-areas and armed forces. P. 307

³⁰¹ Xiao Hua (1916-85), a native of Xingguo, Jiangxi Province, was then deputy secretary of the Liaodong Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee and deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the Liaodong Military Area. P. 307

³⁰² Lin Biao was then secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army. P. 307

³⁰³ The Eighth Route Army, a shortened term for the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, was one of the main forces of the people's army led by the Chinese Communist Party during the anti-Japanese war. It was reorganized as the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the War of Liberation. P. 307

³⁰⁴ This refers to the agrarian reform movement conducted in the liberated areas after the CPC Central Committee issued the "Directive on the Land Issue" on May 4, 1946. After victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, an extensive and thorough mass movement was launched in the countryside to combat Chinese collaborators, settle accounts with

landlords and reduce land rents and interest. As the vast numbers of peasants urgently needed land, the Central Committee decided to change the policy of reducing rent and interest which was followed during the anti-Japanese war to one of confiscating land from landlords and distributing it to the peasants. P. 307

³⁰⁵ The Russo-Japanese War was an imperialist war fought between Japan and tsarist Russia from 1904 to 1905 for China's northeast territory and Korea. As the war was fought mainly in Fengtian (now Shenyang), Liaoyang Prefecture and around the port of Lüshun in northeast China, the Chinese people suffered enormous losses. On February 8, 1904, the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleets in the port of Lüshun and captured the port by the following January. Soon afterwards, Japanese troops routed the main force of the Russian army near Fengtian and smashed Russian reinforcements from the Baltic Sea in the Tsushima Strait. On September 5, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded between Japan and Russia through the mediation of the United States. Thus, the Japanese imperialists supplanted tsarist Russia as the dominant power in northeast China. P. 307

³⁰⁶ The term "diehard troops" refers to the Kuomintang army fighting against the Communist Party and the people. P. 308

³⁰⁷ The civil war, also known as the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Ten-Year Civil War, refers to the Second Revolutionary Civil War led by the Chinese Communist Party from August 1927 to July 1937. P. 308

³⁰⁸ A "united county" consisted of several adjacent counties behind enemy lines, over whose struggle the Party exercised unified leadership. These counties were scattered throughout southern Manchuria. For example, Shen-Tie-Fu United County consisted of Shenyang County (later incorporated into Shenyang City), Tieling County and Fushun County. P. 308

³⁰⁹ The railway ran from Shenyang to Dalian. P. 309

³¹⁰ The Changchun Railway ran from Changchun to Shenyang; the Jifeng Railway ran from Jilin to Shenyang; the Pingmei Railway ran from Siping to Meihokou. P. 309

³¹¹ The term "Kuomintang diehards" refers to the Kuomintang henchmen working against the Communist Party and the people. P. 310

³¹² Saima is a town in Fengcheng County, Liaoning Province. P. 310

³¹³ The peasants were compelled to pay a portion of what they produced as taxes. P. 311

³¹⁴ Fenghuangcheng refers to Fengcheng County, Liaoning Province. P. 311

³¹⁵ Liaoxi refers to western Manchuria. P. 311

³¹⁶ Tie-Fa-Kang was a united county in Liaoning Province which consisted of Tieling, Faku and Kangping counties. P. 311

³¹⁷ Wang Kuixian (1916-), a native of Huoqiu, Anhui Province, was then commander of the Hanan Military Sub-area of the Songjiang Military Area. P. 312

³¹⁸ Wen Yucheng (1915-89), a native of Xingguo, Jiangxi Province, was then commander of the Hadong Military Sub-area of the Songjiang Military Area. The 1st and 3rd Regiments were under the command of the Hadong Military Sub-area. P. 312

³¹⁹ Liaonan was a province at that time. P. 312

³²⁰ Feng Zhongyun (1908-68), a native of Wujin, Jiangsu Province, was then governor of the People's Government of Songjiang Province. P. 312

³²¹ The Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army was a people's anti-Japanese armed force led by the Chinese Communist Party in northeast China. The army was founded in 1936. In October 1945, jointly with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that had marched into the Northeast, it was reorganized as the Northeast People's Autonomous Army. At the beginning of 1946, it was renamed the Northeast Democratic United Army. P. 312

³²² See note 308 of this volume. P. 313

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- ³²³ Pingdingshan is a town in Xinbin County, Liaoning Province. P. 314
- ³²⁴ The 12th Division was a division of the 4th Column of the Northeast Democratic United Army. P. 314
- ³²⁵ Rehe, a province at that time, was abolished in 1956. The areas formerly under its jurisdiction were incorporated into Hebei and Liaoning provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. P. 314
- ³²⁶ Huanren County is in Liaoning Province. Ji'an County is in Jilin Province. Jinchuan County is now Jinchuan Township in Huinan County, Jilin Province. Huinan County is in Jilin Province. P. 314
- ³²⁷ In mid-October 1946, eight Kuomintang divisions in the Northeast (about 100,000 troops) set out to attack the Southern Manchuria Liberated Area along three routes. The troops of the Northeast Democratic United Army in the Liaodong Military Area, in coordination with local armed forces, fought heroically. However, because the Kuomintang troops were much stronger, by late October they had successively occupied most cities and towns including Andong and Tonghua and then pressed towards the Changbai Mountains region in an attempt to wipe out the Southern Manchuria Liberated Area. P. 315
- ³²⁸ The four counties were Changbai, Linjiang (now Hunjiang City), Mengjiang (now Jingyu County) and Fusong. P. 315
- ³²⁹ Liuhe County is in Jilin Province. P. 316
- ³³⁰ This refers to Lüda Prefecture which consisted of Lüshun, Dalian and Jinxian County at that time. Han Guang (1912-), a native of Qiqihar, Heilongjiang Province, was then secretary of the Lüda Prefecture of the CPC Central Committee. P. 317
- ³³¹ Tonghua City is in Jilin Province. P. 317
- ³³² Guandongzhou refers to Lüda Russian Concession, which consisted of Lüshun, Dalian and Jinxian County. In 1898 tsarist Russia forced the Qing Government to grant this Concession, which was transferred to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. P. 318
- ³³³ Xiao Jingguang (1903-89), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, was then Deputy Secretary of the Liaodong Sub-bureau and Commander of the Liaodong Military Area. P. 318
- ³³⁴ Zhengjiatun is a town in Shuangliao County, Jilin Province. P. 319
- ³³⁵ Harbin is the capital city of Heilongjiang Province. P. 319
- ³³⁶ A reference to Xiao Jingguang and Cheng Shicai. P. 320
- ³³⁷ On March 27, 1947, the Kuomintang army mustered seven divisions for the fourth offensive on Linjiang Prefecture along three routes. While some of its forces pinned down the enemy on both flanks, the Northeast Democratic United Army in the Liaodong Military Area, concentrating the main force of the 3rd Column and part of the 4th Column, annihilated the 89th division and the 162nd regiment of the 54th division of the Kuomintang 13th army, which consisted of over 7,000 men in Liuhe County on April 3, thus smashing the enemy's offensive. P. 320
- ³³⁸ From January to March 1947, the Northeast Democratic United Army in northern Manchuria launched three offensives across the Songhua River to support the forces of the Liaodong Military Area in defending Linjiang Prefecture. On January 5, the northern Manchuria forces concentrated 12 divisions for the first offensive across the Songhua River. They annihilated over 4,000 Kuomintang troops in Jiutai County, forcing the enemy to send two divisions of reinforcements from southern Manchuria and one division from western Manchuria. On January 19, these forces withdrew to the north of the Songhua River to rest and prepare for new actions. On February 21, they crossed the Songhua River for a second offensive. They annihilated a regiment and a battalion defending Chengzijing and went on to besiege Dehui County, luring the enemy's 12 regiments north from southern and western Manchuria and Changchun. On March 2, the northern Manchuria forces withdrew again to

the north of the Songhua River. While the enemy continued advancing northward on several routes, they launched a counterattack across the Songhua River for a third time on March 8, annihilating the enemy's 88th division and part of its 87th division in Nong'an County. They then laid siege on Nong'an County, forcing the enemy to bring up two divisions from Rehe and southern Manchuria for reinforcements. On March 16, the northern Manchuria forces retreated to the north of the Songhua River before it began to thaw. P. 322

³³⁹ From December 1946 to February 1947, the Northeast Democratic United Army in the Liaodong Military Area smashed three offensives on Linjiang Prefecture launched by Kuomintang forces. On December 17, 1946, six Kuomintang divisions launched an offensive on Linjiang Prefecture along the Huinan-Liuhe-Tonghua-Huanren-Kuandian line. The Liaodong Military Area adopted the strategy of closely coordinating operations behind enemy lines with those at the front; that is, the 4th Column moved deep behind enemy lines, diverting the enemy's attention, while the 3rd Column assumed mobile defensive positions in preparation for a counter-offense. After over a month's fighting, more than 5,000 enemy troops had been annihilated and the enemy's first offensive on Linjiang was smashed. On January 30, 1947, Kuomintang troops mustered four divisions for a second offensive on Linjiang along three routes. The Liaodong Military Area, concentrating the main forces of the 3rd Column and part of the 4th Column, annihilated the enemy's central attack force, the 195th division in Tonghua, then moved to Sanyuanpu where it annihilated two reinforcing battalions (more than 4,000 enemy troops), thus smashing the enemy's second offensive. On February 13, the Kuomintang army mustered five divisions for a third offensive on Linjiang along three routes. The Liaodong Military Area concentrated the main forces of the 3rd Column to strike one of these approaching contingents, while the 4th Column fought behind enemy lines. Within ten days they smashed the enemy's offensive, annihilating more than 7,000 enemy troops in Liuhe and Benxi counties. P. 322

³⁴⁰ The towns refer to Jinchuan, Huinan, Liuhe, Ji'an and Huanren counties. P. 322

³⁴¹ Zeng Kelin (1913-), a native of Xingguo, Jiangxi Province, was then commander of the 3rd Column of the Northeast Democratic United Army. Han Xianchu (1913-86), a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei Province, was then deputy commander of the 4th Column of the Northeast Democratic United Army. P. 325

³⁴² The Pacific War refers to the conflict in the Pacific region between the anti-fascist allied nations and Japan during World War II. On the morning of December 7, 1941, without declaring war, Japan employed a huge naval and air force in a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the main Pacific base of the U.S. naval and air forces, inflicting disastrous losses on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The following day, the United States and Britain declared war on Japan, while Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Thereafter, Japanese troops occupied many countries and regions in Southeast Asia and some islands in the Pacific Ocean. Later, under the heavy blows dealt by the armed forces of the anti-fascist nations in the Pacific region, Japan met with one defeat after another. In August 1945 it surrendered unconditionally, and thereupon the war was ended. P. 327

³⁴³ Zhao Gongwu was then Andong garrison commander of the Kuomintang. P. 329

³⁴⁴ Chen Linda was then commander of the Kuomintang's 195th Division. P. 329

³⁴⁵ Mao'er Hill is near Linjiang in Jilin Province. In 1947, the Liaodong Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee was located in Linjiang. P. 329

³⁴⁶ Zaoyuan was located in the northwest of Yan'an. After 1943, this is where the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee met. Comrade Chen Yun once recuperated there. P. 330

³⁴⁷ Li Lisan (1899-1967), a native of Liling County, Hunan Province, was one of the early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. On June 11, 1930, under his leadership, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution entitled "The New Revolutionary

High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces,” which advocated immediate armed insurrections throughout the country. He drew up an adventurist plan to organize insurrections in key cities and to amass Red Army forces to attack these cities. Subsequently, he combined leading Party organs, the Youth League and trade unions at all levels into action committees to further these uprisings. These “Left” adventurist mistakes became known as the “Li Lisan Line.” In September of the same year, the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee began to correct these “Left” mistakes. Li Lisan admitted his mistakes at that session and stepped down from his position on the Central Committee. After he had proven that he had corrected his mistaken ideas over a long period through working for the revolution, he was re-elected to membership in the Central Committee at the Party’s Seventh and Eighth National Congresses. P. 330

³⁴⁸ On the night of January 28, 1932, the Japanese marine corps attacked Shanghai. Responding to the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment among people throughout China, the 19th Route Army stationed in Shanghai together with the people of the city heroically resisted the attack. This was the beginning of the Wusong-Shanghai anti-Japanese war. P. 330

³⁴⁹ The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC was convened in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. With the support of Mif, representative of the Communist International, Wang Ming attained leadership of the CPC Central Committee at this session, which initiated the dominance of his “Left” Adventurism in the Party for the next four years. P. 330

³⁵⁰ The CPC Provisional Central Committee’s Resolution on Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces was adopted on January 9, 1932. It exaggerated both the crisis in Kuomintang rule and the level of development of revolutionary forces, putting forth adventurist ideas and a series of “Left” policies. These included amassing Red Army forces to seize key cities so as to be able to take over one or more provinces, widely arming workers and peasants and calling for general strikes in various industries in the White areas. P. 330

³⁵¹ During the First Revolutionary Civil War, workers in Shanghai, led by the Communist Party, launched three armed uprisings to support the successful Northern Expedition and overthrow the reactionary rule of the northern warlords. The first uprising was staged on October 23, 1926 and the second on February 22, 1927, but because of inadequate preparation both ended in failure. On March 21, 1927, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, Luo Yinong, Zhao Shiyuan, Wang Shouhua and others, the third armed uprising was mounted. It began with a general strike by 800,000 workers. By then, the East Route Column of the Northern Expeditionary Army had arrived at Longhua in the outskirts of Shanghai. When the workers tried to attack Zhabei and were locked in stalemate with the enemy garrison troops, the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions sent representatives to Longhua asking Bai Chongxi, General Commander of the Front Headquarters of the East Route Column, to send troops quickly to support the workers. However, obeying Chiang Kai-shek’s secret orders, Bai Chongxi took no action, allowing the northern warlords to wear out the workers’ strength. On March 22 through fierce fighting, the workers overthrew the rule of the northern warlords in Shanghai and established the Special Provisional Government of Shanghai, a government of the people, which marked the victory of the uprising. PP. 331, 348

³⁵² Joseph Stilwell (1883-1946), a career American army officer, was the military attaché at the American embassy in China. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, he became commander of the U.S. troops in the China-Myanmar-India theatre and chief of staff of the war zone in China. He was recalled by the United States government in 1944 because of his differences with Chiang Kai-shek. P. 332

³⁵³ The Chinese often call this railway “Si-Mei Railway.” P. 336

³⁵⁴ See Note 260 above. P. 336

³⁵⁵ The Sixth All-China Labour Congress was held in Harbin from August 1 to 22, 1948.

The congress was attended by 504 persons representing 2,830,000 organized workers and office staff from all over the country. There were representatives of the General Labour Federation of the Liberated Areas, the Labour Association of China, the trade unions of the liberated areas in north China, east China, the Northeast, Northwest, Central Plains, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, as well as representatives of the workers in Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan and other large cities under Kuomintang rule. The congress called upon the working class all over the country to unite with the rest of the people and give vigorous support to the People's Liberation Army, so as to rapidly accomplish the historical task of overthrowing the rule of the reactionary Kuomintang and establishing a new China. It adopted a "Resolution on the Current Task of China's Labour Movement" and decided to re-establish the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the unified national organization of the Chinese working class. P. 347

³⁵⁶ On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek staged a counter-revolutionary coup d'état in Shanghai, perpetrating a bloody slaughter of Communists and other revolutionaries. PP. 348, 376

³⁵⁷ The Xi'an Incident is also known as the December 12th Incident. At the critical juncture when the Japanese imperialists were stepping up their aggression to colonize China, the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army, headed by General Zhang Xueliang, and its 17th Route Army, headed by General Yang Hucheng, having been influenced by the Communist Party's policy of a united front against Japan and the people's anti-Japanese movement, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and join efforts with the Communists to fight Japan. He not only refused to comply but hurried to Xi'an to make active preparations for "suppressing the Communists." Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng took joint action and arrested Chiang Kai-shek at Lintong near Xi'an on December 12, 1936. This became known as the famous Xi'an Incident. After the incident, the pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang, headed by He Yingqin, prepared to exploit this opportunity to launch a large-scale civil war and to oust Chiang Kai-shek in order to take his place. The Communist Party wanted to settle the incident peacefully. Thanks largely to the arduous efforts of Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Ye Jianying, all representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, a peaceful settlement was indeed reached, thus facilitating the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. P. 348

³⁵⁸ A reference to the "Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China," made public on October 10, 1945. According to the summary Chiang Kai-shek had to accept the basic policy of peace and national reconstruction put forward by the Communist Party, but shortly afterwards he broke the agreement and launched a military offensive against the liberated areas. P. 348

³⁵⁹ Zhu Xuefan was born in 1905 in Shanghai. Before liberation, he was council chairman of the All-China Labour Union, council member of the International Labour Office and vice-president of the World Federation of Trade Unions. On November 25, 1946, because of his announced refusal to attend the bogus National Assembly, he was wounded in Hongkong by a special agent sent by Chiang Kai-shek to assassinate him. P. 348

³⁶⁰ Yasuji Okamura (1884-1966) was commander-in-chief of the Japanese invading forces in China when Japan surrendered in August 1945. He headed the list of Japanese war criminals published in Yan'an. During the War of Liberation he served as a secret military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. In January 1949 the Kuomintang government declared him not guilty and set him free. P. 348

³⁶¹ The state-owned enterprises were those in the liberated areas run by governments above the provincial level. Enterprises owned by local government were those run by governments at and below the provincial level. On September 2, 1952, to avoid confusion, the Administration Council of the Central People's Government defined the terms used for the different kinds of enterprises. All enterprises invested in and run by departments of the Central People's

Government and of the greater administrative areas (including those run by provincial and municipal governments on behalf of the greater administrative areas) were state-owned enterprises; enterprises invested in and run by local governments at and below the provincial level were state enterprises under local administration; and enterprises in which both government and private capital were invested and which were operated and managed by both parties were joint public-private enterprises. PP. 351, 357

³⁶² See “On the Proper Management of Employees in Enterprises that Have Been Recently Taken Over” in this volume. PP. 355, 371

³⁶³ A reference to the Northeast currency issued by the Northeast Bank starting from March 1946 for circulation in the liberated areas of the Northeast. On April 1, 1951, the People’s Bank of China began to call in the Northeast currency at the exchange rate of 1 yuan Renminbi to 9.5 yuan Northeast currency. PP. 355, 360

³⁶⁴ On July 10, 1948, the Northeast Administrative Committee issued the order. The main provisions were: 1) In the liberated areas, grain could be marketed freely in every province, county, district and village, regardless of its variety or quantity, and whether it was processed or not. 2) No government departments, army units, mass organizations or individuals would be allowed to blockade the trade or interfere with it. 3) The transport licence system for railways was to be abolished. 4) If anyone deliberately blockaded the trade or interfered with it, the victim could lodge a complaint with the governments at different levels, which would punish the offender for encroaching on other people’s property. P. 357

³⁶⁵ The Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast People’s Liberation Army in western Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948. The army captured Jinzhou on October 15, after which part of the enemy forces at Changchun revolted against the Kuomintang and the rest surrendered. The army followed up this victory by liberating Shenyang and Yingkou on November 2, an operation that marked the end of the campaign. The entire Northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 470,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign. P. 359

³⁶⁶ The “gold yuan” was the paper currency the Kuomintang government began to issue on August 19, 1948. It was used as a medium of exchange for withdrawing the rapidly devaluating old currency at the rate of 1 gold yuan to 3 million of the old currency. All gold, silver and foreign currency in the hands of the people were called in within a given time limit. By May 1949, that is, within 10 months, the total amount of “gold yuan” currency issued rose up to 68,000 billion, 34,000 times the originally planned figure of 2 billion. This resulted in precipitous devaluation of the currency, which sent prices soaring. After national liberation, the People’s Government called in all the “gold yuan” currency for abrogation at the exchange rate of 100,000 “gold yuan” to 1 yuan Renminbi. P. 361

³⁶⁷ This currency was issued by the Central Bank of the Kuomintang government, beginning on December 21, 1945 for use in the nine northeastern provinces (see Note 159 above.) The bank stopped issuing currency on May 31, 1948. P. 362

³⁶⁸ The corps were organized to re-educate the Kuomintang soldiers captured by the People’s Liberation Army in the Northeast during the War of Liberation. Many of them, after receiving political education, joined the People’s Liberation Army. P. 364

³⁶⁹ Coal here refers to anthracite. P. 367

³⁷⁰ Huazigou is situated in Dengta County, Liaoyang of Liaoning Province. P. 367

³⁷¹ After China’s victory in the anti-Japanese war, the Kuomintang reactionaries, taking advantage of the support of the U.S. imperialists and its temporary military superiority, occupied most of the Northeast. In the occupied areas the puppet Manzhouguo regime of the Japanese imperialists collapsed and gave way to the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their tools, the Kuomintang reactionaries. This regime became known as the “Second Manzhou-

guo.” P. 370

³⁷² An abbreviation for the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Commission; Mao Zedong was the chairman at that time. P. 373

³⁷³ A reference to “The Outline of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Commission on the Establishment of the Central Financial and Economic Organ (draft),” drafted by Liu Shaoqi and revised by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on May 31, 1949. P. 373

³⁷⁴ Zhang Naiqi (1897-1977), a native of Qingtian, Zhejiang Province, actively took part in the movement to resist Japanese aggression and save the nation in the 1930s. He was one of the leaders of the National Salvation Association of Shanghai Cultural Circles and of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. He held the posts of assistant manager of the Shanghai Zhejiang Industrial Bank and Chairman of the Board of the China Mercantile Agency. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he served as a member of the Central People’s Government, a member of the Financial and Economic Commission of the Government Administration Council, Minister of Food Ministry and as Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. P. 374

³⁷⁵ A reference to the Planning Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the Technology Bureau, the Bureau of Private Enterprise Affairs, the Bureau of Cooperative Undertakings and the Bureau of Foreign-Funded Enterprise Management and the Secretariat. P. 374

³⁷⁶ The 13 subordinate departments refer to the Central Financial Department, the People’s Bank of China, the Central General Administration of Customs, the Central Commercial Department, the Central Railway Ministry, the Central Communications Department, the Central Fuel Department, the Central Metal Department, the Central Textiles Department, the Central Industry Department, the Central Agriculture Department, the Central Forestry Department and the Central Water Conservancy Commission. P. 374

³⁷⁷ At that time, the country was divided into six greater administrative areas, namely, North China, the Northeast, the Northwest, East China, Central-south China, and the Southwest. There was a bureau in each of these to represent the CPC Central Committee. After October 1949 when the Central People’s Government was formed, each area excepting North China had its own administrative organ. That of the Northeast was called the people’s government, while in the other four areas this was known as the military and administrative commission. In November 1952, the Central People’s Government decided that these were all to be renamed “administrative councils,” each serving as an agency of the Central People’s Government instead of a local government. A council was also established in North China. At an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in April 1954, it was decided to abolish Party and government organs at the level of the greater administrative areas. P. 374

³⁷⁸ The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was established in 1872. In 1948 it owned over 460 ships, with a total capacity of about 330,000 tons. On January 15, 1950, the personnel at the Hong Kong branch (the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., Hong Kong) rose in revolt against the Kuomintang authorities and accepted the leadership of the Communist Party. P. 375

³⁷⁹ Lu Quan (1906-79), Lu Kaiti’s father, a native of Qingpu County, Shanghai, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He participated in the peasants’ insurrection in Xiaozheng, Qingpu County in January 1928. He served as chairman of Shijiazhuang City Federation of Trade Unions in 1949. P. 379

³⁸⁰ Wu Zhixi (1911-28), a native of Qingpu County, Shanghai, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. He was among the fifth group of trainees at the Whampoa Military Academy and once served as a member of Qingpu County Party Committee. He led the peasants’ insurrection in Xiaozheng, Qingpu County in January 1928 and was killed by

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- Kuomintang reactionaries. P. 379
- ³⁸¹ A reference to the failure of the peasants' insurrection in Xiaozheng, Qingpu County (now part of Shanghai), Jiangsu Province, in January 1928. P. 379
- ³⁸² Liao Niyun is Chen Yun's cousin. P. 380
- ³⁸³ Zhangliantang is now Liantang Town, Qingpu County, Shanghai. P. 380

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