



Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators

Modern China

37(1) 69–103

© 2011 SAGE Publications

Reprints and permission: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

DOI: 10.1177/0097700410382542

<http://mcx.sagepub.com>



Wai Chor So¹

Abstract

This article examines the views of Chinese collaborators on Pan-Asianism, race, and culture during 1939–1945. It depicts the changing attitudes of Chinese collaborators toward the Anglo-American nations, and discusses how the Pacific War led to the revival of the concept of Pan-Asianism and the appearance of a racial and cultural discourse among Chinese collaborators. Also, it analyzes the nature of collaborators' discourse on race and culture. This is an uncommon episode in twentieth-century Chinese history in which Chinese propaganda gave vent to racial sentiments.

Keywords

Chinese collaborators, Pan-Asianism, race, Eastern culture, Western culture, Wang Jingwei

Chinese collaborators depicted the Pacific War as a struggle against the enslavement of Asia by Britain and the United States. Their propaganda emphasized the unity of Asian peoples as well as racial and cultural differences from the Anglo-American nations. But these themes appeared only after the

¹The Open University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, SAR

Corresponding Author:

Wai Chor So, School of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University of Hong Kong,

30 Good Shepherd Street, Homantin, Kowloon, Hong Kong, SAR

Email: wcsou@ouhk.edu.hk

actual outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. When Wang Jingwei, the leader of the Chinese collaborators, started the mission to negotiate with Japan in December 1938, his major aim was to seek a settlement with Japan to end the Sino-Japanese War and steer China away from the rivalries of the major powers in East Asia. Though he was prepared to identify with Japan's proposed New Order in East Asia, he did not expect that Japan would go to war against the Anglo-American nations. It was only with the formation of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan in November 1940 that Wang and his fellow collaborators became determined to break away from the Anglo-American nations and unswervingly side with Japan to establish the New Order in East Asia.

After Japan went to war with Britain and the United States, forging unity among Asian peoples against Anglo-American domination was the propaganda stuff of the day for the collaborators. Wang Jingwei revived the Pan-Asianism concept of Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) to justify his collaboration with Japan and give the idea of Asian unity a respectable antecedent. With the emphasis on Pan-Asianism, racial and cultural themes entered into the political discourse of Chinese collaborators. On the one hand, they asserted the existence of an Asian identity built on one single race (the yellow race) and one common culture (the Eastern culture). On the other, they deployed racial and cultural themes to differentiate Asia from the West. They cast the Pacific War as a struggle between the yellow race (the Asian peoples) and the white (Anglo-Americans) and condemned the racist policies and attitude of the Anglo-American nations. And they depicted Eastern culture as superior to Western culture and Chinese culture as a vibrant source of world civilization.

This article examines the views of Chinese collaborators on Pan-Asianism, race, and culture. These three themes had been an important part of the Japanese intellectual tradition since the late nineteenth century and were used by the Japanese government in its imperialist expansion in East Asia. As Chinese collaborators came under the aegis of the Japanese, inevitably their views were colored by the current of thought in Japan. The article will first describe the changing attitude of Chinese collaborators toward the Anglo-American nations. It will show how the mounting tension between Japan and the Anglo-American nations led to the revival of the concept of Pan-Asianism in collaborationist circles and the appearance of racial and cultural discourse in collaborationist propaganda.

Next, the article will take up the question of race. Historians have highlighted the dominance of race as a theme in the Pacific War, showing in particular how Americans and Japanese exhibited a strong racial consciousness that contributed to their enmity during the war. This kind of racial

consciousness fed atrocities and made the Pacific War as vicious as the war in Europe (Thorne, 1978: 3–11, 726–30; Dower, 1986: 3–14). In the case of China, scholars have debated whether race and racism are concepts alien to the Chinese mind (Dikötter, 1997: 1–11). But during the war, Chinese collaborators did employ the racial theme against Anglo-American nations. This article will analyze the nature of their racial discourse and the way they utilized the racial theme in the war against the Anglo-American powers.

Finally, the article will analyze the collaborators' discourse on culture. During the Pacific War, Japan took the cultural dimension of the war very seriously (Iriye, 1997: 135; Shillony, 1981: 141–51). Chinese collaborators closely followed Japanese thinking on culture and their propaganda material dwelt on cultural issues at length. In fact, culture and race had been very much intertwined in political discourse in Japan and China since the early twentieth century (Iriye, 1997: 5–6; Dikötter, 1997: 3–4). The Chinese collaborators had Sun Zhongshan to draw on for their cultural discourse. In their view, Sun had long held an essentialist approach toward race and culture. He had propounded that there was an Eastern culture of the yellow race and a Western culture of the white race and that the two cultures were markedly different from each other (Bergère, 1998: 356–60, 403). Basing themselves on Sun's pronouncements and drawing on Japanese expositions on race and culture, Chinese collaborators exploited the cultural issue alongside the racial issue in their struggle against the Anglo-American countries. The article will analyze their views on culture, the ways in which they differentiated Eastern culture from Western culture, and how they assessed the prospects of unity among Asian peoples and, in particular, trust between China and Japan.

Defining China's Relations with the Outside World, 1939

On July 7, 1937, conflict broke out between Chinese troops and Japanese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge, Beiping, and it soon escalated into a full-scale war between China and Japan. By October 1938, the Japanese army had occupied a large part of north China including Beiping, had advanced to central China, taking Wuhan, and then Guangzhou in south China. The critical military situation led to deep pessimism about the prospects of the war in certain quarters in the Guomindang (GMD) and the government. Wang Jingwei, being the most senior among this group of party and government officials, decided to send representatives to meet with Japanese officials in Shanghai to discuss a settlement of the war. When Wang learned that the Shanghai meeting had produced a preliminary understanding, he decided to

launch a peace movement with Japan on his own without the prior approval of the GMD government, now seated in Chongqing, Sichuan.

In December 1938, Wang Jingwei and a group of his followers sneaked out of Chongqing to Hanoi, thus marking the launching of the peace movement with Japan. The Chongqing government under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) denounced Wang's peace attempt, excommunicating him and his followers. Wang stayed in Hanoi for more than four months and then moved to Japanese-occupied Shanghai to start the negotiations with Japan. He then took his first trip to Japan, in June 1939. The trip enabled him to make the personal acquaintance of high-ranking Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichiro and former Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, the then president of the Privy Council.

The meetings mostly revolved around the establishment of a collaborationist government under Wang's leadership. However, Wang also made known his attitude toward the West and the proposed New Order in East Asia.¹ At this time, he perceived international relations in terms of power politics and did not want to see China, or for that matter Japan, enter into a war with the Anglo-American powers. To Wang, the New Order in East Asia was to be something different from the international order imposed by the West. He stated that the regional order in East Asia should be governed by moral principles (*daoyi de waijiao*), a vague concept coined by the Japanese government, which were supposedly superior to Western-style diplomacy based on national interest. To establish a New Order in East Asia, Wang pointed out, two major goals should first be achieved—the expulsion from East Asia of Western aggression as well as communism (Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 89, 98, 197). He told his hosts that he would abandon Jiang Jieshi's anti-Japan policy and would not seek support from the Soviet Union, Britain, France, or the United States. He made it clear that he would identify with the international framework outlined in the declaration of December 22, 1938, issued by the then Japanese prime minister Konoe. In this declaration, Konoe envisioned that Japan, China, and Manchukuo would be united to construct a New Order in East Asia, to establish a joint defense against communism, and to forge economic cooperation. China should recognize Manchukuo as an independent nation and sign an anti-communism pact with Japan allowing Tokyo to station troops in certain specified regions in China such as Inner Mongolia (Huang and Zhang, 1984a: 368–69).

Apart from identifying with the declaration, Wang set his own agenda under the Konoe framework. If China was to establish a joint defense with Japan against communism, he stated, then China had to suppress the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and take a stand against the Soviet Union

(Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 102–5). At the same time, he envisioned a close cooperation between China and Japan to confront the West. He told Konoe and Arita Hachirō, Japanese foreign minister, that if a European war were to break out, China would follow Japan in whatever course of action it would decide to take (“Wang Jingwei yu Jinwei,” 1988: 41; Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 104). He saw the prospects of economic cooperation between the two countries as an opportunity to break the British economic control over China and to eliminate Western influence from East Asia (Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 104–5).

Though Wang Jingwei reiterated time and again the theme of opposing Western aggression (Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 197), he was fully aware that if his peace movement was to succeed, China had to stay away from the disputes among the great powers and maintain a semblance of friendly relations with the outside world. Thus in his meetings with Konoe and Arita, he urged Japan to reconcile with Britain so as to reduce tension in East Asia. To him, disputes with Britain and the Soviet Union could still be settled by peaceful means (“Wang Jingwei yu Jinwei,” 1988: 41–42; Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 104). Wang also conveyed to the British ambassador in Shanghai and the British consul in Nanjing that China would like to maintain friendly relations with their country (Bourne, Watt, and Partridge, 1997: 82; Preston and Partridge, 1997: 19–20). And at the GMD Party Congress organized by the collaborators in Shanghai in August 1939, they proclaimed that the objective of their foreign policy was to promote friendly relations with the outside world. They called for their countrymen to eradicate anti-foreign thinking (*paiwai sixiang*) and to learn from foreign cultures. The only country that Chinese collaborators openly distrusted at this time was the Soviet Union. The Party Congress used “anti-communism” as the rallying cry for the peace movement, calling for China to ally with all non-communist countries in a common front against the Comintern (Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 328, 333–34).

The German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of the European War in September 1939 led the collaborators to reevaluate the international situation. They still perceived international relations through the prism of power politics and intended to cultivate relations with the Anglo-American powers. But they now were more optimistic about the prospects for their peace movement, for the Soviet Union was willing to come to terms with Germany, an ally of Japan. Before the European War, Wang Jingwei and his fellow collaborators had feared that the Soviet Union would throw in its lot with the United States, Britain, and France to counter the growing threat posed by Japan, Germany, and Italy. Such a scenario certainly would strengthen Jiang Jieshi’s resolve to continue the war with Japan. The German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the outbreak of the

European War alleviated that anxiety. The collaborators were now convinced that Moscow would in the end likely side with Germany and Italy and not the other Western countries (Zhongguo Guomindang, n.d.: 6, 9–10, 42). Jiang Jieshi and the Chongqing government, they argued, had put its hope on the four Great Powers of Britain, America, France, and the Soviet Union to constrain Japan. Now that international alignments had shifted, the collaborators anticipated a scenario with the Soviet Union joining Germany and Italy on one side, and the United States, Britain, and France on the other. They envisioned that Japan could adopt a wait-and-see policy and decide at an opportune time with which camp she would throw in her lot (Zhongguo Guomindang, n.d.: 66–67, 337–44).

The collaborators' evaluation of international politics cast the United States in a favorable light. They believed that the American presence in East Asia was critically important to their own country. Tao Xisheng, a key architect in the early stage of the peace movement (Tao later broke with the collaborators and rejoined the Chongqing government), warned that after the Soviet-German rapprochement Britain and France had found it difficult to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Inevitably, the United States would be drawn into the European arena and its commitment to the Pacific region would be reduced. Without a strong American presence, Japan would feel free to pursue its expansion plan and China would have no alternative but to seek a settlement with Japan (Zhongguo Guomindang, n.d.: 10). Here Tao sought to justify the peace movement with Japan, but he also betrayed his desire for American protection of China from Japanese aggression. Yet, *China Daily* (*Zhonghua ribao*), an important mouthpiece of the collaborators in Shanghai, had a different assessment of the American role in the Pacific. It predicted that Britain would want the United States to play a more significant role in the East after the outbreak of the European War. The increasing involvement of the United States in the region would set Washington on a collision course with Tokyo. Moreover, the European War might put a stop to the Japanese effort to reconcile with Britain and America because Japan would exploit the European War to continue its aggression in China. A war between Japan and America was likely, but it was a prospect that Chinese collaborators did not relish (Zhongguo Guomindang, n.d.: 22–24, 31–32, 38–40).

Wang Jingwei actually hoped that Japan would come to ally with Britain, France, and the United States. After the outbreak of the European War, Wang noted, Japan had maintained neutrality and had not seized British and French colonies. He believed that Japan would not want to weaken Britain and France further since a German victory in Europe would also mean the victory of Germany's partner, the USSR, which was considered a potential enemy of

Japan. In an optimistic twist of mind, Wang took this as an opportunity for reconciliation between Japan and Britain as well as France, for all these countries were anti-communist. He also speculated that probably Italy and the United States, also anti-communist, would one day come down on the side of Britain, France, and Japan. If that should happen, an isolated Germany would find it disadvantageous to identify with the USSR (Zhongguo Guomindang, n.d.: 5–6). This was an international situation that would isolate the Chongqing government, as Jiang Jieshi would not be able to obtain aid from Britain, France, and the United States in the war against Japan.

At this stage, then, practical considerations pervaded the collaborators' thinking on foreign relations. Western countries could all be possible allies of China in the Pacific region (*People's Tribune*, Jan. 1940: 23–27). The United States in particular was a country Chinese collaborators wanted to court. In their view, the United States could decisively shape the security order in their part of the world and might be a possible ally in the region. As late as August 1940, when anti-American sentiments began to appear in the collaborationist newspapers in Shanghai, Wang Jingwei, in an interview given to an American reporter, still expressed the hope that the American people would understand his policy of peace with Japan. A Sino-Japanese understanding, noted Wang, would lay the groundwork for friendship between China, Japan, and the United States. An alliance between the three countries, he added, had been advocated by Sun Zhongshan as early as 1917 (*People's Tribune*, Sept. 1940: 213). Chinese collaborators did not give up courting the United States until late 1940.

Identifying with the Axis, 1940–1941

From the beginning, the United States did not reciprocate the cordial attitude of Wang Jingwei and his followers. When the collaborators established a government of their own in Nanjing under the aegis of Japan on March 30, 1940, the United States and Britain immediately denounced the move and proclaimed their continued recognition of the Chongqing government under Jiang Jieshi. The United States regarded the establishment of the Wang government as an attempt by Japan to realize its imperialist ambitions in China (FRUS, 1931–1941: 59–60; Bunker, 1972: 233–34; Iriye, 1987: 94–95). On November 20, 1940, Japan signed a Basic Treaty with the collaborators and officially recognized the Wang regime. The American government interpreted Japan's move as a violation of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference in 1922 (FRUS, 1940: 445). The U.S. attitude foreclosed any possible dialogue with the Wang government.

Meanwhile, the continuation of the war in Europe made the international arena more volatile, creating even more uncertainties for Wang Jingwei's peace movement. By mid-1940, Germany had subjugated Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France. With a triumphant Germany on the European continent, Japan began to assert its power in the Pacific region (Iriye, 1987: 99–100). It also revived negotiations for an alliance with Germany and shortly after concluded the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940. The pact signaled a strategic shift of Japan toward Germany and Italy and away from the Anglo-American nations. Japan even entertained a grand plan of bringing the Soviet Union to their side. This came to nothing as Germany under Hitler was planning a war with Moscow. What Japan could achieve with the Soviet Union was the signing of a five-year treaty of neutrality on April 13, 1941.

With the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and an entente with the Soviet Union, the Anglo-American powers remained the only major obstacle to Japan's construction of a New Order in East Asia. Expelling Britain and the United States from East Asia was the logical conclusion of Japan's foreign policy (Iriye, 1987: 113–19, 131–33). An imperial conference on July 2, 1941, decided to send Japanese forces to Southeast Asia, and four weeks later the whole of Indo-China was occupied. Japanese prime minister Kono and his successor, Tōjō Hideki, did attempt to reconcile with the United States. However, the negotiations broke down over the issue of Japan's withdrawal from occupied Chinese territories. A confrontation with Britain and America was imminent (146–49, 159–62, 168–78).

Wang Jingwei was completely taken by surprise by these new power alignments. He never expected that a war would break out between Britain and Germany, nor did he foresee that the Jiang Jieshi government could develop close relations with the United States (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 1.6, June 20, 1941: 2). He was fully aware that the Tripartite Pact had frustrated his efforts at bringing the Sino-Japanese War to an end. He rightly observed that Jiang Jieshi now could expect the Anglo-American powers to provide his government with more aid in order to tie Japan down in Asia (Xuanchuan bu, 1942b: 54–57). The Russo-German War in June 1941 further strengthened the resolve of Jiang Jieshi's government to stand up against Japan because, said Wang, Jiang believed that Moscow would forge a common front with London and Washington against the Axis powers (*Waijiao gongbao* 40, July 11, 1941: 15–16; Xuanchuan bu, 1942b: 197, 200).

As his peace mission became more and more desperate, Wang took the view that strengthening relations with Japan was the only way to put pressure on Jiang to negotiate for peace. Thus he concluded a Basic Treaty with Japan and secured what he desired most—full diplomatic recognition of his

government from Japan. A joint declaration was also issued with Japan and Manchukuo in which the three parties agreed to work together to build a new order in East Asia (Qin, 1981: 375–87). Subsequently, a breakthrough in relations with the Axis camp took place with the help of Japan. In July 1941, the collaborationist government secured full diplomatic recognition from Germany and Italy, followed by a number of countries friendly with the Axis powers, such as Spain and Romania. The identification with the Axis powers reached its culmination in November 1941 when the Nanjing collaborationist government was invited by the Axis powers to join the Anti-Comintern Pact (*Waijiao gongbao* 40, July 11, 1941: 15–16; 41, July 21, 1941: 11–12; 54, Dec. 16, 1941: 2, 17–19).

Pan-Asianism: Opposing the Anglo-American Powers and Creating an Asian Identity

Wang Jingwei's collaborationist government wielded the concept of Pan-Asianism (*dayazhou zhuyi*) in an attempt to forge unity between China and Japan as well as among all Asian peoples. Pan-Asianism, the collaborators emphasized, had its antecedents in Sun Zhongshan's thought. On November 28, 1924, Sun Zhongshan delivered two speeches in Kobe, Japan, from which the concept of Pan-Asianism took shape among the Chinese. In these speeches, Sun advocated the unity of the Asian peoples to struggle for independence from European and American oppression. He called for Japan to stand up for the cause of the Asian peoples against the West, to forge closer ties with China, and to help China renounce the unequal treaties (Qin, 1989: 535–45).

The origins of Sun Zhongshan's Pan-Asianism can be traced back to his anti-Manchu revolutionary days. His first recorded encounter with the idea was in March 1897 when Sun met in London a Japanese botanist, Minakata Kumagatsu, who told him that "my wish is that we Asians will drive out all Westerners once and for all" (Wong, 1986: 280–81; Bergère, 1998: 66–75). In the early decades of the twentieth century, Pan-Asianism emerged as a significant strand of thought in Japan and was embraced by a number of Sun's Japanese friends, such as Miyazaki Torazo and Tōyama Mitsuru (Jansen, 1967: 2–9). Saving Asia from Western domination (during the Pacific War the idea was rephrased as expelling the Anglo-American powers from Asia) and forging unity among the Asian peoples under the leadership of Japan (later formulated by the Japanese government as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) were advocated by leading intellectuals and political figures like Ōkawa Shūmei, Tokutomi Sohō, and Kita Ikki (Najita and Harootunian, 1988: 717–22, 729–34; DeBary, 2005: 789–90, 807–10).

Sun Zhongshan's advocacy of Pan-Asianism to his Japanese audience in Kobe in 1924 thus struck a responsive chord among a significant group of Japanese.

As soon as Wang Jingwei started his peace mission with Japan, he revived Sun's idea of Pan-Asianism to justify his efforts at building a "brotherly relationship" between the two countries. He claimed that it was natural (*ziran*) for China and Japan to be on good terms. Their close affinity in race (*zhongzu*), geography, history, and circumstances (*huanjing*), as well as their interaction in spiritual, cultural, and material realms, had bound the two countries together. Their present hostilities were just an aberration in their long history of closeness (Huang and Zhang, 1984b: 212–17; Tang, 1941: preface). After the Tripartite Pact was signed, the concept of Pan-Asianism became more prominent and Wang began to define it as the unity of the Asian peoples against Western aggression. In a commemorative essay on Sun Zhongshan, "Nationalism and Pan-Asianism," published on November 12, 1940, Wang pointed out that China, Japan, and the rest of the yellow race in Asia had been confronted by the white race's "imperialist aggression" ever since the Opium War. As China alone was not able to roll back this imperialist intrusion, Wang stated, Sun had advocated the idea of Pan-Asianism to arouse the Asian peoples to unite against the West (Tang, 1941: 111–14).

Wang Jingwei had compelling reasons to give new life to the concept of Pan-Asianism. By projecting Sun Zhongshan as a proponent of Sino-Japanese cooperation against Western aggression, Wang could justify his peace attempt with Japan to his party and his fellow countrymen. At the same time, the idea appealed to the Japanese side as it had roots in Japanese mainstream thought, as reflected in Japan's attempt at establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia. Further, after the formation of the Tripartite Pact, Japan was set on a collision course with the Anglo-American powers. Wang revived the concept of Pan-Asianism not only to show his unswerving allegiance to Japan but also to instigate anti-British and anti-American sentiment among his countrymen for the purpose of expelling the Anglo-American powers from China.

Apart from anchoring the concept of Pan-Asianism in the struggle against Anglo-American aggression, Chinese collaborators held a vague idea that a common Eastern culture and a common racial descent would help create an Asian identity and make Pan-Asianism a reality. Zhou Huaren, vice minister of propaganda in the collaborationist government from 1941 to 1943, was a strong proponent of Pan-Asianism and a prolific writer on cultural matters. Following Sun Zhongshan's ideas on Eastern culture, he stated that there was a "kingly way" (*wangdao wenhua*) culture in the East. Its defining elements, derived from ancient Chinese philosophy, were a moral spirit, benevolence,

righteousness, peace, and fraternity. Zhou was confident that this Eastern culture would provide the foundation for the building of Pan-Asianism (*Zhongyang xuanchuan bu*, 1940: 17–24). As for a common racial descent, again this idea had its antecedents in Sun Zhongshan's idea of a yellow race that embraced all Asian peoples. Sun once depicted Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 as a victory of the yellow race over the white race. To Sun, this yellow race included Arabs, the Afghan people, and Persians (Qin, 1989: 536–38).

To be sure, there were no serious attempts in the collaborationist circle to develop systematically a racial theory of the Asian peoples. At most, some collaborators made an occasional stab at discussing the racial origins of the Asian peoples. An obscure collaborator, Wu Xiefeng, wrote in a collaborationist journal that since ancient times there had been frequent cultural interactions between the Chinese and the peoples of central Asia, such as those in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East. He ventured to claim that the Chinese and these peoples must therefore derive from the same racial stock (*Dayazhou zhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng* 1.5, Nov. 1, 1942: 51–58). Zhou Huaren put forward the idea that there were four major racial divisions in Asia: (1) the Mongols, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the peoples in Indo-China; (2) the Malay people in Southeast Asia; (3) the Indo-Europeans in India and Iran; and (4) the Semites in the Arabian Peninsula. Without citing any scientific data, Zhou asserted that all these peoples belonged to the yellow race, which in racial terms was distinct from the Germanic people, the Slavs, and the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who came under the umbrella term “the white race” (*Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 2.1, Jan. 15, 1941: 22).

To give substance to the abstract notion of Pan-Asianism, the General China Association for the East Asian League (*Dongya lianmeng Zhongguo zonghui*) was established in Nanjing on February 1, 1941, with Wang Jingwei as its president. Wang stated that the idea of the East Asian League was based on Sun Zhongshan's concept of Pan-Asianism and that the association was the counterpart to Japan's Revive Asia Alliance (*Kōa dōmei*), which aimed at building a New Order in East Asia (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou], Mar. 20, 1941: 1–2; Wang, 1941). The association put forward four major goals: political independence, economic cooperation, military alliance, and cultural exchanges. Wang emphasized that every country in the East Asian League should be sovereign and independent. However, he conceded that Japan was the “elder brother” and other Asian countries should also look upon Japan as the leader. Only under such a political framework, Wang stated, could the major goals of the association be achieved (*Xuanchuan bu*, 1942b: 19–20; *Dongya lianmeng Zhongguo zonghui Shanghai fenhui*, 1942: 7–10).

What, then, was to be the geographical extent of this East Asian League? Wang Jingwei himself did not provide an official answer, but others wrote about its intended reach. Lin Baisheng, the minister of propaganda, remarked that China, Japan, and Manchukuo should constitute the Axis of East Asia and a New Order in East Asia should also include Southeast Asia (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 71–72). Zhou Huaren stated that the East Asian League was an alliance of the whole of Asia. Expressed in geographical terms, the league would cover that part of the continent bordered by the Pacific Ocean to the East, the Indian Ocean to the south, the Arctic Sea to the north, and the Ural Mountains, the Caspian Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west (*Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 2.1, Jan. 15, 1941: 17–24). Another typical definition was given by an overseas Malay Chinese, Kuan Zuobin, who suggested that the East Asian League should include China, Japan, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, India, Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Arabia (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 2.11, Nov. 20, 1942: 14). A number of articles also appeared in collaborationist journals supporting the independence movement in India, Burma, and the Philippines as well as in the Arab Muslim world (*Dayazhou zhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng* 1.5, Nov. 1, 1942: 51–58; 1.3, Sept. 1, 1942: 1–4, 11–14; 1.4, Oct. 1, 1942: 70–78; 1.6: 54–55; *Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdongsheng zhixing weiyuanhui*, 1943: 5–6, 129, 132–34).

Japan made a major attempt to promote Pan-Asianism in November 1943 when it invited the Wang Jingwei government, the Manchukuo government, the governments of Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma, as well as the Free India Provisional government to attend a Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. By then, the tide of the war had turned against Japan. The Tōjō government decided to rally the Asian peoples by granting more autonomy and even independence in the Japanese-occupied regions (Shigemitsu, 1958: 284–94). The Greater East Asia Conference was an occasion to mark this new Japanese policy in East Asia and to forge Asian unity and identity (Iriye, 1981: 118–19, 153; Shigemitsu, 1958: 291–94).

At the conference, Wang Jingwei had nothing new to offer, merely reiterating Sun Zhongshan's idea of "Pan-Asianism." To him, an East Asian identity could be forged only by eradicating Anglo-American ideas such as individualism and utilitarianism and restoring the spirit of justice (*daoyi jingshen*) in Eastern culture (Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui, 1943: 6–11). A joint declaration issued by the conference underlined Japan's version of Pan-Asianism. It called for the unity of all East Asian countries against the Anglo-American powers. A Coexistence and Co-Prosperity order was to be established in East Asia based on the spirit of justice. The countries under the Greater East Asia Order would respect each other's sovereignty and independence, engage in

economic cooperation, develop and enhance the culture of East Asia, and work for the abolition of racial discrimination. But the New Order in East Asia would still cultivate relations with all the countries in the world and promote cultural exchange (Lebra, 1975: 93). Ba Maw, who attended the conference as the head of state of occupied Burma, recalled vividly in later years how he was carried away by the atmosphere of the unity of the Asian peoples at the conference. He felt that “for the first time the Asian consciousness, spirit and pride emerged as an actual world force” (Ba Maw, 1968: 347).

Emerging Racial Consciousness: Attitudes toward the Anglo- American Powers and Germany

The refusal of the Anglo-American nations to recognize his government and the formation of the Tripartite Pact forced Wang Jingwei to end his attempts to woo the Americans. After that, racial sentiments entered into the political vocabulary of the collaborators. In the article “Nationalism and Pan-Asianism” mentioned earlier, Wang depicted “imperialist aggression” in terms of race. He pointed out that the imperialist powers had subjugated and enslaved the red race in America (i.e., the Native Americans), the brown race in Australia (i.e., the Aborigines), and the black race in Africa. A similar fate awaited the yellow race in Asia (Tang, 1941: 111–14). Taking the cue from Wang, high officials also depicted the struggle of the Asians against the Westerners as a struggle between the yellow people and the white people (*Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 2.1, Jan. 15, 1941: 17–24; 2.4, Apr. 15, 1941: 65–71; *Zhengzhi yuekan* 1.5, May 20, 1941: 5–10). The two concepts of imperialism and race were superimposed on each other and given a new life in the discourse of the Chinese collaborators.

The subjugation of China by Western powers provided the ready-made stuff for Chinese collaborators to fuel racial feelings against the Anglo-American nations. As early as September 1939, a British diplomat in Shanghai reported that Wang Jingwei’s newspapers published articles and news of a “violently anti-British character.” In July 1940, the American consul in Shanghai reported that Wang Jingwei’s media and the Japanese-controlled press had instigated anti-American campaigns. Relations had deteriorated to such an extent, an American embassy official reported, that Wang Jingwei had even ordered the deportation of certain foreign journalists because of their criticism of him (FRUS, 1940: 408, 889–91). The recovery of foreign settlements and concessions was the focus of the agitation (Bourne, Watt, and

Partridge, 1997: 355). Such sentiments among the collaborators were translated into attacks against the alleged racism of foreigners. Foreign clubs in Shanghai that excluded Chinese people were cited by collaborators as evidence of racial discrimination (*People's Tribune*, Jan.–Feb. 1941: 43–46).

The anti-British and anti-American campaigns in Shanghai were reported to have been aided by the Japanese (FRUS, 1940: 408, 889). In fact, the racial sentiments exhibited by Chinese collaborators were a reflection of Pan-Asianist thought in Japan. A representative example is *Dai Ajia shugiron* (On Greater Asianism), published in 1916 by Odera Kenkichi, a member of Japan's House of Representatives. In it, Odera put forward the notion of a "White peril," in contrast to notion of the "Yellow peril" then in vogue in the West, and advocated the unity of the yellow race against the white race (Kimitada, 1990: 138; Odera, 1916). This kind of thought gained currency in the government and intellectual circles in the 1930s. Ōkawa Shūmei, a famous Japanese scholar at the time, noted that the term "the white man's burden" was coined to degrade the yellow races. Ultimately, a war, waged along racial lines, had to be fought to expel the Western powers from Asia physically and spiritually (Najita and Harootunian, 1988: 729–34; Szpilman, 2004: 94). Ōkawa's contemporaries, a well-known Japanese intellectual, Tokutomi Sohō, and a civilian "liberal" politician, Nagai Ryūtarō, held similar views (DeBary, 2005: 809–10; Duus, 1971: 43–45). The *Dai Ajia kyōkai* (Greater Asian Association), founded in 1933 with leading political figures like Konoe Fumimaro and Matsui Iwane as members, was pervaded with racial thinking (Szpilman, 2004: 94). Although the Japanese government did not officially depict the war as a racial war, it did nothing to discourage this kind of thinking (Dower, 1986: 4–11, 205–8). Chinese collaborators readily adopted these ideas from Japan for their own use in the struggle against the Anglo-American domination of China.

The outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 fuelled the racial rhetoric of the collaborators. In his speeches and writings, Wang Jingwei lamented the fate of people of color under white rule in different parts of the world. If Japan were to lose the war to the Anglo-American race, Wang warned, all Asian races (*Yazhou renzhong*), including the Chinese, would face racial extinction like the aboriginal peoples in Africa, Australia, and America (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 11, 16, 24–25). In addition, he criticized the Anglo-American nations for their opposition to the principle of racial equality put forward by Japan at the Versailles Peace Conference, and cited the British White-Australia policy, the American immigration restrictions on Asian peoples, and the Western oppression of overseas Chinese in Southeast

Asia as evidence of racial discrimination (*People's Tribune*, Mar.–Apr. 1941: 90; Jan.–June 1942: 17; Xuanchuan bu, 1942b: 349–52).

Chu Minyi, the collaborationist government's foreign minister and later ambassador to Japan, accused Britain of "using the yellow race to control the yellow race." In an article written immediately after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Chu analyzed at length how Britain and the United States manipulated the world in their own interests. Indeed, he argued that the current Sino-Japanese War itself was a product of manipulation by the Anglo-American nations, provoking discord and hatred among the yellow race. Because of their superiority in science and technology, the white people were able to subjugate and exploit other races. Nearly every inhabited place on earth, Chu despaired, was subjected to the rule of the white man. He hoped that Japan would ally with the Asian peoples against the white race (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 43–49).

Lin Baisheng, Wang's minister of propaganda from 1940 to 1944, on many occasions employed racial terms in his description of the struggle against the Anglo-American powers. In a number of speeches and writings, Lin highlighted the past three centuries of Anglo-American aggression in East Asia. He pointed out that the white man ruled more than four fifths of the world's territories and seventy percent of its population. In Asia, two thirds of the territories and almost half of the population were enslaved by the United States and European countries, in particular Britain. Out of every ten men and women enslaved by Britain, eight were Asians; and out of every five enslaved by the United States, four were Asians. The notion of the "Yellow peril," Lin pointed out, was manufactured by the whites to justify their expansion. Without citing any evidence, Lin accused the Anglo-American powers of conducting racial genocide against the Africans, American Indians, and Australian aborigines. He warned his countrymen that the yellow race faced the same genocidal threat. To counter the aggression of these two nations, Lin saw no alternative other than brute force (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 50–69, 93–95; *Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 2.4, Apr. 15, 1941: 65–71; Nanjing shi dang'an guan, 1992: 535–39).

Tang Liangli (T'ang Leang-Li), vice minister of propaganda, also in charge of the ministry's International Propaganda Bureau, was a prime mover behind the anti-America movement among the collaborationists. As early as June 1937, before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, in a confidential memorandum to Wang Jingwei, he remarked that America had assumed a haughtily superior attitude toward the Chinese and other non-white races. Chinese people in America were confined to ghettos, and those traveling with Chinese

diplomatic passports were badly treated by American immigration officials (*People's Tribune*, Jan. 1940: 39). Tang later submitted a proposal to the collaborationist government, which envisioned the establishment of a "Chinese League against American Aggression" (Tang, 1944: 276; Zhou Xun, 2001: 146–47). The outbreak of the Pacific War reinforced Tang's racial sentiments. In a speech delivered to the Sino-Japanese Cultural Association in early 1942, he specifically declared that the war was aimed at achieving racial equality for the East Asian peoples. He also talked about his humiliating experience at the hands of the American government. In 1936, before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he had visited the Philippines, Honolulu, and Los Angeles as a Chinese envoy en route to Europe. Despite holding a Chinese diplomatic passport, he was required to secure the ship owner's guarantee before he could visit those places. In addition, the then American consulate in colonial Hong Kong did not recognize Chinese diplomatic passports as valid documents of identity (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 102–4). Tang gave vent to his anti-American feelings in a propaganda booklet titled *American Imperialism in China* published in 1943. In this work, he gave a detailed history of American "imperialist activities" in China and its colonizing activities in Hawaii, Cuba, and the Philippines.² He declared that America was the font of racial discrimination against the Chinese and was a "natural enemy" (*ziran diren*) of China ("Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao," 1943; Tang, 1944: 1–48).

Racial awareness found wider expression in the political journals published by the collaborators. *The People's Tribune*, an English-language journal edited by Tang Liangli and published in Shanghai, carried articles citing cases of Anglo-American racial discrimination, including regulations in the British fighting forces that stipulated that "no one could receive an officer's commission unless he was of pure 'white' parentage." The journal also published unsubstantiated accusations that many whites and Christian Americans had a "deep contempt and distrust" of other races and non-Christian peoples and that Chinese residents had suffered atrocities and massacres in the United States in the late nineteenth century (*People's Tribune*, Mar. 1940: 183–88; Oct.–Nov. 1940: 273–80). Three major political journals—*Zhengzhi yuekan* (Politics Monthly), *Dayazhou zhuyi* (Pan-Asianism), and *Dongya lianmeng* (East Asian League)—also published a number of articles dwelling upon the racial nature of the confrontation between East and West. These journals reflected the views of a broad section of collaborators from the central government to the regional level.

It is not unusual to encounter accusations of racism made by government and party officials in these journals. Zhou Xuechang, mayor of Nanjing; Dai Ce, head of the Overseas Chinese Bureau; Zhou Huaren, vice minister of

propaganda; and Xiao Shuxuan, a member of the party's Political Bureau, made repeated remarks about the East Asian peoples being treated as an "inferior race" and "slaves" by Anglo-American people (*Dongya lianmeng* [Nanjing] 2.1, Jan. 15, 1942: 17–20; *Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 1.3, Oct. 15, 1940: 19–29, 10–18; Xuanchuan bu, 1942c: 112–15). Lesser-known collaborators made similar remarks. An article by Cao Han published in *Politics Monthly* in January 1942 was typical. Cao asserted that race was central to the thinking of European and American peoples. Their success in colonizing Asia in the past 100 years made them regard themselves as the superior race. They propagated the "Yellow peril" theory in order to rally the white peoples to continue their domination of the Asian peoples. The Pacific War, Cao declared, was a war of the oppressed Asian peoples against the Anglo-American imperialist nations. Cao lamented that quite a remarkable number of his countrymen, held spellbound by the Anglo-American cultural influence, failed to realize who were the real enemies and mistakenly took the Anglo-American nations as China's allies. He called for the collaborationist government to educate the people and to change their servile attitude to the West (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 3.1, Jan. 10, 1942: 64–69; for other collaborators holding similar views, see *Zhengzhi yuekan* 4.2, Aug. 10, 1942: 33–34; *Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.1, Oct. 31, 1943: 50–61; 3.9, Sept. 30, 1943: 14).

More inflammatory and provocative racial language was employed by some obscure contributors to the journals. The Anglo-American people were said to have been born arrogant and racist. Americans were described as brutal for they had killed thousands of Chinese immigrants in their country. The white ruling elite in southeast Asia was said to have mistreated the eight million overseas Chinese there whom they looked down upon as a despicable race (*liedeng minzu*) (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.2, Feb. 20, 1943: 57–59; *Zhengzhi yuekan* 3.4, Apr. 10, 1942: 32–35; *Zhengzhi yuekan* 8.4, Oct. 10, 1944: 5).

Such outbursts were also vented by middle-ranking collaborators like Zhang Guohui, a scholar in Shanghai who was a regular contributor to collaborationist journals. In his articles, Zhang declared that the Anglo-Saxon people, particularly Americans, were deeply racist for they despised the red Indian people and the black and yellow races. He asserted that liberty and equality, the professed American ideals, were applicable to whites only. Anyone living in the western and southern part of America could easily feel that racism there was worse than in any other part of the world. Zhang even ventured to remark that though the Anglo-American nations would one day renounce their control over China, they would never treat the Chinese on an equal footing. He also made it clear that "racism" (*zhongzu zhuyi*) was more

important than nationalism because race was a natural bond sealed by blood. The reason for America's readiness to assist Britain in the two world wars was that they shared a common language and were of the same racial stock (*tongwen tongzhong*). The Pacific War should therefore be seen as a war between the yellow race of East Asia and the white race of the Anglo-American countries (*Dayazhou zhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng* 1.1, July 1, 1942: 7–9; 1.4, Oct. 1, 1942: 104–5; *Zhengzhi yuekan* 6.6, Dec. 8, 1943: 11–15; 7.1, Jan. 15, 1944: 39–44; *Wenyou* 3.6, Aug. 1, 1944: 6–8; 3.7, Aug. 15, 1944: 5–6).

Racial sentiments sometimes also crept into the newspapers of the collaborators. When the collaborationist government declared war on Britain and the United States in January 1943, a major newspaper, the *Republican Daily* (*Minguo ribao*), published a special section for weeks with articles fulminating against Britain and America. Those articles ridiculed America for its hypocrisy of failing to live up to its professed goals of freedom and liberty and its continued ill-treatment of the “colored” peoples. They portrayed the British people as pirates who had exploited the weaker races for centuries. One article, without citing a shred of evidence, accused Britain of massacring the Muslims in Sudan and treating overseas Chinese as slaves. And finally, the Anglo-Americans who worked in the Shanghai Municipal Police Force were said to have treated the Chinese prisoners as beasts (*Minguo ribao*, Jan. 9, 1943: 2.2; Jan. 11, 1943: 2.2; Jan. 13, 1943: 2.2; Jan. 14, 1943: 2.2; Jan. 15, 1943: 2.2).

Yet the collaborators' diatribes against the white race could only go so far, since they were in alliance with two major white powers, Germany and Italy. They therefore had to refrain from portraying the war as an all-out racial war against all white people.³ The Chinese collaborators regarded Germany, like China, as a victim of the Anglo-American powers. The Versailles Settlement was used by the United States and Britain to impose their will on Germany. And unlike America and Britain, which continued to enjoy privileges under the “unequal treaties,” Germany had long given up its treaty rights in China (*Waijiao gongbao* 73, Oct. 1, 1942: 56; Tang, 1944: 288). In a declaration to the peoples of Germany and Italy after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Wang Jingwei stated that the German war efforts in Europe were complementary to the Japanese war efforts in Asia for both were aimed at establishing a new world order. The Tripartite Pact, said Wang, had established the principle of racial equality between the white and the yellow race as Germany, Italy, and Japan had mutually recognized each others' respective leadership in Europe and in Asia (*Waijiao gongbao* 58, Feb. 16, 1942: 18–20). Wang also displayed a personal liking for Germany; in the declaration, he remarked that he was much indebted to the German people for his recuperation in

Germany after the assassination attempt on his life in November 1935 (*People's Tribune*, Jan.–June 1942: 18; Wang, 1942).

Admiration for the German people and Hitler's Germany was observable in the collaborators' circle as a whole. The *Republican Daily*, in commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Nazis' coming to power, published an editorial praising them for transforming Germany into a great power in the past decade (*Minguo ribao*, Jan. 30, 1943). Obscure contributors to collaborationist journals characterized the Germans as a resilient race deeply infused with "Spartan spirit," in sharp contrast to the Anglo-Saxon people, who lived a comfortable life and exuded arrogance. They also thought highly of German organizational capabilities, science, and technological advancements. To the collaborators, the German people were a great race which deserved to be the leader of all European peoples (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 3.1, Jan. 10, 1942: 116–18; 5.2, Feb. 1, 1943: 88–92; *Zhongyang daobao* 1.8, Sept. 22, 1940: 6–7).

In their publications Chinese collaborators occasionally wrote about anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish policies in Nazi Germany.⁴ They did not explicitly support these racial policies nor did they intend to implement similar policies of their own (*Dongya lianmeng* [Beiping] 2.2, May 30, 1940: 27–39). But they did give vent to their own anti-Semitism. A Western publication in Shanghai in 1940 suggested that Nazi Germany and Japan fostered anti-Jewish sentiments in the Wang Jingwei government (Zhou Xun, 2001: 45). At the time anti-Jewish policies had been implemented in Germany, and expressions of anti-Semitism were regularly found in major newspapers in Japan. Jews as a people were portrayed as greedy and aggressive and were said to have dominated the American government and allied with Anglo-Americans to achieve world domination (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 106–15; Shillony, 1981: 156–70; Shillony, 2000: 338–43). Such sentiments were echoed among Chinese collaborators. In fact, though Wang Jingwei did not support the anti-Jewish policies in Germany, he did show a streak of contempt for Jews. He once ridiculed the Jews as a people who had lost their country, their culture, and their morality. This was the reason, Wang continued, why the Jews hated all nationalists and despised all cultures and morality. Wang regarded the Jews as "accomplices of the Anglo-American imperialists" and the progenitor of communism and anarchism. German war efforts, to Wang, aimed at breaking the choke-hold imposed by Anglo-American-Jewish financial magnates upon the world (*Waijiao gongbao* 58, Feb. 16, 1942: 18–19; *Zhengzhi yuekan* 3.2, Feb. 10, 1942: 95–96; Xuanchuan bu, 1942b: 228; Zhou Xun, 2001: 146).

Tang Liangli took these anti-Jewish sentiments to a greater height. He had been in Germany when the Nazis took power, and some American and German

sources suggest that he was a Nazi, though there is no evidence to support this. But he nonetheless appears to be a great admirer of Nazi Germany. The Chinese League against American Aggression in Shanghai, with Tang as president, promoted an anti-Jewish campaign (Zhou Xun, 2001: 146–50; Bunker, 1972: 258). For its very virulence, Tang's disdain of the Jews stood out in the circle of collaborators. In an article published in *Republican Daily* on February 15, 1943, Tang stated that the Jews were the progenitor of communism and anarchism and also willing collaborators with the Anglo-American nations. Moreover, though they were often naturalized and became citizens of a country, they never showed any loyalty to their new land. Their only interests were money and power. Tang then turned to review the activities of the Jewish people in China. Since the nineteenth century, he claimed, the Jewish people living in China had been in collaboration with Britain and the United States in dominating the business and economy of China. In Tang's description, the Jews in China often resorted to underhanded and corrupt means to accumulate their wealth. He referred to Jewish business ventures in Shanghai, headed by the Sassoon and the Hardoon families, among others, as "Jewish imperialism." Tang urged the Shanghai municipal government to save Shanghai from their control (*Minguo ribao*, Feb. 15, 1943).

Similar anti-Jewish sentiments were echoed in wider collaborationist constituencies outside of Shanghai and Nanjing. In north China, for example, the People's Renovation Society (Xinmin hui), which claimed a membership of 10 million by 1944 (Beijing shi dang'an guan, 1989: 377), promoted anti-Jewish thinking alongside its anti-British and anti-American movement. In south China, Shi Xuexi, a secretary at a collaborationist army headquarters near Shantou (Swatow), Guangdong, translated a pamphlet *The Jewish Problem and the Sino-Japanese War* penned by an obscure Japanese military officer, which was then published in June 1943 by the local branch of the East Asian League. Shi himself wrote a preface to the translated pamphlet in which he asserted that because of obstruction from the Jews, the Jiang Jieshi government had not accepted the peace offer from the Wang government. To him, the Jews were "enemies of the whole world" and "criminals of East Asia" (Mera, 1943: 1–14).

From Racial Differences to Cultural Distinctiveness

Chinese collaborators not only differentiated between Asia and the West along racial lines, they also emphasized supposedly deep-seated cultural differences between East and West. Race and culture in their discourse were

intimately related. Their analytic framework on culture followed Sun Zhongshan's ideas, elucidated in his Pan-Asianism speech in November 1924, that Eastern culture was a "kingly way" (*wangdao*) infused with moral spirit (*daoyi jingshen*) and benevolence and righteousness (*renyi*), while Western culture was nothing more than the rule of might (*badao*) imbued with utilitarianism (*gongli sixiang*) and materialism (*wuzhi wenming*).

Another notable influence on their cultural views was Japan. Since the 1920s leading Japanese intellectuals and political figures had emphasized the cultural uniqueness and superiority of Japan. In their view Japan had achieved a new cosmopolitan culture by combining the best elements in Eastern and Western culture. By this very achievement, Japan could become a model for the world in its cultural synthesis. Blended with these ideas was another strand of thought that most of Western culture was decadent. Japan should take the lead in ridding Asia of Western cultural influence. Okakura Tenshin, Ōkawa Shūmei, Kita Ikki, and Tokutomi Sohō were in varying degrees the representatives of this current of thought in Japan (Najita and Harootunian, 1988: 712–22, 730–34; DeBary, 2005: 799–816). During the war, this kind of thinking was translated into an official movement to eradicate Anglo-American culture in Japan (Shillony, 1981: 141–51).⁵

This Japanese attitude toward Anglo-American culture was often thrust upon Chinese collaborators by Japanese officials and agents in China. For instance, on the occasion to commemorate the second anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-Japanese Cultural Association in 1941, Nagai Ryūtarō, Japanese envoy to China, spoke about the superiority of the spiritual Eastern culture over the materialist Western culture. In particular, he attacked Christianity for helping Western aggression in China and "polluting" the minds of the Chinese people. On the same occasion, Abe Nobuyuki, former Japanese ambassador to China, called for the expulsion of Anglo-American culture from Asia. To him, Eastern culture, with its synthesis of spirit and matter, was superior to Anglo-American culture, infused as it was with materialism, individualism, and liberalism. Eastern culture was the culture for the future and would bring about a cultural renaissance in the entire world (Zhong Ri wenhua xiehui, 1942: 1–8, 11–13).

Wang Jingwei's cultural views in the main followed Sun Zhongshan's ideas and Japanese official thinking. Wang asserted that Western culture bred domineering traits and treated human beings as mere objects. It was precisely this culture that had motivated Western peoples, especially the Anglo-Saxon people, to scramble for colonies and build up empires in the past century. In contrast, the moral spirit of Eastern culture, typified by Mencius' idea of "harmony among people" (*renhe*), called for mutual respect, co-prosperity,

and coexistence. This kind of spirit, Wang stated, could foster a community of nations in East Asia, particularly between China and Japan. The war against the West aimed to assert the moral spirit of the East over the utilitarianism of the West, eliminate Western imperialism, and reestablish the independence of East Asian nations (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.3, Mar. 30, 1943: 1–7). Equally important, collaborators believed that the Anglo-American nations had exerted their control over China through cultural penetration. The establishment of churches, hospitals, and schools on Chinese soil was, in Wang's eyes, an instrument of "Anglo-American cultural aggression" (*wenhua jinlüe*). Many Chinese intellectuals had been so corrupted that they eagerly followed Anglo-American values and despised their own culture and history (*Minguo ribao*, Jan. 5, 1943: 1.1; Jan. 6, 1943: 1.1; Feb. 17, 1943: 1.1; *Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.3, Mar. 30, 1943: 6–7; *Zhongyang daobao* 3.46, June 20, 1943: 8).

Tai Yingfu, vice minister of education from 1940 to 1942, noted the measures that the collaborationist government had taken to combat the Anglo-American cultural influence. Missionary schools and missionary activities were banned, the study of the English language in schools was curtailed, and the use of English in postal and customs offices was being gradually eliminated.⁶ Despite all this, Tai had to admit, the Chinese still craved Anglo-American films, books, and daily products. They regarded the Anglo-American lifestyle as "high class" and looked to Anglo-American nations as their model. He called for a vigorous campaign against the Anglo-American nations in education (*Xuanchuan bu*, 1942c: 99–101). In a similar fashion, Zhou Huaren, vice minister of propaganda, claimed that Anglo-American culture had conquered China. He put the blame squarely on Christian missionaries and returned Chinese students. The missionaries made converts and established schools, which spread Anglo-American values among the populace. Likewise, returned Chinese students introduced Western values and institutions to China indiscriminately and at the same time disparaged Chinese traditional culture. He called for the Chinese people to eradicate "poisonous" Western influence (*Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan* 4.4, Apr. 15, 1942: 44–47).

To combat Anglo-American cultural influence, Wang Jingwei returned to traditional culture, reaffirming the importance of Confucian teachings. He wrote that people had lost confidence in their own traditional Confucian culture because China lagged behind the West in various areas. Anarchism, communism, and "internationalism" (which Wang defined as Anglo-American thinking and cultural iconoclasm) had made the people despise their own culture and embrace Anglo-American culture unquestionably. Wang contended that it was wrong to put all the blame for China's backwardness and

problems on Confucian thinking. To him, *ren* (benevolence) and *ai* (love) as taught by Confucius were eternal values for all mankind (Xuanchuan bu, 1942b: 223–32).

The collaborators also believed that restoring Confucianism to respectability was a way to strengthen the unity of East Asia. Jiang Kanghu, president of the Examination Yuan of the collaborationist government from 1940 to 1944, noted that despite cultural and religious differences, Confucius was a respected figure in East Asian countries, and Confucianism was compatible with the values of those countries. Confucianism could become the core value system for all of East Asia (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 8.4, Oct. 10, 1944: 4).

Zhang Ming, a writer on culture, even claimed that, in ancient times, Western culture had been greatly influenced by Eastern culture. Before the Middle Ages, Eastern culture spread from India and Arabia to ancient Greece and Rome. Modern Western culture, according to Zhang, was the product of interaction between Eastern culture and the ancient culture of the West. However, Western culture had shed the best qualities of Eastern culture as time went by, becoming instead a culture dominated by force, in sharp contrast to the “kingly way” of the East. Zhang attributed “the fall” of Western culture to geography and race, but did not elaborate (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 2.4, Apr. 20, 1942: 70–77). Another writer expressed pride in the great inventions and creations of Asian peoples. It was from Asia that Europeans acquired gunpowder, printing, and the compass, and the world’s great religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Daoism, and Buddhism—all originated in Asia (*Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.10, Oct. 31, 1943: 52–54).

However, cultural exclusiveness was not the professed aim of the collaborators, for they held up Japan as the model for emulation. Japanese intellectuals had begun in the early 1930s to increasingly emphasize the uniqueness of their country’s culture, but they did not ignore the fact that it had also incorporated some of the best elements from Western culture. During the war, they denounced what they saw as the decadence of Western culture, but still revered science and technology, the defining features of the West (Najita and Harootunian, 1988: 711–13; Shillony, 1981: 136–51). Chinese collaborators largely followed this line in their exposition of cultural matters. Zhou Huaren advanced the view that based on his observations of Japanese experience, Eastern culture could still overtake the West. To him, Japan had successfully transformed itself into a first-rate power after the Meiji Restoration by blending its traditional “kingly way” culture with the scientific culture of the West. He called for his countrymen to create a new Eastern culture in East Asia based on the Japanese model. This new Eastern culture, with a blend of

Chinese, Japanese, and Indian culture as its core, would do what Japan had done—preserve the essence of traditional Eastern culture while amalgamating the scientific culture of the West (Zhou Huaren, 1944: 1–14, 15–23, 66–72). Though Wang Jingwei often abusively attacked the Anglo-American powers for their cultural aggression, he also emphasized the importance of appropriating the scientific culture of the West to further develop Eastern culture (Xuanchuan bu, 1942a: 28–29; *Dongya lianmeng* [Guangzhou] 3.2, Feb. 20, 1943: 2).

All of these views were translated into the cultural policy of the collaborationist government. An “Outline of the Fundamentals of Cultural Propaganda Policy of the Wartime Period,” promulgated on June 10, 1943, encapsulated its stance on culture. The Outline stated that China had to continue to learn from other cultures. Science and technology, symbolic of Western culture, were essential to the development of Chinese culture. However, Western ideas such as aggressiveness, utilitarianism, individualism, and liberalism, as well as what the collaborators labeled the “fake democracy” of the West, were to be replaced by the spirit of coexistence, morality and justice, collectivism (*jiti zhuyi*), and democratic authoritarianism (*minzhu jiquan zhuyi*) of the East. At the same time, the Outline identified Soviet communism, in particular the idea of class struggle, as incompatible with Chinese traditional ethical culture. The overall objectives of cultural policy, as laid down in the Outline, were the restoration and promotion of Chinese culture, the creation and blending of various cultures in the East, and the eventual establishment of a new world culture in the New Order constructed by Japan (Qin, 1981: 942–47).

Asian Unity and Racial Sentiment

Historians often note the cynicism of Japan’s Pan-Asianism. They agree that Japan exploited Pan-Asianism to rationalize its expansionist policy. Hence, Asian peoples were “liberated” from the yoke of Britain and America only to be made subservient to Japan and its superior Yamato race. Pan-Asianism was merely a myth (Dower, 1986: 6–7; Duus, 1988: 10; DeBary, 2005: 789–90). Chinese collaborators were not unaware of the difficulty of achieving Asian unity, nor were they blind to the true nature of Japanese Pan-Asianism. Against the backdrop of a vague conception of Asian unity loosely defined as a single race (the yellow race) and a common culture (the Eastern culture), the collaborators also expressed serious doubts about the prospects for Asian unity or for that matter, Pan-Asianism. First of all, they were aware of the enormous diversity in Asia. In an article published in the *Great East Asia Monthly* (*Dadongya yuekan*) in September 1942, Chen Yafu, a director

of the Anti-British and Anti-American Association of the Chinese Nation, noted that there were numerous races in the whole of Asia. There was not only the yellow race—the Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, and Turks—there was also the white race, such as the Arabs, the Jews, and the Slavs, living in southwestern Asia. In addition, there was the “brown race,” such as the Malays, and the black race in the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, a variety of religions were practiced in Asia—Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and Judaism. With these wide-ranging racial and religious differences, not to mention poor communications and interaction between different parts of Asia, as well as diverse political situations across the continent, Chen anticipated difficulties in creating unity among the Asian peoples. He pinned his hope on the Chinese and Japanese peoples, whom he termed the superior race in Asia, to lead all Asian peoples to unity (*Dadongya yuekan* 2.1, Sept. 1942: 27–28).

Collaborators were also far from optimistic about the prospect of forging unity between China and Japan. Yang Honglie, in a booklet on the cultural interaction between the two countries, pointedly wrote that it was not uncommon for the Chinese and the Japanese to despise each other. He extensively cited statements from both sides to show how widespread and deep the distrust between the two peoples had been (Yang, 1940: 1–39). Hu Lancheng, a famous collaborator journalist, also noted in a newspaper article in December 1944 that the Japanese considered themselves a superior race and looked down upon the Chinese as well as the Chinese nation (Hu, 1945: 65–70). Zhang Shaochang, the publisher of *Riben yanjiu* (Studies on Japan), also warned his countrymen that there was a lack of trust between the two peoples. Without any goodwill from Japan, the Sino-Japanese War could not be brought to an end (*Riben yanjiu* 3.2, Aug. 1944: 1–2).

Such views were shared by the Japanese. In the articles they contributed to *Studies on Japan*, Ōkawa Shūmei, an eminent scholar on Asia’s liberation, and Tachibana Shiraki, a leading China hand journalist, observed that the Chinese had an intense dislike of the Japanese because of Japan’s policies on China and the unending China war (*Riben yanjiu* 4.1, Jan. 1945: 46–48; 4.4, Apr. 1945: 33–34). Morisaki Minato, an ordinary Japanese student at Manshū kenkoku daigaku (Manchurian Nation-Building University) during the war, noted in his diary the tension between Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria and lamented that the differences between the two peoples made racial harmony and Pan-Asianism unattainable (Tamanoi, 2005: 188–90). The Japanese occupation authorities found that Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai remained skeptical of Japan’s claim that the war was a struggle to liberate Asia from Anglo-American domination. They still identified with the outside

world and did not embrace the East Asian cultural identity (Fu, 1993: 151, 161–62). At the time, the Japanese cherished the idea of their racial and cultural supremacy vis-à-vis the Asian peoples (Dower, 1986: 203–8, 264–67, 289). Not surprisingly, there was no mutual trust between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples.

The distrust was further reflected in the failure of the East Asian League movement in China. In November 1939, the East Asian League Association (Tōa renmei kyōkai) was established in Tokyo by well-known Japanese military figures like Ishiwara Kanji and Kimura Takeo, with the support from Itagaki Seishirō, the commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China. Under Itagaki's auspices, a Chinese version of the East Asian League movement was planned. No sooner had Wang Jingwei established the General China Association for the East Asian League in February 1941 than the movement in Japan fell out of favor with the Konoe government and in particular Tōjō Hideki, the war minister. In fact, Tōjō found the stand taken by the East Asian League too soft and heretical for his liking. Under pressure from Tōjō, in early 1941 the Konoe government forced the East Asian League in Japan to merge into a government-sponsored Pan-Asian organization, the Revive Asia Alliance (Kōa dōmei). Thus, born amidst a chilly response from the Japanese government (Peattie, 1975: 316–29), the East Asian League movement in China gradually ran out of steam. Because of the lack of trust between Chinese collaborators and the Japanese government, as well as the sheer diversity of races and religions in Asia, the discourse on Pan-Asianism, an Asian identity, a single race, and a common culture all turned out to be mere rhetoric rather than a goal to strive for.

Following the Japanese discourse on race, Chinese collaborators made use of the supposed differences between the white and yellow race in their propaganda war against the Anglo-American nations. What, then, was the nature of these racial sentiments among Chinese collaborators? In essence, they were fundamentally different from the kind of racism found in Hitler's Germany. Unlike the Nazis with their obsessive anti-Semitism, this group of Chinese collaborators never made any claim that the yellow race, Japanese or Chinese, was biologically and genetically superior to the white or the Anglo-American peoples. In fact, they believed that all the races were biologically and genetically "equal." They undertook no systematic scientific studies relating to race. Their concept of racial distinction was based simply on skin color—the yellow, the brown, the black, and the white—as well as culture.

Racial sentiments were not strong enough to be translated into racial policies against the Anglo-American peoples or the white race in general. Even at the height of the abrogation of foreign privileges in China in 1943,

racial sentiments were not particularly observable in the collaborationist government. On January 9, 1943, under an agreement with the Wang Jingwei government, Japan promised to return to China all foreign concessions as well as to retrocede its extraterritorial rights. Italy, France, Spain, and other countries followed suit (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 6.2, Aug. 1, 1943: 12–25; 6.3–4, Oct. 1, 1943: 169–79; Shi, 1999: 397–407). Following the restoration of the foreign concessions to the collaborationist government, the collaborators did not institute any policies that smacked of racism. The only policies against the Western presence then were carried out by the Shanghai municipal government under its mayor Chen Gongbo. He ordered the demolition of a number of statues of Western historical figures such as Robert Hart and the renaming of roads bearing foreign names (Shi, 1999: 402; Yeh, 1998: 15). But all these measures were carried out to appease Chinese nationalist sentiments rather than out of racial considerations. High officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came forward with reassurances to foreigners that their rights and activities in China would be protected. Hu Daowei, formerly head of the American Affairs Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, penned an article in a Shanghai journal stating that after the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the rights of foreigners in China would be equivalent to those enjoyed by Chinese nationals and would be protected by Chinese law (*Wenyou* 1.8, Sept. 1, 1943: 11–14).

Within the top leadership of the collaborationist government, racial sentiments were not widely shared, nor virulently expressed in the form of racial hatred. Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai, commonly regarded by their contemporaries as the two unrivalled followers of Wang Jingwei, were never interested in any kind of racial discourse. Though Wang Jingwei and Chu Minyi did depict the Pacific War in racial terms, they showed no intention of making the racial theme a key propaganda theme in collaborationist circles. Wang's racial sentiments were most likely only skin-deep. He consistently held the opinion that the New Order in the world should be built upon mutual respect of different racial traits (*People's Tribune*, Mar.–Apr. 1941: 90; Jan.–June 1942: 17–18; *Zhonghua yuebao* 6.1, July 1, 1943: 198–99; *Zhongyang daobao* 4.14, Nov. 7, 1943: 11). Similarly, though Chu Minyi, the longest-serving foreign minister in the Nanjing collaborationist government, did employ racial terms in his speeches, he did so only on occasion. Most of the time, he depicted the Anglo-American conquest of East Asian countries as “imperialist aggression” and “colonial oppression,” and the Pacific War as a war of liberation waged by the East Asian peoples against the Anglo-American powers (*Waijiao gongbao* 66, June 16, 1942, 24; 78, Dec. 16, 1942: 28–29; *Minguo ribao*, Mar. 30, 1943: 2.2). Even on the occasion commemorating the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing imposed by

Britain on China after the Opium War, although Chu spoke vehemently against British and American imperialist aggression in China, he did not use any racial terms to revile the Anglo-American powers (*Waijiao gongbao* 72, Sept. 16, 1942: 36–38).

The racial rhetoric of Chinese collaborators thus in large part stemmed from political expediency. We have seen that when Wang Jingwei launched his peace attempt with Japan, racial themes had not yet entered the collaborators' propaganda. It was only after the outbreak of the Pacific War that racial sentiments against the Anglo-American nations crept into their propaganda. The age-old theme of anti-imperialism—opposing British and American domination of Asia in general and China in particular—now acquired another dimension, a racial dimension. No doubt this kind of discourse had its antecedent in Sun Zhongshan's thought. Sun had depicted the victory of Japan in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War as a victory of the yellow people over the white people (Qin, 1989: 537). This kind of thinking gave anti-imperialism a racial connotation. But it was only during the Pacific War, under the aegis of Japan and drawing on the rich Japanese literature on race, that racial themes came to the fore and became a propaganda weapon of Chinese collaborators in rallying Asian peoples against the Anglo-American powers.

Racial feelings were confined mostly to the propaganda network of the Wang Jingwei collaborationist government. The propaganda machinery played a leading role in inciting racial feelings among the Chinese against Britain and the United States. This group of collaborators obviously did not aim at instituting any racial discrimination policies against the West. Their racial discourse had the political aims of breaking the yoke of Anglo-American political domination in Asia and attaining racial equality for all peoples. As we have noted, in his writings and speeches Minister of Propaganda Lin Baisheng railed against Anglo-American aggression. But he took racial equality as his professed goal. In a radio broadcast in Nanjing in November 1944, he called for the oppressed peoples of the world to fight against Anglo-American aggression and eliminate racial discrimination (Nanjing shi dang'an guan, 1992: 549). This kind of sentiment was widely shared by others in the propaganda network. Zhang Guohui, the Shanghai writer noted for his strong racial language against the Anglo-American nations, admitted that he held a racist attitude only against the Anglo-American peoples because these peoples had despised and ill-treated the Chinese. He did not think other white peoples, such as those in the Soviet Russia, France, or Spain, harbored racist attitudes toward the Chinese. Biologically speaking, Zhang continued, the physical capacities and intelligence of the yellow race and the white race were the same. The *zhongzu zhuyi* (racism) that he

advocated was neither based on racial hatred of the whites nor was it intended to incite racial warfare. It merely aimed at achieving racial equality for the ten billion yellow peoples of Asia (*Zhengzhi yuekan* 6.6, Dec 8, 1943: 11–12; 7.1, Jan. 15, 1944: 43–44).

It is obvious that though racial sentiments were observable in the Wang Jingwei collaborationist circle, they were never virulent. No government measures smacking of racism were ever taken, nor were there any attempts to develop a racial theory or engage in racial research. Whatever racial sentiments the collaborators held grew more out of deep-rooted frustration with the failure to end the Anglo-American domination over China. The war against Britain and America gave vent to this frustration with the official blessing of Japan.⁷ The Anglo-American nations were thus not only reviled in political terms as “colonial” and “imperialist” but also “racist.” But as racial feelings were not widely shared in the top leadership and were mostly limited to the propaganda network of the collaborationist government, they were ephemeral. Racial feelings as expressed by Chinese collaborators were, at bottom, a product of the political circumstances of the time.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. Western scholarship on Chinese collaboration has not given much attention to Wang Jingwei's attitude toward the Anglo-American powers. The two standard Western works on the Wang Jingwei collaborationist government focus more on the politics of Wang Jingwei's peace movement than on his attitude toward the West (Boyle, 1972; Bunker, 1972). Bunker does analyze briefly the foreign policy of the Wang government in 1940. He describes Wang's policy toward foreign powers as one of seeking “friendship and aid from all those who were willing to give it” and aiming to abolish the unequal treaties by diplomacy. The United States at the time regarded the Wang regime as “the cat's paw” of Japanese imperial designs in China. Not surprisingly, the regime had no friends among the Western powers (257). Bunker also notes that Wang's propagandists tended to view the United States as the primary enemy of the peace movement (217). As will be shown in this article, Chinese collaborators led by Wang Jingwei actually had a

favorable impression of the United States and, until late 1940, wanted very much to win it over to their side.

2. Tang Liangli's *American Imperialism in China* was first published, in English, by China United Press in 1943. A Chinese translation was published by *China Daily* in 1944. See *Zhonghua yuebao* 8.1–2, Aug. 1944: 93–94. Though Tang Liangli harbored strong anti-American feelings, he was very much a Western-educated overseas Chinese, with a very good command of English but hardly any Chinese. A Fujianese by origin, Tang was born in Java, Indonesia, in 1901. He attended London University and Vienna University. It was said that he worked for news media in Berlin and London and was once a Beiping correspondent of the *New York Times*. In 1930 he was publisher of China United Press and chief editor of the *People's Tribune*. See *Guowen zhoubao* (National News Weekly) 12.38, Sept. 30, 1935; Dong, 2002: 82.
3. In his *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, John W. Dower analyzes the importance of race in the war between Japan and the United States. However, he also notes that Japan avoided depicting the Pacific War as a racial war between the white and the non-white races because it was incompatible with Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy (Dower, 1986: 206).
4. Few articles in the collaborators' journals dealt with politics and ideology in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Those that did touch on these subjects were more descriptive than judgmental (*Dongya lianmeng* [Beiping] 2.2, May 30, 1940: 27–39). Available evidence also does not indicate that Chinese collaborators were aware of the genocide systematically carried out by the Nazis after September 1941.
5. To rally intellectuals and writers in East Asia to combat Anglo-American cultural influence and forge an East Asian cultural identity, a Greater East Asian Writers' Congress was formed and three meetings, two in Tokyo and one in Nanjing, were held during the war years (Shillony, 1981: 143; Fu, 1993: 150, 217).
6. Similar efforts at restricting the use of English had been made by the Japanese government when the Pacific War broke out. But the English language proved hard to eradicate both in Japan and in East Asia as a whole. It is worth noting that both the Great East Asian literary conferences and the Great East Asia Conference were conducted in English since it was the common language among the conference participants. See Shillony, 1981: 148–50.
7. In his study of racial discourse in modern China, Frank Dikötter notes that "although the discourse of race is situated on the periphery of the Chinese symbolic universe, it has shown singular resilience throughout recent history and hastened to drift towards the centre in periods of instability" (Dikötter, 1992: 195). Chinese collaborators' discourse on race and culture arose from the unstable situation of the time and was visibly influenced by the current of thought in Japan.

References

- BA MAW (1968) *Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
- Beijing shi dang'an guan [Beijing Municipal Archives] [comp.] (1989) *Riwei Beijing Xinmin hui* (The Japanese puppet People's Renovation Society). Beijing: Guangming ribao.
- BERGÈRE, MARIE-CLAIRE (1998) Sun Yat-sen. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
- BOURNE, KENNETH D., CAMERON WATT, and MICHAEL PARTRIDGE [eds.] (1997) *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office. Confidential Print, Part II, Series E, vol. 48*. Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America.
- BOYLE, JOHN H. (1972) *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
- BUNKER, GERALD E. (1972) *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
- Dadongya yuekan [Greater East Asia monthly] (1942–1943) Shanghai.
- Dayazhou zhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng [Pan-Asianism and East Asian League] (1942) Nanjing.
- Dayazhou zhuyi yuekan [Pan-Asianism monthly] (1941) Nanjing.
- DEBARY, WM. THEODORE (2005) *Sources of Japanese Tradition*. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- DIKÖTTER, FRANK (1992) *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press.
- (1997) *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press.
- DONG QIAO (2002) *Congqian* (Once upon a time). Hong Kong: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Dongyang lianmeng [East Asian League] (1940–1943) Beijing.
- (1941–1944) Guangzhou.
- (1941–1942) Nanjing.
- Dongya lianmeng Zhongguo zonghui Shanghai fenhui [Shanghai Branch of the East Asian League] [comp.] (1942) *Dongya lianmeng lunwen xuanji* (Selected materials on the East Asian League). Shanghai: Dongya lianmeng Zhongguo zonghui Shanghai fenhui.
- DOWER, JOHN W. (1986) *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon.
- DUUS, PETER (1971) "Nagai Ryutaro and the 'White Peril,' 1905–1944." *J. of Asian Studies* 31, 1: 41–48.

- [ed.] (1988) *The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 6, The Twentieth Century.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- FRUS: U.S. Department of State (1955, 1959) *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers.* (i) Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2; (ii) 1940, vol. 4. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
- FU POSHEK (1993) *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied China, 1937–1945.* Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
- GOODMAN, DAVID G. and MIYAZAWA MASANORI (1995) *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype.* New York: Free Press.
- HU LANCHENG (1945) *Zhong Ri wenti yu shijie wenti (Sino-Japanese issues and world issues).* Hankou: Dachubao she.
- Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui [Political Council of North China] (1943) *Dadongya xuanyan (The declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference).* N.p.: Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui.
- HUANG MEIZHEN and ZHANG YUN [eds.] (1984a) *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi (The defection of the Wang Jingwei clique).* Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
- [eds.] (1984b) *Wang Jingwei guomin zhengfu chengli (The establishment of Wang Jingwei's national government).* Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
- IRIYE, AKIRA (1981) *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
- (1987) *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific.* London: Longman.
- (1997) *Cultural Internationalism and World Order.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
- JANSEN, MARIUS B. (1967) *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
- KIMITADA, MIWA (1990) "Japanese policies and concepts for a regional order in Asia, 1938–1940." Pp.133–56 in James W. White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R. H. Havens (eds.), *The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan between East and West.* Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- LEBRA, JOYCE C. (1975) *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents.* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univ. Press.
- MERA SHIZUO (1943) *Youtai wenti yu Zhong Ri shibian (The Jewish problem and the Sino-Japanese Incident).* Trans. Shi Xuexi. Shantou: Dongya lianmeng.
- Minguo ribao [Republican daily] (1943) Nanjing.
- NAJITA, TETSUO and H. D. HAROOTUNIAN (1988) "Japanese revolt against the West: political and cultural criticism in the twentieth century." Pp. 711–74 in Duus, 1988.
- Nanjing shi dang'an guan [Nanjing Municipal Archives] [comp.] (1992). *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu (Records of the trials of the traitors of Wang's puppet regime).* Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe.

- ODERA KENKICHI (1916) *Dai Ajia shugi ron* (On Pan-Asianism). Tokyo: Hobunkan.
- PEATTIE, MARK R. (1975) *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- People's Tribune (1940–1942) Shanghai.
- PRESTON, PAUL and MICHAEL PARTRIDGE [eds.] (1997) *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office. Confidential Print Part III, Series E, vol. 3*. Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America.
- QIN XIAOYI [ed.] (1981) *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian—dui Ri kangzhan shiqi* (A first selection of important historical materials of the Republic of China: the period of the War of Resistance against Japan). Series 6, vol. 3. Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui.
- (1989) *Guofu quanji* (Complete works of Sun Zhongshan). Vol. 3. Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe.
- Riben yanjiu [Studies on Japan] (1943–1945) Beiping.
- SHI YUANHUA (1987) “Wangwei shiqi de Dongya lianmeng yundong” (The East Asian League of Wang's puppet government). Pp. 263–301 in *Fudan daxue lishi xi* (History Department, Fudan University) (ed.), *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan de xingwang* (The rise and fall of the Wang Jingwei traitor government). Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe.
- (1999) *Chen Gongbo quanzhuan* (A complete biography of Chen Gongbo). Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe.
- SHIGEMITSU, MAMORU (1958) *Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace*. London: Hutchinson.
- SHILLONY, BEN-AMI (1981) *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (2000) *Collected Writings of Ben-Ami Shillony*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library.
- SZPILMAN, CHRISTOPHER W. A. (2004) “Fascist and quasi-fascist ideas in interwar Japan, 1918–1941.” Pp. 73–106 in Bruce E. Reynolds (ed.), *Japan in the Fascist Era*. New York: Palgrave.
- TAMANOI, MARIKO ASANO (2005) “Pan-Asianism in the diary of Morisaki Minato (1942–1945), and the Suicide of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970).” Pp. 184–206 in Mariko Asano Tamanoi (ed.), *Cross Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire*. Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and Univ. of Hawai'i Press.
- TANG LIANGLI [comp.] (1941) *Zhongguo waijiao zhi nanzhen* (The direction of China's diplomacy). Nanjing: Xuanchuan bu.
- (1944) *Mei diguo zhuyi zai Zhongguo* (American imperialism in China). Shanghai: Zhonghua ribaoshe.
- THORNE, CHRISTOPHER (1978) *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

- Waijiao gongbao [Diplomatic gazette] (1940–1942) Nanjing.
- WANG JINGWEI (1941) “Dongya lianmeng yu Xingya tongmeng lunwen” (A discussion of the East Asian League and the Revive Asia Alliance). Guomindang Historical Bureau, Taipei. 715.1/178.
- (1942?) Shinian lai heping yundong de jingguo (The peace movement in the past ten years). Guomindang Historical Bureau, Taipei. 715.1/174.
- “Wang Jingwei yu Jinwei Wenlu tanhua lu” [Conversations between Wang Jingwei and Konoe Fumimaro] (1988) Dang’an yu lishi 4: 40–42.
- Wenyou [Literary friends] (1943–1945) Shanghai.
- WONG J. Y. (1986) *The Origins of an Heroic Image*. Hong Kong: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Xuanchuan bu [Ministry of Propaganda] [comp.] (1942a) *Dadongya zhanzheng yanlun ji* (Collections of speeches and writings on the Greater East Asian War). Nanjing: Xuanchuan bu.
- [comp.] (1942b) *Wang Jingwei heping jianguo yanlun ji xuji* [The second volume of Wang Jingwei’s speeches and writings on peace and national reconstruction]. Nanjing: Xuanchuan bu.
- [comp.] (1942c) *Zhong Ri tiyue yu Dadongya zhanzheng* (The Sino-Japanese agreement and the Greater East Asia War). Nanjing: Xuanchuan bu.
- “Xuanchuan bu gongzuo baogao” [Work report of the Ministry of Propaganda] (1943) January. Nanjing Second Historical Archives, 2003/2034.
- YANG HONGLIE (1940) *Zhong Ri wenhua jiehe lun* (A discussion of the cultural unity between China and Japan). N.p.: Xinjian yuekan she.
- YEH, WEN-HSIN [ed.] (1998) *Wartime Shanghai*. London: Routledge.
- Zhengzhi yuekan [Politics monthly] (1941–1945) Shanghai.
- Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui [Central Executive Committee of the Guangdong Party Branch of the Chinese Nationalist Party] [comp.] (1943) *Wang zhuxi yanlun ji, diwuji* (Volume 5 of President Wang’s speeches and writings). Guangzhou: Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui.
- Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuan bu [Department of Propaganda, Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang] [comp.] (n.d.) *Ouzhan yu heping yundong* (The European war and the peace movement). N.p.
- Zhonghua ribao [China daily] (1940) Shanghai.
- Zhonghua yuebao [China monthly] (1943–1944) Shanghai.
- Zhong Ri wenhua xiehui [Sino-Japanese Cultural Association] [comp.] (1942) *Zhong Ri wenhua xiehui liang zhounian jinian tekan* (Special edition for commemorating the second anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Japanese Cultural Association). Nanjing: Zhong Ri wenhua xiehui.
- Zhongyang daobao [Central guidance] (1940–1944) Nanjing.

Zhongyang xuanchuan bu [Central Propaganda Department] (1940) *Dayazhou zhuyi lunji* (A collection of essays on Pan-Asianism). Nanjing: Zhongyang xuanchuan bu.

ZHOU HUAREN (1944) *Zhong Ri wenhua jianghua* (Speeches on Sino-Japanese culture). Shanghai: Zhong Ri wenhua xiehui.

ZHOU XUN (2001) *Chinese Perceptions of the “Jews” and Judaism: A History of the Youtai*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.

Biography

Wai Chor So is a professor in the School of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University of Hong Kong, and Honorary Professor in the School of Chinese, The University of Hong Kong. He is the author of *The Kuomintang Left in the National Revolution* (1991). His current research interest is on Wang Jingwei as a political leader.